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ABSTRACT 
The Constitutive Act that contains the right to intervene by the African Union (AU) in 
member states, being the first and only international treaty to contain this novel right, 
has the potential to redraw the landscape of international law, with significant 
ramifications for the UN, member states and regional organisations as well as for the 
way in which we understand and interpret mechanisms for conflict security. This is 
because until now, the general understanding has been that regional organisations' 
right to intervene has been secondary and ultimately under the express authorisation 
from the United Nations. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to address the different questions raised by the 
AU's institutional framework of regional security and explore how its constituent 
nonns sit alongside the more established rules of international law. In doing so, the 
thesis aims to offer a better understanding of the evolving mechanism of African 
regional security and the developing relationship between the UN and the AU. This 
study builds on recent UN reform proposals and uses the Darfur conflict (2003) in the 
Sudan as its case study. Finally, it concludes by assessing the longer term prospects 
that the concerted efforts of the AU and the UN hold in the promotion of regional and 
international peace and security. 
xi 
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Introduction 
A. Analytical Framework 
1.1 The Background to the Thesis 
The UN's failure and the international community's sheer inaction to prevent and punish 
the 1994 genocidal massacre in Rwanda and the recent indecisiveness in the Darfur 
conflict, which could potentially be the first case of genocide in the 21't century, ' 
highlighted the world's ambivalent attitude towards conflicts in Africa. In his speech, 
Kofi Annan addressed the perception brought about by: 
.. the failure of the international community, 
including the United Nations, 
to intervene to prevent genocide in Rwanda. That failure has had 
especially profound consequences in Africa. Throughout the continent, the 
perception of near indifference on the part of the international community 
has left a poisonous legacy that cofitinues to undermine confidence in the 
Organization. 2 
The speech by Annan was made in a broader context; the UNs own acknowledged 
failure in post Cold War Africa. 3 In spite of its primary responsibility for peace and 
security, 4 the UN's deplorable response to the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, DR Congo, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Cote d'Ivoire5 led Africa to 
hold 'the record of [ ... ] wars and conflicts. 
6 In turn, the ensuing scenario ensured that 
violent combat killed and displaced more people in Africa than in any other continent in 
the post-Cold War period. As it turned out, the UN's ambivalence towards conflicts in 
1 See chapter nine. See also the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act 2006 (US). See also The US 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, 'Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee', 
Washington, DC September 9,2004. See also, 'Powell declares genocide in Sudan', BBC News, 
Thursday, 9 September, 2004. However, see the Report of the International commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, UN Doc. S/2005/60,25'h January 2005. 
2 Report of the Secretary General, The causes of conflict and the promotion ofdurable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa, S/I 998/318/37/ILM (1998) 913 para 11 
3 UN Secretariatý Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Doc. S/I 999/1257(1999) December 16 (1999), 3. 
' See chapter three and article 24 (1) of the LIN Charter. 
5 For a historic account of some of these conflicts, see Adekeye Adebajo& Chris Landsberg, 'Back to 
the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa', in Adekeye Adebajo & Chandra Lekha Srirarr4 Managing 
Armed Conflicts in 21st Century, (Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). 
6 Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21 st Century), adopted 8-10 Jul. 1996, $ 6, O. A. U. 
Doc. AHG/Decl. 3 (XXXII). See also chapters three and five. 
'The Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest. ý Report of the Commissionfor Africa (The 
Commission for Africa, London and Addis Ababa, 2005), p. 200. 
1 
the continent reached its watermark during the world's 'sin of ornission'8 in the Rwandan 
genocide. 9 In a mere 100 days, up one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
slaughtered. 10 And more so, this tragedy occurred as 'the majority of the international 
community, impassive and apparently unperturbed, sat back and watched the unfolding 
apocalypse or simply changed (TV) channels. "' 
The 'lack of political WiII712 to act during those dark days leading to the catastrophic 
period not only unearthed the utter failure of humanity, 
13 but also rode roughshod over a 
clear legal obligation under international law. 14 Significantly, the genocide amounted to a 
violation of a peremptory norm of law that obligated states and other international legal 
persons (primarily inter-governmental organisations) not to commit genocide, but also 
(according to Article I of the Genocide Convention) to prevent and punish the crime of 
8 Term used by the Secretary General to describe the world's failure to prevent and halt the Rwandan 
enocide. See 'UN Chiefs Rwanda Genocide Regret'BBC News, World Edition, March 26,2004. 
See chapter five. 
10 See Report ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding 
Events, CM 12048 (LXVII), 29 May 2000. See Question of the Violation ofHuman Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, In Any Part of the World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other 
Dependent Countries and Territories, U. N. ESCOR, Conurfn on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 
12,124, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994/7 (1994). See generally Final Report of the Commission ofExperts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U. N. SCOR, U. N. Doc. S/1994/1405 
(1994); Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rena Deqni-Saqui, 
Special Rapporteur ofthe Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 ofResolution S-311 of 
25 May 1994, U. N. ESCOR, Comrifn on Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda Item 10, U. N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1996/68 (1996); Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rena 
Deqni-Sýqui, Special Rapporteur, Under Paragraph 20 ofResolution S-311 of25 May 1994, U. N. 
ESCOR, Comnfn on Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda Item 10, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995n (1995). 
11 Romeo Dallaire, Shake hands with the Devil. Thefailure ofHumanity in Rwanda (Arrows Books, 
London, 2003) p. xvii. 
12 Kofi Annan, speech, 'Secretary-General Observes International Day of Reflection on 1994 
Genocide, ' Geneva, April 7,2004. http: //www. unog. ch/news2/documents/newsen/sgO4OO3 e. htrrL See 
also Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights 
Watch; Paris: International Federation of Human Rights, 1999); Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, 
'Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion, ' in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., 
The Path ofa Genocide: The Rwanda Crisisfrom Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1999); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History ofa Genocide (London: 
Hurst & Co.,, 1995); Scott Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use offorce Might Have 
Succeeded in Rwanda: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflictý 1998); Carnegie Commission 
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict - Final Report; UN Secretariat, Report of 
the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda 
supra note. 3, p. 1; and Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International 
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessonsfrom the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: Steering 
Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). - 
13 See Romeo A. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure ofHumanity in Rwanda, supra, 
note 11. General; For the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the agenda of the international community 
was 'dictated by racist considerations or the colour of the skin. ' See 'Rwanda Genocide 'Failure' 
Berated', BBC News, April 5,2004. 
14 Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. 
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genocide. 15 Tragically, and typical of Affican regional conflicts, the repercussions of the 
1994 Rwandan massacre went beyond the border of the small East African country. 
16 it 
'ultimately triggered a conflict in the heart of Africa that [ ... ] directly or 
indirectly 
touched at least one-third of all the nations on the continent. ' 17 And as the remnants of 
the genocide spilled over to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the, UN approached it 
with the same lack of urgency and limited itself to sending a mere 5000 troops to a 
country the size of Western Europe. ' 8 
Coincidentally, as the UN Secretary General stood at the Memorial Conference on the 
Rwanda Genocide in 2004 to mark the 10th anniversary of the 1994 genocide and express 
his deep sense of remorse on behalf of the world, 19 a somewhat similar catastrophe was 
underway in the Darfur region of the Sudan. 20 The rapid escalation of the new conflict a 
mere 10 years after the genocide aroused disturbing questions, particularly with regard to 
the lessons learnt by the UN the Security Council. 21 However, the international 
community's ambivalence towards Africa can be traced from as early as the UN's 
inception in 1945. The controversial role played by the ONUC Forces in Congo between 
15 See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951 I. C. J. Rep. 15,23; see also Case Concerning 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I. C. J., Rep. 3,32). For discussion of 
the content of the treaty norm see Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), ICJ 26 Feb. 2007 at paras. 161-7, where the Court analysed the obligation to prevent and 
punish as the express duty upon states in the Convention and found that this implied a duty on states 
not to commit genocide. 'In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the 
prohibition of the commission of genocide' (para. 166). Thus the treaty norm (upon which the rule of 
jus cogens is founded) is firstly one of preventing and punishing, but this necessarily implies that states 
should not commit genocide themselves. Given that this norm, as a rule ofjus cogens, binds 
international organisations with separate personality as well as states, the imperative for organisations 
such as the AU to prevent genocide is clear. 
16 See 'In Africa, Wars Spill over Boarders', Associated Press, 9 March, 2008; Christian R. Manahl, 
'From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of International Regional Order in Central Africa', 
African Studies Quarterly, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 'Leave No One to Tell the Story; Genocide in 
Rwanda', Human Rights Watch Publications, I April, 2004, Peter Uvin, 'Ethnicity and Power in 
Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence', Comparative Politics Vol. 3 1, No. 3 (Apr., 
1999), pp. 253-271. 
17 Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events', 2000, Introductory Chapter, para. 3. 
" Ademola Abass, Regional Organizations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, (Hart Publishing Ltd., 2004), p. vii; Phoebe Okowa, 'Congo's Rebels 
and the Responsibility of Non-State Groups in Situations of Armed Conflict', Paper, International Law 
Association, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - What is the Role for International 
Law? University of Sussex, April 20 & 21,2007. 
19 See Secretary-General Kofi Annan's remarks at the Memorial Conference on the Rwanda Genocide, 
UN Press Release, SG/SlvV 9223/AFR/870, HQ/63 1, New York, 26 March, 2004. 
20 See chapter nine. See also Hugo Salim, 'Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary View of the 
International Response', International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 811-828(18), (2004), See also 
International Crisis Group, 'Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur', Aftica Report N*80,23 May 2004. 
21 See chapters three and nine. See article 24 (1) of the UN Charter. 
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1960 and 1964 22 remained the UN's sole peace operation in Africa in the first four and a 
half decades of the organisation's existence. 23 However, until the fall of the Berlin wall, 
the UN's practice had been dominated by the power rivalry that characterised it, coupled 
with the threat and use of the veto. 24 Therefore, the organisation's disastrous record in the 
African continent was often excused on the grounds that the UN Security Council was 
divided on Cold War lines. 25 But despite the excuses, the enmity within the Council had 
not stopped the organ from functioning during the duration of this period that lasted until 
1989.26 
22 Deployed by SC Res. 161, UN Doc. S/Res/161 (1961); See Osman Mohamed Awad, The United 
Nations andPeace Enforcement: WarsTerrorism and Democracy, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. p. 153- 
165. See also Abi-Saab, Georges. The United Nations operations in the Congo 1960-1964 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978); Amirie, Abbas. The United Nations intervention in the Congo crisis, 
1960-1961. - with special emphasis on the political role ofthe late Secretary-General, Dag 
Hammarskjold, Ann Arbor (MI: University Microfilms, 1967); Burns, Arthur Lee and Nina 
Heathcote., Peacekeeping by UNforces, from Suez to the Congo (New York: Praeger; 1963); Dayal, 
Rajeshwar, Missionfor Hammarskjold: the Congo crises, (London: Oxford University Press; 1976). 
Lefever, Ernest Warren, Crisis in the Congo: a United Nationsforce in action, (Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institution; 1965); Parsons, Anthony, From cold war to hot war. - UN interventions, 1947- 
1995 (London; Penguin Books, 1995) ; Adekeye Adebajo& Chris Landsberg, 'Back to the Future: UN 
Peacekeeping in Africa', in Adekeye Adebajo & Chandra Lekha Sriram, Managing Armed Conflicts in 
21st Century (Frank Cass Publishers, 2001); Ralph Zacklin', 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping 
Operations', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use offorce: Theory 
and Reality-A Needfor Change? (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), p. 94; Christine Gray, International 
Law and the Use ofForce: Foundations ofPublic International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2 nd 
edition), 2004), pp. 202-204. 
23 Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye 
Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue ofthe Deaf: Essays on Aftica and the United Nations 
(Johannesburg: Jacana, 2006). On African perspectives on UN peacekeeping, see AdekeyeAdebabo, 
'From Congo to Congo: United Nations Peacekeeping After the Cold War' in Ian Taylor and Paul 
Williams (eds. ) Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (London: 
Routlede, 2004); Ibrahim Gambari, 'The United Nations' in Mwesiga Beregu and Christopher 
Landberg (eds. ), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2003); James Jonah, 'The United Nations', in Adekeye Adebabo and Ismail 
Rashid (eds. ) West Aftica's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2004) and Agostinho Zacarias, The United Nations and International 
Peacekeeping, ( London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1996); Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping 
in Africa Since 1960 (Longman; I st edition, 2002). 
" See chapter eight. See also Article 27 (3); N. D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security, (Manchester, England; New York: Manchester University Press; 
(1990), p. 10; Niels Blokker, 'The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels 
Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use of Force, supra note 22, pp. 1-29. 25 N. D. White, The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security, 
(Manchester, England; New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 10. See also Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use ofForce (2 lad edition, Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 195. 26 N. D. White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq, Leiden Journal of International Law, 17 (2004), pp. 645-672. 
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1.2 The Entry of the Post Cold War Era: Towards the Regionalisation of African 
Peace and Security 
In spite of the uncertainties that would later emerge, the end of the Cold War period 
'gave rise to hopes of a new era for the UN and of a New World Order 27 founded on 
the rule of international law. 28 Indeed, for some, it represented a new dawn which laid 
down the requisite 'conditions for the United Nations to fulfil completely the promise 
and the vision of its founders. 29 Certainly, the enthusiasm prevailing at the time saw 
the famous publication of the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace" (1991). 
However, despite the buoyancy, the UN's ambivalent approach towards Africa and 
the marginalisation of the continent continued well beyond the immediate post Cold 
War era. 31 
The situation in Africa at the time found expression in the OAU's Yaounde 
Declaration of 1996. At 'the close of the 20'h Century of all the regions of the 
world, Africa is indeed the most backward in terms of development from whatever 
angle it is viewed, and the most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are 
concerned. 9,32 As it turned out, the UN's hasty retreat during the Somali debacle 33 
(1992-95) and other episodes of UN failure subsequently shifted greater responsibility 
34 to African sub regional organisations. Therefore, after much dithering, African 
leaders finally established the crucial link between wars and economic development 
and placed the concept of peace and security into its proper perspective. 
It was in this context that agencies such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
27 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use offorci, supra note 22, p. 153, citing UN Blue Book 
Series, Vol IX The UN and the Iraql Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996; mention by G Bush Senior, Speech to 
Congress, "New World Order March Oh, 199 1; Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations 
System of the Use of Force: The failures of Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the African 
Union, 'Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 8,2004, pp. 237-289. 
28 See chapter three. See also Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, ' Introduction', in Niels Blokker and 
Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce. supra 22. p. xii. 
29 See Osman Mohamed Awad, The United Nations and Peace Enforcement: Wars, Terrorism and 
Democracy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p 25. Osman quotes the Financial Times, 17 July 1991, p. 4. 30 See B. Boutros- Ghali An Agendafor Peace (United Nations, New York, 1992). 
31 See chapter three. 
32 See Organisation ofAfrican Unity (OAU), Assembly ofHeads ofState and Government, - 
Declarations, Resolutions and Decision. Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparingfor the 21stt 
Century), AHG Dect. 3, pmbl. para. 2, OA UAHGIRes. 247-257 (XWI) (8-10 July 1996). 
33 See chapters five and eights. 
34 See chapters four-rdne. 
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.. 'ý 
transformed themselves from mere trading blocks to peace and security regimes 35 
Meanwhile, the 38 year old Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 'like the 
prehistoric dinosaurs, was facing the threat of extinction for failing to adapt itself to 
changed global and regional political, social and economic settings and rising up to 
the new challenges faced by the continent in the post Cold War era. 36 
1.3 The Emergence of the African Union in the 21't Century: The 'New Dawn on 
p37 Africa and for Africa', 
Although the UN had clearly failed its responsibilities, Africans similarly conceded 
that the systematic human rights abuse in the continent had also been as a result of 
their own inaction and failure due to the strict adherence to the notion of 
sovereignty. 38 However, the painful lessons learnt in the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide subsequently led the OAU to institute a Panel of Eminent Personalities 39 in 
1998, whose mandate 40 included making 'recommendations about how to avert 
similar tragedies in the Riture. ' 41 The Panel in turn called upon the OAU 'to establish 
appropriate structures to enable it to respond effectively to enforce the peace in 
conflict situations. 942 
35 See chapter Four. 
36 E Baimu, K Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene', A shift from Human 
Security to Regime SecurityT, . 4frican Security Review, Vol. 12. No 2, (2003). 37 See Opening Statement by Mr . Amara Essy, Secrctary-Gcneral of the OAU, 38th Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government of the OAU, 8 July 2002, Durban South Africa. 
38 See chapter five, 
39 The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and 
Surrounding Events (IPEP) was set up by decision of the Council of Ministers of the OAU 
(CM/Dec. 409 (LXVIII)), and endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 34th 
Ordinary Session, Ouagadougou, June 1998. 
40 The mandate of the High level panel was to inquire into the underlying causes of the mass killings in 
Rwanda, look at their consequences throughout the Great Lakes region, assess the roles and 
responsibilities of the various local, regional and international actors including the UN and its agencies 
and make recommendations about how to avert similar tragedies in the future. It comprised of seven 
members headed by Botswana's former Presidený Sir Keturnile Masire. Other members included senior 
UN official such as Mr. Stephen Lewis (UNICEF), Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirlcaf who is current president 
of Liberia, Ms. Lisbet Palme of Sweden (UNICEF), Justice P. N. Bhagwati a former Chief Justice of the 
of India and member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague., General Amadou Toumani 
Tour6 of former head of state of Mali. Organisation of African Unity, See '7he International Panel of 
Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding events, 12000. " Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events', 2000, Conclusions at Chapter 24. 42 Ibid. 
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It was in July 2000 that African leaders replied to this challenge through the adoption of 
43 
the Constitutive Act of the AU. This treaty gives the Union, acting collectively, the 
right to intervene in order to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity as well 
as serious threats to legitimate order to restore peace and security. 44 Further, member 
states have a right to request such intervention. 45As shown in the coming chapters, this 
being the first and only international treaty to contain such a right, it raises fundamental 
questions relevant to international law, particularly with respect to the Act's 
compatibility with traditional concepts such as the key provisions on the use for force 
contained in article 2(4) and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
The object of this thesis is therefore to demonstrate the manner in which the AU's 
security institutional framework possesses the potential to redraw the landscape of 
international law, with significant ramifications for the UN, member states and regional 
organisations, as well as for the way in which we understand and interpret mechanisms 
for conflict security. This is mainly because during the drafting of the UN Charter, 
regionalism was accepted conditionally in that it was subordinate to universalism. 46 
Hence, until now, the general understanding has been that a regional organisations' 
right to intervene has been viewed as secondary and ultimately under the express 
authorisation from the UN. 47 
2.1 The* Purpose, Research Questions and the Major Arguments of Thesis 
The creation of the AU as Africa's response to the return to mass murder in the 
continent at the turn of the new millennium also occurred at a significant period in 
world history and in particular, the year of the tragic events of September, 11,2001. 
During this age, the combination of challenges 'revealed that that states, as well as 
collective security institutions, [had] failed to keep pace with the'nature of threats 
facing the international community. ' 48 Yet, although it was the underdevelopment 
43 The Constitutive Act of the AU entered into force on 26 May 200 1, after Nigeria became the 3 6th 
member state to deposit its instrument of ratification. 
44 Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 45 Article 4 0). 
. 46 See chapter four. See also I. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems ofInternational 
organizations (Random House, 1965) p. 106. 47 See chapter four. See also Article 53 UN Charter. 
48 See the Report of the United Nations High Level on Threats Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U. N. Doc. A/59/565,12, December 2004. p. 13. 
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caused by catastrophic conflicts, such as Rwanda and Darfur that was most pressing 
49 50 for Africa, much ink was instead spilled on the impact of the war on terror. 
Although the continent had also suffered as a result of the terrorism phenomenon, 
such as the bombing of the American embassies in East Africa (1998), these attacks 
were mainly directed at Western interests and therefore formed part of the threats 
facing the developed world. As it turned out, it was against this background that with 
the continent having 'witnessed the horrors of genocide and ethnic cleansing 
perpetrated on its own soil and against her own kind, '51 African leaders created a 
robust security institutional framework unparalleled in the Asian, Middle East and 
South American regions. 
Therefore, it is within this context that African regional security deserves special 
attention, particularly given that it brought the question of intervention by regional 
bodies into sharper focus. And it does so more than other treaties establishing other 
major regional arrangements, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
Charter 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) 1949.52 This is primarily because, 
as shown in chapter four, the Charters of the latter organisations clearly 'subordinate 
themselves to the dictates of the United Nations systern. ' 53 In sharp contrast, the 
institutional set up of the AU departs from this practice in a number of ways, the 
majority of which form the subject matter of the thesis. 
Firstly, the Constitutive Act of the AU brought the relationship between universalism 
and regionalism with respect to peace and security to the fore. Significantly, it seeks 
to institutionalise other grounds for intervention widcr than those established under 
the universal system contained in the UN Charter; - namely self-defence and measures 
`9 South African president Thabo, Mbeki quoted in Angela Quintal, 'Mbeki sees the Awful Truth: The 
UN is but a Charade', The Sunday Independent, 26 September, 2004; Chris Landsberg, 'The UN High- 
Level Reports and Implications for Africa', Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 3,388-391 (2005) and 
chapter eight. 
" See e. g Paul Eden, Th6rise O'Donnell, September 11,2001: A turning Point in International Law? 
(Transnational Publishers, inc. 2005); N. J. Schrijver, 'September I Idl'and Challenges to International 
Law', in Boulden Weiss (eds), Terrorism and the UN. Before and After September If, (Indiana 
University Press, 2004), pp. 55-73; A. Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law, ' 12 EM (2001), 993. 
"T Maluwa 'Reimagining African unity: Some preliminary reflections on the Constitutive Act of the African Union' (2002) 8 African Yearbook ofInternational Law 28. 
52 See chapter four. 
53 Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 27. 
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under Chapter VII. 54 Furthermore, while the grounds of intervention under the Act, 
including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are relatively clear '55 
it 
also curiously introduces a new concept of 'threat to legitimate order' which is not 
defined in the Act or in subsequent protocols. 56 Finally, given the UN High Level 
Panel's fear that 'allowing one to act is to allow all, 157 the AU's right to intervene 
further raises the questions as to whether it amounts to an opening of the flood gates 
i. e. for other regional organisations such as NATO and OAS. 58 Most significantly, the 
overall abstract nature of certain key provisions further raised serious questions in 
regard to the appropriate relationship between the AU and the UN, which require 
clarification and elaboration. 
Indeed, the unfolding AU framework challenges the manner in which states and 
international commentators understand, interpret and apply international law, 
particularly within the area of collective security. It is against this background that 
this study aims to make a contribution to both academic and policy debates around the 
issues relating to Africa's evolving security and its relationship with the UN and 
general international law. Although considerable literature 59 on this area of law has 
See chapter three. 
See chapter seven. See also art 5 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. 
56 Evarist Baimu & Kathryn Sturman, Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene, supra 
note 3 6; B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non- 
Interference to Non-Intervention, ' International Law Review of the Red Cross, 85 (2003); C Packer 
and Rukare, 'The New African union and its Constitutive Act', 96 American Journal ofInternational 
Law (2002) 372. 
57 UN High Level Report, A More Secure World, supra note 48, p. 63, para. 191. 
58 See chapter seven. 
59 Eg. Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Values and Principles 
into Policy and Practice, ' ISS Paper 143, (2007); Paul D. Williams, 'From the Norm of Non- 
Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security 
Culture', African Affairs, (March 2007); See also Kithure Kindiki, 'Intervention to Protect Civilians in 
Darfur: Legal Dilemnas and Policy Imperatives', Monograph 13 1, in Rethinking the Role of the United 
Nations and the African Union in Darfur, Institute ofSecurity Studies, (May 2007); T Maluwa 
'Reimagining African unity, ' supra note 5 1; Tiyanjana Maluwa , 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or 
Making Haste Slowly? A Note on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union', 
Netherlands International Law Review, Volume 5 1, Issue 02, (2004), p. 195; B. Kioko, 'The Right to 
Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, ' 
supra note 56; Cilliers, J. and Sturman, K. 'The Right Intervention: Enforcement Challenges for the 
African Union, ' Afi-ica Security Review Vol. 11. No. 3 (2002. ); Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 
'Amendment to the African Union's Right to intervene, supra note 36; Jean Allain, 'The True 
Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 27. K. Kindiki, 'The 
Normative and Institutional Framework of the African union Relating to the Protection of Human 
Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Critical Appraisal', 3 (1) African 
Human Rights Law Review Journal (2003); Jakkie Cilliers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union% 
African Security Review Vol 10 No 2, (200 1); Nsongurua J. Udombana, 'Critical Essay: Can the 
Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights', Vol. 17, No. 6, American 
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increased in recent years, this study takes up a timely opportunity to embark on 
methods that present a rounded picture of the AU's regional approach in the 
promotion of peace and security against the background of Rwanda. It also comes 
seven years after the establishment of the AU60 and five years into the Darfur conflict 
which forms the first critical test of the organisation and its relationship with the 
uN. 61 
The thesis posits that there needs to be a serious rethink of the UN's approach to the 
post Cold War African regional conflicts. One of its major arguments is that despite 
the danger of fragmentation to the international system due, in part, to regionalism, 
the recent practice of Africa's evolving regime of peace and security and its 
relationship with the UN, demonstrates the manner in which the decentralisation of 
the collective security system may offer viable prospects for promoting peace. In 
doing so, the study aims at enhancing our understanding of the legal and actual 
capabilities of the AU to create norms and practices that promote regional peace and 
security and in the process, compliment the UN's wider role of the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
2.2 Introducing the Major Themes, Perspectives and Approaches of the Thesis 
Having set the conceptual background to the detailed discussions that form the basis 
of this study, the rest of this introductory chapter sets the main approaches to the 
discourse with particular emphasis of the recurring themes which resonate throughout 
the thesis. It starts with an explanation of the major methods and theoretical 
framework employed, in order to answer the underlying research questions. Having 
discussed the interplay of the main themes, it ends with an outline of the thesis 
structure. 
In addressing the controversial and topical nature of the current debate with regard to 
the function of regionalism in collective security, a conceptual analysis is important as a 
useful tool for enhancing scholarly argument, communication and clarification. For this 
University Law Review, (2002); Magliveras K. D and Naldi GJ, 'The African Union: A New Dawn for 
Africa', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 5 1, Number 2, (April 2002), pp. 415. 425(11) 
60 See chapter five. 
61 See chapter nine. 
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reason, what follows is an explanation of the different approaches and perspectives that 
have shaped the thesis and its insights into current trends in international legal studies. 
The background presented in this section highlights the themes and perspectives that 
shape the study in regard to the formulation of the research questions, thesis format and 
the conclusions reached. 
The starting point to attaining the outlined objectives is to explore the international legal 
theories that suit this study. Although the issues surrounding the emergence of 
regionalisation of peace and security involve diverse theoretical and practical areas of 
examination, this section restricts itself to a review of the major theories employed. 
Therefore, it needs to be said from the onset that the approaches, themes and 
perspectives discussed herein are by no means exhaustive. Nevertheless, the ones 
described in this section immensely assist the thesis in examining the debates. In doing 
so, the study bears in mind the different contexts in which existing practice 'and 
literature have been understood. 
The thesis starts from an international perspective, which is partly borne out of the 
realisation that, in a time of rapid globalisation, key academics have tended to adopt this 
approach in interpreting their perceptions of the activity of international legal entities 
operating on the international plane . 
62 It thus relies heavily on the theoretical 
approaches by eminent scholars such as Christian Tomuschat, 63 Anne-Marie Slaughter" 
and Antonio Cassese . 
65 The use of this approach in this study is useful in examining 
Africa's security system which is inextricably linked to independent sovereign states, 
which in turn, are related to the UN, other international and regional organisations, as 
well as individuals. Though forming an autonomous system on its own, this 
62 On this perspectives, See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 
2004); Slaughter Burley, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda' 87 
American Journal ofInternational Law, (1993), pp. 205-239. 63 C. Tornuschat, 'International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century', Receuil des Cours (1999). 
64 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 62; Slaughter Burley, 'International Law 
and International Relations Theory, supra 62; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States. ' EJIL, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1995) pp. 503-538; Slaughter Burley, 'International Law and International Relations Theory, ' supra note 62. 65 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005); Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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arrangement represents only a part of a structure embedded within a wider international 
legal system that is underpinned by certain fundamental values. 66 
Therefore, this approach challenges the traditional belief of international law as the 
mere legal regulation of relations between states. 
67 This perspective is immediately 
evident in chapter one on the thesis. The discussion contained therein explores the 
major features of the evolving international legal system, including the nature, 
principles and values that bind the international community with regard to peace and 
security. This analysis in turn introduces a key theme of the thesis which highlights the 
manner through which the international legal system is constantly compelled to develop 
and live up to the challenges facing the international community amidst diverse political 
and geostrategic realities, as well as contemporary threats in order to assert its 
legitimacy and effectiveness in peace and security issues. 
As stated earlier, this study advocates the decentralisation of certain aspects of 
universalism through streamlined regionalisation of peace and security. However, it 
acknowledges that any regional action must be carried out within the permissible arnbits 
of the law. Therefore, in the various discussions, the study engages legal positivism in 
order to identify, analyse and explain the relevant law as it stands . 
68 This approach will 
be particularly evident in the examination of the rules within the UN Charter, which 
have dominated the international legal system since 1945. However the study does not 
restrict itself to this rather 'conservative approach. s69 Instead, it merely uses it as a 
foundational base prior to critiquing the law from other points of view. 70 
66 For a display of this approach, see Paul D. Williams, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference' 
supra note 59. 
67 For a similar approach, see Robert McCorquodale, 'The Individual and the International Legal 
System', in Malcolm D. Evans, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 307-332. 
68 On legal positivism, see Brownlie, The Rule ofLaw in International Affairs (The 
Hague/London/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), chapter 1. 
69 Term used in regard to legal positivism in Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus, 'The Responsibility of 
Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts-A Positivist View, ' 93 American Journal of 
International Law, (1999) p. 302. 
70 On critical approaches, see Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics 
(Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 2005); Carty, A. 'Critical International Law- 
Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law' 2 European Journal ofInternational Law (1991) 66; 
Kennedy, D. International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987); M. Koskenniemi, 'The 
Politics of International Law' (1990-199 1) 1 European Journal ofInternational Law 4; N. 
MacCorrnick, Questioning Sovereignty, Law, State and Practical Reason (Oxford. Oxford University 
Press, 1999) and; I. Scobbie, 'Towards the Elimination of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism 
About Sceptical Radicalism' 61 British Year Book ofInternational Law (1990), 339. 
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Indeed, the study challenges the traditional positivist law. This is because legal 
positivism, 'even in its purest form, is never immune to changes in meaning and to the 
consequent informal development of law. ' 71 However, although the thesis is heavily 
grounded on the need for reform, the study in no way subscribes to the idealist attempts 
72 to reimagine the entire legal system. Instead, the thesis attempts to strike the right 
balance it its formulation of a framework through which the regionalisation of peace 
and security may occur in a practical manner and also within the ainbit of the law. 
It was mentioned earlier that the thesis presupposes the existence of an international 
legal system. Therefore, in discussing the fundamental values uniting the international 
community, as well as their enforcement, the thesis borrows from the emerging 
constitutional approach. 73 And although warning has been made against this approach 
to international law, 74 the domestic analogy is useful in demonstrating the manner 
through which the law seeks to promote and protect certain values, particularly the 
71 U. Fastenrath, 'Relative Normality in International Law', (1993) 4 EJIL, 305. 
72 For an idealistic perspective, see Philip Allott, 'Eunomia: New Orderfor a New World (Oxford: 
OUP, 1990); Philip Allott, 'International Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World, ' 
Josephine Onoh lecture (1989) (reprinted in Scott Davidson et at (eds), Contemporary Approaches to 
International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002). Available at 
http: //www. hull. ac. uk/law/Pubs/studiesinlaw/sil-Papers. html.; Allott, 'The European Community is not 
the True European Community' (1990-199 1) 100 Yale Law Journal 2485. 
73 On constitutional approaches to law, see D Fassbender, 'The United Nations Charter as Constitution 
of the International Community", 36 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law 539 (1998); Fassbender, 
Bardo, UNSecurity Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (The Hague; 
Boston [MA]: Kluwer Law International, 1998); Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United 
Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing , 2004); Sandra Szurek 'La Charte des Nations Unies: Constitution Mondiale?, in J-P Cot, A Pellet, M Forteau, La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire 
article par article (3"d ed., Economica, Paris, 2005). See also Joseph Weiler and Marlene Wind the 
State' (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge CUP: 2003); Neil Walker, 'Post- 
national Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation', in Weiler and Wind (eds) European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge CUP: 2003; Weiler, The Constitution ofEurope 
(Cambridge: CUP 1999); de Bi1rca, 'The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European 
Union, ' 28(6) ELRev, (2003), 814 at 82 1. 
74 E-g, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal warned that 'the transposition on to the 
international community of legal institutions, constructs or approaches prevailing in national law may 
be a source of great confusion and apprehension. ' See the Blaskic Case, the Judgement on by the 
Appeals Chamber ofthe Yugoslav', Tribunal on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of 
the Decision of the Trial Chamber, 110, ILR, 1997; paras. 30-3 I. See also Michael Wood, 'The Security 
Council and the 'Constitutionalization' of International Law' Paper, University of Leeds- 14 March 2007. Available at http: //www. law. leeds. ac. uk/leedslaw/webýoes/leedslaw/uploadeddoZýents/cflg- 
wood. doc; Michael Wood, 'The UN Security Council and International Law, ' Paper, Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, University of Cambridge 7- 9 November, 2006; 
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peremptory norms that seek to protect fundamental human rights, through creating 
'rudimentary structures for its enforcement. 75 
In determining the effective methods for international law enforcement, highlight is 
made of a central theme of this study which relates to the debate surrounding 
regionalism and universalism. The regionalism versus universalism debate reflects the 
traditional disagreement between the proponents of centralism and local governance 
76 that persist at the domestic level . These disagreements centre on the effectiveness of 
both forms of governance and enforcement mechanisms. Despite the assertion that 'the 
use of domestic law analogies in international law is often misleading"77 Gattini makes 
a compelling argument. He argues that international law undergoes a process just 'as 
much as the domestic constitutional systems historically experience two different pulls, 
the one towards a greater centralisation of competences, in order to better fasten the 
system, and the other towards greater decentralisation, in order to better respect local 
specificities. 78 
This hypothesis is useful in assisting the thesis to trace, explore as well as analyse the 
most desirable framework in which peace and security issues within the international 
arena ought to be addressed and also the extent to which the two regimes can be 
reconciled. In doing so, what becomes clear is that the regionalisation of peace and 
security within universalism 'is not a sign of disruption but quite on the contrary as 
evidence of a more developed stadium of its constitutionalization. 79 
In doing so, this approach encounters a major theme that runs throughout the thesis, 
which is that of tension between two fundamental norms underpinning the existing 
international legal system. With this regard, the strain revolving around the imperatives 
of state sovereignty and recent demands for the protection of fundamental human rights 
75 See, Erika de Wet, 'The International Constitutional Order, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 55, (2006), 51-76. 
76 Christoph Schreucr, 'Regionalism v. Universalism' European Journal ofinternational Law, Vol. 6 
ý1995) No. 3. 
7 Michael Wood, 'The Security Council and the 'Constitutionalization' of International Law', Paper, 
University of Leeds, 14 March 2007. Available at 
http: //www. law. leeds. ac. uk/Icedslaw/webdocs/leedslaw/uploadeddocuments/cfig-wood. doc. 
7' Andrea Gattini, 'Sense and Quasisense of Schmites Groflraum Theory in International Law -A Rejoinder to Carty's 'Carl Schmitfs Critique of Liberal International Legal Order, 'Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), 15.53-68. 
79 Ibid. 
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deserve attention. This is because any tilt within the system would in turn impact on the 
traditional Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty, which privileges the rights 
of states, and has been the foundation of the international system, 80 particularly in 
Africa. 81 In an attempt to strike a right balance between the two regimes, the thesis 
suggests that in certain well defined circumstances, the only, or at least the best, way to 
protect fundamental human rights is for African regional collective mechanisms, acting 
alone but preferably in concert with the UN, to lift the veil of sovereignty of a particular 
state in times of grave peril. 
2.3. Borrowing from Other Approaches to International Law and Additional 
Themes informing the Thesis 
In support of the theories described above, the thesis bears in mind that, 'international 
law cannot exist in isolation from the political factors operating in the sphere of 
international relations. ' 82 For this reason, this study borrows key theories and 
approaches from other disciplines such as history, politics, sociology and 
philosoph Y. 83 Therefore, in the majority of its chapters, the thesis begins with a 
historical approach which sets the contextual background to the problem and 
highlights the relationship, as well as shortcomings of law and international society. 8' 
so See its application in chapters two, three, five and nine. 
81 See chapter five. 
82 D. W. Greig, International Law, (2nd edn., Butterworths: London, 1976), p. 1. See also Shirley V. 
Scottý 'International Law as Ideology: Thcorising the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics', European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 5 (1994) No. 3. Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States', supra note 64. 
83 On the co-relation of law with these disciplines, see Hueck 'The Discipline of the History of 
International Law: New Trends and Methods on the History of International Law, ' 3 Journal of the 
History ofInternational Law, (2001) 194; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer ofNations: The 
Rise and Fall ofInternational Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: CUP, 2002); Onuma, Yasuaki, 'When was 
the Law of International Society Born-An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an 
Intercivilizational Perspective' I Journal of the History ofInternational Law (2000), 1; 
Schwarzenbergcr, 'Jus Pacis Ac Belli? ' 37 American Journal ofIntemational Law, (1943), pp. 460-479; 
B Lange, 'Researching Discourse and Behaviour as Elements of Law in Action' in R Banakar and M 
Travers, Theo? y and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Oxford: Hart, 2005); D Hirsch, 'Cosmopolitan 
Law, Agency and Narrative' in M Freeman, (ed) Law and Sociology (Oxford: OUP, 2006); and DM 
Trubek, 'Towards a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development' 82 Yale 
Law Journal, (1972), pp. 1-50. 
94 For examples of such approaches, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer ofNations, supra 
note 82; Onuma, Yasuaki, 'When was the Law of International Society Born? I supra note 82; David, Kennedy, 'International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, ' 17 Quinnipiac Law 
Review, (1997), 99; Hueck 'The Discipline of the History of International Law: New Trends and Methods on the History of International Law' 3 Journal of the History ofInternational Law (2001) 194. 
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Such an approach is visible in the work of Koskenniemi whose historical approach to 
law asserts that legal rules are apologetic or utopian and attempt to hide the fact 
conflicts must be solved though PolitiCS. 85 This perspective, though visible across the 
thesis, is most clear from chapter two whose brief history of international law 
highlights power politics from the Westphalian stage to the 18th century which 
stamped international law as a 'product of Western civilization and bore the imprint 
of Eurocentrism, Christian ideology, and of a 'free market' outlook. 986 
From a realist point of view, history and the balance of power politics is a common 
phenomenon in any legal system. When tied to an international law perspective, the 
reality of modem international relations and politics within the legal system is 
evidenced within the UN Security Council whose practice affirms that powerful states 
have often devised 'international rules to serve their own interests. 87 From this angle, 
the law represents the 'will of the ruling class, ' which in turn represents a classical 
Marxist perspective. 88 
Although such an analysis immediately raises doubts on the motives of international 
law, 89 it is important to emphasise that law is also about values and aspirations of the 
human race. 90 Therefore, in examining the application of international law in a world 
of diversity, the thesis identifies areas of convergence as well as divergence within 
regions, drawing comparisons between regions to explore the unique mix of cultural, 
political and security issues that influence the formulation of peremptory legal 
norms. 91 And given that the majority of these norms emanate from the inherent 
dignity of man, the thesis also makes acknowledgm. ent of natural. law perspectives, 
85 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); M; 
Koskenniemi, 'The Politics of International Law' supra note 70. 
86 A. Cassese International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200 1) p. 27. See also Y. Onuma, 
'When Was the Law of International Society Dom? Supra note 82 at p. 27. 87 A. Cassese, 'International Law, 'supra note 65 at p. 27. See also chapter s two and eight. 88 Chirnni, 'An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law, ' 17 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2004) 1-30. 
89 Higgins R, Problems andprocess : international law and how we use it, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006)p. 11. 
90 See chapter one. 
91 See chapter one and two. 
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which are useful in explaining the rationale for the special status ofjus cogens rules 
within the legal system and the need for their protection. 92 
Using the sociological perspective, 93 a picture is portrayed of international law as a 
vehicle for achieving universal principles and interests and protecting regional 
values. 94 An example of extraterritorial principles are those that forbid catastrophic 
crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity'95 through regional 
and universal initiatives by organisations such as the AU's right to intervene 
96 and the 
UN's responsibility to protect. 97 Furthermore, these crimes also form the ratione 
materiae of the Yugoslav and Rwandan International Criminal Tribunals 
98 and fall 
under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court where they have been 
termed as 'serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. '99 
Finally, given that this study focuses on the relationship between African regional law, 
the UN and general international law, consideration of particular theories is given due 
to their relation with the traditional discourse on Africa. Of particular importance is the 
post colonial theory which asserts that the law maintains relations based on colonial 
domination and does not always reflect the consent of the formerly ý colonised 
countries. 100 This approach is closely tied to the majority of theories described above, as 
92 For a modem defence of naturalism, see, Robert P George, 'In Defence ofNatural Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 1999) See also Lauterpacht, 'The Grotian Tradition in International Law' 23 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1946) 1; Weiler, 'Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of 
the Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals-A Critique' 3 European Journal ofInternational Law (1992), 
65. 
93 On the relation between sociology and law, see Schwarzenberger, 'Jus Pacis Ac BelliT 37 American 
Journal ofInternational Law (1943), 460479; B Lange, (2005) "Researching Discourse and Behaviour 
as Elements of Law in Action' 'in R Banakar and M Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal 
Research (Oxford: Hart); D Hirsch, 'Cosmopolitan Law, Agency and Narrative' in M Freeman, (ed) 
Law and Sociology (Oxford: OUP, 2006); and DM Trubek, 'Towards a Social Theory of Law: An 
Essay on the Study of Law and Development' 82 Yale Law Journal (1972), pp. 1-50. 
94 Higgins R, Problems and process, supra note 89 at p. 11. 
95 See chapters one and two. 
96 Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the Affican Union. See also chapter six. 
97 2005 World Sununit, Sept. 14-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, para 138 &139, U. N. Doc 
A/60/L. I (Sept. 20,2005). See also chapter eight. 
98 See article 3,4 and 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and article 2, 
3 and 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
99 Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
100 For more on post-colonial theories, see B. S. Chimni's International Law and World Order: A 
Critique of Contemporary Approaches (London/Delhi: Sage, 1991); Balalcrishnan Rajagopal's 
International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2003); Anthony Anghie's Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making ofInternational 
Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005); Anthony Anghie's 'Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, ' 5 Social & Legal Studies (1996), 32 1; Orford, A. 'Muscular Humanitarianism: 
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none denies the fact that during the formative years of international law, most African 
states were colonies and thereby 'powerless to influence the decisions being taken. '101 
As it were, their initial interaction with the law was animated by 'civilizing 
missions, ' 102 followed by arbitrary importation of norms that were a 'pretender to the 
status of universal validity. ' 03 With Africa having come of age to assert itself at a time 
of rapid globalisation, a common thread that runs throughout the. thesis highlights 
African perspectives on international law, particularly in demonstrating the continent's 
understanding, interpretation and application of key provisions of the UN Charter, 
international custom and other general principles of international law. Finally, taking a 
constructivist approach, 104 the thesis looks at the longer prospects that the AU and the 
UN possess in the promotion and maintenance of regional and international peace and 
security. 
3.1 Structure of the Thesis 
Having outlined some of the approaches, themes and perspectives which relate directly to 
the thesis study and the practicalities of carrying out the research, what follows is an 
outline of the structure of the study which is organised in three parts and in turn divided 
into ten chapters. 
3.2 Part One 
The first part of the thesis focuses on the evolution of the international legal system, 
including the function of the UN and the doctrine of regionalism within the legal 
system. In doing so, it presents an analytical framework for the major issues 
addressed throughout the thesis. Therefore, chapter one will specifically examine the 
nature of the principles, norms and values that bind the international community and 
Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism', 10 European Journal oflnternationalLawý1999), 
679. 
101 See Statement of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General on the Occasion of the 4'h Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of African Union, 30 January, 2005. Abuja, Nigeria. 
102 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, ' supra note 
100. 
103 Prof Ali Mazrui, 'Pretender to Universalism: Western Culture in the Globalising Age', BBC World 
Service, World Lectures (2000). Available at 
http: //www. bbc. co. uk/worldservice/People/features/world lectures/mazrui-lect. shtn-d '04 On constructivism, see Brune6 and Toope, 'International Law and Constructivism' (2000-2001) 39 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19; Shaw, Tostnational Constitutionalism in the European 
Union, ' 6 (4) Journal ofEuropean Public Policy (1999)9'579-97. 
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argue that these are better achieved collectively, through institutional regimes, such as 
regionalism and universalism, as opposed to unilateralism. 
Having traced the roots of international law to the regionalism phenomenon, chapter 
two highlights the journey of international law, from being purely of European origin 
to true universality. In the process, highlight is made of the tension between Western 
and universal values as the interaction of norms from different regions intensify. What 
will become obvious from this discussion is that rather than treating the relationship 
between regionalism and universalism as one of contest, it is their coherent 
cooperation, and not their opposition which should lie at the heart of the debate. 
This discussion paves way for an analysis of the peace and security system under the 
UN framework, explored in chapter three. Such an analysis is useful in setting the 
background for demonstrating the similarities, differences as well as relationship 
between the AU's right tq intervene and the UN's prohibition of the use of force 
contained in article 2(4) of the Charter, discussed in chapter seven. Meanwhile, the 
analysis of the UN collective security system in chapter three sets a foundation for the 
next chapter, which narrows on the regional legal principles under the UN Charter, 
particularly those contained in Chapter VIII and their relationship with article 103 of 
the Charter. 
The aim and purpose of chapter four is to demonstrate the evolving function of 
regionalism within the UN system. The general lessons and uncertainties that emerge 
from this focus will ultimately assist in drawing the pattern that the UN and regional 
organisations; are likely to follow in pursuit for peace and security in later chapters. 
The key theme that is raised by this chapter is not at what level the area of peace and 
security is best placed, but rather on the direction that the relationship between 
regionalism and universalism must take in order to meet the challenges brought about 
by potential threats, and ultimately promote and maintain peace and security. 
3.3 Part Two 
Part two explores Africa's emerging architecture of regional peace and security, in 
order to better understand the envisaged relationship with the UN and international 
law. With this objective in mind, chapter five offers a chronological historical, 
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political and legal synopsis, including an exploration of the rationale that led to the 
formation of the AU. This approach magnifies a recurring theme of the thesis that 
represents the AU as a radical departure from the peace and security framework of the 
former Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Furthermore, in addition to setting the 
scene for a discussion of the new peace and security regime, this chapter also 
introduces a comparative tone and engages in a more specific examination of the 
differences and similarities and relationship between the Charter of the OAU and the 
Constitutive Act of the AU. 
What will become clear from this discussion is that the AU's institutional framework 
is founded on new approaches to peace and security, which are explored in chapters 
six and seven. In particular, chapter six engages in a qualified analysis of the roles and 
functions as well as the differences in its internal composition of the major organs of 
the AU, as well as the designated relationship with the UN. Having made the case for 
a division of responsibilities between the AU and the UN, this examination paves way 
for a more specific discussion of the relationship between African regional security 
and its relationship with the UN's collective system. 
Therefore, chapter seven narrows in on the legal issues surrounding the AU's 'right to 
intervene' in member states! 05 In particular, this chapter will examine and explore 
the provisions contained in the Constitutive Act and assess their compatibility with 
traditional concepts, such as the key provisions in article 2 (4) and Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter. It finally concludes by providing legal and other justifications for the 
ability of the AU to legally intervene including, under certain circumstances, without 
authorisation of the UN Security Council but still be in apparent conformity with the 
principles and purposes of the UN. Having done so, the latter point is reinforced in 
chapter eight which begins by looking at African perspectives on UN reform and 
argues that the AUs recent contribution to the formulation of the current reform 
agenda further displayed Africa's intention to strengthen cooperation, rather than 
usurp the UN's role in peace and security 
3.4 Part Three 
105 Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
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Part One: Theoretical 
Framework 
The final part brings together the major legal-political issues explored throughout the 
thesis and acts as a forum through which major norms may be tested, including the 
right to intervene and the responsibility to protect, as well as how the relationship 
between the UN and AU is useful in drawing future patterns. Hence chapter nine 
looks at the manner in which the lessons from the Darfur conflict provide a 
framework of cooperation between the UN and the AU. It does so by examining the 
approaches and actual operations of the AU and the UN in the conflict in Darfur, 
including their deployment of the AMIS and UNAMID peace operations. 
Finally chapter ten concludes the study by articulating the framework which allows 
for these two organisations to authorise legal, political and military action and 
suggests how the emerging norms may develop general international law. In this 
regard, it concludes by looking at future prospects and proposes a way forward 
through which the AU and the UN organisations can better promote and maintain 
regional and international peace and security. 
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Chapter One 
The International Legal System: Community Values, 
Principles and their Enforcement 
The international legal system is inherently unique. In sharp contrast to domestic legal 
systems, which primarily regulate the behavior of human beings, the international 
system 'consists of rules and principles of general application dealing with the 
conduct of states and international organisations, and their relations inter se, as well 
as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical. 
" For 
Rosalyn Higgins, international law reflects a normative system 'harnessed to the 
achievement of common values -values that speak to us all, whether we are rich or 
poor, black or white, of any religion or none, or come from countries that are 
industrialized or developing. 2 The legal rules embodied in the international system 
emanate from three primary sources which are international treaties, custom, and 
general principles of law. 3 
This chapter presents an analytical framework for the discussion of the building 
blocks of the international legal system with a particular focus on the area of peace 
and security. In doing so, it introduces the key principles and values to which the 
subjects of international law, the majority of which are discussed in the coming 
chapters, interact, including their obligations to adhere to the rule of law, through 
regional and universal regimes. In the course of discussion, a m4jor theme that arises 
concerns the seriou's debate of whether international law should be based on the 
1 See Section 10 1 of the Restatement of the Law Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
1988. 
' Higgins R, Problems and process: International law and how we use it (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006), p. 2. 
3 See article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. There is general agreement that 
article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice represents the sources of international law. 
On this point, see DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, (Sweet& Maxwell, 2004,6th 
edition). However, the list is not meant to be exhaustive. See Mark E. Villiger, Customary 
international law and treaties :a manual on the theory andpractice of the interrelation ofsources (2nd 
ed, Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 17. Generally on sources and article 38 (1) of 
the ICJ Statute, see Danilenko, Law making in the International Community, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); 
Degan, Developments in International Law. Sources ofInternational Law ( Kluwer Law International, 
1997); Szasz, in Schachter and Joyner, eds, United Nations Legal Order, (Cambridge University Press, 
1995), Vol. 1, Ch. 1; See also Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources ofInternational law (Deventer, Kluwer 
1983), pp. 187-189. 
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Grotian model whereby the rule of law is one of maintaining tolerance and 
coexistence between states in pursuit of their interests or whether it should be based 
on the Kantian model, which provides a framework of cosmopolitan outlook based on 
active cooperation in support of trans-regional solidarity amongst states and 
international organisations. 4 
In order to achieve its objective, the chapter precedes in three main sections. The first 
section introduces the concept of an international community. What will become clear 
from this discussion is the move towards the 'prioritization of community interests as 
against the egoistic interests of individual states. '5 Although some of the community 
values, particularly those western in nature are challenged in chapter two, the second 
section identifies the effect of jus cogens norms which are universal in application. 
The discussion therein paves way for part three which explores the enforcement of 
international norms and legitimacy in international law. What will become clear is the 
favour found in collectivity, as opposed to unilateral actions, in pursuing the common 
interests of the international community. 
1.1 Establishing a Common Value Based International Community 
The international legal system is largely based on respect for the autonomy and 
sovereignty of states established by Peace of Westphalia in 1648, described in chapter 
tWo. 6 However, these states are said to form a society tied together by rules and 
principles to form what is commonly referred to as the international community. 7 
Indeed, the major UN institutions, such as the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, g have used the term international community in 'an almost inflammatory 
way. '9 Similarly the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has, in various cases, also 
4 On this theme, see Francisco Orrego Vicufia, International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving Global 
Society: Constitutionalization, Accessibility, Privatization Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 5; See 
also A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 18. 
5 See Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The 'International Community': Facing the Challenge of 
Globalization, ' European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 9 (1998) No. 2. 
6 On African perspectives on sovereignty, see chapter five. 
See Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The 'International Community, ' supra note 5. 
See the examples given by R. -J. Dupuy, La communautg internationale entre le mythe et I'histoire, 
(Paris, Economica, 1986) p. 12.; Tomuschat, 'Die internationale Gemeinschaft', 33 Archiv dq 
Volkerrechts (1995). 
9 See Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The 'International Conununity, ' supra note 5. 
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acknowledged the existence of an international community. ' 0 However, despite the 
numerous references" to the 'new doctrine of international community, ' 12 the 
arbitrary use of the term fails to explain its distinctive elements and in particular, 
whether it is international law that binds states together. 13 
According to Bull, such a community comes into existence 'when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions. ' 14 However, and perhaps not surprisingly, the notion of an existing 
international community has, on occasion, been vigorously disputed. 15 For example, 
in 1968, De Visscher forcefully argued that it is 'pure illusion to expect from pure 
arrangement of inter-State relations the establishment of a community order. ' 16 
In return, Christian Tomuschat argues that although states, as a mere juxtaposition of 
individual units may not in themselves constitute the international community, the 
'concept denotes an overarching system which embodies a common interests of all 
states and, indirectly, of mankind. ' 17 In this context, the 'sufficient degree of 
10 See the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use offuclear Weapons, the World 
Court uses the term seven times, see also the US Hostages in Tehran, ICJ Reports (1980), at 43 where 
it referred to the international community. See also ICJ in its obiter dictum in the Barcelona Traction 
ICJ Reports (1970), at 32 where it characterised the obligations amounting to erga omnes as 
commitments towards the international community as a whole. 
" For example, references to this concept is made in key documents such as the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998); The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM (1969), 
article 53; The Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations of 
between Organizations, 25 ILM ( 1986), article 53. See also article 40 (1) and (2) of the Articles of 
State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001). 
Supplement No. 10 (AJ5611 0), chp. IV. E. 1). 
12 Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April, 1999. See also 
Blair, 'A moment to Seize: Let us Reorder this World Around Us', The Guardian ( London), 3 October, 
2001, p. 4. 
13 Dino Kritsiotis, 'Imagining the International Community', EJIL, vol. 13, No. 4 (2002). 
14 H. Bull, 'The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics (Mackmillan, 1977), p. 13. On 
the same, see H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 
1950), p. 65. 
'5 S. Toope, 'Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law', in M. Byers (ed. ), The Role of 
Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 9 1, at 103: P. E Corbett, Law in Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1959), p. 273. -I 16 De Visscher, Theo? y and Reality in Public International Law (translated from French by P. E Cornett, 
Princeton Univ Pr; Revised edition rev. ed., 1968), p. 94. 
17 C. Tomuschat, 'Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will', 241 RdC (1993), p. 227. 
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interdependence and contact'18 between states has led to a factual element of a 
community. 19 This development has in turn resulted in the evolution of the 
international legal system to include other legal subjects whose link to certain 
common traits enjoins them to the community. 
20 Therefore, in this context, although 
states remain the primary subjects and possess full legal capacity, 
21 others who may 
possess international legal personality include international organisations, 
22 and human 
beings. 3 
In this regard, the international community 'represents a normative entity, 
characterised by shared norms and understandings, common sensibilities and a shared 
feeling of collective destiny. t24 For this community to thrive, it needs 'certain interests 
common to all its members and a certain set of common values, principles and 
procedures. ' 25 The values of the community 'contains as much aspiration and 
reality, 26 whose binding traits are embodied in the 'sense of shared opportunity, 227 
and the need to act on the society's 'high valueS, 
28 in pursuit of 'shared vision of a 
better world. 9 29 Therefore, the international legal system is 'like a modem 
18 See Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The 'International Community, ' supra note 5. 
" From a political science point of view, see R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 
(2nd ed., Second Edition. Glenview: Scott Foresman. 1989), p. I& 122; McDougal, Reisman & 
Willard, 'The World Community: A Planetary Social Process', 21 UC. Davis L. Rev. (1988) 807, at 
089. 
20 For a historical account, see Abi-Saab, International Law and The International Community: The 
Long Road to Universality in R. MacDonald ( ed. ), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: 
Nijhoff, 1994) p. 3 1; A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1986). See also Fassbener who makes references to the international community as including all 
subjects of intemational law. Fassbender, 'The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the 
International Community', 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998) 529, at 532. 
21 A. Cassese, International Law, supra note 4, p. 46. 
22 See Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] 
ICJ Reports 174 at 178. See also N. D White, The Law ofInternational Organisations (second edition, 
Juris Publishing, Inc, 2005); Jean d! Aspremont, 'The Abuse of Legal the Personality of International 
Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States, 'International Organizations Law Review, 
Volume 4, Number 1, (2007), pp. 91-119(29) 
23 See G. Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica moderna (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976), p. 473. 
24 See Nicholas Tsagourias, 'International Community, Recognition of States and Plotical Cloning', in 
Colin Warbrick and Stephen Therny, Towards an International Legal Community: The Sovereignty of 
States and the Sovereignty ofInternational Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2006), p. 211. 
25 B. Simma, & A. Paulus, 'The International Community, ' supra note 5. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Nicholas Tsagourias, International Community, Recognition of States and Plotical Cloning', in 
Colin Warbrick and Stephen Therny, Towards an International Legal Community supra note 24, p. 217. 
29 P. Allot Eunomia : New Orderfor a new World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 200 1), p. xx. 
29 See Secretary General 'Meaning of International Community, ' Address to the DPI/NGO Conference, 
Press Release SG/SM/7133, PI/I 176 (15 Sept 1999). See also K. A. Annan, 'Problems without 
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constitution' which not only 'comprises of principles and rules, but also basic values, ' 
according to Tomuschat. 30 And although some of these may not, as yet, amount to 
legal rules in the strict sense, they are reflective of the values of the international 
system, whose reiteration and practice may lead to their elevation as legal principles. 31 
The generally accepted principles and values include those enshrined in article 1 of 
the UN Charter 32 and those contained in key documents, 33 including those on UN 
reform. 34 However, as will be shown in chapter two, 'suspicions remains that they 
[values] are simply the fruits of cultural history belonging to the West. ' 
35 Yet, not 
only has the concept of a community been deemed to exist, the Secretary General has 
ruled it as 'the only way forward. 06 Importantly, the community and its values act 'as 
a limitation of political power, " 37 particularly of states and other influential 
international actors. 38 It does so through its description of certain rights and the 
imposition of duties on international players within the whole international system. 39 
In spite of the above, the contemporary diversity of state and regional priorities not 
only leads to the difficulty of arriving at a 'global consensus on values, "O its 
Passport', (Sept/ Oct 2002). For a general discussion., see Anne Orford, 'The Gift of Formalism', 
European Journal ofInternational Law, (2004), Vol. 15. 
30 C. Tomuschat, 'International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century', 
Receuil des Cours (1999), p. 23, at 28. 
31 N. D. White, 'The Ties that Bind: The EU, The UN and International Law, 'Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. XXXVII, 2006. On the differences, similarities and relationship between legal 
rules and values see K. Zamanek, 'Basic Principles of UN Charter Law', in R. St. J. Macdonald and 
D. M. Johnston, eds., Towards World Constitutionalism, (Leiden, Nijhoff 2005). 
32 On a discussion on some of these and their relationship with legal principles, see N. D. White, 'The 
Ties that Bind, ' Ibid. 
33 E. g. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, U. N. Doc A/60/L. 1, Sept. 20,2005; The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998; the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, G. A. res. 2625, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U. N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 
(1970; The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) 
34 See chapter eight. 
35 P. Ricoeur, Oneselfas Another ( trans. K. Blamely, 1992) at 262-263. See also Emmanuelle Jouannet, 
'Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law? ' EJIL, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
(2007); Dino Kritsiotis, 'Imagining the International Community, ' supra note 13. 
36 See Secretary General 'Meaning of International Community'; supra note 29. 37 P. Allot, Eunomia supra note 28, p. 104. 
3" N. D. White, 'The Ties that Bind, ' supra note 3 1. See also N. D. White, The UN System: Toward 
International Justice (Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner 2002), p. 47. 
39 Abi-Saab, 'International Law and The International Community: The Long Road to Universality,, in 
R. MacDonald (6d. ), Essays in Honour of Wang Tfeya, supra note 20, p. 31; A. Cassese, International 
Law in a Divided World, supra note 20, p. 1. 
40 R. Foot, 'Introduction' in R. Foot, -J. Gaddis &A Hurrell, eds., Order and Justice in International 
Relations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2. 
26 
association with politics often compromises the instruments through which the 
community finds expression, as shown below. 
1.2 Differing Levels of the International Community in Peace and Security 
The UN Charter has often been described as the constitution of the international 
community. 41 As stated above, the UN Security Council has, in carrying out its peace 
and security mandate on behalf of UN member states, 
42 increased its references to the 
international community. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council 
has passed binding resolutions not only on states but also other legal subjects such as 
43 44 individuals, liberation and guerrilla movements, as well as outlaws, such as the Al 
Qaeda network. 45 What is important to appreciate here is the fact that the rules 
regulating peace and security are primarily drawn from the UN strengthens the belief 
that the international 'community remains the source of legitimacy and authority of 
the undertaken action. 46 
However, this should not obscure the fact that, as shall be shown in the coming 
chapters, the sovereign state is still widely perceived as both the main instrument for 
implementing the decisions of the UN. 47 Furthermore, the decisions and practice of 
the UN hardly apply uniformly across the whole of the international community with 
'fairness, '48as discussed elsewhere in this study. 49 It is partly because of this reason 
that the use of the term 'community' is easily subject to manipulation. and it can be 
applied in one context and be wholly inappropriate in another, with varying degrees of 
intensity. 50 With this regard, actions that have been justified as beneficial to the 
common interests have often led to serious disagreements. 
See discussion in chapter three. 
Article 24 of the UN Charter. 
43 E. g. see SC Res. 1532 (2004), 12 March 2004, on the former Liberian President Charles Taylor. 
44 E. g see SC Res. 864 (1993), 15 September 1993, concerning UNITA and SC Res. 942 (1994), 23 
September 1994, concerning the self-proclaimed Serb Republic in Bosnia- Herzegovina. 
45 E. g see SC Res. 1267 (1999), 15 October on individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida. 
46 See Nicholas Tsagourias, International Community, Recognition of States and Political Cloning, in 
Colin Warbrick and Stephen Themy, Towards an International Legal Community, supra note 24, p. 
213. 
47 N Schrijver, 'The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty', (2000) 71 BYIL 65, p. 65. 
48 See T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), p. 
232. 
49 See chapters three, five and eight. 
so See Georges Abi-Saab, 'Whither the International Community'?, EJIL, Vol. 9 (1998), No. 2. See 
also Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The 'Intemational Community, ' supra note 5. 
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This was clear in the speech by the Representative of India in the Security Council in 
stating that the West was not acting on behalf of the international community during 
NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999.5 1 However, this assertion does not signify the 
absence of an international community. Rather, it can be interpreted as questioning 
the unilateral NATO action whose membership represented under ten percent of the 
world's population, and rejecting the notion that the intervention represented the will 
of the international community, particularly given that at no time had NATO been 
appointed the world's representative. 52 
Indeed, the whole of the international community is riddled with 'many diversions 
and differences. ' 53 In this regard, due to the nature of fragmentation in the 
international system, Abi-Saab argues that the application of legal rules does not 
signify the presence of community in the group concerned in the same manner, and 
54 with the same intensity on all subjects. Instead, he takes the view that, for the sake 
of precision, it is better to speak of a degree of community within a specific context, 
rather than referring to a group as a community in general. It is 'therefore in essence 
made up of different, sometimes overlapping communities, each with its own 
normative (value) system, which can be of national, regional or functional (sectoral) 
nature. 55 Borrowing from this perspective, a major approach of this study treats 
regional organisations, such as the EU and AU, as representing regional communities 
while the UN and WTO would amount to sectoral. communities. 
Hence, for the purposes of this study, the term international commu 
, 
nity is used to 
demonstrate the different points of extraterritorial agreement by international society, 
at which there is clear embodiment of commonly shared values, particularly those that 
seek to protect the peremptory norms of international law. Therefore, heavy reliance 
is made on the principles contained in key treaties, including the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969, which defines jus cogens, as norms 'accepted and 
51 See Representative of India in UNDOC S/PV 3988 (24 Much 1999), at 15-16. 52 Martti Koskenniemi, 'International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, ' EX Vol. 16 
(2005) No. 1. 
53 A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, supra note 20 p. 32. 54 Georges Abi-Saab, 'Whither the International Community'? Supra note 50. 55 Sec, Erika de Wet, 'The International Constitutional Order, ' International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2006) 55: 51-76. 
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recognized by the international community of states as a whole. 56 As shown in the 
following section, failure to abide by these norms incurs state responsibility for 
violating states. 57 
2.1 The Rationale and Justification for the Protection of Peremptory Norms of 
International Law 
In spite of the horizontal nature of international law with its restricted grip on 
universally entrenched ideological, political, cultural and economic links, there have 
emerged a series of community duties, obligations and rights agreed upon both at the 
universal and regional level, and which have special protection under regional and 
multilateral treaties. According to Hedley Bull's formulation, these norms arise 
whereby 'states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on 
one another's decisions to cause them to behave- at least in some measure-as parts of 
a whole. '58 Also commonly referred to as jus cogens, these norms emanate from the 
advent of international law conferment on each state obligatio erga omnes. 
59 In other 
words, the obligations contained therein are owed to the international conununity as a 
whole. 60 Therefore, the implication ofjus cogens are those 'of a duty and not optional 
rights' and it is this unique feature that makes them acquire the special status of 
peremptory norms of international law. 61 
A key feature of peremptory norms is that states, be it in times of war or peace, are not 
allowed to derogate from the commonly agreed values and rules that amount to Jus 
cogens or attempt to justify their breach on the concept of sovereignty. 
62 For Kelsen, this 
notion applies uniformly across all states. He asserts that the international 'legal system is 
56 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
57 On the international community and its relationship with the law of state responsibility, see, Erika de 
Wet, 'The International Constitutional Order, ' supra note 55. 
58 Hcdley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Macmillan: London, 
1995), pp. 9-10. 
59 Cherif Bassiouni, 'International Crimes, Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, ' 59 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 63,68 (1996), p. 266; M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'A Functional Approach to "General Principles of 
International Law, ' II MICH. J. IN77L L. 768,801 (1989-1990). 
60 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., Belgium v. Spain, ICJ Reports 
[1970] 3, at 3 1; Case Concerning East Timor, Portugal v. Australia, ICJ Reports [1995], at 102; Case 
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Bosia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, ICJ Reports [ 1996] 616. 
61 M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'International crimes, ' supra note 59 
62 A. Cassese, International Law, supra note 4 See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'States of Emergency and 
States of Exception: Human Rights Abuses and Impunity under Color of Law', in Non-Derogable 
Rights and States ofEmergency (Daniel Prernont ed. 1996), p. 125 See also M. Cherif Bassiouni 
'International crimes, 'supra note 59. 
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superior equally' to all states and that the 'natural law' nature of this sort of foundation of 
international law cannot and should not be denied. s63 The reason that these natural rights 
are of special importance is principally because they contain principles that are 
considered as universal in nature. Significantly, they have come to be regarded as worthy 
of the duty of protection for the benefit of the international community, notwithstanding 
the structural differences in the political,, economic and social settings across the diverse 
regions. 64 
The rationale behind the status ofjus cogens in international law is also given by Vitoria, 
who referred to these rules as 'una respublica', with the purpose of the general well- 
being of all human beings (bonum commune omnium). 65 Francisco Suarez developed 
Vitoria! s ideas further and in a classic exposition observed that however 'divided into 
different peoples and kingdoms it may be, mankind has nevertheless always possessed a 
certain unity, not only as a species, but also, as it were, as a moral and political unity, 
called for by the natural precept of mutual love and mercy, which applies to all, even to 
the foreigners of any nation. 66 Accordingly, the subjects within the international legal 
system 'constitute a perfect community' with each being 'a member of that universal 
society. 67 
In modem international law, the legal protection of these rules finds expression in 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of treaties, which prohibits any treaty 
68 law from running contrary to the peremptory norms of international law. It is worth 
mentioning however, that this convention deals with treaties and its application to 
custom is subject to dispute. 69 Furthermore, problems arise because not only do key 
documents, such as the UN Charter, hardly mention or refer to any peremptory 
63 Quoted in Danilo Zolo, 'Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law', EM, Vol. 9 
L1998) No. 2. 
See Furundzya (Trial Chamber, ICTY), 38 ILM (1999), 349; Frowein, 'Jus Cogens', 7 EPIL (1984) 
329. See also Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 19.2 Yearbook of the ILC (1976 11) 73. See also 
J. H. H. Weiler, A. Cassese, M. Spinedi (eds), International Crimes ofStates: A Critical Analysis ofthe 
JLC`s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (European University Institute, Series A., 1989). 
65 Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law, ' EJIL, Vol. 
6 (1995) No. 1. Here, B Simma quotes Relectio de Indis, III, Tit. 5, leg. 4; De potestate civil!, 13,21 66 Bruno Simma, 'The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law, ibid. 67 ibid. 
68 For a recent study of the legal effects of peremptory norms of international law, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2008). 69 See chapter two. See also R Bernhardt; 'Article 103', in Simma (ed), The Charter of The United Nations. A Commentary', (OUP, 2002), p. 1293; N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Fights to the UN Security Council', in Mashood A. Baderin& Robert Mccorquodale, (eds. ) 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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norms, there is also no definite list agreed upon as to what amounts or fails to 
constitute peremptory norms . 
70 However, although the Charter does not expressly 
refer tojus cogens, it can be argued that the principles contained in article 2 largely 
correspond with well established peremptory norms. Nevertheless, questions still 
persist with regard to whether there exists a defined hierarchy amongst the more 
readily identifiable peremptory norms. 71 
However, the limitation of article 53 in the Vienna Convention to consensual concepts 
was favourable because substantive definitions of jus cogens would have been 
controversial due to the doctrine's close connection to natural law philosophy. 
Disagreement on major issues would have placed the standing of key rules of jus 
cogens in doubt, and for this reason the substance is best left incomplete and the list 
in-exhaustive, in order to meet the challenges posed by a fast changing world. 
However, as demonstrated throughout this study, the flexible nature of what amounts 
to a peremptory norm may be utilised by powerful states to alter and effectively make 
iaW. 72 
Having said so, despite the lack of a clear list of the rules of international law 
amounting tojus cogens, it is beyond dispute that the prohibition against the use of 
force, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity are settled in their 
classiflcation. 73 It is primarily these norms that this thesis chiefly focuses on because 
these principles are crucial to the'maintenance of regional and international peace and 
security. 74 However, it also deserves to be mentioned that, in order to prevent their 
70 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'International crimes, ' supra note 59. See also chapter two on the clash of 
jus cogens. 
71 See Martti Koskenniemi, 'Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch', European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 8 (1997) No. 4, Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, ' Reflections on the Existence 
of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law, ' European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 8 (1997) 
No. 4 
72 See chapter two. 
73 See the list provided in the Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 40, paras. 4-6 in Ojji'cial Records of the General Assembly, Fifth-sixth Session (A/56/10) pp. 283-284. See also Cherif Bassiouni, 'International Crimes, ' supra note 59; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in 
International Law, supra note 68, pp. 50-66. 74 See chapters three-nine. 
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offence to 'international order, 75 the crimes of piracy, slavery, racial discrimination 
and torture also amount to peremptory norms. 76 
In order to protect the special nature of jus cogens norms and enhance state 
compliance, article 40 of the Articles of State Responsibility 'applies to the 
international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law' and 'breach 
of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the 
responsible State to fulfil its obligation. 77 While the application of the doctrine of 
78 
state responsibility is discussed elsewhere in this study, it deserves to be pointed out 
that the Articles do not allow for a right to intervene in cases of breaches of 
peremptory norms by states, although such violations attract international 
responsibility on states and the international community. 79 
Nevertheless, the gap in the law with regard to enforcement has led to the assertions 
that the obligations deriving from these duties has led to an 'emerging norm' entailing 
$a collective responsibility to protect' 80 citizens from genocide, mass killing, and 
massive and sustained human rights violations. 's' However, bearing in mind the 
emphasis placed on the extraterritoriality of fundamental values discussed in this 
section, a central theme of the thesis addresses the tension between the major 
principles of jus cogens. This is clear from the dilemma facing the international 
community in the run up to the Rwandan genocide (1994) where there was a clear 
conflict between the peremptory norms prohibiting genocide, war crimes, crimes 
73 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), p. 58. 
76 See the list provided in the Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 40, supra note 
73 paras. 4-6 in pp. 283-284. see also Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes, ' supra note 59. 
77 See article 40 (1) and (2) of the Articles of State Responsibility supra note 73; see also lain Scobbie, 
'The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of 'Obligations under Peremptory Norms of General 
International Law', EM, Vol. 13, (2002) No. 5; Eric Wyler, From 'State Crime' to Responsibility for 
'Serious Breaches of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Lay/ EM, Vol. 13, 
(2002) No. 5; Christian J. Tams, Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the 
Responsible State? EM, Vol. 13, (2002) No. 5; Pierre Klein, Responsibility for Serious Breaches of 
Obligations Deriving from Peremptory Norms of International Law and United Nations Law, EM, 
Vol. 13, (2002) No. 5. 
" See chapters seven, eight and nine. 
79 See article 41 (1), (2) and (3) of the Articles supra note 73. so See Secretary General's repoM In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rightsfor All, UN Doe A/59/2005, para. 203. 
81 See 2005 World Surrunit, Sept 11-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, 138, U. N. Doc. 
A/60/L. L(Sept 20,2005) See also Secretary General's report, In Larger Freedom, ibid. 
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against humanity on one hand, and the norm that bans the use of force in international 
relations on the other. 82 
Given that the occasional failure by the international community to protect and 
enforce fundamental values, particularly in Africa has been alarming, 83 the recent 
conflict in Darfur brought the questions with regard to their protection to sharper 
focus. While the role of the UN in this area is discussed in chapter three, what follows 
is a general discussion on the available mechanisms for the enforcement of the 
international norms and the emerging relevance of the concept of legitimacy in this 
area. 
3.1 The Enforcement and Legitimacy of International Law 
The aspect of enforcing international legal obligations is closely tied to the legitimacy 
of international law, as shown in this section. 84 Traditionally, it is due to the lack of a 
centralised enforcement system of international law that led to the question as to 
whether international law was really 'law. '85 The answer in turned depended on what 
one meant by law. 86 According to H. L. A. Hart, law derives its strength from 
acceptance by society that its rules are binding and not necessarily from its 
enforceability. 87 Similarly, Fitzmaurice argues the law is not binding because it is 
enforced but rather, it is enforced because it already binding. 88 
On the other hand, scholars such as Austin argued that international law was not true 
law but merely, 'positive morality, ' since there were no sovereign capable of 
sanctioning the violation of its rules. 89 This viewpoint differed with that of Kelsen 
who perceived the law as involving submission to rules and not to a particular 
" See chapters two, three and seven. 
83 See introduction, chapters three, five, six and nine. 
84 Jacob Katz Cogan, 'Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol 31 No. 1 (2006). 
Anthony D'Amato, " Is International Law Really 'Law'?, ' 79 Northwestern Law Review 1293 
(1985). 
86 Anthony Aust, Handbook ofInternational Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
87 Hart, H. L. A. The Concept ofLaw ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
" G. G. Fitzmaurice, 'The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of 
Enforcement', The Modern Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1. (1956), pp. 1-13. 
89 J. Austin, The Province ofJurisprudence Detennined, (W. Rumble (ed. ), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 24. 
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sovereign. 90 Nevertheless, although the debate with regard to whether international 
law is really law has virtually vanished, focus has since shifted to the problem of 
enforcement, with a respectable school of international lawyers considering it to be a 
necessary characteristic of any system of law. 91 Indeed, many international theorists, 
both traditional and modem, agree that law 'shall be enforced by external power'92 
since it is a 'coercive order' which contains certain measures of compulsion which are 
to be taken in case of 'legally wrong conduct. ' 93 However, although the problem of 
enforcement is much associated with international law, using a comparative approach, 
Roger Fisher suggests that much of what is considered as 'law' in the domestic 
context is also unenforceable. 94 
In any event, opinion on the practical compliance of international law is divided. For 
example, Louis Henkin, famously observed that '[i]t is probably the case that almost 
all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time. 95 On the other hand, the UN Secretary General 
opined that, 'today, the rule of law is at risk around the world. Again and again, we 
see fundamental laws shamelessly disregarded. 96 Despite there being some truth 
behind Henkin's aphorism, 97 the Secretary General's frustration was understandable 
given the return of mass murder at the turn of the 21" century, as shown throughout 
this study. What remains clear is that 'the rule of [international] law as a mere concept 
is not enough. Laws must be put into practice. 98 Therefore, in order to enforce 'an 
international culture of compliance, '" the international legal system must be founded 
90 Charles Leben, 'Hans Kelsen and the Advancement of International Law' European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 9 (1998) No. 2. 
91 See Fitzmaurice, 'The Foundations of the Authority if International Law and the Problem of 
Enforcement. ' (195 6) 19 M-LR- 1. 
92 Lauterpacht, Oppenheims International Law (Longmans, Green and Co., London, Vol. I (8th Ed), 
195 5), p. 10. 
93 Kelsen, Principles ofInternational Law (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc, 1952). 
94 See R Fisher. 'Bringing Law to Bear on Governments', 74 Harv. L. Rev., 1130,1132-34 (196 1); See 
R. Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law: Procedural Aspects ofInternational Law 
Series, (Univ of Virginia Pr, 198 1). 
9' Louse Henkin (2. ed) How Nations Behave (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 47. See 
also See, DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, (Sweet& Maxwell, 2004,6th ed, ), p. 3. 96 See 'Rule of law at risk around the world, says Secretary-General in address to General Assembly, ' 
UN Press Release SG/SM/949 1, GAII 025 8 (2004). 
9' See Harold Hongju Koh, 'Review: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, ' The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 106, No. 8, Symposium: Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and Religion (1997), pp. 2599-2659 1 
" UN Secretary-General, 'Rule of law at risk around the world, ' supra note 96. 99 Louse Henkin, 'International Law: Politics, Values and Functions'. 216 Recued Des Cours 9,86 (1989). 
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on ga new world order based on the rule of international law. "00 Finally, as portrayed 
by recent trends, in addition to being law, legal rules ought to be legitimate. 
Although the concept of legitimacy has traditionally been viewed as secondary and 
weaker compared to that of legality, it has acquired increased significance since Tom 
Frank's observation in the late 1980s that no one seemed to be asking fundamental 
questions about the legitimacy of international law. 101 Since then, the concept of 
legitimacy has attracted much attention across the disciplines of international politics, 
law and relations. 102 For international law, the growing pre-eminence of the concept 
of legitimacy is evident in the Independent International Commission's view that the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo was 'illegal but legitimate. ' 103 
Furthermore, key reports, such as that submitted by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)104 and the UN High Level Panel, 
105 make 
references to the five criteria of legitimacy against which the authority of action based 
on the doctrine of responsibility to protect should be measured. 
106 Importantly, as 
shall be shown in chapter seven, the AU's right to intervene has similarly been 
justified on the fact that it is not assigned to a single or particular group of states but 
to the AU collectively. In this regard, when acting collectively, the AU represents a 
100 A. Cassese, 'On the Current Trend Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
international Humanitarian Law', EM, Vol. 9 (1998) No. I. See also Kenneth Anderson, 'The Ottawa 
Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-govermnental Organizations and the 
Idea of International Civil Society', EM, Vol. 11 (2000). 
101 Frank, T., Why a quest for Legitimacy', 21 UCDavis Law Review (1987) 535. 
102 For a detailed analysis of the practice of legitimacy in international society, see Ian Clark, 
Legitimacy in international society (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). See also Thomas Frank, 
The Power ofLegitimacy Among Nations (New York, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1990), Thomas 
Frank, Why a quest for Legitimacy, ' supra note 101; Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (1995) 3841; Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', American 
Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 82, No. 4 (1988), pp. 705-759. See also Dworkin, Law's Empire 
(Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986) p. 176-224; Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in 
international politics', 53 International Organization (1999), 379. Roth, 'Governmental Illegitimacy in 
International Law', (Oxford University Press, 1999); See Weiler, ' The Geology of International Law- 
Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy', ZaoR V 64, No 3, (2004). 547-5 62. 
103 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo: Conflict, International response, 
Lessons Learnt, (Oxford 2000). 
104 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report ofthe International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Council, 2001) 
105 The Report of the United Nations High Level on Threats Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U. N. Doc. A/59/565,12, December 2004. 
106 See chapter eight. 
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community interest, and not just the interests of one single state and hence, is 
legitimate. 107 
Ian Hurd, a theorist in international relations, defines legitimacy as the 'normative 
belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. ' 108 For international 
lawyers, this definition would have to be connected to a legal rule through a pull of 
compliance towards an established legal system. Nevertheless, the concept of 
legitimacy has been defined to mean 'that quality of a rule which derives from a 
perception on the part of those it is addressed that it his come into being in 
accordance with right process. $109 Although legitimacy is useful in explaining why 
states abide by law, despite its lack of a centralised coercive authority, the concept is 
closely associated with international consensus and is thereby generally abstract and 
vague given the diversity of state and regional interests. 
Nevertheless, from the onset, it can be argued that international law is prima facie 
legitimate and should be obeyed simply by virtue of it being the law of the 
international community, as described above. This is because international law 
provides a fair framework for the conduct of international relations for different 
actors. ' 10 However, the reality of power politics, whiclý often strained multilateralism 
and made it vul , nerable 
to unilateralism, has often given good cause to question the 
legitimacy and credibility of international law, as it often proves unable to hold states 
accountable in their adherence to the law. "' 
Irrespective of the above, there is a common perception that community values and 
principles are more legitimate when undertaken collectively and that a given act is 
undertaken by a single state, rather than by the international community, makes it 
illegitimate. 112 A more extreme approach equates unilateralism with illegality. ' 13 This 
107 See chapter six. 
log Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in international politics', supra note 102. 
109 Thomas M. Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System', supra note 102. 110 See Thoma Franck, 'Fairness in International Law and Institutions', supra note 102; p. 3 84; 
Dworkin, 'Law's Empire, ' supra note 102, p. 176-224. 
111 It is within this context that some commentators have gone to the extent of stating that international 
law is in a legitimacy crisis. See Weiler, 'The Geology of International Law-Govemance, Democracy 
and Legitimacy', supra note 102. 
112 Dan Bodansky, ' What's So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment? ' EJIL, Vol. 11 
(2000) No. 2. 
113 ibid. 
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is in spite of the need to evaluate each particular unilateral action 'to determine 
whether, on the balance, it advances or detracts from the desired ends. ' 114 
Furthermore, the problem with the above presumption is that it ignores the reality that 
collective decision making 'often reflects the will of a particular state, or a small 
group of states, which can impose their will on others, rather than an 'authentic' 
decision of the international community. ' 115 
In demonstrating this point, Hans Morgenthau in his work on Political Limitations on 
the United Nations, noted that the establishment of the UN, which is primarily based 
on a historic event, 116 led to the institutionalisation of power politics, rather than to the 
latter's elimination. 117 It is within this context that the legitimacy of the Security 
Council has come into question as evidenced in the Secretary General's own 
admission that many 'decisions lack legitimacy in the eyes of the developing world, 
which feels that its views and interests are insufficiently represented among the 
decision-takers. ' 118 
In this context, Christine Chinkin makes the suggestion that there is no dichotomy, 
between unilateralism and collectivism. ' 19 Instead, she argues that the two merge into 
each other. 'What masquerades as collective action or inaction may be manipulated 
by a state with a particular interest or take in the issue, be dictated by a single strong 
actor through the threat or use of the veto, or by a single state taking the lead. " 20 This 
practice is manifest in the arm-twisting conducted by powerful states within Security 
Council that often to results in 'coalitions of the willing, ' which in the true sense 
amount to 'coalitions of the coerced. ' 121 In particular, reference is often made with 
114 ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 See chapters three and eight. 117 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace ((New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Fifth Edition, Revised, 1978). 
118 See Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, UN Doc., A/58/323,2 September 2003. 
119 Christine Chinkin, 'The State That Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan or Iconoclast? 
Multilateralism i la Carte: The Consequences of Unilateral 'Pick and Pay' Approaches', European 
Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 11 (2000) No. 1. 
120 Ibid 
121 See, Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis and John Cavanagh, Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced. - How the Bush Administration Influences Allies in its War on Iraq (Institute for Policy Studies Report, 2003). 
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respect to the 'arm-twisting' influence that the United States 
122 has in the Council, 123 a 
practice acknowledged by a former US Secretary of State. 
124 
Yemen's loss of a $70 million US aid package in 1990 after its refusal to vote in line 
with US interests in the Security Council is only one of the more cited illustrations of 
arm twisting. 125 Other examples include the threat by the US to block an extension of 
the UN mission in Bosnia, unless its nationals were protected from prosecution by the 
ICC126 in July 2002.127 Similarly, Security Council resolution 1593 of March 2005 '128 
with regard to the Darfur conflict was only agreed upon by the US on condition that 
it 
gave blanket immunity from prosecution to designated peacekeepers. 
129As shown in 
chapter eight, such behaviour by permanent members of the Council can 
itself 
engender a threat to peace and security. 
130 
Meanwhile, although this study heavily relies on the institutional methods of 
enforcement, particularly those undertaken by the UN and regional organisations, 
it 
deserves to be mentioned that states and international organisations are also capable 
"' For detailed discussion on US unilateralism, see Christian Tomuschat, 'Multilateralism in the Age 
of US Hegemony, in MacDonald, St John Johnston, D. M, 'Towards World Constitutionalism: 
Issues 
in the Legal Ordering of the World Community', (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005), p. 31-75; Robert F. 
Turner, American Unilateralism and the Rule of Law', in MacDonald, St John Johnston, D. M, 
'Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community' (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2005), p77-101; Feffer, John, 'Power Trip: U. S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy 
After September I V, (Seven Stories Press, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, 'A Grand Strategy, ' Foreign 
Policy (November/December 2002); The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States ofA merica, LeClue22,2008. See also J. R. Bolton, 'Is There Really 'Law' in International 
AffairsT Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 10 (2000); Ronald A. McDonald's Pron-dsed 
Land, Crusader State: American Encounter with the World Since 1776, (Houghton Mifflin, 1997) and 
John Lewis Gaddis's Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Harvard University Press, 
2004). 
123 See chapters three, five, eight and nine. 
124 Former US Secretary of State James Baker discussed U. S arm-twisting in his autobiography. See 
James A. Baker III, 'The Politics ofDiplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992'(New York: 
G. P. Putriam's Sons, 1995). See also Martin Walker, 'Baker's Quest for Bloodless Victory', The 
Guardian, 9 December, 1990 
125 ibid. 
126 For US policy regarding the International Criminal Court, see Jennifer K. Elsie,, US Policy 
Regarding the International Criminal Court, (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
2006). See also chapter nine. 
127 SC Res. 1422 (2002), 12 July 2002. 
128 SC ReS. 1593 (2005), 31 March, 2005. 
129 For discussion on the question of immunity and the relationship between the Security Council and 
the ICC, see Neha Jain, 'A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council 
and the International Criminal Court', 16 EJIL, (2005), 239. See also Robert Crier and N. D. White, 
'The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: Who is feeling Threatened? ' 8 Yearbook 
ofInternational Peacekeeping (2002), 141 and Carsten Stahn, 'The Ambiguities of Security Council 
Resolution 1422 (2002)', (2003) 14 EJIL 85. 
130 N. D VAiite, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 17 (2004), pp. 645-672. 
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of compelling other legal subjects to abide by the rule of law. These entities have 
traditionally enforced international obligations by utilising actions that inflict damage 
or deprives the violating state of the advantage of a privilege. 131 Mention should also 
be made of the functions of judicial and arbitration bodies such as the International 
Court of Justice, which is the primary judicial organ of the UN and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), 132 designated as 'the first new major international institution of 
the twenty-first century' 133 and is empowered to exercise its jurisdiction on 'the most 
serious crimes of international concern, ' 134 such as those committed in Darfur. 135 
One the regional front, the activity of regional organisations in the enforcement of law 
has dramatically increased in recent years. 136 It is in this context that the thesis aiMs to 
demonstrate the challenges and prospects of the AU's right of intervention, as a 
potential method of enforcement. 137 Clearly, its evolving architecture of peace and 
security has brought the debate on the function of regionalism within the international 
f CUS. 13 legal system to sharper 08 As shown in the coming chapters, when acting 
collectively, the AU perceives itself as representative of community value 
, 
s, and not 
just the interests of one single state and hence, is legitimate. With this regard, what is 
clear from the onset is the international community's clear favour of institutionalised 
methods of enforcement, as opposed to unilateral acts by states, some of which have 
now been rendered illegal, for example, reprisals. 139 
13 1 Georges Abi-Saab, 'Whither the International Community'? supra note 50. 132 On the ICC, see Benjamin Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court, (Cambridge 
University Press; 1 edition, 2008). Another important judicial institution is the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) established under the 1982 U. N Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). See, DP O'Connell, IA Shearer, The International Law ofthe Sea, (Oxford University 
Press, USA, 1984). 
133 D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds. ), The Permanent International Criminal Court: 
Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 40. See also see Oscar Solera, 
'Complementary jurisdiction and international criminal justice', International Review of the Red Cross (2002) No. 845, pp. 145-17 1. 133 See SC Res. 1593 (2005), March 31' 2005. ) 
134 Article I of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 135 See chapter nine. See SC/Res/l 593 (2005) adopted on March 3 l" 2005) 136 See chapter four. 
137 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the Affican Union. 138 See chapter two on the function of regionalisrn. 139 See Advismy Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in. 4med Conflict [1996] 1CJ Reports 226. 
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3.2. Conclusion 
This opening chapter introduced a conceptual and theoretical framework, including 
the key concepts informing the study, some of whose definitions and classifications, 
as well as relationships are elaborated in the coming chapters. Such an analysis offers 
valuable insights into current trends in international law, as they provide a forum 
through which existing practice may be measured, hence providing an important tool 
for enhancing scholarly debate, particularly in the area of peace and security, which 
forms the basic subject matter of this study. 
The first section argued that in spite of whether the international community, is 
'imagined, asserted or realized, ' 140 the world is 'no longer an ordered anarchy. '14'And 
although the peaceful coexistence of states has often seemed 'unachievable and 
illusionary, ' 142 it was shown that there are particular rules that bind all states, which 
can be referred to as universal international law. 143 These principles of universalism 
are not designed to protect the individual interests of states but to affirm the common 
interest of mankind. 144 In this regard, taking a constitutional approach, the peremptory 
norms have arguably led to 'verticalisation of international law. ' 145 
As will become clear from the coming chapters, the impact of these rules, including 
their gradual erosion of the doctrine of state sovereignty, 146 demonstrate 'an emerging 
international constitutional order consisting of an international community, an 
140 Dino Kritsiotis; 'Imagining the International Community, ' supra note 13. 
14 1 Brun-Otto Bryde, 'International Democratic Constitutionalism', in MacDonald, St John Johnston, D. 
M, 'Towards World Constitutionalism, 'supra note 122, p. 104-125. 
142 Quoted in Ruth Wedgwood, 'Unilateral Action in the UN System' European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 11 (2000) No. 2. Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress Regarding the 
Yalta Conference, March 1945, President's Personal File 1820, (speech 1572), FDR Library, Hyde 
Park, New York. Also in the Department of State, Bulletin, 4h March 1945, vol 12, at 321-326. See T. 
Hoopes and D. Brinkely , FRD and the Creation of the United Nations (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1997) 172-179. 
143 C. G. Weeramantry, Universalising International law (Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). 
144 See Brun-Otto Bryde, 'International Democratic Constitutionalism', in MacDonald, St John 
Johnston, D. M, 'Towards World Constitutionalism, 'supra note 122, pp. 104-125. 145 ibid. 
146 See B. S. Chirnni, 'International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making', 
European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 15 (2004) No. 1. See also James N. Rosenau, 
'Organizational Proliferation in a Changing World, ' in Issues in Global Governance (Kluwer, 1995), 
pp. 371-403; Christoph Schreuer, 'The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for international Law? ', 4 EJIL, (1993), 447,469; A. Cassese, International Law, supra note 4, p. 10. 
40 
international value system and rudimentary structures for its enforcement. ' 147 
However, as shown throughout the thesis, the problem of enforcing international legal 
obligations has continued to significantly affect the legitimacy of international law. 148 
This anomaly is attributed to the lack of a central authority, which means that most of 
its legal functions are, to a large extent, decentralised. 149 
Therefore, as shown in chapters two and three, the horizontal nature of this system 
traditionally promoted realist notions and meant that it was largely up to each state to 
decide how to handle their disputes either, peacefully or forcefully, unilaterally or 
collectively. Nevertheless, given the special nature of fundamental community values, 
unilateral enforcement has been perceived as 'the one that puts the triumph of its 
interests before that of the collective interest' 156 and therefore, 'dangerous and 
ultimately counter-productive. ' 151 Furthermore, prevailing conditions suggest that 
'history is on the move from state sovereignty to international community, ' 152 within 
'a space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has largely 
broken down. ' 153 
Therefore, bearing in mind the deficiency of the UN system, 154 this thesis switches the 
focus to other institutions, which arguably possess the legality and sufficient 
legitimacy to carry out the enforcement of community values on behalf of the 
international community. Using the model provided by regional organisations, in 
particular the AU, it argues that it is their coherent cooperation, and not their 
opposition to universality, which should lie at the heart of the debate. 
147 See, Erika de Wet, 'The International Constitutional Order', supra note 55. See also Bruno Simma 
and Dirk Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, ' EJIL, 
2006 17(3): 483-529; Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and 
International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992). 
. 148 Jacob Katz Cogan, 'Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law', The Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol 31 No. 1 (2006). 
149 A. Cassese, International Law, supra note 4, p. 4; Higgins R, Problems andprocess, supra note 75, 
P; 039. Dupuy, P. -M. 'The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law', European 
Journal ofInternational Law, It (2000) pp. 19-30. 15' Sibylle Kapferer, 'En 
, 
ds and Means in Politics: International Law as Framework for Political 
Decisionmaking', in Paul Eden, September, 1] 2001: A Tuming Point in International Law? ' 
(Transnational Publishers inc., 2005) p. 26. 
152 Koskenniemi, ' Repetition as Reform: George Abi Saab Cours G6n6ral de droit international public', 9 EJIL (1998) 104, at 411. 
153 Nico, Krisch* and Benedict Kingsbury, 'Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the Intemational Legal Order', EJIL 2006 17(l): 1-13.0, ý 
154 See chapters three and eight. 
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Chapter Two 
The Function of Regionalism within the International 
Legal System 
A: Introduction 
One of the most notable trends in international law is the increasing emphasis placed 
on the important role of regionalism within the international legal system. The effect 
of the regionalism phenomenon on universalism at a time of rapid globalisation has 
been the subject of intense study and analysis by international lawyers, I political 
scientists, 2 historianS3 and economists. 4 These diverse schools of thought grapple with 
the question: does regionalism embodied in regional organisations encourage or 
discourage the trend towards the attainment of universally shared values, such as 
those discussed in chapter one? However, and somewhat unfortunately for many 
international legal commentators, while these disciplines, through their respective 
methodologies, may advance the understanding of this subject, one may still have a 
few misgivings regarding their findings. 
Indeed, a serious problem with this debate is that, with a few exceptions, its focus has 
largely been dominated by a narrow empirical focus on Europe, North America and 
the Pacific-Asia region. 5 This means that the origins, dynamics and 
institutionalisation, along with the effects of regionalism in other parts of the globe 
and its application on a universal scale have been severely restrained. It therefore 
follows that there needs to be a rethinking of the examination of this concept, and in 
particular an informed scrutiny of the impact of other regions, such as those in Africa, 
1 Christoph Schreuer, 'Regionalism v. Universalism', European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol 6, 
ý1995) No. 3. 
L. Fawcett &A Hurrell, (eds. ), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and 
International Order (Oxford: 1996); Pitman B. Potter, 'Universalism Versus Regionalism in 
International Organization, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 37, No. 5. (Oct., 1943), pp. 
850-862. 
3 G. Lundestad, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945-1997, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); L. Fawcett, 'Regionalism in Historical Perspective' in L. 
Fawcett, & A. Hurrell, . Regionalism in World Politics, (Oxford, 1995). 4 Andrew T. Guzman& Alan 0. Sykes, Research Handbook in International Economic Law, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2007); Tsuneo Akaha, Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Pomfret Richard, The Economics ofRegional Trading Arrangements, (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
5 Ademola Abass, Regional Organizations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond 
Chapter VIII Of The UN Charter (Hart Publishing Ltd., 2004), p. xxiv. 
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South America and the rest of Asia, have on universalism. However, when faced with 
a universal system divided into a diverse array of states, regions, and organisations, it 
is difficult to convincingly come up with comprehensive results outlining the specific 
function of regionalism in the international legal system. Nevertheless, the present 
chapter shows the role of regionalism in the development of international law and sets 
the background for the discussion with regard to the potential that Africa possesses in 
the development of peace and security. 
B: Aims, Purposes and Structure 
The object of this chapter is to look at the developing impact of regionalism with a 
particular focus on regional trends in the area of peace and security. It argues that the 
function of regionalism in the birth and development of the current legal system, 
confirms its potential to bring unprecedented opportunities for peace and security, as 
shown in chapter four and part three of the thesis. Importantly, this chapter fits in 
with the central theme of this study, which addresses the developing relationship 
between the concept of universalism and regionalism, including their strengths and 
limitations within the international system. - 
In order to achieve its aims, the discussion herein is divided into three parts. The first 
section looks at the asserted role of regionalism in the history and evolution of 
universalism and the balance of power. This is achieved through a chronological 
analysis of the birth and development of international law, which emanated from 
regionalism. Therefore, the section traces the journey of European regional law of the 
10h and 17th centuries, whose universality attained its pinnacle with the penetration of 
Europe into the Americas, Asia, Africa and other regions in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, mainly by way of colonialism and other 'civilization' missions. Here, 
it is noted that, although there has been a decline in the accusations that rules of 
international law are rooted in Euro centrism, 'suspicions remains that they are 
simply the fruits of cultural history belonging to the West. 6 
The second section looks at the key factors influencing the rapid growth and 
development of regionalism in the 20'h century and thereafter. Having demonstrated 
6 P. Ricoeur, Oneselfas Another ( trans. K. Blamely, 1992), pp. 262-263. 
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its chameleonic evolution in the American, European, African, the Middle East and 
Asian regions, this section sets the background for an introduction of the 
contemporary function of regionalism in peace and security, particularly in the 
protection of universally shared values, such as those that seek to protect human 
rights. This discussion is followed by section three which presents the key questions 
that will fall for in-depth examination throughout the study, including the legal 
capacity, competence and viability of regional organisations in peace and security 
functions, particularly those touching upon peremptory norms of international law. 
What will become clear is the rejection of the hypothesis stating that a series of acts 
by a fragmented system of regional organisations necessarily leads to a collapse of 
the universal system. 
1.1 The Birth of European Regionalism as the Source of Universalism 
Universalism in its historic context is rooted in the Stoic-Christian premise that 
advances the view 'that mankind as a whole forms a moral-legal unity anchored in 
natural law. ' 7 In this regard, 'the international society adheres to the ideals of 
universality, 8 through accepted rules of universal law that are all binding. 9 In its 
original form, this presumption can be traced to the influential work of St. Augustine 
of Hippo, one of most respected thinkers of the Middler Ages. In his City of God, 
Augustine wrote of one divine order of God which would be reflected in the one 
earthly order of Rome; 'God himself gave dominion to the Romans. '10 
However, the origin of universalism in its present structure has traditionally been 
traced to the 16'h century and in particular, the Thirty Years' War involving the major 
countries of Europe. Largely based, but not necessarily restricted, to religious grounds 
between Catholic and Protestant countries, it evolved into an all-out struggle for 
military and political hegemony in Europe. " The war narrowed down to the intense 
7 Bruno Simma, 'The Contribution of Alfred Verdoss to the Theory of International Law, ' EJIL, Vol. 6 
(1995) No. 1. See also Christoph Schreuer, 'Regionalism v. Universalism' supra note 1. 
Francisco Orrego Vicufta, International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving Global Society: 
Constitutionalization, Accessibility, Privatization, (Cambridge University Press (2004), p. I. See W. W 
Rostow, 'The Coming Age of Regionalism. A 'Metophor' for our Time?, ' LXXIV(. 5), Encounter, 
(June 1990), p. 3-7. 
9 C. G. Weeramantry, Universalising International law, (Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). 
10 St. Augustine, The City of God, (Modem Library, 1994). 
11 Gutmann, Myron P. 'The Origins of the Thirty Years' War', Journal oflnierdisciplinary History, 
Vol. 18, No. 4. (1988), pp. 749-770; Langer, Herbert. The Thirty Year's War. (Poole, England: 
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struggle that ensued between two warring factions. 12 On one hand were the 
guniversalist' actors, who were members of the Habsburg dynasty. i. e the emperor and 
the Spanish King. On the other hand lay the 'particularist' actors Le the Denmark, 
Dutch Republic, France, Sweden and the German Princes. ' 3 
The universalists asserted their right, and that of the Pope, to control Christendom in 
its entirety. Meanwhile the particularists rejected the imperial lordship of the 
emperors and challenged the authority of the Pope by upholding the sovereignty and 
full indepndence of the state. 14 This chain of events led to the final settlement of 
Westphalia (1648), which displayed the classic tension between unilateralism, 
regionalism and universalism in international relations. In essence, the settlement 
reached at Westphalia was designed 'to undermine the hegemonic aspirations of the 
Habsburgs. ' 15 According to Michael Sheehan, the peace 'refuted the aspirations of the 
papacy and the Holy Roman Empire to recreate a single Christian imperium' 16 while 
Hedley Bull adds that the settlement 'marked the end of Habsburg pretentions to 
17 18 
universal mornarchy' and put a halt to their aspiration of a 'supranational empire. ' 
Furthermore, the Peace of Westphalia saw not only the end of a brutal war that had 
caused 'great effusion of Christian blood and the desolation of several provinces, ' 19 it 
also led to the rapid decline of the church . 
20 The further disintegration of the Empire 
in turn resulted in the establishment of independent and equal units as a way of 
Blandford Press, 1980); Rein Milllerson, Vus Ad Bellum: Plus Qa Change (Le Monde) Plus C'Est La 
M8me Chose (Le Droit)? ', Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7(2): 2002,149-190; J. V. Poligenský, 
'The Thirty Years'War and the Crises and Revolutions of Seventeenth-Century Europe', Past and 
Present, No. 39. (Apr., 1968), pp. 34-43; C. V. Wedgwood, and Paul Kennedy, Thirty Years War (New 
York: The New York Review of Books, Inc., 2005); Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War., Armed Conflicts 
and International Order, 1648-1989, (Cambridge University Press, 199 1); Antonin Gindely, History of 
the Thirty Years' War, (Putnam, 1884). 
12 Andreas Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth', International 
Organization, , vol. 55, issue 2, (2001) pp. 251-287. 13 ibid. 
14 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford Press, 2005), p. 23. Is David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1998), p. 290. See also Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Dictionary of World Politics (New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
'6 Michael Sheehan, The Balance ofPowen History and Theory, (London: Routledge 1996), p. 38. 17 H. Bull, Anarchical Society (Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 32. Is Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics: Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas andInstitutions, (London: Havester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 420. 19 See Preamble of Munster 1648. 
20 Antonio Cassese, International Law, supra note 14. p. 24. 
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ensuring peace and stability in Europe. 21 However, as will become clear throughout 
the thesis, the historic events surrounding the Peace of Westphalia went beyond the 
shores of Europe and penetrated further into other regions to establish an international 
system based upon the independence and sovereign equality of states. 22 Certainly, as 
shown below, these events were to have major repercussions for the American, the 
Middle East, Asian and Africa regions. 23 
Meanwhile, the sovereignty of states that emerged denoted the competence, 
independence and legal equality of states that became prominent through the 17th, 
18th and 19th centuries. 24 However it was not until December 1933 that the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, itself a regional treaty, 
was signed and thereby set out the four criteria for statehood. Basically, in order to 
qualify as a state, an entity had to possess a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states. 25 As will be shown throughout this study, the doctrine of sovereignty of states 
based on this model, though constantly challenged, lies at the heart of the post 1945 
international legal system, three hundred and sixty years later. 26 It is against this 
background that a key theme of this thesis addresses the tension between the 
imperatives of state sovereignty and recent demands for the protection of human 
rights, which portrays a paradigmatic shift. 
Meanwhile, the state system established by the Peace of Westphalia meant that the 
new international community belonging to different geographical, political, cultural 
and religious backgrounds in Europe would enter into relations by signing treaties 
both with one another and also with other states that the European region had come 
21 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia, ' International Security 20 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 
115. 
22 Martti Koskenniemi, 'International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal', EJIL, vol. 16, 
ý2005) No. 1. 
24 
On its impact on Africa, see chapter five. 
Antonio Cassese, International Law, supra note 14, p. 24. 
25 See article I of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933. See also 
Opinion No I., Badinter Arbitration Committee, Arbitration Commission, EC Conference on 
Yogoslavia, November 29,1991.92 11r. 162. 
26 See article 2(l) & (7) of the UN Charter. See ICJ decision in the Corfu Channel case, (UK v. 
Albania) ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4. On a summary of the scope and significance of state sovereignty, see Nico Shrijiver, 'The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty', The British Year Book ofInternational Law 1999 ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 69-70. 
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into contact with. 27 Therefore, treaties were conducted with the Mogul Empire in 
India, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, China, Japan, Burma, Siam (Thailand), Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Haiti and later, with the Americas. 28 During this period, Europe remained the 
'theatre of World History' and where 'World Spirit' found its home. 29 As shown 
below, the contact which Europe made with other regions entrenched major principles 
whose Western characteristics ensured that for centuries to come, international law 
remained mainly EurocentriC. 30 
1.2 The Importation of the Westphalian State System to Non-European Regions 
The international law based on the Westphalian state system that became prominent in 
Europe through the 17th, 18t" centuries was to be later imposed in an imperialistic 
manner during the 19'h and the first half of the 20th centurieS. 31 As demonstrated in 
this section, this was primarily achieved by way of colonialism whereby European 
states extended their sovereignty over the territories which they acquired through 
conquest. 32 Led by Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Portugal, colonial powers 
penetrated into Asia, Middle East, America and Africa and partitioned these regions 
into independent units, which eventually met the legal status of statehood as outlined 
by the Montevideo Convention, described above. 
Furthermore, the artificial creation of these states was further entrenched by the 
principle of uti possidetis juris, a European concept that emanated from the Roman 
republic'sjus civile, which was originally aimed at the settlement of private property 
27 Antonio Cassese, International Law, supra note 14, p. 25. Matti Koskinicnuni, 'Legacy of the 19'h 
Century', Paper given at Erik Castr6n Institute of International Law and Human Rights, 2007. 
Available at http: //www. helsinki. fi/eci/Publications/Talks 
- 
Papcrs_MK. htm. 
28 Antonio Cassese, International Law, supra note 14, p. 25. 
29 ibid. 
30 Y Onuma, 'When was the Law of International Society Bom? -An Inquiry of the History of 
International Law from an Intercivilisation Perspective', Journal of the History ofInternational Law 2 
(2000)1-66. 
31 Emmanuelle Jouannet, 'Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International 
Law? ' EJIL, Vol. 1, No. 3, (2007). 
32 On the importation of international law through colonialism, see generally, Anthony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2005); Martti, Koskeniernmi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006); Martti Koskeniemmi, 77ie Gentle Civiliser 
of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Mutua, wa Makau, 'Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, ' 16 
Michigan Journal ofInternational Law (1995), 1113; Okafor, Obiora Chinedu, 'Newness, Imperialisrn, 
and International Legal Reform in our Time; A Twail Perspective, ' 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
171(2005); Okafor, Obiora, Chinedu, 'The Third World, International Law and the Post 9/1 lEra: An 
Introduction, ' 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, (2005), 1. 
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conflicts between citizens. 33 However, this norm was later established as a binding a 
nascent international norm with regard to Latin America and, whose status as a 
principle of international law, was later judicially confirmed in each of the main 
regions, including Aftica, 34 the Middle East '35 the AmericaS36 and Asia . 
37 
Having evolved from its European origins and developed in Latin America, the 
journey of the principle of utis possidetis finally reached its pinnacle in the African 
38 continent, as shown in chapter five. Now a well recognised rule of international law, 
the ICJ in Burkina FasolMali case affirmed that its purpose 'lies in its primary aim of 
securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is 
achieved. v 39 However, in another ruling, the ICJ Chamber cautioned that the uti 
possidetis juris is essentially 'a retrospective principle, investing as international 
boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes. 40 
Furthermore, in apparent superiority over the rights of people under alien domination, 
the principle of uti possidefis juris prevails over the well established principle of self 
determination . 
41 This is in spite of the overwhelming consensus on the importance of 
the right to determination as expressed in the principles and purposes of the UN 
42 43 44 Charter, General Assembly Declarations, resolutions, and judicial, decisions, 45 as 
33 J. Moore, 'Memorandum on Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration 191 V, The Collected 
Papers ofJohn Bassett Moore, vol. 111 (1944) p. 328; M Shaw, 'The Heritage of States: The Principle 
of Uti Possidetis Juris Today', 67 B YbIL (1996) 75, at 98. 34 See the Burkina FasolMali case, ICJ Reports (1986), at 565. See also the Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal 
case, 83 ILR, at 35; and the Libya/Chad case, ICJ Reports (1994), at 83 et seq. (Judge Ajibola); 3' The DubailSharjah case, 91 JLR 543, at 578. 
36 The El SalvadorlHonduras case, ICJ Reports (1992) 35 1. 
37 The Temple case, ICJ Reports (1962) 6, at 16. 38 M. Shaw, 'Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries', EJIL, Vol 8. (1997) No. 3. 
39 ICJ Reports (1986) 554, at 566. 
40 The Land island and Maritime Dispute ICJ Reports (1992) 351, at 386. 41 See EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, supra note 22, Opinion No. 2 (1992) ILR. 42 See articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter. 43 See GA Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations, 1970; and common article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 44 See e. g. GA Res. 1755 (XVII), 1962; 2138 (XXI), 1966; 2151 (Y-XI), 1966; 2379 (XXIII), 1968; 2383 (XXIII), 1968; and SC Res. 183 (1963); 301 (1971); 377 (1975) and 384 (1975). 45 Namibia Case, ICJ Reports (1971) 16, at 3 1; Western Sahara Case, ICJ Reports (1975) 12, at 3 1; the Burkina FasolMali case, ICJ Reports (1986) 554, at 567 and Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, 83 JLR 1, at 24; the East Timor Cases, ICJ Reports (1995) 90, at 102. 
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well as by commentators. 46 However, the uti possidetis juris norm has been justified 
as essential to preserve what was achieved by the people who have struggled for their 
independence. 47 Yet, the norm's application beyond the colonial context has been 
confirmed by the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission which held that; 'though initially 
applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, ' the principle of uti 
possidetis 'is today recognised as a general principle. 948 Having said so, European 
states have seemingly since abandoned their imperial conquests and emphasised on 
the right to self determination, particularly where it serves their'national interests. 
This is visibly clear from the recognition and support by some major European 
powers of Kosovo's unilateral secession from Serbia in 2008, which challenged the 
principle of the inviolability of borders. Nevertheless, there still exists 'a double 
imposition for most European states: the need to repudiate their imperial past, while 
clinging resolutely to the belief that there can be no alternative to the essentially 
European liberal democratic state. 49 
1.3 The Further Universalisation of European Law: The Evolution of History 
Having entrenched the principle of uti possidetis, other rules of European nature 
spread on a near universal scale as colonial conquests made further in roads across the 
major regions throughout the 15th- 19th centuries. 50 Meanwhile in Europe, the early 
debates centred on the supremacy of international law over domestic law. During this 
time, the conservatives insisted on the sovereignty of the state and the primacy of 
46 For literature on self determination, see generally, Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 'Self Determination', in 0. 
Schachter and C. Joyner (eds. ), United Nations Legal Order, vol. I (1995) 349; U. 0. Umozurike, Self- 
Determination in International Law ((Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972); R. A. Sureda, The 
Evolution ofthe Right ofSelf-Detemination: A study of United Nations practice, (Leiden: A. W. 
Sijthoff, 1973); M. Shukri, The Concept ofSelf-Detemination in the United Nations ((Al Jadidah Press, 
Damascus, 1965)); M. Pornerance, SeV-Determination in Law and Practice: 7he New Doctrine in the 
United Nations (The Hague/Bostori/London, 1982); H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self- 
Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1990); M. N. Shaw, Title to Territory in 
Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, l 986), p. 59-144; M. N. Shaw, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003 ). C. Tomuschat (ed. ), Modern Law ofSelf- 
Determination (London: Martinus, Nijhoff, 1993); A. Cassese, Sey-'Determination ofPeoples 
(Cambridge University, 1995); T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 5; R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How 
We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), ch. 7; C. Br6lmann, K Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds. ), 
Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Dordrechtý Boston and London, 1993); Koskenniemi, 
'National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice', 43 ICLQ (1994) 24. 
47 See chapter five. 
48 Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. ý 3,92 ILR 168. 49 A Pagden, The Idea ofEurope. From Antiquity to the European Union, (Cambridge University Press 
2002). 
50 Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making ofInternational Law, supra note 32 
49 
51 domestic jurisdiction. On the other hand, scholars such as Grotius, while determined 
to support the legal supremacy of international law over domestic law, accepted that 
international law contained a regional character, due to the fact that 'saepe in una 
parte orbis terrarum estjus gentium quod allbi non est. 
52 
Given that 'colonialism defined much of the international. law and politics of the 20th 
century, ' Koskenniemi observes that the 'pursuits of 'universal' international law 
cannot be understood without reference to the colonial experience., 
53 Even 
international lawyers of that period were said to be 'enthusiastic colonialiStS, 154 as 
evidenced in their pleasure at the allotment of the Congo to King Leopold at the 
Berlin Conference of 1885.55 Indeed, many assumed that the progression to the 
realisation of the idea of a Kantian universal law could only be achieved through the 
civilising activity of European law. 56 
However, the First World War has been said to have 'marked the passing of the 
'European Age. 57 Nevertheless, it was also during this period that colonialism was 
incorporated as a 'science' within the Mandates system of the then newly established 
League of Nations in the 1920's. 58 As it turned out, despite its attempts at universal 
application, the League consisted of European states and thereby remained, to a large 
extent, a regional organisation. 59 In the end, although it was regionalism, albeit 
European, that had led to the development of the international system, including the 
creation of the League, the poor drafting of article 21 of the League Covenant 
51 Ernmanuelle Jouannet, 'Universalism and Imperi alisrn, ' supra note 3 1; Matti Koskeniemmi, 'Legacy 
of the 19th Century', supra note 27. 
52 Translates into, 'Often in one part of the world there is a law of nations which is not found 
elsewhere. ' Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace, 1625), vol. I, ch. I, para: 14. 
Quoted by Vierucci in Vierucci, Luisa VEU: A Regional Partner of the United Nations', EU-ISS 
Chaillot Paper 12, December 1993. 
51 Matti Koskinienuni, 'Legacy of the ISO Century, supra note 27. 
54 ibid. 
51 See the declaration of the Institut de droit international on the occasion of the 1885 Berlin 
conference, 8 Annuaire de Nnstitut de droit international (1885-1886), 17-18. See also The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations, ' supra note 32, p 155-156. 
56 Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Civilising Mission: International Law and the Colonial Encounter in the 
Late 19d' Century, Paper given at Rechtshistorikertag, Bonn 12-17 September 2004, available at 
http: //www. helsinki. fi/eci/Publications/Talks 
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Papers 
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MK. htrrL 
57 A. Cassese, International Law, supra notý 14, p. 30. See also R. Albert-Carrie, The Meaning of the 
First World War, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice, (1965), p vi. " Matti Koskiniemmi 'Legacy of the 10 Century', supra note 27. 
51 Ibid. 
59 See chapter three. Christoph Schreuer, 'Regionalism V. Universalism', supra note 1. 
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concerning regional organisations partly led to its demiSe. 60 However, as shown in 
chapter three, it was the failure of this organisation to prevent World War II that 
marked its fatal end and thereby replaced by the TJN in 1945, which devised a key 
role for regionalism. 61 
In contrast to the earlier regime, the decolonisation process that was triggered by the 
new UN system saw the dramatic increase in its membership, especially in the 1960s, 
which 'not only led to a strengthening of the groups of African and Asian states, but 
also to a newly discovered self-confidence of Members from these 'new regions. ' s62 
Indeed, it was during this time that the traditional Eurocentric approaches to 
international law and its purported universal application became susceptible to a 
certain degree of resistance from other regions. This is particularly due to the fact that 
it had more to say about Europe than about any real universality of international law. 
Unsurprisingly, African and Asian states emerged at the forefront to challenge the 
63 rules of international law. However, it deserves to be mentioned that the entry of 
European law to other regions had first been challenged at the turn of the 20'h century 
when America engaged in the debate on the rules that were appropriate for the 
continent. 64 Subsequently, the regional policy that followed echoed the Monroe 
Doctrine (1823), which famously proclaimed that 'the American continents [ ... ] are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European 
power 65 and affirmed that the United States would steer clear of European affairs. 66 
60 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS 
Compared'African Security Review Vol 10 No 2,2001. 
61 See chapter four. 
62 Christoph Schreuer, 'Regionalism v. Universalism', supra note 1. 63 Abi-Saab (ed. ), The Concept ofInternational Organization, (UNESCO: Paris 198 1). On Afro-Asian 
attitude towards colonial international law, see F. E. Snyder and S. Sathirathai (eds. ), Third World 
Attitudes toward International Law: An Introduction, (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987). 
64 See A. Alvarez, 'International Life and International Law in America', 74 Bulletin of the Pan 
American Union (1940) 232. 
65 See President Monroe's Annual Message to Congress, December 2,1823. 
66 For a detailed account of the Monroe Doctrine, see James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897, (James D. Richardson, vol. 4, ed., 1920), pp. 385- 416; Ernest R. May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1975); Frederick Merk, 71e Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843-1849, (New 
York: Knopf, 1966); Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of US. Empire, (Duke University Press, 2005); Joel S. Poctker, The Monroe Doctrine, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc, 1967); Donald Dozer, The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance, (New York: Knopf, 1965). 
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Meanwhile, many developing states, although not rejecting international law in its 
entirety, argued that they were under colonial domination during its formative years 
and since they played no real part in the structure of the law, 
67 they were not bound 
by rules which they did not help create. 68 However, the decision to make their 
arguments in specific contexts was calculated in a manner that avoided the rejection 
of the various rules of international law that operated to their advantage. 
69 Hence, in 
as much as they were defending their own interests, they were also expressing, 
forcefully, the direction which international law should take. 
70 In doing so, the 
tensions that emerged over certain values aligned states into national and regional 
groupings to further shape and affirm the universality of certain principles of law, 
some of which were discussed in the previous chapter. 
71 
1.4 Reconciling European Regional Values with Universal Principles 
International law, both past and present, has been said to represent a paradox. This 
irony stems from its reflection of a Western culture 'while at the same time claiming 
not only to internationalize it but also to almost universalize the values that it 
conveys. M For Anghie, international law's attempts at universality have always been 
animated by the 'civilizing mission. v 73 And it was during the colonial period that the 
importation of western 'civilisation' techniques in non-European regions elevated this 
law to become truly universal. 74 Therefore, its importation of Christianity, secular 
67 See O. C. Okafor, 'After Martydom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction 
Legitimate Statehood in Africa', 41 Hary, Int 7 L. J 513 (2000). 
68 See Akehurst, Modem Introduction to International Law (Routledge 7tb ed, 1997). For an analysis of 
Afro-Asian attitude towards colonial international law, see T. O. Elias, Africa and the Development of 
International Law (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972); F. E. Snyder and S. Sathirathai (eds), Third World Attitudes 
toward International Law: An Introduction ( Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987); R. P. Anand, 'The Role of 
Asian States in the Development of International Law' in R-J. Dupuy (ed. ), The Future ofInternational 
Law in a Multicultural World (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983) p. 105. 
69 Higgins R, Problems andprocess: international law and how we use it, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 
Q006) p. 11. 
0 Pieffe-Marie Dupuy, 'Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to 
Universal Values: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi, ' EJIL, Vol 16 (2005) No. 1; Higgins R, 
Problems and process, ibid, p. 11. 
71 On the influence of regionalism to universal law, see Robert Jennings, 'Universal International law 
in a Multicultural World' in Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie, Liber Amicorumfor Lord Wilberforce 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) also published in Collected Essays ofSir Robert Jennings 
(The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) p. 341. See also C. G. Weeramantry, Universalising International Law, 
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73 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making ofInternational Law, supra note 32. See 
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statehood and other forms of 'civilisation' through shrewd colonialism means that its 
legitimacy is often susceptible to doubt. Meanwhile for others, the tensions between 
the universal and regional values lie at 'a deeper level' of that 'between the rational 
and cultural. 975 
Nevertheless, Europe has been accused of engaging in the common trend of 
'mistaking one's preferences and interests for one's traditions' and then treating them 
as universal. 76 Therefore, according to an African scholar, Ali Mazrui, European 
civilization, has habitually been a pretender to the status of universal validity. 
77 On 
the other hand, Koskenniemi seems to defend the Eurocentric nature of international 
law when he argues that '[tlhe fact that international law is European language does 
not even slightly stand in the way of its being capable of expressing something 
universal. v 78 This is because, as he argues, the universal has no voice and 'no 
authentic representative of its own. ' 79 
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that the 'voice' of universal 
is often expressed in various treaties and customs, particularly those protecting 
peremptory norms which possess universal reach across all regions. 
80 And these 
values also exist in other forms, such as, religious, cultural and traditional norms. For 
example, from an Islamic point of view, mankind is 'one nation'81 whose 'dignity 
should be inviolable. ' 82 Similarly 'collective unity is not something new or peculiar to 
Africa. ' 83 Indeed, the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which translates as humanity 
towards others, also emphasises the ethical conduct expected of mankind. 84 
Sovereignty and the Making ofInternational Law, supra note 32; Martti Koskenniemi, 'International 
Law in Europe, ' supra note 22. 
'5 Emmanuelle Jouannet, 'Universalism and Imperialism, ' supra note 3 1. 
76 See, Martti Koskenniemi, 'International Law in Europe, ' supra note 22. 
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Meanwhile, Koskenniemi also ignores the cosmopolitan nature of the contemporary 
international legal system. As shown in chapter one, in addition to sovereign states, an 
array of legal subjects and values within the international community exist and 
operate on the universal and regional scales to form the most active component of 
international legal SoCiCty. 85 These entities operate within a legal system which 'like a 
modem constitution' not only 'comprises of principles and rules, but also basic 
values. 3,86 Nevertheless, despite its noble claims to universality, the law is accused of 
concealing hidden political, social and cultural forces which immediately raises 
doubts about its motives. 87 
In this context, the compulsion to look behind the seemingly humanist motives of 
powerful states in their advancement of assistance to developing countries is visible 
in an African expression explaining the dilemma facing its natives subsequent to the 
earlier civilising missions. The famous Bantu saying precedes that; 'At first we had 
the land and the white man had the bible. Now we have the Bible and the white man 
has the land. ' 88 However, this is to not to deny the existence of 'genuine humanists 
and genuine liberals, sharing an authentic faith and thoroughly convinced of the 
rightness of their cause. 89The point here is that certain principles which were 
traditionally thought as universal have also been accused of being imperialist in 
nature. 90 
This reasoning has been extended to the application and enforcement of peremptory 
norms. Hence, Koskenniemi argues that the rules ofjus cogens and obligations erga 
omnes, described in chapter one, do not necessarily express anything universal and 
are more or less used in hegemonic struggles. 91 He argues thatjus cogens are merely 
used as a pretext by powerful states as a smokescreen in order to further their selfish 
85 For a detailed criticism of Martti Koskennien-d , see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values, ' supra note 70. 86 C. Tornuschat, 'International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century', Receuil des Cours (1999), p. 23, at 28. " Higgins R, Problems andprocess, supra note 69 p. 11; A Cassese, International Law, supra note. 14, 
ri 27; Martti Koskenniemi, 'International Law in Europe, ' supra note 22. 
See H. L. Menckcns, New Dictionary of Quotations, (Knopf, 194 1). 89 Emmanuelle Jouannet, 'Universalism and Imperialism, ' supra note 3 1. See generally M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Ovilizer ofNations, ' supra note 32. " Emmanuelle Jouannet, 'Universalism and Imperialism, ' supra note 3 1. 91 See, Martti Koskenniemi, 'International Law in Europe, ' supra note 22. Koskenniemi, 'International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 Cambridge Review ofInternational, 4ffairs (2004) 197. 
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interests. 92 However, while appreciating the unilateralist propensity and hegemonic 
power of certain states, 93 the problem with this argument is that the rules of jus 
cogens are part of 'a higher law, 04 incapable of being measured by way of economic, 
political or military might. 
Therefore, despite the possible truth in this argument, the assertion thatjus cogens are 
manipulated by western states to further their own aims is questionable. Indeed, the 
rules are a matter of law and do not prevent a powerful state from intervening in a 
case of breach of jus cogens e. g. under the obligation to 'prevent and punish' 95 
genocide simply because it is also in its national interests. The problem here seems to 
be the selective nature of powerful states in their purported crusade in support of the 
rules ofjus cogens, and not the legitimacy with regard to the universal application of 
these rules. Therefore in a response to Koskenniemi, Dupuy argues that more efforts 
'should be directed at reminding powerful states that their convictions, which favour 
the international legal system at the universal level, should be carried out 
consistently. 96 
Having traced the function of regionalism in the birth and development of 
international law, the rest of this chapter considers its current function within the 
present system. What becomes obvious from the discussion below is that as the 
universalisation of legal principles intensifies, each region on the globe seeks to 
consolidate its strength by putting its own values on the universal table while at the 
same time adjusting and regionalising the commonly agreed values to suit its own. 
2.1 The Key Factors Influencing the Growth and Development of Regionalism in 
the 20th Century and Beyond 
As Western values battled and interacted with those of other regions, European law 
continued to shape the international legal, system. Based on geographical relationship 
and mutual interdependence, states continued to interact through bilateral and 
regional agreements at the turn of the 20'h century. During this time, regionalism grew 
92 See, Martti Koskennierni, 'International Law in Europe, ' ibid. 
93 See chapter one. 
94 Gennady M. Danilenko, 'Intemational Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making', EJIL, Vol. 2 (199 1) No. 
I. 
95 See article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1949. 96 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values, ' supra note 70. 
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in a chameleonic manner, which included constant transfortnation of regional 
organisations in order to meet the demands of the evolving international 
community, 97 as shown in chapter four. Therefore, what will become clear here is that 
the concept of regionalism has not always necessarily been desired, but has resulted 
from what has been perceived as indispensable, not only in support of peace and 
security, but also for broader issues of integration and economic survival. 
In the Americas, the early regional efforts by Latin America and the Caribbean were 
largely viewed as attempts to develop along the lines of import substitution in 
isolation from the rest of the world. 98 However these states are also part of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) that was formed in 1948 partly in response to 
a perceived threat from communism. 99 The foundational purpose of the OAS was 'to 
achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their 
collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their 
independence. "Oo Although its early preoccupations were security-related, the OAS 
currently takes an active role in key areas particularly in the promotion of 
democracy, 101 as shown in chapter seven. 
Meanwhile, in the European context, the current evolution of regionalism began in 
the early 1950s, in the form of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation 
and the Coal and Steel Community in Europe. This development reflects the 
historical and cultural desire to strengthen the political and economic conditions 
within the region. 102 The European community has since transformed itself to the 
97 L Fawcett and A Hurrell. Regionalism in World Politics, supra note 2; Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, 
Regionalism 4cross the North-South Divide, (London, New York: Routledge, 1999); Hettne Bj6rn, 
Inotai Andris, and Sunkel Osvaldo, Globalism and the New Regionalism, (London: MacMillan Press 
Ltd, 1999); Schulz Michael, S6derbaum Fredrk and Ojendal Joakim, Regionalization in a Globalizing 
World (London, New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2001); Boas Morten, Marchand Marianne, and Shaw 
Timothy. 'Special Issue: New Regionalisms in the New Millennium. ' Third World Quarterly 20: 897- 
1070 (1999). 
98 On recent trends or Latin American regionalisation, see Robert Devlin, Ricardo French-Davis 
'Towards an Evaluation of Regional Integration in Latin America in the 1990s', The World Economy 
22 (2) (1999), 261-290. See also, generally, Inter-American Development Bank, Beyond Borders: The 
New Regionalism in Latin . 4merica: Economic and Social Progress in LatinAmerica: 2002 Report, 
(Inter-American Development Bank, 2002). 
99 On the OAS, see David Sheinin, The Organization ofAmerican States, (Oxford: ABC-Clio Press and 
New Brunswick, NL: Transaction Publishers, 1995 and 1996). 
100 Article I of the Charter of the Organisation of American States. 
101 See the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter 2001. 
102 Christopher Harvie, The Rise ofRegional Europe, (London & New York: Routledge, 1994); Ben 
Rosamand, Theories ofEuropean Integration, (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Mario TeI6, European 
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European Union, (EU) 103 whose membership, powers and areas of policy has 
significantly increased. 104 Indeed, the political and legal structure of the EU is widely 
accepted as representing the most advanced form of regionalism. 105 Therefore it 
forms an important contribution to international law with valuable lessons for other 
regions, including Africa. 106 
Certainly, the latter point is visibly clear in the fact that the AU, which is the overall 
continental organisation of the African continent, is modelled around the EU. 107 
Established in 2001, the AU represented a seismic shift in the institutional evolution 
of the continent. 108 However, the early development of regionalism within Africa was 
manifest in the Pan African struggles that led to the creation of the now defunct 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which the AU replaced. 109 Founded in 1963, 
the OAU was originally designed to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of 
colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to 
coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of member states and to promote international cooperation 
within the framework of the UN. 110 
In contrast, and in a clear attempt to move with the changing times, the AU was 
formed with the objective of accelerating the process of integration in the continent to 
Union and New Regionalism, (Burlingtow. Ashgate Publishing Company, 200 1); Anders Wivel, 
Explaining European Integration, (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1998); Desmond 
Dinan, Europe Recast: A History ofEuropean Union, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
103 The Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union, TEU), Maastricht, Netherlands. 7, February, 
1992. See also Jan Klabbers, 'Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law' in 
Martti Koskenniemi, International Law Aspects of the European Union (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1997) pp. 
231-254. 
104 See generally Craig, Paul; GrEnne de Bfirca EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2007); Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The 
Four Freedoms, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2007); Steiner, Josephine; 
Loma Woods; Christian Twigg-Flesner, EULaw, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 9th ed., 
2006); John McCormick, Understanding the European Union, (Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed 2005); 
John Peterson, & Michael Shackleton, The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 
2nd edition, 2006). 
105 See generally, Jeremy Rifkin The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly 
Eclipsing the American Dream (Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2004) 
106 See chapter six. 
107 Ibid. 
108 T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Postcolonial Institution-building in 
Africa', 16 Leiden Journal ofInternational Law (2003) p. 157. 109 See chapter five. 
110 See chapter five for a discussion of the principles and purposes of the Organisation of African Unity Charter 1963. 
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enable it play its rightful role in the global economy, while addressing multifaceted 
social, economic and political problems compounded as they are by certain negative 
aspects of globalisation. "'Furthermore, its establishment also formed 'one of the 
greatest achievements' of the continent 'symbolizing the realization of the aspirations 
of great Pan-Africanists. ' 112 The historic journey from the OAU to the new AU, 
particularly with regard to peace and security, is discussed in detail in the second part 
of this thesis. 
Meanwhile, regionalism in Asia remains a relatively new concept when compared 
with Europe, the Americas and Africa. Unlike the other regions, there is no single 
dominant organisation, such as the EU, that is responsible for the continental regional 
integration. However, this may be due to the 'Asian way' of behind the scenes 
diplomacy based on non-confrontation, informality and lack of rigid structures which 
they remain hesitant to change. ' 13 Nevertheless, the main sub-regional organisation 
includes the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) founded in 1967.1 14 As its 
name suggests, ASEAN is an organization on the Southeast Asian region and aims to 
accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development among its 
members and the promotion of regional peace. ' 15 However, there are other agencies 
111 See the principles and purposes of the AU embodied in the Constitutive Act of the Union 2001. 
112 See Statement by Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU, at the opening of the 37th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Lusaka, Zambia, 9 July 2001. 
113 Almonte, Jose T., 'Ensuring Security the ASEAN Way, 'Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4, Winter 1997- 
1998, pp. 80-92; See also Acharya, Amitav, 'A Regional Security Cominunity in Southeast AsiaT The 
Journal ofStrategic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, (September 1995), pp. 175-200; Buzan, Barry, and Gerald 
Segal, 'Rethinking East Asian Security, 'Survival, Vol. 3 6, No. 2, (Summer 1994), pp. 3-2 1; Alagappa, 
Muthiah (ed. ), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998); Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regionalization of Peace Operations in Asia: 
Experience and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership, ' Paper presented at the SWPAPA 
workshop on Regionalisation of Peace Operations, I 1- 12 January 2002, Potsdam. See also Mely 
Caballero-Anthony, 'Partnership for Peace in Asia: ASEAN, the ARF, and the United Nations, ' 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, (2002) 
114 On ASEAN, see Jones, David Martin and Michael L. R. Smith. 'Making Process, Not Progress: 
ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order. ' International Security 32 1 (Summer 2007): 
148-184; Paul Bowles, 'ASEAN, AFTA and the 'New Regionalism'. ' Pacific Affairs 70 (1997), 219- 
234; Philip Charrier, 'ASEAN's inheritance: the regionalization of Southea st Asia, 1941.6l. ' The 
Pacific Review 14 (2001), 313-338; James Cotton, 'The 'haze' over Southeast Asia: Challenging the 
ASEAN Mode of Regional Integration. ' Pacific Affairs 72 (1999), 331-352; Peter Eng, 'Transforming 
ASEAN, ' Washington Quartely 22 (1999), 49-66. 
115 See the Overview, contained in the ASEAN Secretariat official website available at http: //www. aseansec. org/. See also Evelyn Goh. 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast 
Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies. ' International Security 32 3 (Winter 2007/08): 113-157. 
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within the region, which include the ASEAN Regional Forum 
116 (ARF). Founded in 
1993, the ARF is an informal multilateral dialogue of 25 members that primarily 
addresses regional security issues in the Southeast Asian region. 
117 
Also, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation'" (APEC), which was established in 
1989, consists of most 'economies' with a coastline on the Pacific Ocean. The term 
teconomies, ' as opposed to states, is used to describe APEC members because the 
APEC cooperative process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic 
issues, with members engaging with one another as economic entities within the 
Asia-Pacific region. 119 Finally,. the South Asian Association for Regional Co- 
operation 120 (SAARC) that was established in 1985 is an economic and political 
organization, which although bogged down by the rivalry between India and Pakistan, 
is aimed at accelerating the pace of socio-economic and cultural development in the 
Southern Asian region. 
121 
116 Member states include Australia, Canada, People's Republic of China, European Union, India, 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, East 
Timor, United States and Bangladesh. 
117 Ralf Emmers, 'The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN Regional Forurn', 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, (200 1); John Garofano, 'Flexibility or Irrelevance: Ways 
Forward for the ARF, ' Contemporary Southeast Asia 21 (1999), 74-94; Ippei Yamazawa, 'Whither 
East Asian Regionalism. ' Asia-Pacific Review 8 (2001), 18-27. 
1 'a Its 21 members include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong-China, 
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam 
119 On APEC, see M. Dutta, 'Asia-Pacific Econoniic Cooperation (APEC)', Journal ofAsian 
Economics, Vol. 6 No. 4 (1995), pp. 511-588; P. J Lloyd, 'An APEC or Multilateral Investment Code?, ' 
Journal ofAsian Economics, Vol. 6 No 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 53-70. Bergsten, C. Fred, 'The Case for 
APEC: An Asian Push for World-Wide Free Trade, ' The Economist, January 6,1996, pp. 62-63; Paul 
Aarts, 'The Middle East: A region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptioalisrn. ' Third World 
Quaterly 20 (1999), 911-925. 
'20Member states are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan and Afghanistan. 
121 Kishore C. Dash, 'The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia, Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 69, (1996); Adiseshiah, Malcolm 'The Economic Rationale of SAARC. ' South Asia Journal Vol. 
1, Number 1 (1987): 2942; Bahadur, Kalim. 'The Politics of SAARC, ' World Focus Vol. 25, Number 
6 (2004), pp. 3-8; Das, Debendra K. SAARC Regional Cooperation and Development, (New Delhi, 
India: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998); Gopal, Krishan. Geopolitical Relations and Regional 
Cooperation: A Study ofSouth Asia, (New Delhi, Iiidia: Trans Asia Publications, 1996); Harshe, Rajen. 
'South Asian Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects, ' Economicand Political Weekly. Vol. 34, 
Number 19 (1999): 1100-1005 and Nahar, Emanual. SAARC, Problems and Prospects, (New Delhi, 
India: Sehgal Publishers, 199 1). 
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Finally, the Middle East region offers a unique insight into the complexities which 
may arise of out of social-cultural differences within a region. 122 The disagreements 
that divide its constituent states are as a result of the presence of radically Islamic 
regimes and the threat posed by western political ideology. Indeed, the ongoing crisis 
has led the Middle East to be referred to as 'a region without regionalism. ' 123 
However, rather than a lacking of regionalism, it has been argued that the expanse 
consists of a multiplicity of regionalisms, which consists of the Middle East, the Arab, 
the Mediterranean and the Islamic paradigms. 124 
Nevertheless, the Arab League, which was created in 1945,125 is the principle 
regional organisation and has been preoccupied with the ongoing Arab-Israel 
confrontation. 126 In contrast to the regional organisations described above, the 
membership of the Arab League is founded on culture, 127 rather than geographical 
location, and has hardly achieved any significant degree of regional integration. 
However, as shown in the chapter four, though not initially perceived as a regional 
arrangement for the purposes of the UN Charter, it now qualifies with that regard in 
similar fashion to the OAS and the AU. 128 
It also deserves to be mentioned that all Arab League members are also members of 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference whose aim is to 'promote Islamic 
solidarity among Member States. ' 129 However, despite the shared history, language 
and culture, there exist deep ideological differences amongst these states. 130 Hence in 
122 Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: A region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptioalism, 'supra 
note 119; Bilgin, Pilar. 'Inventing Middle Easts? ' Pp. 10-37 in Utvik and Vikor The Middle East in a 
Globalized World, (Bergen/London, 2000). 
123 Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: a region without regionalism or the end of exceptionalismT, supra 
note 119. 
124 See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East, ' Security Dialogue 27: 4 (1996) 
Pp. 428-430. 55 See the Pact of Arab League of States, 1945, U. N. doe. A/C. 6/L. III (also in U. N. Treaty Series, 
vol. LXX, pp. 237-263). 
126 H. McCoubrey, J. Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 2000), p. 189; Charles Tripp, 'Regional organizations in the Arab Middle East, in Louise 
Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds, Regionalism in worldpolitics: regional organization and 
international order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 283-308. On the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue, see Charles L. Geddes, A Documentary History ofthe, 4rab-Israeli Conflict, ' (Greenwood Press, 
1991). 
127 See article I of the Arab League Cultural Treaty 1946. 
128 On this point, see Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, (Oxford University Press, 
2nd Edition, 2004), p. 287. 
129 Article I of the Charter of Islamic Conference 1969. 
130 Michael N. Barnett, 'Sovereignty, Nationalisn; and Regional Order in the Arab States System', 
International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3,1995, pp. 479-5 10. 
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this context, despite the noted advantages of regionalism in the provision of regional 
solutions to disputes, 'the case of [the] middle east clearly demonstrates that regional 
organisations are occasionally ill suited in solving crisis within their very own 
borders. " 131 
3.1 The New Regionalism and its Developing Mechanisms for Human Rights 
Enforcement 
Having traced the historical function of regionalism in the development of the 
international legal system, what follows is an introduction of the contemporary 
function of this phenomenon and its relationship with universalism in the protection 
of community values. As will be demonstrated throughout the thesis, the role of 
regional organisations in the protection of human rights has worked in a manner that 
was unforeseen by the drafters of the UN Charter, which was designed to regulate 
their activities and ensure their actions were consistent with the principles and 
purposes of the UN. 132 And although the major regional organisations were originally 
economically aligned or designed to deal with external threats to their peace and 
security, they have since transformed themselves to halt the gross violation of human 
rights in their territories. 133 
Indeed, as shown in the coming chapters, the areas of peace and security and human 
rights are intractably linked. This is primarily because, for themost part, the latter 
incorporates peremptory norms that seek to protect populations from severe political, 
legal, and social abuses that are conflict related. At this juncture, it is worth 
mentioning that the Vienna Declaration of the 1993 UN World Conference on Human 
Rights, which gave a modem interpretation of the earlier Declaration of Human 
Rights, 134 authenticated the important role of regional organisations in reinforcing 
universal human rights. 135 
Moreover, the Declaration called for the establishment of regional arrangements to 
promote the interests of the international community. Indeed, for the purposes of 
131 H. McCoubrey, J. Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, supra note 126, p 59. 132 See chapter four. 
133 Ibid and chapter seven. 134 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
135 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action$ 25 June 1993,1 para. 37,32 ILM (1993) 1661 at 1672. 
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furthering these objectives, there exists a broad range of regional agreements which 
promote and protect human rights, including the European Court of Human Rights, 
the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. Significantly, 
the complimentary function of regional human rights regimes across the major 
regions has been welcomed by the UN. 136 However, an evaluation of these regional 
agreements demonstrates the limited enforcement capability available in their 
treaties. 137 
Therefore, this thesis uses the peace and security model and measures its application 
in the human rights context. Such an approach is based on the practice of recent 
actions of regional organisations which have highlighted the challenges brought about 
by potential threats to universal and regional peace and security against the increasing 
emphasis on the promotion of human rights, particularly those amounting to 
peremptory norms. 138 Indeed, as shown in the coming chapters, certain organisations 
have acted upon the challenge presented by the UN Secretary General, on whether the 
doctrine of non-intervention and sovereignty should allow coalitions of states to stand 
aside and watch as horror unfolds on a future Rwanda or Srebrenica. 139 
However, as shown in chapter three and seven, some of their actions have often been 
perceived as posing a potential challenge to the UN legal system, 140 including the 
rules on the use of force contained in article 2(4) and chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
It is in this context that this thesis aims to identify and develop a workable framework, 
within the permissible legal rules, in order to demonstrate that the new regionalism is 
indispensable, particularly in the areas of human rights where the potential future role 
of regional organisations was ignored and where the much favoured universalism had 
failed. 
136 E. g. see G. A. Res. 47/125,47 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 198, U. N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992). 137 See generally Rhona K. M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, (Oxford University 
Press, 3Rev Ed edition, 2007). 
139 See chapters three, four and seven. 139 Kofi Annan's speech on 20 September 1999 before the UN General Assembly: Balance State 
Sovereignty with Individual Sovereignty! http: //users. Inii. net/wfanca/pp_annan on sov. html; Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, A/54/1,1999, p. 48; Kiflinnag, We the Peoples; The Role of the United Nations in the 21" Century, UN Doc. A/54/2000, Chapter IV, p. 7. see also Kofi Annan, 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ' Economist, September 18,1999. 140 See chapters three, four and seven. 
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3.2 Devising a Complimentary Function for Regionalism within Universalism: 
An Overview of the Key Issues addressed in the Study 
A major theme of this thesis addresses the similarities and differences, as well as 
evolving relationship between regionalism and universalism, with respect to collective 
security. This broad enquiry is useful in answering specific questions informing the 
study such as Africa's understanding, interpretation and application of the rules 
governing the use of force in international law and how they measure against the 
prohibition against'the rules prohibiting the use of force contained in article 2(4) and 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. As argued in chapter seven, the recent actions of 
regional organisations, though controversial, are rooted in the deficiency of the UN 
system, 141 which is based on the Wesphalian interstate system and which hardly 
emphasised the significance of the need to protect human rights. 142 
The study identifies and builds on the developing regional approach that is founded on 
the dilemma brought about by the strict interpretation of the provisions of the UN 
Charter against the wider peremptory rules of law, as was highlighted by the inaction of 
the UN and the international community during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 143 in this 
instance, despite the fact that a clear peremptory norm of international law required 
them to 'prevent and punish' 144 genocide, the UN and regional agencies failed to act in 
order to prevent the massacre of up to one million people. 145 Instead, reliance was 
placed on the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, 146 and the prohibition of the 
use of force, 147 above the duty to protect the higher laws enshrined in thejus cogens, 
which obligated them to act. 148 Whereas few would doubt the UN's primacy in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the question that still persists is with 
141 See chapters three, seven and eight. 
142 N. D. Wbte, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Rights to the UN Security Council% in 
Mashood A. Baderin& Robert Mccorquodale, (eds. ) 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action% 
(Oxford University Press, 2007); Mashood Baderin. A. and A. Abass, 7owards Effective Collective 
Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African Union, ' Netherlands International Law Review, 49. (2002), pp. 1-3 8. 143 See chapter five and eight. 
144 See article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
adopted by Resolution 260 (111) A of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948. 145 See chapter five. 
146 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See chapters three, five and nine. 147 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. See chapter three. 149 See chapter one. 
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regard to which body possesses the subsidiary or complementary function when the 
latter organisation is slow, unwilling or unable to exercise its competence. 149 
This question has partially been answered and the lessons from Rwanda continue to 
make a strong case for the reassessment of past practice. 150 Indeed, the ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia (1991) and Sierra Leone (1997) brought about an African 
tradition that raised fundamental issues with regard to whether there was a right, or an 
emerging one for that matter, where regional organisations could intervene in order to 
halt systematic violations of human rights without the Security Council's prior 
approval, particularly where the latter had failed to act. 151 And as scholars grappled 
with this question, the ECOWAS action was closely followed by the NATO's 
regional intervention to halt the slaughter of Kosovo Albanians (1999). 152 
However, Africa went further. Not only did it dismantle its previous continental 
organisation (OAU), 153 subsequently the established a new African Union and 
awarded itself the right to intervene, which portrayed Africa's willingness to play a 
more formidable role in the prevention of key international crimes such as war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. 154 In doing so, the emerging development led 
to fundamental questions of what was left of the UN's peace and security system, 
which vests the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in its 
Security Council. 155 The issues raised were highly significant given that the UN 
organisation forms an almost complete system and arguably takes primacy over all 
other international agreements. 156 
Unfortunately, as shown below, the relationship between regionalism and 
universalism with regard to peace and security has often been seen as one of 
contest. 157 Therefore a major aim of this thesis is to present a rounded picture of the 
149 See chapter three, seven and eight. 150 See chapter seven. 151 See e. g. Richard B. Lillich, & Hurst Hannurn, International human rights: Problems of law, policy, 
andpractice, (Little, Brown, Boston, 1995), p. 614. 152 See chapter three. 153 See chapter five. 154 Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of African Union. 
See chapter three. 156 See chapter four. 157 Ibid. See also chapters four, seven, eight and nine. 
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manner through which the UN and regional organisations can better their relationship 
in the promotion and maintenance of regional and international peace and security 
using the AU's model of regional security. In doing so, the study analyses the 
different questions raised by the AU's right to forcefully intervene as part of its 
mechanism of regional security and how this right sits alongside established rules of 
intemational law. 
3.3 Establishing the Case for Regionalism and addressing Key Concerns 
A serious problem with universalism is that it often leaves gaps amidst its struggles to 
catch up with the increasing pace of international affairs. 
' 58 This flaw has meant that 
its functions have been picked up by regional organisations. 159 These include the EU, 
the OAS and the AU. Furthermore, there are other regional organisations in existence 
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and defence- 
, pacts, such as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as security 
arrangements such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). As shown elsewhere in this study, these have all modified their constitutive 
instruments to include peace and security roles. 160 
indeed, the deficiency. the UN and the usefulness of regional organisations challenge 
the notion as to whether every international problem requires universal collective 
action. However, to some, the growth of regional organisations and increased 
multilateralism. has become a matter of concern as these entities have been perceived 
as possessing the potential to undermine the rule of international law embodied in the 
international legal system. In this context, a deeply divisive debate has since emerged 
between the 'regionalists' and 'regiosceptics' schools of thought. 161 
According to its detractors, regionalism poses as a threat to the international system in 
terms of its relationship with universalism under the auspices of the UN, whose 
legitimacy in terms of numbers in membership remains largely unchallenged. 162 
However, the weakness of this argument is that it seems to ignore the role of 
See chapters three six and eight. 
15 For detailed illustration of this point, see chapter four and part two of thesis. 
160 See chapter four. 
161 Temis used by Benedikt in Benedikt F. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa', 
The Journal ofHumanitarian Assistance, 2006. 
162 See article 4 (1) of the UN Charter. 
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regionalism in its contribution to 'a deeper sense of participation, consensus and 
democratization in international affairs. ' 163 However, in reality, due to the fact that 
'few regional organisations have the capability or international legitimacy, ' 164 
Higgins observes that 'the involvement of regional arrangements has not had the 
effect of enlargement in the sense of a broader participation. ' 165 
On one hand, the proponents of regional organisations argue that the emergence of 
regionalism has brought an urgently needed approach and offers an unprecedented 
opportunity for an effective partnership with universal organisations. 1 66 In this regard, 
Louise Fawcett observes that 'robust regionalisation goes hand in hand with robust 
internationalism' 167 However, the critics of regionalism favour universalism over 
regionalism and argue that the mere usurpation of the universal role given to a 
universal body by the international conununity without the latter's authorisation, is 
itself a violation of international law. 168 However, the problem with this assertion is 
that it fails to recognise valuable opportunities that the cooperation and coordination 
between the UN and regional organisations provide for the international community. 
Hence, a theme of this study sets out at identifying clear purposes of promoting and 
deepening co-operation in peace and security within permissible legal grounds. 
Such an approach is important given that warning has been made to the effect that - 
'the current trend in regional collective security portends dire consequences for 
Chapter VIII in particular and for the cohesion of the UN collective security in 
general. ' 169 However, despite this assertion, it will be shown that the function of 
regionalism, itself acknowledged by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, is apt to adapt to 
meet the changing security demands of the international community. 170 Having said 
163 See former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros, Agenda for Peace, UN Doe. A/47/277 - S/24111, (1992), para 64. 
164 Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by 
the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers, (Oxford University Press, USA; New Ed edition, 
2000), p. 282. 
165 R. Higgins, 'The United Nations' Role in Maintaining International Peace: the Lessons of the First Fifty Years', New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, . 16 (1996), p. 135 
at p. 143. 
166 See chapters three, six, seven and eight. 
167 Louise Fawcett, 'The Evolving Architecture of Regionalization', Presentation at the SWPAPA 
workshop on Regionalization ofPeace Operations, II- 12, January 2002, PotsdarrL 168 See chapter eight. 
169 A. Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security, supra note 5, p. xx. 170 See chapter four. 
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so, highlight is made of the apparent difficulty surrounding the ability to structure 
formal relationships that outlines a clear division of responsibilities between the UN 
and regional organisations. 171 
In doing so, it has to be bore in mind that any relationship between the UN and 
regional organisations has to exist within the key parameters of the UN, including 
ensuring the compatibility with traditional concepts, such as the key principles in 
article 2(4) and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Moreover, particular reference is 
made to an important universalistic feature which affirms the prevalence of Charter 
obligations over those contained in 'any other international agreement' 172 provided 
for under article 103 of the UN Charter. 173 Therefore, in order to envisage a proper 
relationship of cooperation between the UN and the AU, it must be shown that its 
right to intervene interpreted narrowly or permissively, is in harmony with key 
principles of the UN. 
However, mention must be made of wider rules of international law, which go beyond 
those envisaged by the UN Charter, such as those prohibiting war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity, to which the AU subscribes. Importantly, it is also crucial to 
take into account the tension and often the clash ofjus cogens norms existing within 
and beyond the Charter. 174 In this context, it will be recalled from chapter one that the 
lack of a hierarchy of peremptory norms occasionally creates a legal void in the event of 
a conflict between rules ofjus cogens. Therefore, a major question this thesis poses is 
whether regional organisations ought to be ready to seemingly act in flagrant violation 
of the prohibition against the use of force contained in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 175 
in order to comply with an equally compelling obligation, such as that embodied in 
article I of the Genocide Convention. 176 
171 See chapter four, six and eight. 
172 See article 103 of the UN Charter. 
173 On the application of article 103, see discussion in chapters three, four and seven. 
174 Joseph H. H. Weiler and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The Structure of Change in International Law or Is 
There a Hierarchy of Norms in Intemational LawT EM, Vol. 8 (1997) No. 4, Martti Koskenniemi, 
'Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, ' EM, Vol. 8 (1997) No. 4, Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, 
'Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law' EM, Vol. 8 (1997) No. 4. 
17S Confirmed as a pereniptory norm in the Nicaragua Case, ICJ Reports (1986) 14, para. 190. See also 
the Palestinian Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep (2004), para. 87. See chapters three, four and seven. 176 Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 
mandates states to "prevent and punish' the crime of genocide. See also Case Concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Bosnia and 
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Alternatively, should regional organisations use the UN rules on the use of force as their 
justification for their failure to halt the core crime of genocide which they are obligated 
to 'prevent and punish. '? 177 As shown in chapter seven, the consideration of the 
appropriate response to situations of conflict between peremptory norms within the UN 
charter and general norms ofjus cogens is 'complicated by the fact that there is little 
scope for 'balancing' the interests of international peace and security against the 
humanitarian values recognized in the clearly accepted norms ofJus cogens. ' 178 
Finally, the actions of ECOWAS operations in Liberia (1991) and Sierra Leone (1997), 
NATO in Kosovo (1999) as well as the formation of the AU and its right to intervene 
raised further concerns. In particular, one issue that has emerged is with regard to 
whether there exists a legal rule, or an emerging one for that matter, authorising or 
tolerating a regional organisation to forcefully intervene after the Security Council has 
determined that a situation is a threat to international peace and security and thereby 
remains seized of the matter but fails to take flarthei action due to a deadlock in the 
Council. 179 However, the specific answers to the questions raised in this section are 
better answered through an analysis within the broader framework in which they have 
traditionally been understood. With this regard, the discussion of the peace and security 
system under the UN is introduced and explored in the next chapter. Such an analysis is 
useful in setting the background for demonstrating the similarities, differences as well 
as relationship between African regional security and its compatibility with UN and 
general international law, which is the object and purpose of the thesis. 
C: Conclusion 
The historic synopsis provided by this chapter demonstrated that the current 
international legal framework is not only based on foundations of European origin but 
is also largely dominated by western values advocated for and attained during 
hegemonic struggles amongst powerful states. However, the current system also 
provides a podium where the fundamental rights of mankind can be protected. It 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ 26 Feb. 2007 at paras. 161-7, where the Court examined the obligation to prevent and punish as an express duty imposed upon states in the Convention. 177 See chapter seven. 178 Steven Wheatley, 'The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq', EX, 2006 17(3): 531-551 
179 See chapters three and seven. 
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therefore serves as a pragmatic platform whereby old and new, as well as just and 
unjust, rules operate. 
The second section showed that the turn of the 20'h Century saw the crystallisation of 
the major subjects within the international legal system. The proliferation of 
institutions further witnessed the entrenchment of international law in the world 
system as vehicle through which these entities could co-exist and cooperate in spite of 
the diversity in cultures. Indeed, the formation of the League of Nations(1919) and 
the UN (1945) furthered the Kantian thesis that international law requires the 
development of institutions which express the general will of sovereign states to 
ensure world peace and to solve international conflict. 180 
Therefore, in this context, section three affirmed the theme that the increasing role of 
regionalism does not necessarily contradict universalism embodied in the UN system. 
In fact, many of the functions of the traditionally more acceptable norms of 
universalism are also carried out by regionalism, which often possesses the capability 
to act towards their own self-interest including the primary objective of ensuring their 
own peace and security. In this context, the current forces of compulsion for regional 
solutions coupled with both traditional and new opportunities provided by regional 
organisations have come to reflect what Walt Rostow termed as the 'coming age of 
regionalism. ' 181 
However, against this background, regional organisations have often shown 
tremendous reluctance to rely on the rule contained in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
in order to prevent the core crimes of international concern such as those of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. As shall be demonstrated in the coming 
chapters, African regional organisations have displayed their willingness and often, 
preparedness to act in what may appear to be in violation of the prohibition against 
the use of force, in order to comply with their obligations in the protection of 
fundamental human rights. This inno 
' 
vative thinking represents the changing focus 
from a state oriented interpretation of international law to the responsibility of the 
180 See Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, (Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 2000). 
181 W. W. Rostow, 'The Coming Age of Regionalism, ' supra note 8. 
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international community as expressed in key UN documents, 182 which affirm the role 
of regionalism. 183 Nevertheless, the key theme of this study however, remains of 
cooperation and how the international community can ensure that any action is legal, 
proportionate, effective and sustainable. 
Up to this point, it becomes obvious that the universalism versus regionalism debate 
is misplaced and ultimately amounts to an artificial creation of states and 
commentators who are in support of international cooperation, to the extent that it 
does not infringe on their sovereignty and national interests. This dispute has 
essentially been one between the proponents of international organisations and 
institutions and the 'realists' who often underestimate the compelling need of states to 
operate within an institutional framework, particularly through regionalism. It is in 
this context that the thesis aims to add to the debate, which has been wrongly phrased 
as one that determines, or seeks to determine, which of the two i. e. regionalism and 
universalism, provides a better system. Instead, the study explores the relevant law 
and practice, in order to identify and develop the possibility of an effective 
relationship of cooperation between the AU and the UN in the promotion and 
maintenance of regional and international peace and security. 
182 E. g see the Report of the United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared ResponsibiUty, Report 
of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U. N. Doc. A/59/5652, December 2004; 
Koft Annan, In Larger Freedom. Towards Development, Securityand Human Rightsfor All, UN doc. 
A/59/2005,21 March 2005; 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, 
para 138, U. N. Doc A/604L. I (Sept. 20,2005). 
183 See chapters four, six, seven and eight. 
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Chapter Three 
The International Legal Framework under the 
Charter of the United Nations 
A: Introduction 
The UN Charter is a universally accepted multilateral treaty whose application 
transcends across all regions and possesses a special status in international law. Indeed, 
the very adoption of the Charter and creation of the UN marked an unprecedented 
evolution of the pre-1945 international *legal systern. 
' Inspired and committed to prevent 
the suffering caused by the scourge of war, 
2 the drafting of the UN Charter formed a 
spirited attempt at creating a universal organisation with the primary purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security through a collective security system. 
3 
However, in spite of the initial optimism, the rivalry amongst the major powers during 
the aftermath of World War II brought with it the Cold War era, which severely 
impaired the proper functioning of the UN system. 4 
As it turned out, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a new age that 
dramatically increased UN membership and its peace and security role. However, this 
period also brought with it a surge of conflict, particularly in Africa. 5 The catastrophic 
events that followed thereafter led to disturbing reali ' 
ties, which in turn led to the 
dramatic increase in the activities of other organisations, in order to fill the perforations 
of a deficient UN system. 6 As ' 
shown throughout the thesis, this development raised the 
question that must now be asked: should the UN Charter, a 1945 document, realistically 
be expected to meet the international challenges of the 21st century and beyond? The 
UN was established on the basis of Westphalian sovereign equality between states as 
stipulated in article 2 (1) of its Charter. It thereby failed to adapt to issues and problems 
which did not conform to this paradigm. 
1 For a detailed history of the evolution of the UN, see Ruth B. Russell& Jeanette E. Muther, A History 
of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945, (Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1958). 
2 See Preamble to the UN Charter. 
3 Article I of the LTN Charter. 4 See below and chapter four. 
5 See below, introduction and chapters four & five. 
6 See chapter four. 
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Indeed, as shown in the coming chapters, the rise in the activity of regional 
organisations in peace and security functions sought to rectify the shortcomings of the 
UN. Broadly speaking, despite its undisputed contemporary relevance, its flaws are 
hardly surprising given that the formation of the UN was a direct response to the horrors 
of World War II. However, it is abundantly clear that today the world stands in stark 
contrast to the challenges which the organisation was created to confront. 
7 There exist 
new and real threats. Amongst many others, human rights violations, terrorism, rogues 
states and non-state actors have become the new threats to peace and security. 
8 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to address the fundamental questions facing the 
international community at this juncture in the broad context. Does the international 
community need, and want, the UN to centrally manage regional peace and security and 
can it meet the evolving peace and security demands of intra and trans-state challenges, 
which are increasingly apparent? Or does its current situation risk it being deemed 
Irrelevant and fall into the dustbin of history as did the League of Nations as the world 
descended into the darkness in the aftermath of World War 1'9? 
While it remains true that the League could not halt the aggression by states in the 
1930s, the UN is designed to be more effective and survive much longer than its 
predecessor. 10 In light of the foregoing, this chapter turns to the current regulatory 
institutional framework contained in the UN collective security system and assesses the 
envisaged possibilities and limitations faced by the organisation in carrying out its 
function. In doing so, the discussion herein takes into account the changes in the 
international character of conflict from the inter-state conflicts against the background 
of the enlarged definitions of security in the post-Cold War era, including the 
broadening of the multilateral agenda to cover numerous aspects of regional conflict 
and internal wars. 
7 See chapter eight. 
' See the Report of the United Nations High Level on Threats Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World., Our Shared Responsibility, U. N. Doc. A/59/565,12, December 2004. 
9 See 'Testimony of U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Before the Senate Armed Forces 
Committee Regarding Iraq' (transcript), 19 September, 2002. Available at 
www. dod. gov/speeches/2002/s2OO2O9l9-secdef2. html 
'0 See Alexandru Grigorescu, 'Mapping the UN-League of Nations Analogy: Are There Still Lessons 
to Be Learned from the League?, 'Global Governance, Volume 11, (1), (February 2005). 
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B: Aims, Purpose and Structure 
The present chapter provides the thesis with an analytical framework for a critique of 
the current peace and security mechanisms. It also aims to demonstrate the 
evolutionary manner of the international legal system and highlight some of the 
contemporary justifications for its alteration and amendment to meet the challenges of 
the prevailing international community. " In order to achieve its objective, the chapter 
is organised in three main sections. The first section elaborates on the tremulous 
development of the peace and security system. Therefore, it starts with an 
examination of the early European doctrines on the use of force and the diplomatic 
restrictions in the League of Nations Covenant (1919) to the restraint on war in the 
Kellogg- Briand Pact of 1928. 
The second section will begin by demonstrating the magnitude of the UN's 
establishment in 1945 and discuss the special status of its Charter within the 
international system. This part will also focus on the distinct role vested in the UN 
Security Council, as well as the obligations bestowed on member states, in adhering 
to the dictates of the UN Charter. Having examined its collective security set up, this 
section will then narrow in on the particular significance of the prohibition against the 
use of force by states and quite possibly, regional organisations. 12 
Furthermore, the section will also address the legal exceptions to the use of force 
including the doctrine of self defence contained in article 51 of the UN Charter and 
collective measures permissible under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Here, it will be 
argued that the current rules prohibiting the use of force are often unsuitable for 
contemporary regional conflicts, particularly those stemming from internal wars, such 
as those in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2003). Thereafter, the discussion paves way 
for the third section which addresses the use of force by states and regional 
organisations beyond the permissible exceptions under the UN Charter, in an attempt 
to rectify its shortcomings. 
" On UN reforn4 see chapter eight. 12 For a discussion on the specific obligations of regional organisations, see chapter four. 
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In investigating the challenges posed to the UN system, this discussion necessitates an 
analysis of not only what states do but what they say, being the ultimate creators of 
international law through state practice and opiniojuris. For this reason, this section 
will explore the legality, as well as the legitimacy, of humanitarian intervention, as 
well as its significance in international law. What will become clear from this 
discussion is the connection between humanitarian intervention and the justification 
of the AU's right to intervene, ' 3 as well as the UN's responsibility to protect. 14 It is 
against this background that the chapter concludes with an assessment of the lessons 
that can be drawn from the past success and failure of the UN collective system. 
Having introduced the theme of reform, the final part demonstrates the manner in 
which the shortcomings of the UN calls for more cooperation with regional 
organisations, which as demonstrated in the coming chapters can greatly contribute in 
the development of the UN's collective system of peace and security. 
1.1 The Pre-1945 International Legal System: The Development from the Just 
War Doctrine to the Second World War 
The principles governing peace and security form the basic apparatus of any 
community and usually emanate from the early rules found in primitive societies. 15 
However, it will be recalled from chapter two that during the early years of 
international law, Western Europe formed the 'world theatre' 16 and it is where the 
current rules on the use of force originate. During this time, the tenets regarding the 
resort to war as a method of enforcement action were largely dominated by the 
teachings of ancient Jewish, Christian, Greek and Roman traditions for 'just war' 
theory. 17 
" See chapter seven. 
14 See chapter eight. 
15 See H. L. A. HaM The Concept ofLaw, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 9 1; Niels Blokker, 'The 
Security Council and theUSe of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The 
Security Council and the Use offorce: Theory and Reality -A Needfor Change? (Martin Nijhoff, 2005), p. 2. See generally, M. Barkun, Law without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies as the World Community, (Yale University Press, 1968). 
16 See chapter one. 17 See Aquinas, Saint Thomas Timothy McDermott (Editor), Summa Theologiae. - A Concise Translation, (Christian Classics, 199 1). Other traditional just war theorists include Cicero (106 DC-43 
BC), Augustine of Hippo (354-430) Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617, 
Hugo Grotius; (1583-1645) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Modernjust war'theorists include Michael 
Walzer and Brian Orend. For contemporary relevance of the just war theory, see Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, (Wilfrid Laurier Univ Pr, 2000); M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, 3. rd. Edition, 2000). 
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In his exposition regarding the use of force, St Augustine (AD 354-430) 
authoritatively wrote that the purpose of a just war is to 'avenge injuries, when the 
nations or city against which warlike action is to be directed has been neglected either 
to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly 
taken by it. Further, that kind of war is undoubtedly just which 'God Himself 
ordains. "s However, towards the end of his life, the renowned Saint also inserted one 
of the first documented restrictions to the resort to war. In his words, 'it is a higher 
glory still to slay war itself with the word, than men with the sword, and to procure or 
maintain peace by peace, not war. ' 19 
The just war doctrine is also vaguely manifest in the biblical historical teachings and 
has been presented most notably by Saint Thomas Aquinas, who developed St 
Augustine's conception of war in his Summa Theologicae. 20 More recently, the 
modem interpretation of the just cause was articulated in 1993 at a US Catholic 
Conference. Here, it was explained that in support of a just war, 'force may be used 
only to correct a grave, public evil, i. e., aggression or massive violation of the basic 
rights of whole pooulations. ' 21 Hence, in the human rights context, a just war is 
legitimate in order to put halt violations 'that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind. t22 
As demonstrated further below, the just war era stood in sharp contrast to the current 
international regulatory framework. Indeed, a key problem with the just war theory 
was that states enjoyed the right to resort to war without any real legal limitation. It 
was therefore not surprising that the difficulty in making a distinction between just 
and unjust wars was manifest most notably in the Russo-Turkish wars, which were a 
series of wars fought in the European region during the 17th, 18th, and 19th and 20th 
centuries. 23 Other conflicts included the French intervention of Syria in 1860-61; the 
18 John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition ofthe Law offations, (Washington D, C: 1935), P. 70. 19 Ibid. p. 74. 
20 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica , supra note 17. 21 See 'The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace: A Reflection of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on the Tenth Anniversary of 'The Challenge of Peace, ' Nov. 17,1993. 22 See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, supra note 17, p. 107 23 For more on these wars, see Aksan, Virginia H. 'Ottornan Military Matters, ' Journal ofEarry Modern History 6 (1) (2002), 52 - 62; Frederick W. Kagan, and Robin Higham (eds. ), The Military 
History of 7sarist Russia, (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Bruce W. Menning, 'Russian Military 
Innovation in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century. ' War & Society 2 (1) (1984), 23 -41. 
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threat of intervention in Crete from 1866 to 1868; the Russian intervention in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria from 1877 to 1878, the United States Intervention in Cuba 
of 1898 and the Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia intervention in Macedonia from 1903- 
1908. 
Although steps had been taken towards limiting the freedom of states to use force, 
such as during the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,24 it was not until the 
unprecedented, and previously unimagined, suffering brought about by the First 
World War that states were compelled to change their attitudes towards recourse to 
war. Indeed, the millions of lost lives and the sheer destruction that took place 
between 1914 and 1918 made a strong case for Grotius' 25 plea for the rule of 
international law and the Kantian 26 concept of peace amongst the community of 
nations. 27 
It was for primarily due to this reason that, barely a year later, the League of Nations 
was established in 1919, under Treaty of Versailles, with the aim 'to promote 
international cooperation and to achieve peace and security. ' 28However, a major 
problem with the League was that it remained largely a regional organisation. 29 
Furthermore, despite designating wars as 'a matter of concern to the whole League 30 
and imposing some limitations on resort to the phenomenon, 'it did not contain a 
prohibition'of war. Instead, article 12 (1) provided that the members of the League 
would submit their disputes 'either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry 
by the Council' after which the lapse of three months would give a discretion go to 
war if a settlement was not forthcoming. 
24 See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 18 October, 1907, art. 2,36 
Stat. 2199,205 Consol. T. S. 233. 
25 See H. Grotius, Dejure belli ac pacis: libri tres (1965), book 1, chapter 11, para. II(2), translated in 
F. W. Kelsey, The Classics ofInternational Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925) 
26 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, (Hackett Publishing Company, 2003). 
On Kant see James Bohman&Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's 
Cosmopolitan Ideal, (the MIT Press, 1997); Immanuel Kant & H. S. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 
(Cambridge University Press; 2 edition, 199 1); Patrick Capps, The Kantian Project in International 
Legal theory', EJIL, Volume 12, Number 5,2001. 
27 Niels Blokker, 'The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use offorce, supra note 15, p. 5. 28 Preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations found before Article I of the Versailles Treaty, 
June 28,1919. 
21 See chapters two and four. 30 Article I1 (1) of the League of Nations Covenant. 
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A further weakness with this arrangement was that, unlike the present UN framework, 
the League's collective security system did not lie within the Council or Assembly, 
but largely lay in the hands of individual member states. 
31 In this respect, 'the League 
of Nations failed to keep world peace primarily because the idea of collective 
security was far weaker than each individual State's interests to protect its national 
interests. ' 32 Therefore, it was not until the signature to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand 
Treaty33 (Pact of Paris) that the gaps left in the Covenant were partially filled and 
which saw an almost universal accession of states to its provisions. 
34 Most 
significantly, the state parties to the Pact of Paris finally considered it opportune 
for a 
'frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national PoliCY, 
35 and 'condemne[d] 
the recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. 
36 
Disagreement remains over whether the ban on the recourse to war was the same as 
37 
the prohibition on the use of force contained in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
described below. Meanwhile, despite its considerable strength, a key setback of the 
Pact of Paris was that, just like its predecessor, it did not contain a provision referring 
to the doctrine of self-defence. However, what became clear is the general trend by 
the international community to view war as evil. Nevertheless, the league's failure to 
'safe-guard the peace of nations' 38 and act on Japan's intervention in Manchuria 
(1931), Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935) and Germany's occupation of parts of 
Czechoslovakia (1939), rendered it to near irrelevance. However, it was the failure to 
prevent the Second World War that ultimately marked the League's ultimate 
disappointment and subsequent demise, as it was unable to meet its primary purpose 
which was to avoid any future world war. 
31 Niels Blokker, 'The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use offorce, supra note 15, p. 5. 
32 N. D. White, Keeping the Peace. The United Nations and the Maintenance ofInternational Peace 
and Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 3. 
33 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy opened for signature 
27 August, 1928, TS No. 796. 
34 
35 
D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, (Sweet & Maxwell; 6 ed., 2004), p. 888. 
Preamble to the League Covenant. 
36 See article I of Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928. 
37 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, supra note 34, p. 888. 38 Article I1 (1) of the League Covenant. 
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2.1 The Emergence of the United Nations and the Special Status of its Charter 
The establishment of the UN 39 was a defining moment in world history that brought 
much optimism for the future generations. Created in 1945 by representatives of 51 
states, 40 the formation of the organisation, which was initially a wartime alliance, 
41 
was a direct response to the horrors of the Second World War. 
42 Unsurprisingly, the 
institutional set up of the UN was based on the proposals worked out by the victorious 
powers that included China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944.43 In pursuit of a 
'better world 9 44 amongst its members, the Charter of the United Nations was 
subsequently signed on 26 June 1945.45 
Back then, the UN Charter was agreed upon by the triumphant world powers with the 
hope that it would act to prevent conflicts between states and make future wars 
impossible. 46 This objective was to be carried out through the collective security 
system, which awarded the power of vet047 to the victorious alliance as 'an implicit 
guarantee to all members that they will not be asked to wage a war, in the name of the 
United Nations, against any of the big powers. 4' Therefore, in fostering the idea of 
collective security, major powers would act as trustees of peace on behalf of the 
international community. 49 In sharp contrast to the League of Nations, the UN 
displayed a clear preponderance of universalist features and it is through its creation 
50 that an international legal system based on universalism was achieved. 
39 See UN Basic Facts About the United Nations (UN publication 2000), Sales No. E. 0012 1. Also 
available at http: //www. un. org/aboutun/history. htnL 
40 ibid. 
41 See 11 Claude, Jnr., Power and International relations, (Random House, 1962) p. 161. See also Dore 
Gold, The Tower ofBabble: How the United Nations has Fueled Global Chaos, (Three Rivers Press, 
2005); Richar Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 
1941-1991, Routledge; I edition, 1994). 
42 See preamble to the UN Charter 1945. 
43 See UN, 'History of the Charter of the United Nations', available at 
http: //www. un. org/aboutun/charter/history/dumbarton. shtn-A. 
44 See President Truman's Address to Opening Session of United Nations Conference on International 
Organization at San Francisco. April 25,1945 United States Department of State Bulletin. Available at 
http.. Ilwww. ibiblio. orglphalpolicyll9451450425a. html 
45 See UN Basic Facts About the United Nations, supra note 39. 
46 See LL Claude, Jnr., Power and International relations, supra note 4 1, p. 161. 
47 On the veto, see below and chapter eight. 
49 See the statement of the Indian delegate to the San Francisco Conference as quoted in Hilaire 
McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, (The Hague ; London 
Kluwer Law International, 2000). p. 25 
49 ibid. 
50 See chapter four. 
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In doing so, the UN Charter immediately gained a unique legal standing 
in 
international relations. Most importantly, the UN Charter has been observed as 
'not 
just an inter-state compact'51 but a 'kind of public law transcending in kind and not 
merely in degree the ordinary agreement between states. ' 
52 For some, it went even 
ftirther. According to the first UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskj6ld, 
53 the 
Charter clearly implied the existence of 'an international community, for which the 
Organization is an instrument and an expression. 54 And although the document does 
not 'entail all principles of paramount importance for the international community"55 
it was said that the Charter acts as a 'venture in progress towards an 
international 
community living in peace under the laws ofjustice. ' 
56 
Indeed the UN Charter has been described as a 'constitution of the world 
community. ' 57 This is bearing in mind that a typical constitution sets out 'the 
fundamental rules of political order and establishes the basic political institutions 
58 as 
well as regulates the relations between the subjects of that order. , 
59 Therefore, 
according to Koskenniemi, the UN Charter represents 'the fulfilment of the modernist 
wish to find a single, comprehensive, and consistent point of view on the political 
51 N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic'and Social Rights to the UN Security Council', in 
Mashood A. Baderin, Robert Mccorquodale (eds. ), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 93. 
2 AD McNair, 'The Functions and Different legal Character of Treaties, ' (1930) XI British Yearbook 
dInternational Law 100 at 112. o 
' Dag Harnmarskj6ld served as United Nations Secretary-General from 10 April 1953 until 18 
September 1961. 
54 See Kofi Annan, 'Dag Hammarskj6ld and the 21 st century', The Fourth Dag Hammarsk/dId Lecture 
6th September 2001, Uppsala University, SG/SIvV794. See also UN Press Release/SC/7756 of 
13/05/2003. 
55 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited', 
in I Max Planck YB United Nations L 1,2 (1997). 
56 See Noeleen Heyzer, UNIFEM Executive Director, 'Women, War and Peace: Mobilizing for 
Security and Justice in the 21 st Century, The Dag Hammarsk/61d Lecture 2004, Uppsala, Sweden, 22 
September 2004. 
57 See the section by Reisman in B. Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Oxford Univ Pr, 2 ad ed. 2002). See also section by Fassbender and Bleckmarm on article 2(l) of the 
UN Charter. See also J. A. Frowein, 'Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public 
International Law', 247 RdC (1994, IV) 345, at 355; Macdonald, 'Fundamental Norms in 
Contemporary International Law, 25 Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law (1987) 115, at 119,120, 
128; idem, 'The Charter of the United Nations and the Development of Fundamental Principles of 
International Law, in B. Cheng and E. D. Brown (eds), Contemporary Problems ofInternational Law. 
Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberger, London: Stevens, 1988), p. 196 
5" H Abromeit and T Hitzel- Cassagnes, 'Constitutional Change and Contractual Revision- Principles 
and Procedures', 8 EJIL 1 (1999) at 9. 
59 ND White, The Law ofInternational Organisations (Manchester University Press, 2 ad ed., 2005), p. 
15. 
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organisation of humankind. v60 Furthermore, Tomuschat suggests that it 'has become 
obvious in recent years that the Charter is nothing else than the constitution of the 
international community. ' 'Now that universality has been reached, it stands out as 
the paramount instrument of the international community, not to be compared to any 
other international agreement. 61 
On the other hand, although 'the present-day order rests entirely on the Charter, 62 it has 
been argued that none of the above makes the UN document the constitution for the 
international community. Indeed, it has been put forward that the word 'constitution' has 
no particular meaning in international law. 63 In fact, even Tomuschat himself 
acknowledges that the Charter 'may not be fully satisfactory as a world constitution, not 
having been conceived of that function in 1945. s64 Furthermore 'the membership of the 
international community extends beyond the state membership provided in the UN 
Charter. 65 With this regard, it is perhaps better to say the Charter formed an amendment 
of the existing legal system and subsequently gained a special status within the 
international framework. 66 
Indeed just like in the United Kingdom, whereby the components of the constitution are 
not to be found in one document, the relevant rules and obligations detailing the 
governance of international community are set out not only in the provisions of the 
Charter but also beyond it. 67 Certainly the rules governing the community may also be 
contained in other treaties as well as other customs which are supported by state practice 
and opinio juris. Indeed, as illustrated earlier, 68 there are laws within the international 
60 See M. Koskennierni, 'Review of Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Cornnientry', Australian Yearbook ofInternational Law (1996) 227. 
` C. Tornuschat (ed. ), The United Nations at agefifty: a legal perspective, (Hague; Boston, MA: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995). P. xvii, and 327. 
62 ibid. 
63 Michael Wood, 'The Security Council and the 'Constitutionaaation' of International Law', Paper, 
University of Leeds, 14 March 2007. Available at 
http: //www. law. leeds. ac. uk/leedslaw/webdocs/leedslaw/uploadeddocuments/cfig-wood. doc. 
'4 C. Tomuschat The United Nations at agefifty, supra note 6 1. See also Tornuschat, 'Obligations 
Arising For States Without or Against their Will', RdC 241 (1993), 199, et seq., (217). 65 See, Erika de Wet, 'The International Constitutional Order, ' International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, (2006) 55: 51-76. 
66 See Nigel D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', Leiden Journal of International Law, 17 (2004), p. 649. 
67 C. Tomuschat, The United Nations at agefifty: a legal perspective, supra note 61. 68 See chapter one and two. 
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legal system that are considered so fundamental that they override and bind all others, 
including those contained in the UN Charter. 69 
Nevertheless, the UN Charter normalises the world's most powerful organisation 
consisting of 192 states, with its operations including the fields of international law, 
international security and economic development. Significantly, as demonstrated in the 
next chapter, the activities of regional organisations such as NATO, the Arab League, the 
OAS and the AU are regulated under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
70 Furthermore, 
some of the major provisions in the Charter have also been held to reflect customary 
international law and hence bind non-state parties. 71 Most notably, in the Nicaragua 
Case, 72 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed the customary character of the 
prohibition against the use of force. 73 As shall be shown below, the Court also held that 
this rule amounts to a peremptory norm orjus cogens meaning that it is part of a 'higher 
law' considered by the international community as so fundamental that derogation by 
states is strictly forbidden. 74 
The duty to adhere to the dictates of the Charter is similarly manifest in that the uN 
treaty supersedes any states' interests which may be in conflict with its mechanism 
for collective security. In particular, article 103 of the UN Charter, which possesses a 
constitutional function, 75 provides that in the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of member states under any other international agreement, the obligations 
under the Charter shall prevail. 76 As shown in the next chapter, this provision was 
reaffirmed by the ICJ in the Lockerbie Case. 77 Notably, its ruling has recently been 
followed by the other judgments of the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities in Luxembourg in the Yusu 
.f8 
and Kadi79 cases of 2005. Furthermore, 
6' See chapter seven. 
70 See articles 53 and 103 of the UN Charter. See also chapter four and seven. 
71E. g. article 51 on the right to self defence, see in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica), 1986 I. C. J. Reports p. 14. 72 lbid 
73 Article 2 (4) of the UN UN Charter 
74 See article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. See also chapter one. 75 Michael Wood, 'The Security Council and the 'Constitutionalization' of International Law, ' supra 
note 63. , 
76 However, see chapter seven. 77 See Questions ofInterpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arisingfrom the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports, pp. 15 and 126 respectively. 78 Ahmed Ali Yusufand Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission o the European Communities, T-306/01, unreported case, 21 September 2005. f 
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the status and strength of the principle in article 103 of the UN Charter was similarly 
affirmed by the UK House of Lords in the AI-Jedda Case 80 in December 2007. 
Although its application to regional agencies is subject to debate, 81 article 103 is 
clearly addressed to states. 82 Indeed, the obligations arising from this provision have 
been said to be part of the higher law with respect to other international agreements. 83 
Moreover, it is argued that article 103 is connected to member state obligations under 
article 25 of the UN Charter, 84 which confirms the Charter's status as an integral part 
of the constitution of the international community. 85 As a matter or practice, the 
special nature or article 103 is evidenced by the General Assembly's approval of the 
Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining 
from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations. 86 This Declaration 
included a paragraph reaffin-ning priority of member state obligations under the UN 
Charter over any other international obligations in accordance with article 103 of the 
UN Charter. Clearly, this provision applies with regard to the rules relating to the 
collective securityset up under the UN, which contains specific obligations imposed 
on member states, starting with those concerning the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
2.2 The United Nations System of Collective Peace and Security 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the UN treaty is outlined in article I of the 
Charter which in 1945 was, 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
which [ ... I brought. untold sorrow to mankind. ' Therefore, the Charter sets up a 
collective security system. In doing so, it provides that its purpose is to maintain 
79 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
communities, T-3 15/0 1, unreported, 21 September, 2005. 
go R (on th e applica tion of A I-Jedda) ( FQ v. Secretary of Statefor Defence [2 007] UKHL 5 8, para 3. 81 See chapter four. 
82 N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Rights to the UN Security Council', in 
Mashood A. Baderin& Robert Mccorquodale, 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, 'supra 
note 51. 
93 See Bardo Fassbender, 'The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community, ' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 36 (1998), p. 590; Lord A. D. McNair, The 
Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 217; Bruno Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use 
of Force: Legal Aspects', European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 10 (1999) No. 1. 94 Michael Wood, 'The Security Council and the 'Constitutionalization' of International Law,, supra 
note 63. 
"R Bernhardt, 'Article 103', in Simma (ed), The Charter of The United Nations. A Commentary', 
supra note 57. 86 G. A Res. 42/22 of 18 November 1987, annex. 
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international peace and security for the prevention and removal of 'threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. 87 
It was mentioned earlier that during the creation of the UN in 1945, it was envisaged 
that the Security Council would play a central role in fulfilling the purposes of the 
organisation. 88 Hence, member states conferred 'on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree[d] 
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on 
their behalf. '89 Theref6re member states are obligated under article 25 to 'accept and 
carry out' decisions of the Council in the exercise of its responsibilities, which are set 
out in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the Charter. 
But in the real sense, the Council was, from the onset, structured to be 'a universal 
instrument of geopolitics' 90 whose composition 'is nothing more than the victory 
coalition of 1945. '91 Thus at any one time, the Council is comprised of the victorious 
powers of World War II, namely; the United States, France, Britain, China and Russia 
and ten non-permanent members, who are elected for two-year terms on a regional 
geographical rotation. 92 The current criticisms and calls for reform with regard to the 
current system, which contradicts the 'principle of the sovereign equality of all UN 
member states, ' 93 are discussed in chapter eight. 
Meanwhile, in spite of its limitations, which are considered further below, 94 the 
Council was intended, through consensus, to exercise both executive and diplomatic 
functions in its primary duty of maintaining peace and security. 95 At this stage, it is 
important to mention that questions have often arisen as to what body possesses the 
subsidiary responsibility in lieu of the Council's inability or unwillingness to act on 
87 Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter. 
88 Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development 6fCollective Security: The Delegation by 
the UN Security Council ofts Chapter MPowers, (Oxford University Press, USA; New Ed edition, 
2000) p. 3. 
89 Article 24 of the UN Charter. For further on article 24, see B. Sinuna, The Charter ofthe United 
Nations, supra note 57, p. 397. 90 R. Falk, 'The United Nations and the Rule of Law', 4 TLCP (1994) 625. See also Eagleton, 
'International Law and the Charter of the United Nations', 39 ARL (1945) 751-752; Kunz, 'The United 
Nations and the Rule of Law', 46 ARL (1952) 505. 
91 Charles Krauthanuner, 'Don't Go Back to the UN, ' Washington Post, 21 March 2003, p. A-37 92 See article 23 (1), (2) and (3) of the UN Charter. 93 Article 2(l) of the UN Charter. 
"' See also chapter eight. 
9' N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 66 See also, Inis Claude, 'The Security Council', in E. Luard (ed), The Evolution ofInternational Organizations, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966), p. 68. 
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its duty, which in turn has led to much controversy over the legality of certain actions 
of the existing regional organisations. 96 
While the latter point is developed in coming chapters, it deserves mention that the 
UN General Assembly arguably possesses subsidiary responsibility in this area. 
Indeed, the Assembly may invoke the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution (377) that was 
originally put forward in 1950 to overcome situations when the Security Council is 
unable to act. 97 The difficulty with this instrument is the fear that it would undermine 
the Council, which is given exclusive authority on the resort to enforcement 
measures. 98 Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter eight, any attempt to curtail the 
Council's powers in this area are not only fiercely resisted by states, such a possibility 
is also mooted in the intended reforms of the Council, which seek to further entrench 
its powers and in the process, alienate any intended use of Res. 377. In further 
demonstration of the powers vested in the Security Council under the Charter, UN 
member states are forbidden from recourse to the use of force without authorisation of 
the Council, as shown below. * 
2.3 The United Nations and the Prohibition on the Use of Force 
While institutionalising the international collective security system within the UN, the 
drafters of the Charter further centralised the use of force. This was achieved by 
prohibiting the unilateral use of force by states in international relations with limited 
exceptions. The legality of the ban on the recourse to force is of 'universal validity"99 
and is specifically spelt out in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. 
96 See chapter four. 
97 See ND White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance ofInternational Peace 
and Security, (Manchester University Press, 2nd ed, 1997), pp. 169-182-, N. D. White, 'The Legality of 
Bombing in the Name of Humanity', 5 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000), 27. "' See below. See also article 2(4) and 42 of the UN Charter. 
99 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modem Introduction to International Law, (Routledge, 7th rev. ed., 1997), p. 309. 
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Article 2(4) lies at the heart of international law and instils a fundamental obligation by 
prohibiting the unilateral use of force. Famously affirmed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
Case (1986), 100 the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion 
(1996)101 and the Oil Platforms Case 102 (2003), the rules on the threat and use of force 
had also been asserted in the much earlier Nuremberg 103(1 946) and Corfu Channel'04 
(1949) cases. Most recently, the ban was similarly reiterated in the two recent African 
cases concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Uganda and Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) in 
2005.105 However, although all these cases commonly restate the prohibition on the use 
of force, 'some of these decisions are, at least in part, controversial. ' 
106 
Nonetheless, one of the major strengths of article 2(4) of the UN Charter lies in so far as 
it talks of the broader 'threat or use of force' rather than the more narrower concept of 
'war, ' which featured in the League of Nations system. 107 However, despite the claim 
that 'all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of 
international law, ' 108 it is clear that economic coercion and political pressure are not 
considered to amount to a threat or use of force under the Charter. 109 This view was 
confirmed in the Nicaragua judgment, where the World Court held that t he economic 
sanctions imposed on Nicaragua by the United States were not in breach of the principle 
of non-intervention. 110 
100 Nicaragua v United States ofAmerica, supra note 7 1, p. 14. 
101 Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226. 
102 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of1ran v United States ofAmerica), Judgement, ICJReports 2003, 
P63161. 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgement and Sentence, 1 October, 1946. Available 
at 41 American Journal ofInternational Law 172, (1947). 
104 Corfu Channel case (UK v. Albania), 1949, ICJ Rep. 4, April, 9,1949. 
'05 Posted on the ICJ website. 
106 Michael C. Wood, 'Towards New Circumstances in Which the Use of Force May be Authorized? 
The Cases of Humanitarian Intervention, Counter-Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction', in 
Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use offorce, supra note Is, p. 79. 
107 On this point, see D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, supra note 34, p. 890; 
W. M. Reisman/J. E. Baker, Regulating Cover Action: Practices, Contexts and Policies of Coercion 
Abroad in International and American Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press 1992). 
108 See the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law's section on the Principle of Non- 
Intervention. 
109 A proposal by Brazil, during the drafting of article 2(4) UN charter, which required states to refrain 
from'economic measures', was rejected. See 6. U. N. C. I. O., Documents 335. 
110 ICJ Reports (1986). On the legality of US economic sanctions on Nicaragua, see also Curtis J. 
Henderson, 'The Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of Nicaragua, ' 43 
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All the same, the general prohibition against the unilateral use of force has been 
accepted and reaffirmed on many occasions. 
"' Most significantly, the rule has gained 
the status ofjus cogens, 112 reference to which was made by the ICJ in Nicaragua, 
113 as 
described earlier. The prohibition is therefore part of a 'higher law', deemed 
necessary for the benefit of the international community in which derogation by states 
is not allowed. 114 And although clearly -addressed to states, the prohibition also 
features in the constitutive instruments of key regional organisations, such as the 
NATO treaty, ' 15 the former Warsaw Pact, ' 16 the OAS Charter 117 and the Constitutive 
Act of the AU. 118 
However, in spite of the fact that the prohibition has served as a very effective 
restraint against the use of force, an intense debate has ensued with respect to the 
precise parameters of the ban. In particular, the question that needs to be asked is, 
does article 2(4) represent a total ban of the use of force, except in self-defence and 
collective enforcement measures under Chapter VII, or is it limited when it prohibits 
the use of force 'against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,? ' 19 
Wash. Lee L. R. (1983), 167. See also Acevedo, 'The U. S. measures against Argentina resulting from 
the Malvinas conflict, ' 78, AJIL, 323 (1984). 
111 The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States; GA 
Res. 213 1 (XX) UN Doc, A/6014; the 1970 Declaration of the Principles of International Law, GA 
Res. 2625 (XXV); the 1974 the Definition of Aggression GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/9632; 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV), 
UN Doc. A/4684 (1961); the 1987 Declaration on the Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of 
the Use of Force in International Relations, GA Res. 42/22, UN Doc. A/Res/42/22. 
112 jI Chamey, 'Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, ' 32 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (1999), 123 1; A. Abass and M. Baderin, 'Towards Effective Collective Security 
and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African 
Union', (2002) 49 Netherlands International Law Review 116. 
113 ICJ Reports (1986) 14, para 190. See also the See the Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep. 2004, para. 87. See also Christenson, 'The World 
Court and Jus Cogens, 81 American Journal ofInternational Law (1987) 93; Ronzitti, ' Use of Force, 
Jus Cogens and State Consent', in A. Cassese (ed. ), Developments in International Law, the Current 
Regulation of the Use offorce, (Brill Academic Publishers, 1986) p. 147; Weisburd, 'The Emptiness of 
the Concept of Ius Cogens, as Illustrated by the law Bosnia-Herzegovim', Michigan Journal of 
International Law (1995-6) 591. 
"' Gennady M. Danilenko, 'International Jus Cogens: Issues ofLaw-Making., ' EJIL Vol 1 (2) (199 1). 
i's Article I North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, UNTS 243. 
116 Art 1 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance 1955,219 UNTS 3. 
117Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States 1967. 
1` Article 4(f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000. 
119 On this issue, see Corfu Channel Case, Pleadings, Vol III, p 296. See Bowett, Self-Defence in 
international Law, (Manchester University Press, 1958) p. 152; Simma (ed. ), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 1994) 106; Waldock, 'The 
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While this issue features in the discussion in chapter seven concerning the African 
Unions' right to intervene, it is worth mentioning here that the diverse views on this 
question taken lie in the interpretation advocated by the 'permissive' and 'restrictive' 
schools of thought. 120 Meanwhile, a key problem with the ban is that it prohibits the 
use of force by states in 'international relations' and therefore does not specifically 
address regional conflicts which emanate from intra-states wars, such as the Darfur 
conflict. 121 Nonetheless, the Charter provides two related exceptions to the prohibition 
on the use of force which include 1) the right to self defence under article 51 of the 
UN Charter and 2), forcible measures taken by or authorised by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
2.4: Self defence 
While prohibiting the use of force, the UN Charter provides for 'the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack' occurs against a state. The 
temporary nature of this right provided by article 51 is evidenced by the condition that 
it is only exercisable 'until the Security Council has taken measures necessary. ' The 
supremacy of the Council is also demonstrated in the requirement that the measures 
taken by states in the exercise of self-defence are to be immediately reported to the 
UN organ. Furthermore, any measures taken 'shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility' of the Council 'to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. ' 
Although the concept of self defence is universally accepted, both as a treaty and 
customary right, 122 its precise limits are subject to much controversy and continue to 
raise fundamental questions relevant to international law. Precisely, can a state invoke 
the right to self-defence only after an armed attack has occurred, or may it strike first in 
the face of an imminent attack? 123 International legal commentators have largely been 
preoccupied with the debate centring on the scope of what constitutes an 'armed attack' 
under article 51 of the UN Charter and whether, given the threat of terrorism, the 
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual Stated in International Law', 81 Recueil des Cours 
(1952)415. 
"' C. Gray 'International Law and the Use offorce, (Oxford University Press, USA; 2 edition, 2004) 
See also I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use ofForce by States (Clarendon Press, 1963). 121 See chapter nine. 
122 Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica, supra note 7 1, p. 14, 123 Ibid. See also Gray, International law and the use offorce, supra note 120, pp. 86-87. 
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concept of self defence allows anticipatory, preventive or pre-emptive action. 124 
However, this debate has ignored the fact that the concept of self defence as an 
exception to article 2(4) of the UN charter hardly meets the challenges posed by modem 
regional conflicts, particularly those raging in Africa. 
Indeed, taking into account that the UN Charter was formulated with aggression 
between states in mind, its provisions appear to be inadequate to address conflicts 
internal in nature, particularly where rebel factions challenge the authority of the 
government as highlighted by the Darfur conflict. 125 This is because article 51 has not 
been interpreted to cover internal armed attacks, as they do not amount to a breach of 
article 2(4) and hence are considered to be within the domestic jurisdiction of individual 
states. 126 Therefore, it was anomalous that the UN High Level Panel (2004) took an 
abstract approach and claimed that article 51 need not be 're-written nor 
reinterpreted. ' 127 
Meanwhile, the Court in the Wall Case 128 also restricted the use of force in self-defence 
to cases of an armed attack by one state against another state. However, this view has 
been criticised by Judge Higgins in her separate Opinion where she argues that 'nothing 
in the text of Article 51 stipulates that self defence is available only when an armed 
attack is made by a state. ' 129 This observation by Higgins is of particular significance in 
evaluating the rationale of regional intervention based on self-defence of peoples in the 
context of regional wars in response to the changed nature of conflicts, from inter-state 
to intrastate. It is for this reason that the concept of regional self-defence is considered 
in more detail in the next chapter. Perhaps a more relevant discussion here is with 
respect to the second permissible exception to the prohibition against the use of force, 
which rests in the residual role of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. 
124 See A. Cassese, 'Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law', 
12 European Journal ofInternational law, (2001) 993. See also C. Gray, International law and the use 
0 orce, supra note 120; M. Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge University Press; 5 edition, 2003). 1ý'See chapter nine. 
126 See article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
127 UN, High Level Report, A More Secure World, supra note 8. 129 See the Palestinian Wall Case, supra note 113, para. 138-141. 129 separate Opinion by Judge R. Higgins, ibidem, para 33. 
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2.5 The Collective Security System under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: The 
Powers and Discretion of the UN Security Council 
Under the current set up, the Security Council is vested with a broad discretion under 
, breach of the peace, article 39 in determining 'the existence of any threat to the peace, 
or act of aggression' and may make recommendations that are binding. In practice, 
the Council rarely makes express reference to article 39 of the UN Charter 130 in its 
resolutions, although it did so when passing resolution 598 (1987), 13 1 relating to the 
Iran-Iraq conflict and resolution 660 (1990)132 concerning the illegal invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq. However, it has been observed by some that the 'Security Council 
members no longer pay much attention to the presence or absence of a reference to 
such a threat. ' 133 Therefore, although it is generally agreed that that the Council must 
first determine the existence of a threat to peace before a passing decree under 
Chapter VII, 134 it has voted for certain resolutions, such as the much controversial 
resolution 1422 (2002), 135 without making a determination under article 39 of the 
Charter. 136 
Nevertheless, article 39 normally constitutes the preliminary steps to taking 
enforcement actions which include measures short of the use of force by way of 
sanctions under article 41. In recent years, the Council has imposed some form of 
sanctions on, amongst others, Angola, 137 Haiti, 138 Iraq, 139 Liberia, 140 Libya, 141 
16 
130 On this point, see Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use ofForce in International Law, 
(Manchester University Press, 2006), pp. 7-10. 
131 SC Res. 598 (1987) of 20 July 1987. 
132 SC Res 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990. 
133 See H. Freudenschub, 'Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent 
Practice of the UN Security Council', 46 AJPIL (1993) 1. 
134 See R. Higgins , 7'he New United Nations: Appearance and Reality, (Hull: University of Hull Press, 
1993), p 10; V. Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State 
Responsibility', 43 ICLQ (1994) 55, p, 61; F. L. Kirgis, 'The Security Council's First Fifty Years', 89 
AJ1L, (l995), p. 5l2; J. A. Frowein and N. Krisch, 'Article 39', in B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the 
United Nations, ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 nd ed, 2002) p. 717. See also Michael C. Wood, 
'Towards New Circumstances in Which the Use of Force May Be Authorized? The Cases of 
Humanitarian Intervention, Counter-Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 15, pp. 75-90. 
135 See SC Res. 1422 (2002) of 12 July 2002, UN. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002), 
136 See Carsten Stahn, 'The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)', EJIL, Vol. 14, 
(2003), No. 1. 
137 See SC. Res. 864 (1993) of 15 September (1993) and SC Res. 1127 (1997) of 29 October 1997. 138 See SC Res. 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993. 
139 See SC Res. 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990. 
140 See SC Res. 798 (1992) of 19 November 1992. See also SC Res. 1343 (200 1) of 7 March 200 1. 141 See SC Res. 748 (1992) of 3 Ist March 1992 and SC Res. 883 (1993) of I Ith November 1993. 
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Rwanda, 142 Somalia 143 and the states of the former Yugoslavia. 144 However, this 
practice has extended to other legal subjects such as individuals, 145 liberation and 
guerrilla movements, 146 as well and outlaws, such as the Al Qaeda network. 147 Having 
said so, it deserves mention that some of the sanctions, particularly those previously 
imposed on Iraq, have not been free from criticism. 148 
Meanwhile, the Security Council is also empowered to take enforcement measures 
under article 42 which provides that should initial measures prove 'to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. ' 149As will be shown below in regard to the 
UN's initial action in Iraq, rather than making references to the use of force, it has 
been the practice of the Council to authorise the use of 'all necessary measures' or 'all 
150 
necessary means' when conferring a military enforcement mandate. 
However, a fundamental flaw of the UN is its lack of a standing army to carry out 
some of its functions. Indeed, regional agencies such as NATO and the AU have since 
capitalised on the lessons leant from the shortcomings encountered by the lack of an 
UN army, and thereby established standby forces. 151 In the meantime, due to the 
obsolete nature of article 43 of the Charter, which had envisioned an UN armed force 
142 See SC Res. 918 (1994) of 17th May 1994. 
143 See SC Res. 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992. 
144 See SC Res. 713 (199 1) of 25th September 1991 and SC Res. 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992. 
145 See SC Res. 1532 (2004) on the former Liberian President Charles Taylor. 
146 
. See also SC Res. 942 
(1994) of September 23 1994. 
147 See SC 1267 (1999) of October 15 1999. 
149 See the Symposium on: 'The Impact on International Law of a 
Decade of Sanctions against Iraq', with contributions by different authors, published at 13 EJIL (2002) 
1. See also Jean Dupraz, 'UNICEF and the Sanctions Committee - Lessons Learned from Iraq', in Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas, United Nations Sanctions and International Law, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2001). 
149 On the UN's use of force, see N. D. White, International Conflict and Security Lam Essays in 
Memory offfilaire McCoubrey (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 235; M. Golding, 'The Use of 
Force by the United Nations', (1996) 3 International Peacekeeping 1; G. Gaja, 'Use of Force Made or 
Authorized by the United Nations', in C. Tomuschat (ed. ), The United Nations atAge Fifty: A Legal 
Perspective supra note 6 1. 
150 On interpretation of the Council's mandate, see M. C. Wood, 'The Interpretation of Security Council 
Resolutions', (1998) 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 73. R. Cryer, 'The Security Council 
and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence? ', (1996) 1 Journal ofArmed Conflict Law. See also See E. 
Papastavridis, 'Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII in the Aftemiath of 
the Iraqi Crisis', 56 ICLQ (2007) p. 83; C. Gray, 'Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final 
Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obligations', in ASIL Insights (Nov. 2002); P. McLain, 
'Settling the Score with Sadam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force', 13 
Duke JCIL (2003) p. 233. 
151 See chapter six. 
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managed by a Military Staff Committee, it has been the tradition of the Council to 
request 'coalition of the willing' states to provide armed forces on an ad hoc basis. 
152 
This practice was initially subject to controversy. For example, during the Korean 
crisis, the United Kingdom maintained that the Security Council could not resort to 
article 42 without concluding an article 43 agreement 
153 while the former U. S. S. R 
argued quite the opposite. 154 In the end, with the latter position favoured by notable 
scholars, 155 the legality of this practice was confirmed in the flexible approach taken 
in the Expenses Cases. Here, the ICJ ruled that 'nothing in the text of Art. 43 would 
limit the discretion of the Security Council negotiating such agreements. 
156 
Meanwhile, in spite of the wide powers available to the Security Council, the 
persistence of the Cold War rivalry ensured that it was not until November 1990 that 
the Security Council authorised a 'coalition of willing states' to take enforcement 
action against Iraq, subsequent to the latter's infamous invasion of Kuwait. 157 During 
this time, Security Council resolution 678 called on these states to use 'all necessary 
means' to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. 158 However, controversy persists as to whether 
the intervention in Iraq amounted to an exercise of collective self defence or whether 
it is better perceived as collective security measures authorised by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 159 
152 See Gary Wilson, The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the 'Coalition of the Willing' 
Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action', Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 12, 
Number 2,2007, Pp. 295-330; N. D White, Keeping the Peace, supra note 32, p. 30. See also L. Sohn, 
'The authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent Force', 52 AXL (1958) 
229, P. 230; G. Schwarzenberger, 'Problems of a United Nations Force', 12 CLP (1959) 247, p. 254; D. 
Sarooshi, 'The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security supra note 88. 
153 S/PV. 476, p. 3,7 July 1950. 
154 Memorandum of the U. S. S. R. A/AC. 121/2,10 July 1964. 
155 See, e. g. D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Developmentof Collective Security, ibid, pp. 143- 
53; H. McCoubrey and N. D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict (Ashgate Publishing 1992) 
at 133 and 144-5; R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and how we use it (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994) at 263-6; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to 
International Law (Routledge, 7th ed., 1997) at 389-90; N. Blokker, 'Is the Authorization Authorized? 
Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the 
Able and Willing, ' (2000) 11 EJIL 541 at 547-55; F. L. Kirgis, 'The Security Council's First Fifty 
Years', (1995) 89 AJIL 506 at 521. However, for an alternative view, see J. Quigley, 'The 
'Privatization" of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism', 17 Michigan 
Journal OfInternational Law (1996), 249. 
156 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case I. C. J. Rep. 1962, pp. 166-167. 
157 However, see SC Re. 83 (1950), June 27,1950. On the Council's increased role after the Cold War, 
see generally, N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq, ' supra note 66. 158 See SC Res. 678 (1990), 29 November 1990. 
159 Some have argued that article 51 UN Charter seemed to be the one most relevant in passing 
resolution 678. See Oscar Schachter, 'United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict,, 85 American Journal 
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This uncertainty is largely borne out of the Council's ambiguity in the sense that it did 
not specify the provision it relied on but merely stated that it was acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 160 More controversial was the reliance on resolution 678, 
more than a decade after Operation Desert Storm in 1990, as justification for the 
US/UK invasion of Iraq (2003). 161 Also contentious was the use of Council resolution 
68 8 as a legal basis for military action in Iraq to protect the Kurdish population, which 
aroused deep disagreements on the whether the Council's could impliedly authorise 
the use of force. 162 
Nevertheless, the fall of the Berlin Wall brought with it a new optimism which 
manifest itself in fundamental agreements between the permanent members. 
163 in 
particular, resolution 678 'gave rise to hopes of a new era for the UN and of a New 
World Order. ' 164 In turn, the aftermath of the Kuwaiti liberation saw the famous 
publication of the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace 165 and a vision exemplified 
in President Bush's words that; 'the rule of law would supplant the rule of the 
jungle. ' 166 In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Group 7 (G7) leaders also announced 
the emergence of the requisite 'conditions for the United Nations to fulfil completely 
the promise and the vision of its founders. ' 167 Meanwhile some writers argued that the 
DfInternational Law. 452,459 (1991); Mary Ellen O'Connell, 'The UN, NATO, and International Law 
After Kosovo', Human Rights Quarterly 22.1 (2000), 57-89. 
160 On the use of SC Res. 688 (1990), 5 April 199 1, see D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on 
International Law, supra note 34. 
161 See N. D. White and E. P. J. M)jer, 'The Use of Force against Iraq, 8 JCSL (2003) 1; N. D White, 
'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq' supra note 66. On the legality of the Iraq 
War, see, generally, T. M. Franck, 'What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq', 97, American 
Journal ofInternational Law, (2003), 607; W. H. Taft and T. F. Buchwald, 'Pre-emption, Iraq and 
International Law', 97, American Journal ofInternational Law (2003), p. 557. 
162 C. Antonopoulos, 'The Unilateral Use of Force by States after the end of the Cold War', 4 Journal 
ofArmed Conflict Law 117, (1999) at 152-3; P. Malanczuk, 'The Kurdish Crisis and Allied 
Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War', (1991) 2 EJIL 11; N. D. White, 'Commentary 
on the Protection of the Kurdish Safe-Havens: Operation Desert Strike', I Journal ofArmed Conflict 
Law (1996), 197. 
163 See introduction by Niels Blokker, in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the 
Use ofForce supra note 15, p. l. 
164 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use offorce, (Oxford University Press: New York, 
2000), p. 153, citing UN Blue Book Series, Vol IX The UN and the IraqlKuwait Conflict 1990-1996; 
G Bush Senior, Speech to Congress, 'New World Order, ' Washington D. C, II September, 1990; Jean 
Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The Failures of Kosovo 
and Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union7, (2004) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law 237. 
... See B. Boutros- Ghali An Agendafor Peace (United Nations, New York, 1992). 
'66 Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers, 'Has US power destroyed the UN? ', Royal United Services 
Institutefor Defense Studies Journal (August) 1999. 
167 See Osman Mohamed Awad, The United Nations and Peace Enforcement : Wars, 
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'waning of the Cold War seems to have brought with it a rebirth of collective security 
system advocated and designed in 1945 by the victors in World War JI, 
068 a view 
shared by many others. 
169 
However, in their article, Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers rightly observe that 
the post-Cold War 'rhetoric was euphoric, utopian and short-lived. ' 170 It soon became 
clear that this 'new world order' was beset by the same problems as the old one. 
Indeed the pursuit of national interests by the permanent members and the domination 
of geopolitics brought the real possibility of the Security Council being paralysed 'in 
a way that may render it more ineffective than at any time during the Cold War. ' 171 
As it turned out, the discretion of the permanent members to use the Council powers 
to further and protect their individual interests raised fundamental questions in regard 
to whether they are bound by the principles of the Charter and importantly, whether 
the Council could be held accountable in cases of breach. 
2.6 The Question of the Legal Limits to the Political Powers of the Security 
Council 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the Security Council retains a key role both 
under self-defence and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However the failure of 
the Charter to define the meaning of the terms under article 39 has led to the 
discretionary use of the Council powers. 172 Indeed, the Council has been reluctant to 
use the expressions 'breach of the peace' and act of aggression' and has preferred to 
use the phrase 'threat to peace, ' which allows a wide margin of discretion. 173 
However, the Council has found aggression, for example in resolution 573 (1985), 174 
Terrorism and Democracy, (Aldershotý Ashgate, 2002), p. 25. Osman quotes the Financial Times, 17 
July 1991, p. 4. 
168 See E. B. Haas (1994), 'Collective Conflict Management', in F. Kratochwil and E. D. Mansfield, 
International Organisations: A Reader, ' (Mansfield Harper College Publishers), p. 237. 
169 For example, in 199 1, Oscar Schachter agreed that 'UN enforcement action against an aggressor is 
presently the centre of world attention'. See 0. Schachter, (1991)' Authorised Uses of Force by the 
United Nations and Regional Organisations', in L. F. Damrosch and D. J. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force 
in the New International Order, (Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford), p. 66. See E. B. Haas (1994), 
'Collective Conflict Management', in F. Kratochwil and E. D. Mansfield, International Organisations, 
ibid. p. 237. 
170 Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers, 'Has US power destroyed the UN? ', Royal United Services 
Institutefor Defense Studies Journal (1999). 
171 Ibid. 
172 Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 164. 171 See Tarcisio Gazzini, The changing rules on the use offorce in international law, supra note 130, p. 10 
174 See SC Res. 573 (1985), 4 October, 1985. 
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which condemned the Israeli military action on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. 
Compounded by the use of veto, 175 the Council's often unwillingness and inability to 
act in times of grave peril has meant that what constitutes to 'a threat to peace, breach 
of the peace or acts of aggression' has not evolved in a uniform manner. Instead, the 
Council continues to fully exploit its discretion and 'in some cases even beyond any 
reasonable limits or in a rather suspicious selective manner. ' 
176 
Furthermore, serious problems arise due to the blur between the legality of the 
Council's practice and politics. 177 White observes that 'the making of a determination 
that there is a threat to, or breach of the peace or an act of aggression will depend in 
practice at least as much upon political factors as upon strictly legal criteria, 
especially where the interests of permanent members may be involved [or 
s178 otherwise]. This discretion raises the question as to whether the UN is itself bound 
by any legal limits 'or whether it is omnipotent and legibus solutus. ' 179 In this context, 
it has been argued that the Council has unfettered discretion and with no real legal 
limits in its exercise of Chapter VII measures. 180 However,, this argument is fiercely 
contested. 18 1 For example, in his dissent during the Lockerbie Case, Judge 
175 See article 27 (2) and (3) of the UN Charter. See also chapter eight. 
176 Tarcisio Gazzini, The changing rules on the use of force in international law, supra note 130. See 
also I. Brownlie, 'The Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations and the Rule of Law', in 
S. St Macdonald (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), p. 91; and The Rule 
ofLaw in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 
(The Hague; Nijhoff, 1998), p. 217. 
177 Niels Blokker, 'The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use of Force, ' supra note 15, p. 11. 178 ND White, Keeping the Peace, supra note 32. 
17' Aristotle Constantinides, 'An Overview of Legal Restraints on Security Council Chapter VII Action 
with a Focus on Post-Conflict Iraq', Paper presented at the Inaugural Conference of the European 
Society of International Law, Florence, May 2004), at www. esil-sedi. orglenglisb/papers. html. See also 
T. D. Gill, 'Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise 
its Enforcement Power Under Chapter VII of the Charter, ' 26 NYIL (1995) 33. 
180 See G. Oosthuizen, 'Playing Devil's Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound by 
Law', LJIL 12, (1999), 549. 
181 See generally Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra 
note 1; J. Gardam, 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action', 17 Michigan 
Journal ofInternational Law 285, p. 318. N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social 
Rights to the UN Security Council', in Mashood A. Baderin, Robert Mccorquodale, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Action, supra note 5 1, p. 93. See finiher R. Higgins, The Development of 
International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations, (Oxford University Press, 1963); 
S. R. Ratner, ' The Security Council and International Law', in Malone, The UN Security Council. 
From the Cold War to the 21"' Century, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 591-605; See, also D. 
Schweigman, The Authority ofthe Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Legal Limits 
and the Role of the International Court ofJustice (Springer; I edition, 200 1); Lamb, 'Legal Limits to 
United Nations Security Council Powers', in G. Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon (eds. ), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour oflan Brownlie (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 361; Nolte, 
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Weeramantry expressed the view that the Council's powers 'must be exercised in 
accordance with well-established principles of international law. ' 182 White concurs 
and asserts that the Council discretion must exist within the law since it is granted by 
the UN Charter which being a treaty, is thereby a legal document., 83 Indeed, such a 
premise had also been stated by the ICJ in the Admissions Opinion where it was held 
that the 'political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the 
treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its 
powers or criteria for its judgement. ' 184 Still on the same point, reference is also made 
of the statement made by first president of the Security Council, Mr Makin, on 17 
January 1946 during its first meeting: 'Our work must be based on the Charter. We 
are not permitted to go beyond it. " 85 However, he was to add 'but we shall not fail to 
exercise to the full the great powers which have been given to this Council. 086 
However, despite its 'great powers, ' it is agreed that the Council is bound by the 
peremptory norms of international law. 187 Recently, this has been confirmed by the 
Court of First Instance of the EC, which, in the cases of Yassin Abdullah Kadi and 
Ahmed All Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation, held that the Council 
(must observe the fundamental peremptory provisions ofjus cogens. " 88 Furthermore, 
'The Limits of the Security Council's Powers and Its Functions in the International Legal System: 
Some Reflections', in M. Byers (ed. ), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in 
international relations and international law (Oxford University Press, USA, 2000), at 315. 182 Questions ofInterpretation andApplication ofthe 1971 Montreal Convention Arisingfrom the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK. Libya v. US) Provisional Measures, 1992 ICJ Rep. 114,14 
A ril, 1992,175 (Judge Weeramantry dissenting). 
18rN. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 66. For a 
similar assertion, see also Gary Wilson, The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the 
'Coalition of the Willing' Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action', Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law, Volume 12, Number 2, (2007), pp. 295-330. 
184 Conditions ofAdmission ofa State to Membership of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1948], 
ICJ, Rep. 57, at 64. See also the Case Concerning CertainErpenses ofthe United Nations (Article 17, 
parSagraUph 2Sofothe Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 168. is ee NCR No. 1 (1946). 
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187 N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Rights to the UN Security Council', in 
Mashood A. Baderin& Robert Mccorquodale, 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, ' supra 
note 5 I. See also, P Sands &P Klein, Bowett's Law ofInternational Institutions (5 1h ed, 
Sweet&Maxwell, 200 1), pp. 45 8459; Erika de Wet. The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations 
Security Council. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 187-19 1; Gowlland-Debbas, 'LYN Sanctions and 
International Law: an Overview', in V. Gowlland-Debbas (Ed. ), United Nations ýanctions and 
International Law, (Kluwer Law International, ) 200 1, p. 14. 
'" Case T-306/0 1, Ahmed AU Yusufand Al Barakaal International Foundation v. Council ofthe European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the CFI, 21 Sept. 2005, 
at para. 28 I; Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council ofthe European Union and Commission 
of the European Communities, Judgment of the CFI, 21 Sept. 2005, at para. 230. 
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as argued in chapter eight, the UN Security Council, is also arguably bound by the 
concept of 'good faith. "89 However, the Security Council's has rarely felt compelled 
to decisively act during circumstances requiring urgent action, particularly in Africa. 
Indeed, its record in the continent stands in apparent contradiction to the broad powers 
and extensive discretion vested to it by the UN Charter, in order to discharge its peace 
and security responsibilities. 
Instead, of invoking its wide powers available under Chapter VII, the Council, 
although often declaring the existence of a threat to peace and security in Africa, 
hardly ever takes the decisive action necessary to halt conflicts and alleviate much 
suffering, as shown in Darfur. 190 This last point is of particular significance as the 
Council's inability or unwillingness to act with regard to the commission of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity has not only led to catastrophe but also 
increased the activity of regional organisations which, to some, challenges the UN's 
collective security system. 191 
2.7 The Practice of the Security Council in Africa: The Ambivalence towards 
African Regional Conflicts 
Although the turn of the 21' century saw a fully decolonised Africa, 192 'liberation 
from the yoke of colonialism did not automatically bring about peace and prosperity 
for Africa. 193 Instead, the post-colonial system, which was based on the Westphalian 
state system, 194 paved the way for systematic coup d'gtats and gross violations of 
human rights that ieached their watershed in the 1990s. 195And in spite of its primary 
responsibility for peace and security, the UN was unable to effectively deal with the 
post-Cold War conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, DR Congo, 
189 On this point, see Franck, T. M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1995), p. 51-3& 219-220. See also R. Cryer, 'The Security Council and Article 39, ' supra note 
ISO. 
190 See chapter nine. 
191 See chapter seven. See also Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the 
Use of Force, ' supra note 164. See also Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use ofForce in 
International Law, supra note 130, p. 114. 
192 See chapter five. 
193 Nsongurua J. Udombana, 'Critical Essay: Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union 
Treaty and Human Rights', Vol. 17, No. 6, American University Law Review, (2002). 
194 See chapters two and five. 
195 See chapter five and six. 
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Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Cote d7voire. 196 As it turned out, the 
escalation of the violence confirmed Africa's status as holding 'the record of ... ] 
wars and conflicts. ' 197 This picture ensured that violent conflicts killed and displaced 
more people in Africa than in any other continent. 198 
Although the UN later acknowledged its own failure in post-Cold War Africa, 
199the 
international community's ambivalence towards the continent can be sketched out 
from as early as the UN's inception in 1945. Indeed, despite the presence of wars in 
the continent, the controversial operation played by the ONUC Forces in Congo 
between 1960 and 1964 200 remained the UN's sole peace operation in Africa in the 
first four and a half decades of the organisation's existence. 201 Until the early 1990s, 
196 For a historic account of some of these conflicts , see Adekeye Adebajo& Chris Landsberg, ' Back 
to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa', in Adekeye Adebajo & Chandra Lekha Sriram, Managing 
Ar7ned Conflicts in 21st Century, (Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 
197 Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21 st Century), adopted 8-10 Jul. 1996,16, O. A. U. 
Doc. AHG/Decl. 3 (XXXII). 
198 See Kofi Annan, 'The Cause of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa', (General Assembly, Security Council Fifty-Second Session, Fifty-third year. 
See UN Press Release, SG/SM/6524 of 16 April 1998; Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of 
the Organization of African Unity); reproduced in 10 African Journal ofInternational & Comparative 
Law (1998), pp. 549-550. See also Jeff-rey Herbst, 'Economic incentives, natural resources and conflicts 
in Affica'Journal ofAfrican Economies 9,3 (2000), pp. 270-88,292 and 294; and the World Bank, 
Can Africa Claim the 21 Century? (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2001), p. 59; The Commission 
for Africa, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa (The Commission for Africa, 
London and Addis Ababa, 2005), p. 200. 
199 UN Secretariat, Report ofthe Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Doc. S/I 999/1257(1999) December 16 (1999), 3. 
" Deployed by SC Res. 161 (1961), 21 February 1961. See Osman Mohamed Awad, The United 
Nations and Peace Enforcement : Wars, Terrorism and Democracy, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002). p. 153- 
165. See also Abi-Saab, Georges, The United Nations operations in the Congo 1960-1964, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 1978); Amirie, Abbas, The United Nations intervention in the Congo crisis, 
1960-1961: with special emphasis on the political role ofthe late Secretary-General, Dag 
Hammarskjold, (Ann Arbor, MI : University Microfilms, I 967); Burns, Arthur Lee and Nina Heathcote. 
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the UN practice had been dominated by the Cold War and the power enmity that 
characterised it. 202 For this reason, its disastrous record in the African continent was 
often excused on the grounds that the UN Security Council was divided on Cold War 
lines, 203 coupled with the threat and use of the veto. 204 This separation, however, had 
not stopped the Council from functioning during the duration of this period, which 
lasted until 1989.205 
As suggested earlier, these conflicts pointed towards the reality that the formulation of 
the UN Charter, with aggression between states primarily in mind, meant that its 
provisions appeared to be inadequate for regional conflicts and failed to address the 
threats that emanate from intra-state wars. However, as will be shown below, the 
provision in article 2(7) of the UN Charter did not prevent the Security Council from 
determining the existence of a threat to peace under Chapter VII despite their internal 
character. 206 It can therefore be deduced that the Security Council's practice took note 
of the changing nature of what amounts to threat to peace from being strictly interstate 
to include intra, state conflicts. 207 
Therefore, its resolutions with regard to the situations in the African conflicts of 
Somalia (1992)208 Rwanda (1994) 
, 
209 Central African Republic (1997) 
'210 Liberia 
(1991), 211 Sierra Leone 
, 
212 (1997), Sudan213 (2005) and the DRC (2000), 214 the 
Rashid (eds. ) West Aftica's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2004) and Agostinho, Zacarias, Yhe United Nations and International 
Peacekeeping, ( London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 1996). 
202 See chapter two. 
203 N. D. White, The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security, 
(Manchester, England; New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. I O. See also Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use offorce supra note 120, p. 195. 204 See chapter eight. See also Article 27 (3); N. D. White, 'The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security', ibid, p. 10. 
205 N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq, ' supra note 66. 206 On this point, see N. D. White, Keeping the Peace, supra note 32, p. 56. 207 Ibid, p. 26. About this changing notion of threats to peace, see J. E. Alvarez, International 
Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005), 195-196; see also K. C. Wellens, 'The UN Security Council and new threats to the peace: back to the future', (2003) 15 JCSL 15. 208 See SC Res. 794 (1992) adopted 3 December 1992. See also SC Res 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992. 209 See SC Res. 918 (1994) of May 1994. See also SC Res. 1955 (1994) of 8 November 1994. 210 See SC Res. 1125 (1997) of 6 August 1997. 
211 See SC Res. 788 (1992) of November 19 1992. 
212 See SC Res. 1132 (1997) of October 08 1997. 
213 See SC Res. 1591 (2005) of 29 March 2005. - 214 See SC Res. 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000. 
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Council made a link between threats to peace and gross human rights violations. 215 
The justification for this practice was supported in Prosecutor v Tadic, whereby the 
ICTY observed that there 'there is a common understanding manifested by the 
subsequent practice of the members of the United Nations at large, that the threat to 
peace under Art. 39 may include, as one of its species, internal armed confliCtS., 216 
However, the Council went further and determined that non-state actors could also 
pose a threat to international peace and security. 217 
Nevertheless, while the Council's practice with this regard shows a clear development 
of international law, the permanent members continue to reinforce their seemingly 
unfettered discretion in pursuit of their national interests. Occasionally, this behaviour 
has in itself triggered threats to international peace and security, including during 
grave circumstances. 218 A clear illustration of this point lay in its approach to the 
Rwandan genocide. 219 Indeed a Panel of Eminent Personalities from the Organisation 
of African Unity accused certain members of the Security Council, specifically France 
and the United States that they 'consciously chose to abdicate their responsibility for 
Rwanda. ' 220 And according to Boutros Boutros -Ghali, '[t]he behaviour of the 
Security Council was shocking; it meekly followed the US' lead in denying the reality 
of the genocide. Although it was a clear case of genocide, US spokesmen were 
obviously under instructions to avoid the term in order to avoid having to fulfil their 
treaty obligations under the 1949 Genocide Convention. v221 
In the words of the UN Secretary General, the ambivalent attitude towards the Rwandan 
genocide brought about the 'perception of near indifference' on the part of the 
international community which left a rpoisonous legacy' that undermined confidence in 
215 The Security Council has also authorised action in Yugoslavia (1992), Haiti (1994), Rwanda, the 
Great Albania (1997), the), Kosovo (1999) and East Timor (2000) which were largely internal conflicts 216 See Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), para. 30. 217 See SC Res. 1532 (2004) of 12 March 2004 on the former Liberian President Charles Taylor. See 
also SC Res. 864 (1993) concerning UNITA. See also SC Res. 942 (1994) concerning the self- 
clairned Serb Republic in Bosnia- Herzegovina. 
1r80See chapter eight. 
219 For a more analysis, see chapter five and eight. 220 See Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate 
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding events', 2000 para. 13.1. 221 See Buotros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A US-UNSaga, (I. B. Tauris Publishers, London-New 
York, 1999), pp. 135-136. See chapters five, eight and nine. 
99 
222 
the UN. Significantly, the Council's response to Rwanda clearly violated a norm of 
law which obligated states 'to prevent and punish' the international crime of genocide. 
223 
As it turned out, the 1994 massacre 'ultimately triggered a conflict in the heart of Africa 
that [ ... ] directly or indirectly touched at 
least one-third of all the nations on the 
continent. 9224 What was equally shocking was that as the remnants of the Rwandan 
genocide spilled over to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN displayed its 
ambivalent attitude towards African conflicts when it sent a mere 5000 troops to a 
country the size of Western Europe. 225 
The culmination of these events sent a strong message to African leaders: the UN could 
not be solely relied upon to prevent and halt the conflicts raging in the continent. 
Fortunately by this time, the actions of ECOWAS in West Africa had provided African 
states with valuable lessons from which they could exercise new ways of thinking and 
contemplate issues with respect to intervention to halt gross human rights abuse within 
226 
the continent . Meanwhile, the entry of regional organisations, such as 
NATO, as an 
attempt to correct the deficiency of the collective security system raised the fears of an 
attempted dismantling of the UN collective system of security. 227 Their actions aroused 
questions with regard to the legitimacy of regional organisations in the area of peace 
and security, particularly given that article 2 (4) and Chapter V111228 of the Charter 
prohibited the use of force by such organisations except in self-defence or under 
Security Council mandate. 
222 Report of the Secretary General, The causes of conflict and the promotion ofdurable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa, S/1998/318/37/ILM(1998)913para 11. 
" See article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. 
224 Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events', supra note 220, Introductory Chapter, para. 3. 
225 Ademola Abass, Regional Organizations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond 
Chapter V711 Of The UN Charter, (Hart Publishing Ltd., 2004), p. vii; Phoebe Okowa, 'Congo's Rebels 
and the Responsibility of Non-State Groups in Situations of Armed Conflict', Paper, International Law 
Association, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - What is the Role for International 
Law? University of Sussex, April 20 & 21,2007. 226 See chapter seven. 
227 Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use ofForce in International Law, supra note 
130; Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 
164. 
228 See chapter four. 
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3.1 The Use of Force beyond the United Nations: The Legality of the so- called 
Right to Humanitarian Intervention 
The concept of humanitarian intervention has remained an elusive subjeCt. 
229 Most 
recently, it has aroused an intense debate pertaining to its legality in international law, 
which gained rigour with respect to the Darfur conflict. 
230 Humanitarian intervention 
denotes the use of coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed 
force in another state without its consent, and with the purpose of preventing 
widespread suffering or death . 
231 The response of regional organisations to the 
violation of peremptory norms, particularly those that breached fundamental rights 
raised the question as to whether humanitarian intervention now sat alongside self- 
defence and Chapter VII measures as exceptions to the prohibition of force under 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 232 
22' For a study on humanitarian intervention, see Susan Breau, Humanitarian Intervention: The United 
Nations and Collective Responsibility, (Cameron May, 2005). See also see Francis Abiew, The 
Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice ofHumanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999); Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner, Le devoir d'ingirence: Peut-on les laisser 
mourir? (Paris: Denodl, 1987); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200 1); Richard Lillich, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the UN (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973); Sean D. 
Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The UN in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and 
International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Natalino, Ronzitti, Rescuing 
Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on the Grounds ofHumanity (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). See also Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use ofForce by States 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); and Fernando Tes6n, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into 
Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 1997). For a review of the 
legal and international-relations literatures, see Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, 
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). See also 
Richard A. Falk, 'The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge, ' 
Michigan Journal ofInternational Law 17, No. 2 (1996), pp. 491-513; and Tom J. Farer, 'Harnessing 
Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, ' Harvard Law Review 82 
(1969), pp. 511-514. 
'0 See 'Sudan Cant Wait' the Economist, 31 July-6 August, 2004, pp, 32-33. 
" See definitions of humanitarian intervention in Ian Brownlie, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in John 
Moore ed., 1974, Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ' (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press), p. 217; Oliver Ramsbotharn &Torn Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary 
Conflict, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 103-13; Terry D. Gill, 'Humanitarian Intervention: 
Legality, Justice and Legitimacy', supra note 229; Fairley, H. Scott, 'State Actors, Humanitarian 
intervention and international Law: Reopening Pandora's Box', 10: 1' GA. J. Intl. & Comp, L. (1980) at 
p. 32; Vevrey, Wil, 'Legality of Humanitarian Intervention After the Cold War' in Ferris, E., (ed. ), The 
Challenge to Intervention: A New Rolefor the United Nations, (1992) at p. 114; Adam Roberts, 'The 
So-Called Right of Humanitarian Intervention. ' Yearbook ofInternational Humanitarian Law, vol. 3, 
Summer 2001. See also J. L. Holzgrefe& R. O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas, (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Netherlands Advisory Council on 
International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Humanitarian 
Intervention, Report no. 13. 
232 Susan Breau, Humanitarian Intervention supra note 229. 
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Although the doctrine has been topical in recent years, the historical practice of 
intervention to halt gross human rights violations in another state had been 
233 
acknowledged much earlier by writers such as Suarez, Grotius and Vattel. 
However, their assertions were based on the 'just war' theories described above. 
234 As 
demonstrated earlier, their justifications were severely eroded by the legal framework 
established by UN, which prohibited the use of force, and led the legality of 
humanitarian intervention to be questioned. This is because Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter provided a mechanism to halt humanitarian catastrophe after the Council 
having determined that they constitute a threat to peace and security. 
235 However, 
such arguments were at the risk of making the presumption that a humanitarian 
tragedy will always amount to a threat to peace and security and failed to take into 
account of the flaws brought about by the Council's discretion in making such a 
detemlination, as shown above. 
Although the rules contained in the UN Charter and the doctrine of non-intervention 
were supported by post -1945-state practice, some legal scholars vociferously argued 
for the right of intervention 236 with the significant reason that the UN had not met the 
original expectations of collective actions in response to 'threats to the peace. ' 237 
Meanwhile, other proponentS238 of the doctrine stated that the concept of humanitarian 
intervention was supported by state practice in spite of the UN Charter's prohibition 
against the use of force. 239 Amongst the interventions embarked during the Cold War 
period, 240 the two most cited examples to illustrate this point are India's invasion of 
233 Terry D. Gill, 'Humanitarian Intervention: Legality, Justice and Legitimacy' supra note 234; Danish 
Institute of International Affairs. Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, 
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 11; Susan Breau, Humanitarian 
Intervention, ibid. 
234 Susan Breau, Humanitarian Intervention, ibid, p. 22 
235 See section two above. 
23' For definition of the term intervention, see chapter seven. 
237 See J. P. L. Fonteyne The Customary International Law Doctrine ofHumanitarian Intervention 
(1974) 4 California WILJ 203 at 257. 
238 Lillich, 'Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for a Constructive 
Alternatives' Chapter II in Moore, J. N. Law and Civil War in the Modern World, (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), Lillich, 'Forcible Self-Help under International 
Law' in 22 Naval War College Review 61 (1970), and McDougal and Reisman 'Rhodesia and the 
United Nations; The Lawfulness of International Concern, ' 62 AXL 1 (1968) McDougal and Reisman,, 
'Response' 3 International Lawyer 438 (1969). 
239 Susan Breau, Humanitarian Intervention supra note 229, p. 24. 
240 For a review of the interventions in the Cold War period, see Susan Breau, Humanitarian 
Intervention, supra note 232; Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?, supra note 229; Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
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East Pakistan in 197 1241 in response to the human rights violations by the West 
Pakistan Army and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979, in order to overthrow Idi 
Amin's oppressive regime. 242 
However, the key problem with these illustrations is that neither state put forward 
humanitarian intervention as their legal justification for intervention 
? 43 Instead, the 
two states defended their military intervention on 'self-defence' and even though the 
outcome was held to be 'humanitarian, ' this trend showed states do not always 
undertake humanitarian intervention for humanitarian reasons. Furthermore, 
Chesterman conducted an extensive study of instances of 'humanitarian intervention' 
in the Cold War era and how states justified their actions and concluded that the 
writers who claim that 'state practice provides evidence of customary international 
right of humanitarian intervention grossly overstate their case. 
244 However, after the 
lessons from Rwanda, and in the face of the 'ethnic cleansing' of Kosovo Albanians 
in the republic of Yugoslavia, both scholars and more importantly, states, were forced 
to re-assess their positions with respect to humanitarian intervention. 245 
University Press, 2000); Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Fernando Tes6n, 
Humanitarian Intervention. An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 1997); and Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations 
in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). 241 On details of this intervention, see Susan Breau, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 229, pp. 35- 42. 
242 On details of this intervention, see ibid, pp. 54-61. 243 Terry D. Gill 'Humanitarian Intervention, ' supra note 229. 244 1 S-Chesterman, 'Just War or Peace?, 'supra note 229, p. 84. See also F. K. Abiew, 'The evolution of the Doctrine and Practice ofHumanitarian Intervention, supra note 229. 245 E. g. C. Greenwood, 'Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, ' 10 Finnish Year Book of International Law (1999), 141: R. Zacklin, 'Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention% 42 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law (2001), 923. Susan Breau, Humanitarian Int"'ention, 
supra note 232, p. 26. 
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3.2 Kosovo and Relationship between Legality and Legitimacy of Intervention 
The conflict in KoSOV0246 raised serious questions relevant to the UN system and the 
use of force, which were articulated by the Secretary General with regard to the 
"consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority. ' 
'On the one hand is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN 
mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of 
human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? s247 After 
decades of reluctance by states to use humanitarian intervention as a legal justification, 
even for actions that have been regarded as such on an ex postfacto basis, 248NATo 
member states attempted to expand the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of 
249 force. 
This is evidenced by the attempts of the United Kingdom's forceful argument that 
past practice, including its very own, had led to the re-emergence of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. 250 This was despite its earlier assertion that 'the best case 
that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to be 
246 For some literature on the conflict, see Amnesty International, Kosovo: The Evidence (London: 
Amnesty International, 1998); Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society (Houndmills; New 
York: Palgrave, 2002); Ken Booth, The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London, 
Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2001); Noarn Chomsky, The New Military Humanism (Monroe, Me: 
Cornmon Courage Press, 1999); Richard A. Falk, 'Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of 
International Law', 93 American Journal ofInternational Law 847 (October 1999); Franck, Thomas 
M., 'Lessons of Kosovo', 93 American Journal ofInternational Law 857 (October 1999); Hahn, 
Michael, 'The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional WarT, 89(7) The Georgetown Law Journal 2351 
(July 2001); Henkin, Louis, "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Interventioe', 93 American Journal 
ofinternational Law 824 (October 1999); Koskennierrd, Martti, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much': 
Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law', 65(2) The Modern Law Review 159 (March 
2002). 
... UN 1999, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in 
. 
flict, UN Doc. No. S/ 1999/957,8 September. Armed Con 
248 on expostfacto authorisation, see chapter seven. 
249 See the UN position in Legality ofthe Use ofForce Case (Yugoslavia v United States), Verbatim 
Record, II May 1999, CR 99/24, para 1.7. See also the humanitarian grounds put forward in the 
Chairman's Summary of the Deliberations on Kosovo of the Informal Meeting of EU Heads of States, 
14 April 1999, S/1999/429, Annex; See also the reference by U. S. and Canada to the humanitarian 
emergency (S/PV. 3988,23 March 1999, p. 5); B. Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal 
aspects, ' European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 10, (1999). 
250 See the argument by the UK representative Sir Jeremy Greenstock at the Security Council debate on 
the NATO intervention of Kosovo (1999). UN Doc/PV. 3988. March, 24 1999. See also the United 
Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention contained in the speech by Mr Robin Cook, 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 19 July 2002, U. K. M. I. L. 2000 (2000) 71 
B. Y. I. L. 646. See also Michael C. Wood, 'Towards New Circumstances in Which the 
, 
Use of Force 
May Be Authorized? The Cases of Humanitarian Intervention, Counter-Terrorism, and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra 
note 15, p. 75-90. 
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unambiguously illegal. ' 251 Thereafter, the Conservative government through 
its 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, invoked humanitarian intervention by name in the 
case of northern Iraq during the 'Operation Provide Comfort' to protect the Kurds. 
(1991). 252 
This resulting trend was illustrative of the tension between law and morals, as well as 
the uneasy relationship between legality and legitimacy. 
253 The question that arose 
was whether there might be instances where legality should give way to 
legitimacy. 
On this point, leading scholars, while maintaining that the NATO intervention 
in 
Kosovo remained illegal as it was not authorised by the Security Council, held the 
view that there remained a thin line between NATO action and 
international 
legality, 254 that in some cases there existed a moral imperative to act, 
255 and that the 
cmilitary intervention was illegal but legitimate. 2561 
In his contribution to the ongoing debate, Simma argued that whilst humanitarian 
intervention involving the threat or use of armed force and undertaken without the 
mandate of the authorisation of the Security Council will be unlawful, such a general 
statement cannot be the last word. He stresses that 'in any instance of humanitarian 
intervention, a careful assessment will have to be made of how heavily such illegality 
weighs against all the circumstances of a particular concrete case, and of the efforts, if 
any, undertaken by the parties involved to get 'as close to the law' as possible. 'Such 
analyses' he concludes 'will influence not only the moral but also the legal judgement 
in such cases. ' 257 
Indeed, the divergent views have led some commentators to talk of 'an emerging right 
to humanitarian intervention 9258 provided that a certain criterion of legitimacy is 
"' See the 1984 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Paper, Foreign Policy Document No. 148 
contained in B. Y. B. IL. Vol. 57 (1986), beginning at page 614. 252 See BYB IL (1992) 824. 
253 See chapter one. 
254 See Simma 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force, ' supra note 249. 
255 A Cassese, 'Ex iniuria ius oritun Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community, EJIL, Vol. 10, (1999). See also Foreign 
Affairs Committee (UK), Fourth Report: Kosovo, (HC 284), 2000. 
2'6 Independent International Conm-iission on Kosovo, Kosovo: Conflict, International response, 
Lessons Learnt, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
257 See B. Simma 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force, ' supra note 249. 
258 ibid. 
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followed. However, this line of argument fails to take into account the differing views 
put forward by states in justifying their actions as well as the different arguments put 
across by-scholars in the assessment of state actions and their legality. Firstly, apart 
from the LTK and Belgium, states were reluctant to openly use humanitarian 
justifications as a legal basis of their actions or relied on it on an expostfacto basis. 
259 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise on not only what states do but also what 
they say, being the ultimate creators of international law by way of state practice and 
opinio juris. 260 For example, in April 2000, the 114 states comprising the Non- 
Aligned Movement, along with China, declared that they reject the 'so called right' of 
humanitarian intervention. The 'so-called right, ' they argued, 'had no legal basis in 
the [UN] Charter or in the general principles of international law. ' 261 This 
pronouncement was reaffirmed in February 2003 where the Heads of State and 
Government reiterated their dismissal of the concept of humanitarian intervention. 262 
As shown in chapter eight, some of these states were to later reject yet another 
emerging concept known as the responsibility to protect, 
263 which in their 
denunciation, termed it a reincarnation of humanitarian intervention in another name. 
The justifications behind the refusal to accept this concept is that in reality, weaker 
states remain weary of becoming the target of a humanitarian intervention action 
while some perceive it as bearing too much resemblance to the colonialism of the 19th 
Century, which while advancing western concepts, threatened local cultures. 264 
Furthermore, as Louis Henkin argues, 'the law against unilateral intervention may 
reflect, above all, the moral-political conclusion that no individual state can be trusted 
... Belgium also argued in the Legality of Use offorce Case was that the Security Council's lack of 
condernnation for the NATO action meant that it was legal. Legality of Use ofForce Case (Provisional 
Measures) (International Court of Justice, 1999), pleadings of Belgium, May 10,1999, CR 99/15 
260 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) (1969] ICJ Reports 4. 
261 'Declaration of the Group of 77 South Summit', 10-14 April 2000, para. 54. 
262 Non-Aligned Movement, 'Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government 
of the Non-Aligned Movement Kuala Lumpur'. 24-25 February 2003, para. 16. 
263 On the responsibility to protect see chapter eight. 
264 David Chandler, From Kosovo to KabuL Human Rights and International Intervention (London: 
Pluto, 2002), p. 135. For similar reasoning see Statement by Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, at 
the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 15,2005; 
available at www. embavenez-us. org/news. php? nid=1745.; Mohanuned Ayoob, Third World 
perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration, 10 Global Governance 99, 
115(2004). 
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with authority to judge and determine wisely. ' 265 However, the problem with this 
explanation is that it fails to take into account that 'unilateral intervention' is now 
increasingly been utilised by organisations such as NATO and ECOWAS collectively 
rather than by individual states. However, although there hardly exists any distinction, 
in law, between a state and a regional organisation with respect to intervention, 
NATO states have argued the fact that there was multilateral support within the 
organisation, in which all 19 member states have in theory the power of veto, 
confirms that this military action did represent an international-community interest, 
and not just the interests of one single state and hence was legitimate. 266 
Nevertheless there is cuffently is no legal right of states or regional organisations to 
forcefully intervene in another state for humanitarian reasons without the 
authorisation of the Security Council, notwithstanding there may be a moral right to 
intervene in such circumstances. 267 However, the failure of the right to humanitarian 
intervention as a legal doctrine posed further questions eloquently articulated by the 
Secretary General in explaining the dilemma facing the international community due 
to an impotent Council: 
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is 
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might 
ask ... in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up 
to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of 
the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorisation, 
should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to 
unfold? 268 
This statement is of single particular significance for two reasons that are interrelated 
Firstly, it provides the partial justification of the AU's right to intervene 269 and the 
UN's responsibility to protect. 270 Indeed, African states and world leaders while 
overwhelmingly rejecting the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, went ahead to 
263 L. Henkin, 'Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of 'Humanitarian Intervention, ' American Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 1999,824 266 Bi1jana Vankovska , 'NATO War Over Yugoslavia: Civilian Control in Focus' July (2000) Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. 
267 See chapter seven. 268 Kofi Annan's speech on 20 September 1999 before the UN General Assembly: Balance State Sovereignty with Individual Sovereignty! http: //users. Inii. net/wfanca/pp_annan on sov. html. 269 See chapter seven. 270 See chapter eight. 
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promote the application of new doctrines, particularly in situations that involved war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity. 
Secondly, the emergence of the new norms raised fundamental questions with regard to 
the potential conflict between rules ofJus cogens. This will become clear in part two of 
the thesis. However, for the purpose of illustration, it will be recalled that despite the 
271 fact that a clear norm ofjus cogens obligated states to 'prevent and punish' genocide , 
the UN and regional agencies failed to act in order to prevent the massacre of up to one 
million people in Rwanda. 272 Instead, reliance was placed on the peremptory norm 
contained in the prohibition of the use of force, 273 above the duty to protect the higher 
laws enshrined in the jus cogens, which obligated them to act. 274 As shown in the 
coming chapters, partial answers to the underlying questions are to be found in the 
constituent instruments and recent practice of some major regional organisations, whose 
legal background is considered in the next chapter. 
C: Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the manner in which the emergence of the United Nations 
fundamentally altered the pre 1945 international legal order. Before the establishment of 
the UN, the previous system was based on the just war doctrine whereby states enjoyed 
the right to resort to war without any real legal limitation. However, although the 
collective security system of the UN has played a central role in preventing a third world 
war, the Cold War period and its'aftermath has nevertheless been marked by numerous, 
national and regional conflicts. The reality remains that the UN was designed in 1945 to 
confront challenges facing the world during that era and not the one facing the 
international community of the 21st century. Taking into account that the UN Charter 
was formulated with aggression between states in mind, its provisions appear to be 
inadequate to address internal conflicts, particularly where rebel factions challenge the 
authority of the government as highlighted by the Darfur conflict. Unfortunately for 
Africa, the failure by the UN to adapt to new threats and challenges has had especially 
profound consequences in the continent. 
271 See article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (111) A of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948. 171 See chapter five. 
273 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. See chapter three. 274 See. chapter one. 
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As shown in this thesis, the predicament facing Africa is not helped by the fact that it 
remains the only continent in the world that has been without a permanent seat in the 
Security Council since the UN's inception, despite the latter being the body responsible 
for conflict in the region. 275And although terrorism, rogues states and non-state actors are 
acknowledged as the new threats to international peace and security, this does not 
necessarily reflect the case for Africa. 276 Instead, it is the typical characteristics of 
modem conflicts in Africa involving internal wars with the potential to destabilise entire 
regions that forms the greatest threat to the continent's peace and security and the 
survival of millions of its citizens as the DRC, Rwanda 277 and DarfUr278 Show. 
As shown in chapter five, it is the images brought by specific failures, both by the UN 
and African leaders, which formed the rationale and inspiration for the continental 
journey from the OAU to the new AU, including its right to intervene in grave 
circumstances as part of its system of regional security. 279 As aforementioned '280 this 
being the first international treaty to contain such a right raises fundamental questions, 
particularly in regard to the prohibition against the use of force and article 53 of the UN 
Charter, which states that no enforcement action shall be taken by regional agencies 
without the authorization of the Security Council. 291 With the former having being 
discussed above, the next chapter looks at the regional legal principles under the UN 
Charter, in order to ultimately determine the legality of the AU's right to intervene and its 
relationship with the UN Charter and general international law. 
275 See chapter eight. 
276 ibid. 
277 See introduction, chapters five and eight. 278 See chapter nine. 279 See article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 280 See introduction. 
281 See chapter four. 
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Chapter Four 
Regional Legal Principles 
A: Introduction 
It will be recalled that the 16'h and 17'h century European law that crystallised into 
international law had little to say on the future role of regional agencies. ' And 
although regionalism was envisaged under the League of Nations, the demise of the 
organisation was partly attributed to the poor drafting of its article 21 concerning the 
function of regional organisations. 2 Nevertheless, the system established by the UN in 
1945 devised a key role for regional arrangements, which did not achieve its full 
potential due to the Cold War. 3 However, the peace and security challenges facing the 
international community after the fall of the Berlin Wall have led regionalism to work 
in a manner unforeseen by the drafters of the UN Charter. 4 
The recent actions of some regional organisations have raised fundamental questions 
with respect to their compatibility with traditional concepts such as the key provisions 
in article 2(4) and article 103, as well as Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In particular, 
the enforcement actions of ECOWAS in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (IP97), the 
NATO invasion of Kosovo (1999) and the establishment of the AU's right to 
1 See chapter two. 
2 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, 'Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS 
Compared' Aftican Security Review Vol 10 No 2,2001. See Covenant (Part I of the Treaty of 
Versailles). 
3 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and 
Security, UN Doc. S/2008/186,24 March, 2008. 
4 For extensive literature regarding the increased activity of regional organisations in peace and 
security, see Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
Delegation by the UN Security of its Chapter VII Powers, (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 247-228; 
Gray, C., 'Regional Arrangements and the United Nations Collective Security System', in Fox, H, The 
Changing Constitution of the United Nations (London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 1997), p. 91; Wolfrurn, R., 'The Protection of Regional or Other Interests as 
Structural Element of Dccision-Making Process of International Organizations', Max Plank Yearbook 
ofInternational Law, 1, (1997), p. 259; Walter, C., 'Security Council Control over Regional Action', 
Max Plank Yearbook ofInternational Law, 1,1997, p. 129; Norton Moore, J., 'The Role of Regional 
Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order', in The Future of the International Legal Order, vol 
3, ( Falk, R., Black, C., eds, 197 1), p. 122; Nolte, G., 'Restoring Peace by Regional Action: 
International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict', ZaOR Vtt, 53, (1993), p. 603; Christoph 
Schreuer, 'Regionalism v. Universalism', European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 6 (1995) No. 3; 
Rivlin, B., 'Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: 
A New Road AheadT, Foreign Relations, 11, (1992), p. 5; Akehurst, M., 'Enforcement Action by 
Regional Agencies with Special Reference to the Organization of American States', British Yearbook 
ofInternational Law, 42 (1967) p. 175. See also chapters on regional organisations in Simma, Bruno, 
ed. Charter of the United Nations :a commentary, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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intervene (2001) have been subject to much controversy. This is because the general 
understanding has been that regional organisations' right to take enforcement 
measures has been subsidiary and ultimately under the express authorisation from the 
United Nations. 5 In light of the foregoing, the object of the present chapter is order to 
demonstrate the evolving function of regionalism within the UN system. 
B: Aim Purpose and Structure 
For the purpose of proper analysis, the chapter restricts itself to analysing the 
remarkable changes brought about by the dramatic realignment of geo-political 
interests that emerged at the turn of the post Cold War era. Using the existing 
framework, it introduces the central argument of the thesis; despite the assertions to 
the contrary, regional organisations may engage in enforcement action and at the 
same time play a complementary role of strengthening the universal system. In 
support of this argument, which is reinforced in chapter seven, this chapter calls for a 
defined and structured formal division of labour between the UN and regional 
organisations. 
In order to meet its objectives, the discussion herein is divided into three main 
sections. In order to uncover the present form of the ongoing debate, section one 
begins by re-introducing the perennial question of regionalism v universalism that 
prominently featured at the 1945 San Francisco Conference. Having done so, it will 
examine in detail, the UN's legal framework as spelt out in the relevant provisions of 
its Charter. Given the lack of definition of what entails a regional organisation, it 
discusses the term as understood in practice and calls for more clarity. 
This analysis will pave way for the second section which analyses the practice of 
regional organisations in the post-Cold War era. This part will highlight the 
transformation of the major regional organisations, which were initially defence pacts, 
to meet the challenges brought about by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 'This 
discussion will pave way for the third section which looks at the evolving relationship 
between the UN and regional organisations, as well as assess the obstacles and 
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, (Oxford University Press, USA; 2 edition, 2004); Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security, ibid, p. 247- 228; Gray, C., 'Regional Arrangements and the United Nations Collective Security System', in The 
Changing Constitution ofthe United Nations ibid, p. 9 1; Akhurst, M., 'The Enforcement Action by 
Regional Agencies with Special Reference to the Organization of American States, ' ibid. 
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prospects of decentralisation. Although the study herein is premised on their 
cooperation, this section ends by lo*ng at the possibility of conflict between the UN 
and regional organisations and assesses the applicability of article 103 of the UN 
Charter. 
1.1 The Deliberations Touching on Regionalism at the San Francisco Conference 
and the Final Outcome of the UN Charter 
It will be recalled that although article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
noted the validity of regional arrangements for securing the maintenance of peace and 
security, it was the lack of proper attention given to regionalism that ultimately led to 
its failure and subsequent demise. 6 Against this background, an intense debate 
immediately ensued amongst delegates during the negotiating and drafting of the UN 
Charter on the merits of regionalism. 7 As will be demonstrated below, Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter, which regulates the functioning of regional arrangements, was only 
achieved as a result of a compromise between the proponents of universalism led by 
US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and regionalism favoured by Winston Churchill! 
The regionalist front, represented by the Latin American and Asian states, made a 
'decisive and ultimately successful push for modification of the universalist 
principle. '9 However, as it turned out, the final draft of the UN Charter reflected 'the 
premise that the UN should be supreme, and accepted regionalism conditionally. '10 In 
the end, the lobbying by Latin American states to have regional organisations exempt 
from- the Security Council with regard to the use of force failed at the San Francisco 
6 See chapter two. See also Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Regionalism into Globalism? supra note 2. 
7 Marten Zwanenburg, ' Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International peace and 
Security: Three Recent Regional Peace Operations', Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol 11, No. 
3,2006, ppý 483-5 08. 
a See Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan, vol. 2,194 8), p. 1640. See also W. G. 
Grewe, 'The History of the United Nations' in Bruno Simma, (ed. ), The Charter of the United 
Nations. A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 7. Hilaire McCourbrey & N. D. 
White, 'Intemational Organizations and Civil Wars', (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995), p. 45; Bruno 
Simma, The Charter ofthe United Nations, supra note 4, p 685; Michael Akehurst Enforcement Action 
by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organization ofAmerican States, supra note 4; 
Mary Ellen O'Connell, 'The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, Human Rights 
Quarterly 22.1 (2000) 57-89. 
9 Bruno Simma, The Charter ofthe United Nations, supra note 4, p. 686. See also H. McCoubrey, 
Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 189. See 
also W. Hurnmer & M. Schweitzer, 'Article 52', in B. Simma (ed. ), The United Nations Charter: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, USA; 2 edition, 2002) 679 at 685-687. On regionalism v. 
universalism, see C. Schreuer, 'Regionalism v. Universalism', supra note 4. 10 I. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems ofInternational organizations, (Hodder & 
Stoughton Ltd, 1965), p. 106. 
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Conference as the 'majority of the delegations considered prior authorization by the 
[Council] to be necessary. ' 11 
As shown throughout this study, with the above position having been incorporated in 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it is in this context that some recent actions of certain 
regional organisations have been controversial. This is because until now, the general 
understanding has been that regional organisations' right to take action has been 
12 
secondary and ultimately under the express authority of the UN. Surprisingly 
however, the UN Charter gives no definition of what constitutes a 'regional 
arrangement or agency' under Chapter VIII. 13 A flexible approach in determining 
their status was taken by the Secretary General. In his Agendafor Peace, 14 which was 
the first official document to encourage regionalism, Boutros-Ghali explained that the 
Charter 'deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and 
agencies. ' 15 Hence, having put the debate with regard to the constitutive elements of 
regional organisations to rest, tlfe efforts to find a definition have remained largely 
abandoned. 16 
The interpretation taken in Agenda for Peace offers a 'useful flexibility for 
undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action 
[and]which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. ' 17 However, this approach did not prevent the Secretary General from 
explaining what may constitutes a 'regional arrangement or agency' under Chapter 
VIII. Thus, the Agenda for Peace articulates that such 'associations or entities could 
include treaty-bascd organizations, ' such as 'regional organizations for mutual 
security and defence, organizations for general regional development or for 
cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal 
with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern. '" However, 
11 G. Ress, 'Article 53', in Simma, The Charter ofthe United Nations, supra note 9. 
12 See article 53 (1) of the UN Charter. 
13 B. Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 9, pp. 820- 828. See also Cot and Pellet, La 
Charte des Nations Unies (Economica, 199 1) pp 801 and 8 10. 
14 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111.17 June 1992. 15 Ibid. 
16 However, see B. Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, supra note 9, pp. 820-828. 
17 See Report of the Secretary-Generaipursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992, An Agendajor Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
eace-keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/241 I lAvailable at www. un. org/Docs/SG/agpeace. htrnl - 69k 8 Ibid. 
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although the interpretation above may act as a useful guide, its lack of properly 
dcfined legal criteria for what constitutes a regional agency means that reliance is 
placed upon political recognition from key states and international organisations, as 
shown below. 
1.2 The Wide and Narrow Definitions of Regional Organisations 
In spite of the lack of definition of regionalism, key organisations such as the 
Organisation of American States (OAS), 19 the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) 20 and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)21 have 
explicitly proclaimed their status as regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter . 
22 However, the positions of key regional bodies, such as NAT023 and the 
former Warsaw Pact have not been so clear cut. On this point, White writes that 
'organisations; such as [ ... ] NATO and the 
former Warsaw pact are not, prima facie 
regional arrangements under Chapter VIII. Indeed the treaties establishing these 
bodies seem to be clear that they are based on Article 5 l. t24 However, given the 
flexibility regarding the constitutive elements of regional organisations, the latter 
view is a matter of 'a technicality rather than a point of substance. 25 Indeed, it has 
largely been accepted that a regional arrangement did not have to make express 
reference to Chapter VIII, or even to the UN Charter, in its constituent instrument to 
qualify as a regional organisation. 26 
In support of this point, it is worth noting that the Security Council and the Secretary 
General implicitly referred to NAT027 and WEU as regional organisations even 
though none of these had been originally designated as regional organisations under 
Chapter VIII. 28 Similarly, this was also the case with regard to the Arab League which 
19 See Article I of the Charter of the Organization of American States of 1948,119 UNTS 4. 
20 See the 'Concept for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts on the Territories of the Member- 
States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, ' adopted by the Council of the Heads of States of 
the CIS in Moscow, Russia, January 19,1996. 
21 See the Declaration and Decisions from Helsinki Sumn-dt, 10 July 1992,31 ILM (1992) 1385 at 1403; 
Schlotter, 'Universalismus, Regionalismus, Kapitel VIII: Die KSZE und die Vereinten Nationen', 41 
VereinteNationen (1993) 137. 
22 Christoph Schreuer, Regionalism v. Universalism, supra note 4. 
23 See for example, kelsen, H., 'Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional Arrangement? ' American 
Journal ofInternational Law, 45 (195 1), pp. 162-6. 
24 See N. D. White, Keeping the Peace, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2nd ed, 1997), p. 2 1. 25 H. McCoubrey, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, supra note 9, p. 73. 26 Christine Gray, International Law, supra note 5, p. 287. - 27 See Simma, Bruno, Charter of the United Nations, supra note 4, p. 730. 
28 Christine Gray International Law and the Use offorce, supra note 5, p. 289. 
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had not expressly claimed to be a regional organisation but was still accepted as a 
regional arrangement. 29 Furthermore, the AU's status as a regional organisation is 
undisputed despite its vague references with regard to its status, as well as its 
obligations under the UN Charter. 30 However, having said so, the flexible approach 
with regard to what constitutes a regional organisation appears to be contradicted by 
the ICJ. 
In the Nicaragua Case, 31 the World Court seemed to require a link between regional 
agency activities and the purposes of the UN in order to qualify under Chapter VIII of 
the Charter. In its obiter dictum it observed that '[t]he Court does not consider that the 
Contadora process, whatever its merits, can properly be regarded as a 'regional 
arrangement' for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. 32 
From this reasoning, it is argued that whether an organisation qualifies under Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter ought to be determined by whether its activities are 
undertaken in a manner that is clearly consistent with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter. 
In spite of the above view, as practice demonstrates, it is often the case that it is the 
Security Council, a political body, that acts as the arbiter in determining the 
compatibility of the activities of a regional organisation and the purposes of the UN 
Charter. 33 This means that a regional organisation's status in international law is 
determined neither by its own constitutive instruments nor by the nature of the 
34 organisation but by the relationship and position taken by the Council . As shown in 
chapter seven, this practice extends to the legality of activities taken by regional 
bodies, as was evident in the actions of ECOWAS in West Africa in the 1990s, which 
found favour with the Council despite their lack of UN authorisation. 35 
For the above reasons, legal scholars have not concerned themselves with the internal 
mechanisms of regional arrangements but rather determined an organisation's status 
29 Ibid., p. 287. 
30 See chapter six and seven. 
31 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Xicaragua v. United States qf America), 1986 I. C. J. Reports. 
32 Ibid at para. 440. 
33 See chapter seven. 
34 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, supra note 5, p. 287. 35 See SC/Res/788 (1992), 19 November 1992 and SC Res 1162 (1998) of 17 April 1998 respectively. See also Aoife O'Donoghue, 'Humanitarian Intervention Revisited', I HanseLR (2005), 165-175. 
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by assessing the practice between the UN and the said organisations. 36 However, the 
Secretary General has recently called on the Security Council to consider defining the 
specific role of regional organisations, to make a distinction between regional 
agencies for Chapter VIII purposes and other regional activities, in considering issues, 
such as membership, focal area and mandate. 37 
1.3 Regional Organisations under Article 51 of the UN Charter 
The majority of the literature takes Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the starting 
point in the discussion relating to the function of regionalism within the UN system. 
However, there remains a close link between article 51 of the UN, Charter 38 and 
regionalism. In essence, it was article 51 that prepared the legal ground for defence 
pacts such as NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (195 5). 39 Indeed, it will be recalled 
that important modifications in favour of regionalism were inserted at the insistence 
of the Latin American and Arab States, including the right to individual and collective 
self-defence as enshrined in article 51 of the UN Charter. In demonstrating the' 
connection between regionalism and the doctrine of self-defence, it is worth noting 
that throughout the deliberation on article 51, emphasis was placed on the doctrine of 
'collective self- defence' as opposed to 'individual self-defence. 40 
1 
Therefore, in line with article 5 1, regional organisations were granted the right to 
collective self-defence 'until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Al The justification for this approach was 
based on the fact that due to the inherent nature and most often, the unexpected 
invocation of the concept of self-defence, the exercise of this right would not require 
42 the explicit authorisation from the Security Council. Nevertheless, that the passage 
36 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use OfForce, supra note 5, p 287. 37 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, supra note 3, para. 71. 
38 On article 51 of the UN Charter, see chapter three. 39 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, EJIL, Vol. 10 (1999) No. 1. '0 See Osman Mohamed Awad, The United Nations and Peace Enforcement : Wars, Terrorism and Democracy, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 88. 41 Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
42 N. D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and Security, (Manchester, England; New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 23. 
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in article 51 refers to the authority of the Council no less than three times emphasises 
43 
that the use of force is very much subject to the control of the Council . 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the drafting process at the San 
Francisco was formulated with inter-states conflicts in mind and its provisions failed 
or at best were inadequate to address the changing nature of conflicts that were to take 
prominence in the post-Cold War era, such as Rwanda 
ý4 and Darfur. 45 Therefore, in 
recent years, some of the proponents of regionalism favour inclusion of a right of 
regional organisations to use force in defence of values, such as fundamental 
freedoms from genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, within a region. 
During such instances, the regional agencies would take action until the intervention 
of the Security Council, in a similar manner as that within article 51 of the UN 
Charter. 
Therefore according to a NATO document, a new interpretation would recognise 'that 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, also enshrined in Article 51 
of the UN Charter, must include defence of common interests and values, including 
when the latter are threatened by humanitarian catastrophes, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes. 1,46 Regional action is favoured due to the proximity of regional 
organisations to local conflicts. In this context, regional arrangements are perceived as 
47 able to compliment the collective security system at the regional level . The AU 
position is most clear on this matter; 
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the 
scenes of conflicts and may not be in a position to undertake effectively a 
proper appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations, it is 
imperative that Regional Organisations, in areas of proximity to conflicts, 
are empowered to take actions in this regard. 48 
Thus, the AU, while acknowledging the need 'to comply scrupulously with the 
provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorise the use of force only in 
43 See chapter three. 
44 See chapter five. 
45 See chapter nine. 
46 NATO Doc. AR 295 SA (1998) as reprinted in Bruno Sinuna, NA TO, the UN and the Use offorce, 
supra note 39. 47 See chapters six, seven, eight and nine. 
48 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reforin ofthe United Nations: The Ezulwini 
Consensus, Executive Council, 7'h Extraordinary Session, Ext/EXCIJ2 (VII) 7- 8 March 2005, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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cases of legitimate self-defence' offers its own interpretation on the issue and asserts 
that it is 'important to define the notion of 'collective danger' which would justify 
collective action. 49 However, the problem with this view is that although article 51 
would be broadened to include the defence of community values and not just states, it 
will be recalled5o that the ICJ in the Wall Case restricted the use of force in self- 
51 defence to cases of an armed attack by one state against another state. 
Nevertheless, although speaking in the context of the terrorism threat posed by non- 
state actors, the ruling by the ICJ was criticised by Judge Higgins in her separate 
Opinion where she observes that 'nothing in the text of Article 51 [ ... ] stipulates that 
self defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a state. ' 52 Indeed, the 
ICJ decision ignored the changing nature of conflicts from being purely inter-state to 
internal wars with the potential to destabilise whole regions, such as was the case in 
Rwanda and Darfur. 53 However, even though there currently is no right for the 
invocation of the right to self-defence in the absence of an armed attack, the 
provisions in Chapter VIII offer alternatives for regional action to protect community 
principles and values enshrined in the UN Charter. 
1.4 The Acknowledgement of Regional Organisations under Article 52 of the UN 
Charter 
The first provision in Chapter VIII relating to regionalism within the UN system is 
article 52 of the Charter. However, this provision merely acknowledges the existence 
of regional agencies 'provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities 
are consistent with the purposes and principles' of the UN. 54 In such terms, it seems to 
favour the restrictive approach taken in the Nicaragua Case, described earlier, in 
regard to what constitutes a regional organisation and thereby makes it clear that not 
55 all organisations qualify as regional organisations for the purposes of the UN. 
49 ibid. 
so See chapter three. 51 See the Legal Consequences ofthe Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ 
Rep. 2004, para. 138-14 1. 52 Separate Opinion by Judge R. Higgins, ibidem, para 33. 5' See introduction, chapter five and nine. 
54 See article 52 of the UN Charter. 55 U. Beyerlin, 'Regional Arrangements', EPIL 1040. - 
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Although article 52 recognises the existence of regional agreements, the same article 
does not define the concept of region nor does it provide whether there are any 
geographical or social political economic conditions that must be met by states in 
order to enter into regional arrangements. Nevertheless, given that it contains the 
word 'regional, ' a narrow interpretation of article 52 would suggest that it would 
56 
require geographical vicinitybetween the member states of a regional organisation. 
Furthermore, it has been observed that a degree of vicinity is suggested by the term 
'local disputes' in article 52.57 However, although Joseph Nye defines a region as a 
group of states linked by way of geographical relationship and mutual 
58 interdependence, the term regional has been interpreted broadly and is not limited 
by territorial conti gUity. 59 
Indeed, Louse Fawcett observes that regions do not need to conform to state 
boundaries and 'may comprise of substate as well as suprastate and trans-state units, 
offering different modalities of organisation and collaboration. ' 60 In this regard, 
Fawcett proposes a multipurpose definition, which is interpreted to include an 
economic criterion such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), cultural and historic links such as the Commonwealth of 
Nations, or religion such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Furthermore, 
this definition interprets the 'South' as a region and includes non-state actors that 
operate regionally. 61 However, for the purpose Is of this study, the term regionalism is 
used to refer to the economic, political, social and cultural cooperation or integration 
of states and is largely based on geographical identity. 62 Having said so, in order to 
ensure further clarity, the use regionalism is restricted to the areas where it is 
56 See Yepes, 'Les Accords R6gionaux', (1947 11) 71 Recueil des Cours 227 at 249. 
57 Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International peace and 
Security, supra note 7. 
58 Joseph Nye, International Regionalism, (Boston; Little, Brown, 1968), p. vii. See also J. Baylis and 
Smith, S., 7he Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (New York: 
Oxford Press, 1997), pp. 409-425. 
" M. Akeburst, 'Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the 
Organization of American States', supra note 4, at 177. 
60Louise Fawcett 'Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism' International 
Affairs, Volume 80, Issue 3, (2004), p. 429 
61-1bid. 
62 See J. Baylis and Smith, S., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations (New York: Oxford Press, 1997), pp. 40. However, the geographical location of states may 
expand beyond a specific region e. g. the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) 
includes the USA and Canada. 
119 
connected to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter in peace and security 
functions. 
In spite of the usefulness of the above definition, a key problem that arises is the fact 
that article 52 of the UN Charter offers no finther explanation as to the framework 
within which regional agencies must operate. Significantly, it hardly requires regional 
agencies to adopt a position on questions of foreign policy by following the Security 
Council's decisions concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Although article 52 calls on regional arrangements to deal with such matters which 
are appropriate for regional action, it does not require them to designate any organ to 
make an appropriate judgement on a particular matter or specify what needs to be 
done if there exist parallel and different judgements. Furthermore, the same article, 
whilst giving priority to regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of local 
disputes does not contain criteria which the relevant decision makers should take into 
account in making the distinction between national and regional disputes. However, 
as will be made clear throughout this thesis, the activities embarked on by regional 
agencies under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter may only be taken within the 
membership of the regional organisation. 63 
1.5 Regional Enforcement Measures under Article 53 of the UN Charter 
The general function of regional agencies in the international collective security 
framework of the UN is provided in article 53 which provides that the 'Security 
Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for 
enforcement action under its authority. ' However, despite envisioning a key role for 
regional agencies, article 53 restricts their capability and actual functioning by 
outlining that 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or 
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. ' Although this 
article does not broaden the enforcement powers of the Council, they certainly widen 
the ways in which enforcement measures may be implemented. 64 
61 W. Hummer&M. Schweitzer, 'Article 52', inB. Simma(ed. ), The UnitedNations Charter, supra 
note 9, pp. 685-687; Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of 
International peace and Security, ' supra note 7; Villani, Ugo, 'The Security Council's Authorization Of 
Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations', Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 
Vol. 6, No. 1 (2002 ), pp. 535-555(2 1). 
64 Villani Ugo, 'The Security Council's Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional 
Organizations', ibid. 
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In spite of the above, specific issues arise as to the definition of 'enforcement action' 
and in particular, whether it is similar to 'enforcement measures' as used in article 2 
65 (7) and 50 of the UN Charter. Although military action would clearly amount to 
enforcement, questions arise with regard to sanctions, in which case it is argued that 
the majority of states do not consider them as enforcement action. 66 This is because if 
enforcement action'in article 53 were interpreted as including economic sanctions, a 
group of states would not be entitled to do what each of the states singly would. 67 
Nonetheless it is also argued that 'Article 53 UN Charter seemed to provide that any 
non-forcible measure taken by regional organizations that amounted to 'enforcement 
action' would require the authorization of the Security Council. '68 However, as shown 
in chapter seven, the OAS, the AU and other African regional mechanisms have, as a 
matter of practice, recently imposed sanctions on their members without Council 
approval. 
Meanwhile, other issues that have arisen with regard to article 53 relate the nature of 
authorisation by the Council that may be required in order to undertake enforcement 
measures. For the most part, the questions that have come up are with respect to 
whether the authorisation must be explicit or if it may be merely implicit. Furthermore, 
does the failure to condemn an otherwise illegal enforcement action amount to an 
approval? As shown later in the thesis, these issues have gained enormous interest in 
69 the context of the NATO and ECOWAS actions. Moreover, a huge debate has 
emerged as to whether there is a legal rule, or an emerging one for that matter, 
authorising intervention whereby the Council commends or seems to condone an 
otherwise illegal intervention. While these issues are discussed in chapters seven and 
eight, what is clear is the general understanding that a regional organisations' right to 
intervene remains secondary and ultimately under the express authority of the 
65 See Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, supra note 7. 
66 Ibid. See also G. Ress, 'Article 53', in Simma, The Charter of the United Nations supra note 9, p. 733. 67 See Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, ' supra note 7. See also M. Akehurstý 'Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organization of American States, ' supra note 4, p. 177; ChristophSchreuer, Regionalism v. Universalism, supra note 4. 68 N. D. White & A. Abass, 'Countermeasures and Sanctions' in Malcolm D. Evans (ed. ), International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 511. 69 See chapter seven. 
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70 Council. Indeed, as mentioned above, in similar fashion to the debates at the San 
Francisco Conference, the attempts to provide regional organisations with the right to 
take enforcement action without the need for Council approval has recently been met 
with resistance. 71 Nevertheless, it is argued that recent African practice does not show 
the requirement of Council authorisation where there is an urgent need to prevent or 
halt the gross violations of human rights. 72 
1.6 The Duty to Report to the Security Council under Article 54 of the UN 
Charter 
Article 54 of the UN Charter mandates regional organisations to ensure that the 
'Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities' taken for the 
maintenance of peace and security. This duty applies to activities under both articles 
52 and 53 of the Charter. 73 The main function of article 54 is to emphasise that the 
Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and to 
guarantee its control of regional organisations' activities. 74 
While the Council hardly makes explicit references to article 54 UN Charter, 75 there is 
evidence demonstrating that the organ has been kept informed of activities of regional 
organisations, such as the OAU76 and OAS . 
77 However, it has also been noted that 
regional organisations' compliance with the obligation in article 54 in practice is 
70 See chapters seven and eight. 
71 See chapter seven. 
72 ibid. 
73 See Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, ' supra note 7. 
74 See W. Hummer & M. Schwitzer, 'Article 52' in B. Simma (ed), The United Nations Charter, supra 
note 63, p. 893. 
75 However, see SC Res. 530 (1983) of 19 May, 1983. 
76 See e. g. Letter Dated 9 October, 1970 From the Executive Secretary of the Organisation of African 
Unity Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/9962,14 October, 1970. See also Letter 
dated 14 December 1966: transmitting the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the OAU, concerning the policies of apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa; Letter dated 14 December 1966: transmitting the text of a resolution adopted 
b the Assembly of Heads of State and Government concerning South West Africa. 
71 See e. g. Telegram dated 20 September 1966: transmitting a report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the 
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation concerning the implementation of a resolution 
regarding the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic; letter dated 
29 November 1966: transmitting the text of a report entitled 'The First Solidarity Conference of the 
Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and its Projections' (volume 1) prepared by the OAS 
Special Committee. Telegram dated 1 December 1966: transmitting pursuant to the resolution adopted 
on 28 November 1966 by the OAS Council, the text of a report entitled 'The First Solidarity 
Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America and its Projections' (volume 1J). 
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weak. 78 This appears to contravene the emphasis placed on the primacy of the 
Security Council required under article 54, which covers all areas and continues to 
79 
apply even during activities undertaken or in contemplation by regional agencies. In 
this regard, in its resolution 1631 of October 2005,80 the Council explic itly reminded 
the relevant regional organisations of their obligations under article 54 of the Charter 
to keep the Council fully informed of relevant activities. 
The recent efforts by the Security Council to engage in a more collaborative 
relationship with regional organisations is highly significant, particularly given 
developments that demonstrate new approaches to regional peace and security. 
However, before examining the move towards robust regionalisation of peace and 
security, it is important to first look at the root causes of the emerging practice that led 
the key regional organisations to adjust their constituent instruments, which initially 
did not make reference to enforcement action, but which were amended to meet 
challenges of the post-Cold War era. 
2.1 The Impact of the Post-Cold War Era and the Evolution of Regional Peace 
and Security 
Although similar assertions have been made of the powerful effects of the events of 
September 11,200 1,81 the fall of the Berlin Wall challenged the manner in which 
governments and commentators understand, interpret and apply international law. 
Broadly speaking, the impact of the new era is summarised in the expositions by 
Charles Krauthammer, Francis Fukuyuma and Samuel Huntington, three of the most 
influential commentators in America. Krauthammer observes that the beginning of the 
1990s 'was the end of everything--the end of communism, of socialism, of the Cold 
War, of the European wars. But the end of everything was also a beginning. On 
December 26,1991, the Soviet Union died and something new was born, something 
79 See Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, ' supra note 7. 79 See W. Hummer & M. Schwitzer, 'Article 52' in B. Simma (ed), The United Nations Charter, supra 
note 63, p. 892. 
80 SC Res. 1631 (2005) of 17 October 2005. 
81 See generally Paul Eden& Thftýse O'Donnell, September 11,2001: A turning Point in International 
Law?, (Transnational Publishers, inc. 2005); N. J. Schrijver, 'September I Ith and Challenges to International Law', in Boulden Weiss (eds), Terrorism and the UN. Before and After September I] (2004), pp. 55-73.; A. Cassese, Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of Intemational Law, ' 12 EJIL (2001), 993. 
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utterly new--a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower unchecked by any 
rival and with decisive reach in every comer of the globe. *82 
His critic, Francis Fukuyuma, agreed that this period marked 'not just the end of the 
Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of 
history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government. ' 83 However, in his most influential and controversial work, Huntington 
disagrees with both Krauthammer and Fukuyuma and theorised that the post-Cold 
War order would witness .a clash of civilizations as the source of conflict 
in the 
world. "' Irrespective of the similarities and differences of these schools of thought, the 
effects and subsequent realignments of the end of the Cold War forced the 
modification of regional organisations as the UN struggled to adapt itself to the 
changing realities. 
It will be recalled from chapter two that despite providing a role for regional 
organisations, the Charter lacked a precise explanation as to the relationship between 
regionalism and universalism. 85 Instead, it restricted the role of regional organisations 
to that of assisting the UN in the maintenance of peace and security even within their 
respective regions. However, the threats that emerged in the post-Cold War era 
compelled regional organisations to amend their constituent treaties and engage in 
92 See C. Krauthammer, Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policyfor a Unipolar World, (The 
AEI Press., the Publisher for American Enterprise Institute, Washington D. C, 2004), p. 5. 
83 See Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of HistoryT in The National Interest, 16, (1989). See also Francis 
Fukuyama, The End offfistory and the Last Man, (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
84 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Sirnon 
& Schuster; I edition) See also Samuel Huntington, (ed. ), The Clash of Civilizations?. The Debate, 
(New York, Foreign Affairs, 1996) ; Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of CivilizationsT, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 72, no. 3,1993, pp. 22-49. On reaction to the clash of civilisation theory, see Tony Blankley, The 
West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?, (Washington, D. C., Regnery Publishing, 
Inc., 2005); Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage offfistory, (New York, The Free 
Press, 2004); Hans K8chler, (ed. ), Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue?, (Vienna, International Progress 
Organization, 1999); Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity ofDifference: How to Avoid the Clash of 
Civilizations, (London, Continuum, 2002); Andrej Tusicisny, 'Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, 
Longer, and Bloodier?, 'Journal ofPeace Research, vol. 41, no. 4, (2004), pp. 485-498. " Ademola Abass, 'The Security Council and the Challenges of Collective Security in the Twenty-First 
Century: What Role for African Regional Organizations'? In N. D. Lewis (ed) Global Governance and 
the Questfor Justice (Oxford; Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 9 1. 
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practice that sought to legitimise enforcement action to deal with 'crimes of 
international concern, ' 86 including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
This changeover is evident in the constitutive instruments of organisations such as 
NATO, which had originally been designated as a defence pact designed to deal with 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 87 The dissolution of the former and the demise 
of the latter led NATO to undergo a dramatic transformation to meet the more 
diversified threats brought about by disputes over ethnicity, religion and territory. 88 
This modification was based on the rationale that these threats could trigger armed 
conflict, leading to political instability, refugee flows and humanitarian catastrophe 
and potentially endanger European regional security. 89 
Similarly, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was 
established in 1973 for the purposes of security in its region during the Cold War 
period. The OSCE is unique in the sense that its membership is not limited to Europe 
and includes the United States and Canada. 90 While the OCSE was not originally 
recognised by its members as a Chapter VIII organisation, its status was confirmed 
during 1992 Helsinki Summit whereby the Heads of State and Government of the 
OSCE declared the organization to be a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter. 91 Subsequently, this resulted in the 1993 Framework for Cooperation 
and Coordination between the UN Secretariat and the OSCE with the latter remaining 
a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict rehabilitation in its region. 92 The fall of the Berlin Wall also led to an 
appraisal of regional security issues for the OAS which, even in the absence of a 
communist threat, transformed itself by broadening its concept of security 'to include 
86 See article I of Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 87 See article 5 of the NATO treaty. 
88 Bruno Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force', supra note 39. 89 UK Foreign Office Policy Document No. 148, reprinted in 57 BYbIL (1986) 614; Bruno Simma, 
, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force, ' ibid. 
90 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations on the Conference on Security and Co- 
9peration in Europe, Helsinki, 3 July 1973, para. 54. 9' 31 ILM (1992) 13 85; Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas (eds), The OCSE in the Maintenance ofPeace and Security, (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997). 92 See CSCE, Budapest Document 1994: Towards A Genuine Partnership In A New Era, 'Budapest Summit Declaration, ' par. 8,5 December, 1994. 
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inter alia, the protection of democracy regimes, human rights, and economic and 
social development. 93 
However, contrary to certain assertions, 94 these organisations have not denied but 
instead affirmed their submission to the principles and purposes of the UN. In this 
context, the primacy of the Security Council over regional arrangements is evidenced 
by the practice of organisations such as NATO and the OAS. In particular, the latter 
proclaims itself to be a regional organisation in article I of its Charter, 95 and 
undertakes 'not to resort to the threat oi use of force in any manner inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. ' Similarly, NATO states 
continue to agree to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations' and further 
acknowledge that the treaty does not affect in any way 'the primary responsibility of 
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. 96 
In short, these constitutive instruments 'demonstrate the manner in which [these] 
regional organisations; clearly subordinate themselves to the dictates of the United 
Nations system. 07 However, in sharp contrast to the Charters of NATO and OAS, the 
amendment of African constitutive instruments in the aftermath of the Rwanda 
genocide98 in order to allow for African regional mechanisms to engage in robust 
peace and security roles, were not so clear on the issue and to some seemed to do 
quite the opposite. 99 While an in-depth analysis of the AU is given in later chapters, 
this section restricts itself to the dramatic evolution of ECOWAS, its practice, as well 
as the manner in which it differs from the organisations mentioned above. 
Briefly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 100 is an 
African sub-regional organisation established in May 1975. Its foundational purpose 
93 Hilaire McCoubrey, Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, supra note 9, 
pp. 50 and 54. 
" See chapter seven. 
9s 119 UNTS 48; 33 (1994) 98 1. 
'6 See Article 1 and 7 of the NATO Treaty. 
97 Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The failures of Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 8, (2004), pp 237-289. 98 See chapter five. 
99 Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 97. 100 ECOWAS member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Me d1voire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
126 
had initially been to 'to promote cooperation and development in all fields of 
economic activity, the purpose of which is to increase the standard of living of its 
people, to enhance and maintain economic stability, to strengthen relations between 
its members and to contribute to progress and development on the African 
continent. "Ol 
However, a serious problem with ECOWAS was that it did not provide for a regional 
peace security function. Indeed, it was not until the escalation of conflicts in the West 
African region that it soon became clear that peace and stability was a prerequisite for 
economic development. Therefore, in contrast to NATO and OAS, which emphasise 
their obligations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, ECOWAS takes an 
interventionist approach. In this regard, article 4 of the 1981 Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defence authorises the organisation to intervene in 'internal armed 
conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside 
likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community. ' The protocol, by 
allowing for intervention in the internal affairs of member states, appears to stand in 
contradiction with the principles on non-intervention embodied in the Charters of the 
now defunct OAU, 102 the AU, 103 and the UN. 104 
Indeed, in its much later Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security (1999), while paying lip 
service to the UN, mandates itself to 'authorise all forms of intervention and decide 
particularly on the deployment of political and military missions. "05 In practice, 
ECOWAS has involved itself in operations in Liberia (1991), Sierra Leone (1997), 
Guinea -Bissau (1999) and C6te d1voire (2003). 106 At this stage, it deserves to be 
mentioned that ECOWAS is currently designated one of the five regional pillars of 
the AU. 107 Most significantly, some of its recent activities continue to demonstrate 
the potential that the regionalisation of peace and security holds in strengthening the 
Security Council's role of maintaining international peace and security. 
101 Article 2 ECOWAS Treaty. 
102 See article 3(2) Organisation of African Unity Charter 1963. See chapter five. 103 See article 4(g) of the Constitutive Act of the AU 104See article 2 (7) UN Charter. See also chapters three and nine. ` Article 10 (c) ECOWAS, Protocol concerning the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management 
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security 10 December (1999). "See chapter seven and eight. 
107 See chapter six. This is, together with COMESA, ECCAS, IGAD and SADC, ECOWAS signed the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and RECs in February 1998. 
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Furthermore, in the process, ECOWAS made a strong case for the decentralisation of 
the UN security system. log Indeed, as will be shown in the chapter seven, the 
ECOWAS interventions in the West African region created a precedent in Africa that 
inspired the AU to build a robust regional security system that is unparalleled in the 
South American, Asian and Middle East regions'09 Meanwhile, as the overall function 
of regionalism in the area of peace and security increases, so have fears of regional 
hegemonism. 110 Hence despite their key role, accusations of supremacy have been 
labelled against the US within the OAS, "' Russia in CIS, 
112 and Indonesia in 
ASEAN, ' 13 as well as Nigeria in ECOWAS 114 and South Africa in SADC, 
115who 
have all utilised the underlined regional arrangements in pursuit of their own national 
interests! 16 
3.1 Cooperation of Regionalism and Universalism in the UN: Theory and 
Practice 
In sharp contrast to the Cold War period, where there were no references in Security 
Council resolutions to regional organisations, the past decade has seen a strengthened 
relationship between the UN and regional organisations. 117 Therefore, in April 2008, 
the Security Council expressed 'its determination to take effective steps to further 
108 See discussion below and chapters seven and eight. 
'09 See chapter six. 
110 For a display of African hegemony, see chapters five-eight. 
111 Hilaire McCoubrey, Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, supra note 9, 
p. 54. See generally, Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane & Michael Mastanduno, US Hegemony and 
International Organizations, (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003). 
112 Hilaire McCoubrey, Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, ibid. See also 
Roy Allison, 'Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia, ' 
International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, (May 2004), pp. 463-483,; Annette Bohr, ' Regionalism in Central 
Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order', International Affairs, Volume 80, Issue 3, (May 2004), 
pp. 485-502,; Roy Allison, 'Strategic Reassertion in Russies Central Asia Policy', International Affairs, 
Volume 80, Issue 2, (March 2004), pp. 277-293. 
113 Ralf Ernmers, 'Regional Hegernonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of 
Indonesia and Vietnam', Asian Survey, (2005), Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 645-665. 
114 Hilaire McCoubrey, Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, supra note 9, 
F; 
55 
6. 
Ibid. p. 56. 
1'6 On hegemony and regionalism, see James Mittelman and Richard Falk, 'Global hegemony and 
regionalism', in Stephen Calleya, ed., Regionalism in the post-Cold War world (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000); Thomas Pedersen, 'Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional 
integration, ' Review ofInternational Studies (2002), 28,677-696. See also William D. Coleman and 
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds. ), Regionalism and Global Economic Integration (London: Routledge, 
1998); See e. g. Richard Falk & Saul Mendlowitz (eds. ), Regional Politics and World Order (San 
Francisco: Freeman, 1973); Joseph S. Nye, International Regionalism. Readings (Boston: Little & 
Brown 1968). 
117 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, supra note 3. 
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enhance the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in 
particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter. "18 This interest carne after having passed resolution 1769 in July 2007, 
which affirmed 'that co-operation between the UN and the regional arrangements in 
matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security is an integral part of 
collective security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. ' 
119 
However, it was in 2005 that, for the first time, the Council passed a resolution that 
outlined a coherent guideline for enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional 
organisations. Unanimously passed on 17 October 2005, resolution 1631,120 expressed 
its 'determination to take appropriate steps to further the development of cooperation' 
between the UN and regional organisations'in maintaining international peace and 
security, consistent with Chapter VIII' of the UN Charter. 121 Similarly, there is an 
array of Security Council Presidential Statements which have reiterated that the 
provisions in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, discussed above, set forth the 
relationship between the UN and regional organisations. 122 
However, in spite of the topical enthusiasm expressed by the Council, the calls for a 
more collaborative effort between the UN and regional agencies had been made much 
earlier, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. ' 23 With 
this regard, successive UN Secretaries, including General Javier Perez de Cueller, 124 
125K f Annan 126 127 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 01 and Ban-Ki Moon, all put forward 
118 See SC Res. 1809 (2008) of 16 April 2008. 
"9 See preamble to SC Res. 1769 (2007), 31 July 2007. 
120 SC Res. 1631 (2005) of 17 October, 2005. 
121 SC Res. 1631 (2005), 17 October 2005. 
122 E. g. S/PRST/2004/27,20 July 2004; S/PRST/1994/22 of 3 May 1994; SC Res. 1170 (1998) of 28 
May 1998; S/PRST/1998/28 of 16 September 1998; SC Res. 1197 (1998) of 18 September 1998; 
S/PRST/1998/35 of 30 November 1998; S/PRST/2004/27 of 20 July 2004; S/PRST/2004/44 of 19 
November 2004; S/PRST/2006/39 of 20 September 2006; S/PRST/2007nof 28 March 2007; 
S/PRST/2007/42 of 6 November 2007. 
123 Benjamin Rivlin, 'Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict 
Resolution: A New Road Ahead?, ' International Relations 1992; 11; 95. 
124 See Javier Perez de Cueller, 'Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation 
(United Nations. Department of Public Information 1990). 
125 Boutros-Ghali, An Agendafor Peace, supra note 17, paras 60-65; Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to the 
Agendafor Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion ofthe 50 Anniversary of 
the United Nations, Doc A/50/ 60-S/1995/1, paras 79-96, January 3 1995; 
126 K. Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programmefor Reform: Report of the Secretary General 
UN Doc A/51/950,14july 1997; the Report of the UNHigh Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/2005,2 December 2004; 
the Secretary General's report, 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rightsfor All UN Doc. A/59/2005,21 March 2005. 
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proposals calling for a greater contribution by and with regional organisation in the 
promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. 
In his penultimate Report on the Work of the Organization (1990) written at the turn 
of the post-Cold War era, the former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated 
that 'for dealing with new kinds of security challenges, regional arrangements or 
agencies can render assistance of great value. ' 128 Consequently, it was during this 
period that the Council began to pass resolutions which expressly recalled Chapter 
129 
VIII and supported cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. And 
for the first time, in 1992, the Security Council authorised the use of force by a 
regional organisation (NATO). 130 
However, this was a rarity and the inadequacy of the UN Charter in addressing the 
relationship with regional agencies called for more reinforcement. Therefore, the 
General Assembly passed significant agreements, such as the 1994 Declaration on the 
strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations 
in the maintenance of international peace and security. 13 1 The renewed interest in a 
revived Chapter VIII was also manifested in the ealier General Assembly Resolution 
46/58, of 20 December 1991, which requested the Special Committee on the Charter 
of the United Nations on Strengthening the Role of the Organization 'to consider the 
proposal on the enhancement of cooperation between the United Nations and regional 
organizations [ ... ] relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
' 
Since then, the General Assembly has perfunctorily adopted resolutions commending 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations that are not necessarily 
restricted to Chapter VIII but spread to all areas. 
127 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, supra note 3. 
128 See 'Envisioning the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century', Proceedings of the Inaugural 
Symposium on the United Nations System in the Twenty-first Century2l-22 November 1995, UNU 
Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. 
129 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, supra note 3. 
130 See SC Res 770 (1992) of August 13,1992, regarding the former Yugoslavia. 
131 UNGA/Res/49/57 of December, 1994. 
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Meanwhile, the issue of cooperation between the UN and regional cooperation was 
also discussed in the Brahimi Report (2000), 132 the 2005 UN High Level Panel 
Report, 133 Ahe 2005 Secretary General's Report In Larger Freedom, 134 and the 2005 
Summit Outcome Document. 135 Most recently, the Secretary General also issued a 
report on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the 
AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security. 136 Published in 2008, this 
report called for more 'dialogues on conflict prevention between the United Nations 
and regional organizations on cross-cutting issues of mutual interest., 137 As shown in 
chapter eight, the High Level Panel report favoured a much more integrated approach 
between the UN and regional organisations while the Secretary General's Report In 
Larger Freedom called for the 'establishment of an interlocking system' that would 
enable the UN to work with regional organisations in 'predictable and reliable 
partnerships. ' 138 For its part, the 2005 World Summit Document urged for 'further 
development of proposals for enhanced rapidly deployable capacities' between the 
UN and regional organisations. 139 
Overall, these proposals are based on the realisation that cooperation based on a 
formalised division of labour would enable the AU and the UN to respond in a more 
comprehensive manner by building str6ngths and compensating for the weaknesses of 
both types of organisation. 140 The key areas of cooperation include brokering of 
peace agreements in conflict situations and taking steps to promote closer and more 
132 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace 
0 erations, UN Doc. A/55/505-S/2000/809,21 August 2000. i' IT UN High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 126. 13' Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, supra note 126. 135 WorldSummit Outcome Document, 16 September 2005, A/RES/60/1. 
136 See Report of the Secreta? y General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Or anisations, supra note 3. 137 gi 
13 
lb d, paras 72-74. 
13 
8 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom. supra note 126, para. 112. 9 2005 World Summit Outcome supra note 126, paras. 92-93. 140 Benedikt F. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa', The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, (2006); Theo Neethling, 'Realising the African Standby Force as a Pan- African Deal: Progress, Prospects and Challenges, ' Journal ofMilitary and Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, Issue 1, (2005), pp. 1-25, pg. 15; C. De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Conceptý' 
Conflict Trends. 2 (2004): 22; A. Adebayo & C. Landsberg, 'Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Afiica, ' in A. Adebayo & C. L. Srirarn (eds. ), Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21" Century, (Frank Cass, London, 2001). 
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operational cooperation between UN and regional agencies in conflict prevention, 
141 
intervention, 142 peace operations 143 and peacebulding. 
144 
In practice, cooperation between regionalism and universalism has taken a variety of 
shapes, including formal and inforinal relationships and partnerships. A key formal 
relationship is that of observer status given to regional organisations by the General 
Assembly, which has been granted to the major regional arrangements. These include 
the AU in 2002,145 the OAS in 1948,146 the Arab League in 1950,147 the EU in 
1974,148 the CSCE in 1993,149 and the ASEAN in 2006.1500thers include the 
ECOWAS in 2004 151 and the OIC in 1975.152 Specific cooperation agreements 
between the UN and regional organisations also include Cooperation between the 
United Nations and the Organization of American States(1994), 
153 Cooperation 
between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference(1994), 
154 
Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States (1994) , 
155 
Cooperation between the United Nations and the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (2003)1 56 and Cooperation between the United Nations and the now defunct 
Organisation of African Unity, in 1993.157 Most recently, the AU and UN signed a 
Declaration on 'Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation' in November 2006.158 And although 
"' See chapter six. 
142 See chapter seven. 
143 See chapter eight and nine. 
I" See chapter eight. 
145 See UNGA Res. 56/475 of 15 August 2002. Note that the former Organisation of African Unity had 
been given observer status in 1965. See UNGA. Res. 48/25 of II October 1965. 
146 See UNGA Res. 2541H) of 16 October, 1948. 
147 See UNGA Res. 477(V) of 1 November, 1950. 
148 See UNGA Res. 3208 (XXIX) of II October, 1974 
149 See UNGA Res. 48/5 of 13 October, 1993. 
150 See UNGA Res. 61144 of 4 December 2006. 
151 See UNGA Res. 59/51 of 2 December 2004. 
152 See UNGA Res. 3369 (XXX) of 10 October 1975. 
153 See GA/Res/49/5,4 1 st plenary meeting, 21 October (1994). See also Cooperation between the 
United Nations and the Organization of American States, G. A. res. 47/11,47 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
49) at 16, U. N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992). 
154 See G. A. Res. 49/15,49 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 14, U. N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994). 
155 G. A. Res. 49/14,49 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 13, U. N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994). 
156 See G. A/ 57/35,57d' Session, I O. January 2003. See also Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Secretariat) and the Secretariat 
of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP Secretariat) 
GA/Res/ 53/435,25 September 1998. 
157 G. A. Res. 47/148 and 48/25. 
15' 'Declaration, Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation Framework: for the Ten-Year Capacity Building 
Programme for the African Union', 16 November 2006. See Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Work of the Organization, GA, 62nd Session, Supplement No. I (A16211), New York, 31 August, 
2007. See also the AU Assembly of the AU Assembly Decision on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: 
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the relationship between the AU and UN is specifically dealt with in chapter six, this 
Declaration is significant as it contained 'an expression of the common commitment 
of both institutions to work together, ' 159 which may potentially create lessons for 
other regional organisations and their relationship with the UN with regard to peace 
and security. 
Meanwhile, informal cooperation and consultation between the UN and regional 
organisations is also visible in the UN Office in Geneva (UNOG), which 'represents 
the UN in the 'Tripartite Process, ' a framework of informal consultations with the 
Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 9160 
The 'Tripartite' consultations are indicative of the manner in which, the United 
Nations and regional organisations can cooperate and coordinate more effectively in 
the maintenance of international peace and security and solve wider international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character. Other diverse 
forms of relationships are not exhaustive but include memorandums of understanding, 
sharing of information, mutual attendance of meetings, seminars and conferences, 
informal contacts and the exchange of documents. 161 
However, the key problem with these agreements is the scarcity of clearly defined 
mechanisms of cooperation and lack of a legal framework to govern, the same. 
Furthermore, these agreements tend to be reactive, rather than proactive, meaning that 
it is usually too late to halt the catastrophes, such Rwanda 162 and Darfur, 163 and 
protect the principles that they purport to uphold. Nevertheless, the failure of the 
current system and the overlap and duplication of mandates with regard to peace and 
Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union, 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 140 (VIII), adopted at the Eighth Ordinary Session, 29-30, January 2007, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. 
159 Statement by Mr. Abdoulie Janneb, UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ECA, Tenth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 25 
January 2007. 
160 See the United Nations Office in Geneva Website available at 
http: //www. unog. ch/80256EE600583AOB/(httpPages)/2BE770FCC3 IA5OF980256EF700769637? Ope 
nDocurnent. 
161 Christoph Schreuer, 'Regionalism v. Universalism, ' supra note 4. 162 See chapter five. 
163 See chapter nine. 
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security described above, has led to calls for better clarity of the division of labour 
164 
between the principal organs of the UN and regional organisations. 
3.2 The Prospects of Decentralisation and Division of Labour between 
Regionalism and'Universalism within the UN System 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, during his tenure as Secretary General of the UN, was in 
favour of a division of labour between the UN and regional organisations, which he 
viewed as being in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter. For instance, he cited 
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh where the UN had supported the work of the CSCE 'as 
just one example of a new division of labour with regional organizations. ' 165 However, 
in spite of the strong case for a formal structure between the UN and regional 
organisations, the apparent hesitation to decentralise the UN system and recognise 
regional agencies with robust roles lies in the fear of usurpation of the function of the 
Security Council, particularly in any enforcement action entailing the use of force. 166 
With this regard, it has been observed that any abandomnent by the Security Council 
of its asserted monopoly on determining the lawful use of force 'could put the world 
community on a slippery slope of competing claims of 'rights' to intervene - with the 
potential consequence of escalating hostilities rather than resolving them. ' 167ThiS fear 
was also shared by the UN High Level Panel, which concluded that, '[a]llowing one 
to so act is to allow all. ' 168 However, the problem with this concern is that it is 
preoccupied with the unilateral activities such as those manifest in the United States 
policy of unilateralism. 169 Furthermore, this fear ignores the potential usefulness that 
164 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, supra note 3. 
"' Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'UN Peacekeeping in a New Era: a New Chance for Peace', The World 
Today, April 1993, p. 168. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on UN Activities (Sept. 1992-Sept. 
1993), (New York, United Nations), para. 323. 166 See chapter seven. 
167 Background Paper for the present Roundtables, prepared by Jeffrey Laurenti for the United Nations 
Association of the U. S. A quoted in Bruno Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal 
Aspects', EJIL, Vol. 10 (1999) No. 1. 
168 UN High Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 126. 169 See chapter one. For detailed discussion on US unilateralism, see Christian Tomuschat, 
'Multilateralism in the Age of US Hegemony', in MacDonald, St John Johnston, D. M, Towards 
World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2005), p. 31-75; Robert F. Turner, American Unilateralism, and the Rule of Law', in 
MacDonald, St John Johnston, D. M, 'Towards World Constitutionalism, ibid, p. 77-101; Feffer, John, 
Power Trip: U. S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11, (Seven Stories Press 2003); 
John Lewis Gaddis, 'A Grand Strategy, ' Foreign Policy (November/December 2002); The White 
House, The National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica, (The White House, September 
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regional arrangements hold, particularly in the enforcement of peremptory norms and 
their capability to prevent a future Rwanda or Srebrenica. 170 
Indeed, as shown in chapters seven and eight, there is an emerging African norm 
where, in the event of a failure to act by the Security Council, the AU possesses the 
requisite legitimacy to intervene with the purpose of protecting and preventing gross 
violations of human rights. 171 In such circumstances, the AU would act upon the UN's 
failure during circumstances requiring urgent action, and subsequently request ex post 
facto authorisation. 172 While the legality of the African regional norm on intervention 
is discussed in chapter seven, suffice to say here that such a possibility was envisaged 
by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 173 (ICISS), 
and the LIN High Level Panel. 174 These Commissions pointed out that that in some 
urgent situations, Security Council authorisation maybe sought after such operations 
have commenced. 175As shown in chapter eight, this proposal 'goes to the heart of the 
legal basis of military operations by regional organisations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. ' 176 
What is important to emphasise at this point is that despite the danger of 
fragmentation to the international system by regionalism, recent practice shows that 
decentralisation of the UN system may offer viable prospects. Therefore, the majority 
of the prevailing regional approaches do not seek to challenge the UN system but 
have instead been necessitated by the failure of the current collective security 
framework. 177 However, in spite of the calls for a decentralised system and formalised 
division of labour between the UN and regional organisations, little has been achieved 
in terms of working out such an agreement. 178 Nevertheless, the practical benefits for 
2002). See also J. R. Bolton, 'Is There Really 'Law' in International AffairsT Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 10 (2000). 
170 See chapters seven and eight. 
171 See article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
172 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Refom of the United Nations, supra note 48. 
173 See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The responsibility to 
protect, (International Development Research Centre, Canada), at 53. 
174 UN High Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 126, p. 71 para 272. 
175 See chapter seven and eight, 
176 Marten Zwanenburg, 'Regional Organisations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, ' supra note 7. 
177 See the Secretary General's Statement at opening of the Second Meeting between the United 
Nations and Regional Organizations. Press Release, SG/SM/5895,14 February 1996. 
178 See chapters six and eight. 
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closer involvement of regional organizations in peace and security were well 
summarized by the Secretary-General himself. 
Firstly, although finding the right division of labour between the UN and regional 
organizations is not easy, 'such cooperation brings greater legitimacy and support to 
international efforts. ' 179 Secondly, 'it eases the material and financial burden' on the 
UN and 'allows for comparative advantage. ' 180 And finally, the division of labour 
also 'brings more actors to the world stage, helping to democratize the international 
system. ' 181 It is after making this observations that Boutros Ghali asserted that the, 
'founders of the United Nations proposed regionalism and universalism working not 
at odds, but together. ' 182 His successor, Kofi Annan, similarly agreed and further 
developed the idea of a division of labour, which for him, could potentially provide a 
platform within which common responsibilities may be shared while at the same time 
ensure more effectiveness in the maintenance of peace and security. In this regard, 
Annan provided important insights. 
We must be willing to seek out and establish our comparative advantages in 
the various areas of tomorrow's challenges -- where'the OAU [now AU] 
may be better suited for a mediation role; where the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may be better suited for an 
election monitoring role; where NATO may be better suited for a 
peacekeeping role; where the United Nations may be better suited to 
negotiate the resolution of a conflict and provide a peacebuilding mission. ' 83 
Most recently, the current Secretary General has also recommended the clarification 
of the specific roles of the UN and regional bodies, particularly the AU in order to 
enhance predictability and sustainability of concerted action. ' 84 Understandably, the 
nature and extent of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations will vary 
in each case, as shown in chapter six. Meanwhile, although the discussion herein 
argues for a strengthened complementary role for regional organisations in the area of 
peace and security, there are further potential restrictions that may hinder the 
functioning of regionalism, which are worth considering. In particular, despite the 
179 UN Press Release, SG/SM/5804, I November 1995. 
"0 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
18' UN Press Release, SG/SW6653,27 July 1998. 
184 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, supra note 3. 
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optimism that increased cooperation may bring, there has been a worry as to the legal 
position in case of conflict between regional organisations and the UN. On this issue, 
it has generally been perceived that the constitutive instruments of regional 
organisations take the back seat when they conflict with the UN Charter as outlined in 
article 103 of the UN; at least as far as the obligations of member states are concerned. 
However, the matter is not so clear cut as the following section shows. 
3.3 The Relationship between Regionalism and Article 103 of the UN Charter 
As mentioned in chapter seven and shown above, the activities of regional 
organisations such as NATO, the OAS and the AU are regulated under Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter. Furthermore, article 103 of the UN Charter provides that the 
obligations of UN member states prevail over their obligations under any other 
international agreement. Article 103 of the UN Charter is often perceived as having a 
constitutional function 185 as it is connected to member states' obligations under the 
article 25 of the UN Charter. 186 Alongside other articles, the latter provisions arguably 
confirm the Charter's status as an integral part of the constitution of the international 
community. 187 
Significantly, the legal effect of article 103 of the UN Charter provision was 
confirmed in the Lockerbie Case. 188 However, it should be noted that the ruling on the 
status of article 103 was contained in the preliminary ruling in the Lockerbie 
proceedings and not in the merits phase of the dispute. Therefore, the latter position 
leaves room for the argument that the status of article 103 is not as settled as it is often 
thought. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the reasoning by the ICJ 
has recently been followed by the other key judgments, such as that of the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities in Luxembourg in the Yusu 89 and 
Kadi'90 cases of 2005. Importantly, the principle was also recently affirmed by the 
185 Michael Wood, 'The Security Council and the 'Constitutionalization' of International Law', Paper, 
University of Leeds, 14 March 2007. Available at 
http: //www. law. leeds. ac. uk/leedslaw/webdocs/leedslaw/uploadeddocuments/cfig-wood. doc. 
116 Ibid. 
187 See chapter three. See also R Bernhardt, 'Article 103', in Sirnma (ed), The Charter of The United 
Nations. A Commentary', (OUP, 2002), 
188 Aerial Incident at Lockerbie Case (1992), 31 I. L. M. 662. 
'89 Ahmed Ali Yusufand Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, T-306/01, unreported case, 21 September 2005. 
I" Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
communities, T-315/01, unreported, 21 September, 2005. 
137 
House of Lords the AI-Jedda Case'91 in December 2007. Nevertheless, in spite of 
their considerable weight, it deserýes to be mentioned that these are European and 
English cases, which thereby lack the veracity of an ICJ decision. 
However, what is important to mention here is that, as opposed to being directed at 
regional organisations, article 103 is addressed to states. 192 This observation is of 
particular significance given that regional organisations possess an international legal 
personality that is independent from their member states. 193 Therefore, state parties 
confer upon regional organisations obligations that are different from those of its 
members under the UN system and thereby create 'an entity possessing objective 
international personality and not merely personality recognized by them alone. ' 194 
Although not all international agreements establish a distinct international legal 
personality, as was held by the JCj'195 such personality, according to Seyersted, 196 Can 
be inferred from the powers, purposes and practice of the organisation. 197 Nonetheless, 
having said so, since it is composed of constituent states, it is difficult to see how an 
organisation created by signatory parties could be independent of the will of its 
'9' R (on the application of A I-Jedda) (FQv. Secretayy of Statefor Defence [2007] UKHL58, para 3. 
192 Nigel D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Rights to the UN Security Council', in 
Mashood A. Baderin& Robert Mccorquodale, (eds. ), 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, 
(Oxford University Press, 2007). 
193 Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949) 174. See 
also F Seyersted, 'International Personality of International Organizations: Do Their Capabilities 
Really depend upon Their Constitutions? % 4 Indian Journal ofInternational Law, 1 (1964); Schermers 
and Bokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity (Brill Academic Publishers, 4th ed 
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edited form in Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen (eds. ), The Legitimacy of International 
Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001); N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of 
the Security Council After Iraq', Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, 17 (2004), pp. 645-672. See also 
T Frank, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 
218-220; Reinisch, 'Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security 
Council for the Imposition of Econon'-dc Sanctions', 95 American Journal ofInternational Law (2001) 
858. 
194 Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, supra note 193. 195 Nauru v Autralia ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240&258. 
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Amerasinghe Principles of the International Law ofInternational Organizations, (Cambridge 
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( Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) pp-243-9; I. Brownfie, Principles ofPublic International Law, (Oxford 
University Press, USA; 6 edition), p. 649; R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How Use it, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 47; R. A. Wessel, 'Revisiting the International Legal 
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198 
members. Yet, the prevailing view is further evidenced by the presence of the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations. 199 Though not in force, the 
treaty was intended to regulate the legal relationships between states and international 
organisations. 200 Furthermore, even assuming that article 103 of the UN Charter 
applied to regional organisations, the effect of the article is not to invalidate the 
conflicting obligation, but rather to set it aside to the extent of the conflict. 201 
The application of article 103 UN Charter is further limited in that that it applies only 
to treaties and not custom. 202 However, it has been noted that there was no need for 
article 103 to refer to customary international law since a treaty obligation overrides a 
customary one in any event. 203 In spite of this assertion, according to Rudolf 
Bernhardt, during the drafting of article 103 of the UN Charter, a 'formula according 
to which all other commitments, including those arising under customary law, were 
superseded by the Charter, was ultimately not included. 9204 This '[a]apparently 
198 D. J. Bederman, 'The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at 
Cape Spartle', 36 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law (1996), 275, at 357. 
'99 See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations 
or Between International Organizations, 1986, UN Doc. A/Conf. 129/15 (1986). 
Article 85 of the Convention provides that it enters into force after the ratification by 35 states. 
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note 185; Jeremy L. Levitt, ' The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United 
Nations Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security 
Council and the Use offorce: Theory and Reality -A Needfor Change? (Martin Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 
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Foundations of the International System. General Course on Public International Law' 266 RCADI 
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showed the framers of article 103 were not comfortable with it superseding 
conflicting customary law developments. 205 
As shown in chapter seven, in signing up to the respective constitutive instruments, 
member states of regional organisations 'create new subjects of law endowed with 
certain autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of realizing common goals. 9206 
Indeed, regional organisations such as the AU seek to enforce certain conununity 
values that have developed independently of the UN Charter, including peremptory 
norms. 207 SignifiCantly, it should be pointed out here that article 103, a mere 
procedural provision, cannot be interpreted as able to override the norms against 
208 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, which the AU seeks to protect. 
Indeed, the 'concept ofjus cogens operates as a concept superior to both customary 
international law and treaty. ' 209 Not even the immense powers accorded to the 
Security Council excuses the organ from observing the fundamental provisions of 
peremptory norms in passing resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Indeed, 
any action by the Council that violated jus cogens would not bind the international 
community as stated in the Kadi case refereed to above. Meanwhile, although there 
exists no defined hierarchy of the peremptory norms of international law, 210 the last 
point is highly significant as it strengthens the case for regional organisations, 
including the AU to act, in order to preserve and enforce peremptory norms of 
international law where the UN fails or is slow to act. 211 
205 Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations 
Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council 
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of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law', EJIL, Vol. 8 (1997) No. 4. 211 See chapters seven and eight. * 
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C: Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the architects of the UN Charter recognised the significant 
function of regionalism within the UN by granting regional organisations; the right to 
collective defence under article 51 by recognising their important role under Chapter 
VIII, which was deemed necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. However, regionalism was accepted conditionally in so far as it was 
subordinate to universaliSM. 212 Even so, acknowledgement was also made that 'not 
every possible situation was foreseen at San Francisco and that it is for the members 
of the United Nations to fill the gaps. , 213 It was in this context that regional 
organisations began to take on more functions in order to repair a deficient UN 
collective security system. 214 
In particular, the end of the Cold War compelled the international community to 
reassess its positions in regard to regional peace and security issues. The change of 
attitude and practice is manifest in the modification of constitutive instruments and 
recent practice by some of the key regional organisations. 21 5 Furthermore, the 
weaknesses of both the UN and regional arrangements called for more collaboration 
in order to meet the threats and challenges of the new century. It goes without saying 
that by acting together, the UN and regional agencies would be stronger than when 
acting alone. Nevertheless, in spite of the references to regionalism discussed above, 
the clear lack of due attention given to the relationship between regionalism and 
universalism under the UN system remains a matter of concern. 216 
It is in this context that the relationship between the UN and African regional 
organisations requires careful examination and analysis. 217 Therefore, using the 
African model and post-Cold War practice, this thesis aims to show that regional 
organisations may be complimentary to the UN and arguably possess subsidiary 
responsibility where the Council struggles or fails, so long as they act when 
212 I. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, supra note 10, p. 106. 213 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supplement No. 3 (1959-1966), Vol. 11,219. 
214 See chapters three and eight. 215 See chapter seven. 
216 Abass, Ademola, 'The Security Council and the Challenges of Collective Security in the Twenty- 
First Century: What Role for African Regional Organizations'? In N. D. Lewis (ed) Global 
Governance and the Questfor Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 9 1. 217 Jane Boulden, Dealing With Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, 
(Palgrave Macmillan; 1 st edition, 2003). 
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authorised, explicitly or otherwise, by the Council . 
21 8 Indeed, notwithstanding the 
constituent instrument establishing major regional organisations, the relationship in 
practice between regional arrangements and the UN seems to indicate an emerging 
trend of support and co-operation and in particular one where the Council is 
occasionally willing to allow the some regional agencies to take the leading role. 219 
However, the lack of formal institutional framework to regulate their collaboration 
has meant that these organisations are free to cooperate at their discretion or not to 
cooperate at all . 
220 Furthermore, by entrusting regional organisations with 
responsibility for regional conflict, the international community alongside the 
Security Council are at the risk of abrogating the'duty to protect and maintain peace 
and security. It is within this context that a formalised division of labour is both 
necessary and indispensable. 221 As argued in part two of the thesis, this is particularly 
important given that its regional agencies have demonstrated that they are part of the 
broader collective security system with key complimentary functions. 222 
And although a formalised relationship between the UN and regional organisations 
may bring along with it rigidity, building on past practices with individual regional 
arrangements may provide viable prospects. In this context, the codification of 
practices would partly eliminate the problems caused by uncertainty and 
inconsistency, as witnessed in Darfur. 223 Therefore, a central theme of the thesis is 
that of cooperation with regard to peace and security between the AU, the UN and 
other regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Finally, it is 
argued that a formalised division of labour would not only reduce reliance on ad hoc 
reactive mechanisms but would also entrench fully fledged practices that would 
guarantee more efficiency, legitimacy and most of all, would save lives by promoting 
and maintaining peace and security. 
"' See chapter seven. 
219 See chapter nine. 
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* The Evolution of Part Two, 
African Regional Security 
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Chapter Five 
The Journey from the Organisation of African Unity 
to the New African Union 
A: Introduction 
On 9 September, 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) issued the Sirte Declaration which called for the establishment 
of an African Union (AU). This was subsequent to a call by the Panel of Eminent 
Personalities to establish appropriate regional structures that was enacted upon by 
African leaders in the coastal city of Sirte, Libya. The OAU Secretariat subsequently 
drafted the legal text of the Union contained in the Constitutive Act of the AU. At an 
extraordinary speed, the Act was later adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government meeting in Lom6, Togo in July 2000 and entered into force on 
26 May 2001, after Nigeria became the 36th member state to deposit its instrument of 
ratification. ' 
The new AU was established in 'conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter' 
of the 'Continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
African Economic Community. '2 Importantly, it was designed to assist in 'accelerating 
the process of integration in the continent to enable it play its rightful role in the global 
economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems 
compounded as they are by certain negative aspects of globalisation. ' 3 
However, the quest for African unity had begun much earlier through various 
initiatives whose evolution culminated in the establishment of the AU. Notably, this 
included the Legal Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos (19SO)'4 the African 
In line with article 36 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
2 4th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 8-9 September 
1999, Sirte, Libya, EAHG/Draft/Decl. (M Rev. I. 
3 See 'The African Union in a Nutshell', available at http: //www. africa. 
uniorLorg/roottau/AboutAiVau-in_a-nutshell-en. htm. 
" See Organisation of African Unity, 'Legal Plan of Action For the Development of Africa, 1980- 
2000', 198 1, published by the International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva. See also Rose M. 
D'Sa', The Lagos Plan of Action--Legal Mechanisms for Co-operation between the Organisation of 
African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa', Journal ofAfrican Law, Vol. 
27, No. 1. (Spring, 1983), pp. 4-21; Adedeji, A. (2002), 'From the Lagos plan of action to the new 
partnership for African development and from the flinal act of Lagos to the Constitutive act: whither 
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Charter on Human and People's Rights (1991), 
5 the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community, (AEQ: commonly known as the Abuja Treaty (1991), " the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993), 7 and the 
Lome Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional 
Changes (2000). 8 
In spite of its ambition, the new Union fell short of Libya's rather 'unrealistic'9 idea 
of Marcus Garvey'slo vision of a 'United States of Africa. 
"' Nonetheless, some 
termed it as part of an 'African renaissance' 
12 and a major triumph for 21st century 
Pan Africanism. 13 Although the evolution of the Pan African movement largely 
Africa?, ' keynote address prepared for presentation at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa, 
Nairobi, 26-29 April, available at: 
http: //64.233.179.104/search? q=cache: AEoDAGQW710J: www. worldsummit2002. org/texts/AdebayoA 
dedeji2. pdf+Lagos+plan+of+Action&hl=en, . 5 See African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27,198 1, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I. L. M. 58 (1982), entered intoforce Oct. 21,1986: 
6 4th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 8-9 September 1999, 
Sirte, Libya, EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. l. 
7 See OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governmentý Cairo Declaration, Doc. AHG/Decl. 3 
(XXIX), Cairo, Egypt, 30 June 1993. 
8 See Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Governments, OAU Doc. AHG/ Decl. 5 (XXXVI) (2000). For a discussion on other initiatives see 
African Union'. 'The African Union in Nutshell, ' supra note 3. 
9 Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union! s Right to Intervene: A Shift 
From Human Security to Regime Security, 'African Security Review 12, no. 2 (2003), p. 42. 
10 For literature on Garvey's ideas on Africanism, see Amy Jacques Garvey, The Philosophy and 
opinions ofMarcus Garvey, (Majority Press; Centennial edition, 1986); Tony Martin, Message to the 
People: The Course of, 4frican Philosophy by Marcus Garvey, (Majority Press, 1986); Hill, Robert A., 
editor. The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro ImprovementAssociation Papers: Africafor the 
Africans 1921-1922, (University of California Press, 1996); John Henrik Clarke, Marcus Garvey and 
the Vision ofAfrica., (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); Manoedi, M. Korete. Garvey and Africa, 
(New York: New York Age Press, 1922); TonyMartin, The Pan-African Connection: From Slavery to 
Garvey and Beyond, (Dover, Mass.: Majority Press, 1983). 
" The phrase 'United States of Africa, ' was coined by Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican civil rights activist 
in his poem 'Hail, United States of Africa' in 1924. See Tony Martin's compilation of Marcus 
Garvey's poems in The Poetical Works ofMarcus Garvey, (Majority Press, 1983). 
" See Thabo Mbeki, 'Africa: The Time Has Come: Selected Speeches'(Cape Town: Tafelberg 
Publishers, 1998), pp. 224-31,239-5 1. See also Statement of Deputy President TM, Mbeki, On Behalf 
of the African National Congress, On the Occasion of the Adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of 
the 'Republic of South African Constitution Bill 1996', Cape Town, 8 May 1996. Available at 
http: //www. anc. org. za/ancdocsUstory/mbeki/1996/sp960508. htn-A. 
13 Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Values and Principles into 
Policy and Practice', ISS Paper 143,2007; Eddy Maloka (ed. ) A United States ofAfrica, (African 
institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 200)1, K. M. Mathews, 'Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The 
African Union and the New Pan Africamsts', Paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(CRR) policy seminar, Building an African Union (A t9for the 21"' Century: Relations with Regional 
Economic Communities (REQ) The New Partnershipfor Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Civil 
Society, Cape-Town, South Africa, 20-22, August 2005.; Abdalla Bujra, 'Africa: Transition from the 
OAU to the AU', Lecture delivered at ACARTSOD Tripoli, Libya on 23 September 2002. Available 
at http-//dpmf. org/meetings/From-OAU-AU. html; Magliveras K-D and Naldi G. J, 'The African Union: 
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shaped the current tide of African unity, the present chapter reflects on the immediate 
rationale and motivating factors that led to the dismantling of the 38 year old 
Organisation of African Unity and the establishment of the AU. 
B: Aims Purpose and Structure 
The present chapter examines the justification for the establishment of the African 
Union in order to ultimately answer the wider question posed by this thesis on the 
relationship between the AU, the UN and international law. In this regard, a 
significant aim of this chapter will therefore be to demonstrate the move away from 
the regional principles contained in the treaty of the OAU. In order to do so, it will 
analyse the events leading up to the key constitutional moment which saw the launch 
of the new AU in Durban, South Africa in 2002. In doing so, this discussion will set 
the foundation for a proper scrutiny of the key differences and similarities between 
the previous regime under the OAU and the AU in the coming chapters. 
In order to achieve its objectives, this chapter looks at the celebrated journey of 
African unity, which is better understood through a historical perspective and is 
divided in three main sections. Therefore, the first section starts by demonstrating the 
manner through which the Pan-Africanist movement that vigorously emerged at the 
beginning of the 19th Century led to the founding of the OAU. 14 Having done so, the 
second part offers a historical, political and legal synopsis of the OAU which will 
allow a clearer understanding of the Pan African evolution leading to the 
establishment of the AU. Here, illustration is made of the impact of the Westphalian 
state system on the fierce debate surrounding Africa's concept of 'unity' where 
highlight is also made of Africa's transformation of the regional principle of non- 
interference to that of non-indifference, as exhibited in the AU's right to intervene. 15 
The third part demonstrates the actual changeover from the OAU to the new AU 
which entailed not only a change in policy but also a literal journey that began in 
North Africa (Sirte, Libya 1999), through Central Africa (Lusaka, Zambia) and 
culminated in Southern Africa (Durban, South Africa (2002). Finally, it sets the 
A New Dawn for Africa', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 5 1, Number 2, (April 2002), pp. 415-425(l 1). 
14 Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, ' supra note 13. 15 See chapter seven. 
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background for a discussion of the ongoing implementation process of the AU's 
institutions that were not part of the OAU organisational structure, but which are 
necessary in order to further peace and security in Africa. 16 It then concludes by 
highlighting the role of hegemony as well as the disagreements behind the pomp and 
vigour of the new developments and concludes that despite commendable advances, 
the AU faces considerable challenges. 
1.1 The Pan-African Quest for Unity: A Historical, Political and Legal Synopsis 
The quest for African unity was manifest in the formation of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 17 in Addis Ababa, on signature of the OAU 
Charter by representatives of 32 states. 18 The foundational objectives of the now 
defunct OAU had been to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and 
apartheid as well as 'to promote unity and solidarity among African States', to co- 
ordinate and intensify 'co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples 
of Africa; ' as well as 'to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member 
States' within the framework of the UN. 19 
However, the OAU was not the first attempt at unification and economic development 
of the African continent. Indeed, long before its establishment, African leaders had 
recognised the significance of the political and social economic integration of the 
continent and the importance of unity and solidarity between African states and the 
peoples of Africa. In this context, it has been said that '[t]he first recorded Pan- 
African Struggle occurred in 3200 B. C. where the Pharaoh Aha [ ... ] united upper and 
lower Egypt into one nations [ ... ] This was an act of Pan-African nationalism of the 
first order. 20 Nevertheless, the quest for African Unity, in its current manifestation, is 
16 See chapter six. 
17 The 25th May is designated as Africa Day. See Assembly of States Decision on the Implementation 
of the Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union, AHG/DEC. I (XXXVII), Lusaka 9-11 July, 200 1. 
Is Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo 
(L6opoldville), Dahomey, Egypt Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast(COte d1voire), Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco (withdrew in 1984), Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta and Zanzibar. '9 See article 2 of the OAU Charter, 
" See Kwaxne Nantambu, 'Pan-Africanism Versus Pan-African Nationalism, 'Joumat of Black Studies, 28,5 (1998), 568. 
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traced to the Pan-Africanist movement that emerged at the beginning of the l8th 
century and accelerated through the 19th and 20th century. 21 
But what exactly is this phenomenon? There exists no single definition of Pan 
Afficanism. 22 Nonetheless, Murithi argues that, '[r]ather than a unified school of 
thought, Pan-Africanism. is a movement with as its common underlying theme the 
struggle for social and political equality and freedom from economic exploitation and 
racial discrimination. 23 However, it is clear that such a struggle would be based on a 
unity of all continental African cultures and states which make up a universal African 
community. This view is supported by African intellectuals who stress that the 
'original Pan Afficanism was meant to be a global project in the sense that the Pan- 
Afficanist demand encompassed all aspects of Africa and the black world that needed 
to be established or rehabilitated. 924 
In light of the foregoing, it has often been the view that Pan-Africanism arose as a 
result of slavery and colonialism. 25 However this view is flawed as . it fails to look 
deeper into the past, which documents African resistance in the initial contact of 
foreign exploitation. 26 Nevertheless, it was the great effort against slavery, such as 
that evidenced in the slave revolts in Americas, that is mostly identified with early 
Pan Afficanism. This struggle was led by the likes of Nat Turner, Henri Christophe 
and Prince Hall, whose ideology was strengthened and put forthright by amongst 
others, Henry McNeal Turner, David Walker and Edward Wilmont Blyden. 27 
21 Tiyanjana Maluwa , 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly? A Note on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union', Netherlands International Law Review, 
Volume 5 1, Issue 02, (2004), p 196. 
22 On the different interpretation of Pan-Africanism, see Giselle D. Aris, 'Pan-Africanism: Competing 
Interpretations, ' Gaines Junction, (Spring 2005), Volume 3, Number 1. 
Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism" supra note 13. 24 Marika Sherwood &, Hakim Adi, Pan-African History: Political Figuresfrom Africa and the Diaspora Since 1787, (Routledge, 2003). This view is also displayed in Rupert Emerson, 'Pan 
Africanism', International Organization, 16,2, (1962), p. 280. See also African Union, 'First Meeting 
of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora Organised by the African Union', Draft Concept Paper, 
Dakar, Egypt 6-9 October 2004. 
2' Rupert Emerson, 'Pan-Africanism' ibid, p. 2 80. 
26 See Giselle D. Aris, 'Pan-Africanisrri, 'supra note 22. See also Kwame Nantambu, Pan-Africanism 
Versus Pan-African Nationalism, supra note 20. 27 See Paul D. Williams, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference; Ile Origins and Development 
of the African Union's Security Culture', African Affairs, 106/423, (2007), pp. 253-279; Giselle D. Aris, 'Pan-Africanisrn, 'supra note 22. 
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As suggested above, a key feature of Pan Afficanism. is that its evolution has taken 
'different forms at different historical moments and geographical locations. 
28 For a 
start, it began as a global project before it reached its renowned pinnacle in the 
African continent. 29 Indeed, it was not until the proliferation of conflicting European 
claims to African territory and the subsequent 'Scramble for Africa, ' which was 
settled at the 1884 Berlin Conferences, 
30 that a reinforced urgency for a more robust 
Pan Africanism, based in Africa itself was called. During this period the pioneers of 
the Pan-African movement included the likes of W. E. B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey, 
Henry Sylvester Williams, Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, Jomo Kenyatta, Franz 
Fanon, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, Leopold Senghor and Langston Hughes. In 
the Conferences mentioned below, these Pan-Africanists shared the 'same ultimate 
goals: to challenge and destroy the European power structure, and serve as a potent 
liberating tool for all African people. 31 
1.2 The Pan African Conferences: From London (1900) to Addis Ababa (1963) 
The first ever Pan African Conference was held on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th July, 1900 
at the Westminster Central Hall, in London, United Kingdom. 32 The Conference was 
convened by Henry Sylvester William and attended by approximately 37 people, 
mostly from the Caribbean, American and European Diaspora rather than from the 
African continent itself. Despite the scarcity in terms of numbers, the notion of 
African unity was to later become a powerful mobilising ideology as was manifest in 
the Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919. Incidentally, this Conference was to 
coincide with the much more publicised Versailles Peace Conference which led to the 
formation of the League of Nations. 33 Nevertheless, the Pan-African Congress was 
28 Marika Sherwood &, Hakim Adi, Pan-African History, supra note 24. p. vii. 
29 K. Nkrumah, The Spectre of Black Power', in The Struggle Continues, (Londres, Panaf, 1980), p. 34; 
Ali Maznli, 'Celebrating six decades of pan-Africanism: Alternative routes for continent's heritage', 
The Sunday Standard, 24 September 2006. Available at 
http: //www. eastandard. neV'hm-news/news-s. php? articleid=l 143958648; see also Abdalla Bujra, 
'Africa: Transition from the OAU to the AU', supra note 13. 
'0 On the scramble for Africa and Berlin conferences, see M. E. Chamberlain, Scramblefor Africa, 
(Longman; 2 edition, 1999); Thomas Pakenham, The Scramblefor Africa: Klite Man's Conquest of 
the Dark Continentfrom 1876-1912, (Avon Books, 1992). 
31 See Giselle D. Aris, 'Pan-Africanism,! supra note 22. 
32 See African Union, 'First Meeting of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora Organised by the 
African Union', supra note 24. ' 
33 See chapters two and three. 
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organised by W. E. D. Dubois in the hope of persuading the world leaders that the 
principle of self-determination 34 should be applied to Africa. 35 
Similarly, in the aftermath of World War 11, the Pan-African Congress of 1945 took 
place in the shadow of the momentous San Francisco Conference that led to the 
establishment of the United Nations. 36 This relatively obscure Pan-African 
Conference in Manchester, UK included participants destined to become global 
figures, including Kwarne Nkrumah of the Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, WEB 
Dubois of the United States and George Padmore of the Caribbean. Most notably, this 
Congress was unprecedented in the sense that, unlike other previous Congresses, it 
was dominated by Africans in the Diaspora. 37 
However, it was not until the 1950s and 1960s that Pan-Africanism truly moved from 
a universal movement to an Afro-centric continental movement. Now as president of 
the first black African country to gain independence, Nkrumah hosted the All-African 
38 People's Conference in 1958. Dubbed as the First Conference of Independent 
African States (CIAS), it was the first real attempt to create an African continental 
organisation. 39 Borrowing from previous conferences, this meeting brought together 
representatives of the people of Africa to Accra where Nkurumah articulated his 
vision of a united Africa . 
40 He later affirmed this aspiration at the second conference 
held in Tunis, Tunisia in January 1960 and finally, the third in Cairo, Egypt in March 
1961. " 
34 On the principle of self-determination, see chapter two. 35 Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism' supra note 13. 16 See chapters three and eight. 
37 Abdalla Bujra, From the OAU to the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New 
Partncrship on African Development (NEPAD) Occasional Paper, No. 13, Development Policy 
Management Forurn, (DPMF), 2004; Abdalla Dujra, 'Africa: Transition from the OAU to the AU', 
supra note 13. 
3' Thornas M. Leonard, Encyclopedia ofthe Developing World, (Routledge 2006), p. 1147. 39 ibid. See also Walraven, Klaas van, Dreams ofPower - The Role ofthe Organisation ofAfrican Unity in the Politics ofAfiical963-1993, (Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999), p. 95. 40 Kwame Nkururnah,, 4frican Must Unite, (New York: International Publishers 1970) and C. O. C 
Amate, inside the OA U. ý Pan Africanism in Practice, (London, McMillan Press 1986), pp. 52-58. 41 ibid. 
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Throughout these deliberations, a serious debate ensued in regard to the most 
desirable strategy for African unity. 42 This was primarily due to ideological 
differences between differing schools of thought, whose disagreements remain visible 
till the present day, as shown further below. The prevailing divisions centred on the 
relentless debate with regard to whether the Pan African vision of continental unity 
should: be realised immediately, or be a long term objective to be achieved first 
through the creation and consolidation of independent states and then built up upon 
sub-regional building blocks. 43 Here, states strategically realigned themselves into 
three groups that pitted the Casablanca bloc, 44 which considered itself as 
eprogressive, ' against the Monrovia 45 and Brazzaville blocs, 46 themselves more 
'conservative' and 'gradualist 47 respectively. 
Predictably, the, Casablanca block was led by Nkrumah himself and advocated an 
immediate unification of the African continent. However, this position stood in 
contrast to the position of the Brazzaville faction, which later merged with the larger 
Monrovia group under the leadership of President Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania. 
This bloc stood for a gradualist approach to the concept of African unity, starting with 
regional economic and cultural co-operation . 
48 In other words, it favoured a union not 
based on 'political integration of sovereign states, but unity of aspirations and of 
42 Colin Legun, Pan Afticanism: A Short Political Guide, (New York: Frederick a Praeger 1962), 
pp. 45-47, 
43 See Abdalla Bujra, 'Pan-African Political and Econon-dc Visions of Development From the OAU to 
the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD)' DPMF Occasional Paper, No 13 (2004). Available at 
http: //www. dpmf. org/Occasionalpapers/occasional-paper-no-13. htnL 
44 The Casablanca Group consisted of Ghana, Mali, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, and the 
Algerian Provisional Government. This group was led by the then President of Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah, and was formally launched on 7 January 196 1. On the failure of the Casablanca Group, see 
Gallagher, Charles, The Death ofa Group (American Universities Field Staff Reports, North Africa 
Series, IX, 4,1963), pp. 5-8. 
45 The Monrovia Group consisted of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, 
Senegal, Dahomey, Malagasy Republic, Chad, Upper Volta, Niger, People's Republic of Congo, Gabon, 
Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Tunisia. 
16 The Brazzaville Group mainly comprised former French colonies: Central African Republic, 
Cameroon, Ivory Coastý People's Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta (the 
fI esent-day Burkina Faso), Senegal, Niger, Chad and Madagascar. )r 7 Benedikt F. Franke, 'Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security 
Architecture', African Studies Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3, (Spring 2007). 
49 Abdullah Bujra, Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Development' supra note 43. 
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action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political 
identity. )49 
The extreme positions taken by opposing sides led to a stalemate based on the 
question as to whether the envisaged continental organisation should be centred on a 
'Federation of African States' or a 'United States of Africa. '50 However, Emperor 
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia succeeded in striking a compromise between the groups, 
which later met in May 1963 in Addis Ababa to establish the OAU. In his words, the 
idea was to 'create a single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles 
to which we all subscribe. 51 As it turned out, the ideals and deliberations held during 
these conferences culminated in the drawing up of the OAU Charter in which the 
earlier aspirations for unity and solidarity of the African found expression. Thus, '[i]n 
1963 Pan-Africanism went truly continental with the formation of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. 52 
Nevertheless, it soon emerged that the compromise that led to the formation of the 
OAU was more of 'a historic necessity and a welter of conflicting political ideas and 
interests' 53 as opposed to reflecting a true unity that called for a continent-wide 
unification of the whole of Africa in all its cultural ethnic and linguistic diversity. 
Instead, its configuration was founded on the distinct units drawn up by the colonial 
masters and thereby further entrenching the Westphalian state system, discussed in 
chapter two. Indeed, the newly acquired unity represented victory for the Monrovia 
group over the weakened Casablanca bloc, which had also been accused of being 
communist inspired. 54 While the ongoing debate between proponents of the 
Westphalian inter-states system and those that called for a Federalist/Political Union 
Chimelu, Chime, Integration and Politics among African States (Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, Uppsala, 1977), p. 164. 
5' Armstrong Matiu Adejo, 'From the OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottle?, ' Paper prepared for 
presentation at the 10th CODESRIA General Assembly, Nile International Conference Centre, 
Kampala, December 8-12,2002. Available at 
http: //www. codesria. org/Archives/ga I O/Abstracts%2OGa%206-1 I /Regionalism Adejo. htm. 
51 Haile L Selassie, 'Towards African Unity', Journal ofModern African Studi ý, 
52 es, 
1,3 (1963), p. 285. 
Ali Mazrui, 'Celebrating six decades of pan-Africanism, ' supra note 29; Emperor Haile Selassie, 
Welcome Address, ' Addis Ababa Summit, 1963 in Journal ofModern African Studies, No. I 
September 1963), 281-91. 
3 Colin Legum, 'The Organisation of African unity: Success or Failure?, ' International Affairs, 5 1,2 
Q975), p. 208. 
4 Armstrong Matiu Adejo, 'From the OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottle?, ' supra note 50. See also Abdalla Bujra, From the OAU to the AU, 'supra note 37. 
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is considered further below, what follows is a discussion of the significant 
consequences that arose as a result of the adoption, by Africa, of the Westphalian state 
system. 
2.1 The OAU and the Importation of the Westphalian State System into Africa 
It will be recalled that the modem international legal system of sovereign states is 
traceable to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which established the equality and 
55 independence of states. Thereafter, the importation of the Westphalian system in 
African had serious ramifications for its citizens in various spheres of influence, 
particularly with regard to the concept of African identity and unity, as well as peace 
and security, social, economic and cultural development. 56 Indeed, the confusion over 
the form of unity that emerged was evident from the OAU's early years where some 
states simultaneously maintained two foreign policy positions in relation to the 
federalist verses independent states issue. 57 This was despite the fact that the 
incorporation of the differing ideological doctrines was untenable. 
Nevertheless, this matter was finally laid to rest when the OAU Assembly passed the 
Cairo Declaration of 1964 on the inviolability of boundaries 59 containing the key 
principle of uti possidetis. 59 In spite of its wide support, this position seemed to 
contradict the essence of Pan Afficanism. and went against the decision of the African 
People's Conference in Accra in December 1958 which had: 
denounce[d] artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers to divide the 
peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide 
people of the same stock; call[ed] for the abolition or adjustment of such 
frontiers at an early date; [and] call[ed] upon the independent states of Africa 
to support a permanent solution to this problem founded upon the wishes of 
the people. 60 
" See chapter two. 
56 Emmanuelle Jouannet, 'Universalism and Imperialism- The True-False Paradox of International 
LawT EJIL, Vol. 1, No. 3,2007, On the imposition of the Westphalian system in Africa, see See Basil 
Davidson, The Black Man 's Burden: Africa and the curse of the nation state, (James Currey, Oxford, 
1992); Thandika Mkandawire, 'Rethinking Pan Africanism', First Conference of Intellectuals of Africa 
and its Diaspora, Dakar, 6-9 October, 2004. Available at http: //africa- 
union. org/CIAD NEW/Documents/Mkandawire_EN. doc 
57 Armstrong Matiu Adejo, 'From the OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottle?, ' supra note 50. 58 OAU Assembly of States and Government, First ordinary session, AHG/Res. 16 (1): Resolution on Boarder Disputes Among African states adopted on 2 1, July, 1964, Cairo, Egypt. 59 See chapter two. 
6' Cited in Rupert Emerson, 'Pan-Africanism', supra note 24, p. 278. 
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However, the prospects of altering state boundaries aroused the possibility of conflicts 
and hence strengthened the case for the 'nearly untrammeled state sovereignty, in 
which heads of states sought sedulously to safeguard the independence so recently 
won. %61 In this context, there remained a real 'fear that if these borders were dissolved, 
all hell might let loose. 62 As shown in chapter two, this position was also justified by 
the ICJ which perceived it as necessary in order to prevent the independence and 
stability of new states from the risks of struggles that may be waged in disputing 
frontiers. 63 
However, as mentioned in chapter two, the ICJ Chamber also cautioned that 'uti 
possidetis juris is essentially 'a retrospective principle, investing as international 
boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes. ' 64 
Meanwhile, some argued that the 'African borders fail to follow any pre-colonial 
logic. ' 65 These assertions were based on the fact that the imperial powers disturbed a 
pre-existing order in their conquests, which in turn resulted in 'a process of 
destruction of the native social and political systems and of the imposition of artificial 
constructs, concerning boundaries, population, and governmental institutions. 966 The 
adoption of this system led the Nobel Literature Laureate Wole Soyinka to accuse the 
OAU of having 'consecrated this act of arrogant aggression, reinforced by civil wars 
on varied scales of mutual destruction in the defence of imperial mandate. 67 
61 Claude Welch, Jr., 'The, African Conunission on Human and PeoplesRights: A Five-Year Report 
and Assessment, ' 14 Hum.. R7's Q. 43,43 (1992). 
62 Chris Berazier, 'African United: Not Hopeless not Helpless', New Internationalist, No. 326: 9-12 
August 2000). 
3 Frontier Disputes (Burkina Faso v Mali), 1986 I. C. J. 554,566-67 (Dec. 22). See also Steven R. 
Ratner, 'Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States', 90 AM. J. INTL L. 590 
Q996). 
The Land island andMaritime Dispute CJ Reports (1992) 35 1, at 386. 6' Bronwen Manby, 'The African Union, NEPAD and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda' Human 
Rights Quartely 26 (2004), p. 983-1027. 
66 Leopoldo Lovelace Jr 'Has International Law Failed Africa?, ' International Studies Association 
Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois, February 21-24,200I. See also Basil Davidson, The Black Man's 
Burden, ' supra note 5 6. 
67 See Wole Soyinka, The Burden ofMemory, 'The Muse ofForgiveness, (Oxford: New York, 1999), p 40-4 I. See also 0. Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legiti-. mate Statehood in Africa', 41 Harvard International Law Journal, (2000), 
503. For a different view, see A. Mbernbe, 'At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Soveicignty in Africa', Public Culture 12: (2000), 259-284. 
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As will be shown below, similar accusations have also been levelled on the AU whose 
Constitutive Act restated the OAU's commitment to the legal principle of uti 
68 
possidetis juris. Meanwhile, the links between the artificial African state and the 
wars that have raged the continent, such as Rwanda and Darfur, have led to strong 
propositions: 
[We] should sit down with square-rule and compass and redesign the 
boundaries of African nations. If we thought we could get away without this 
redefinition of boundaries back when the Organization of African Unity was 
formed, surely the instance of Rwanda lets us know in a very brutal way that 
we cannot evade this historical challenge any longer. 69 
However as it turned out, the Westphalian system became further entrenched as 
African states respected the administrative boundaries and frontiers established by the 
colonial powers. The strong affirmation of the principle of respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of every state left little room for the OAU to attach any 
conditions on these norms, let alone mention human rights. Instead, African regional 
principles seemed to reject the earlier ideals of Pan Africanism and were more 
concerned with the protection of the state and not the individual. 
With this regard, Mathews notes that the OAU Charter initially 'spoke for the African 
peoples still under colonialism or racial domination, but once the countries emerged 
to nationhood, the Charter stood for the protection of their heads of state which 
protected them. In other words, the OAU appears to be an institution for the heads of 
state, by the heads of state and for the heads of state. ' 70 While the horror that 
unfolded due to the principles of non-interference is considered further below, what 
follows is a brief analysis of the Africa's interpretation of the Westphalian doctrine of 
sovereignty, which stood as a stumbling block to the realisation and protection of 
fundamental human rights. 
68 Article 4 (b) of the Constitutive Act of African Union. 
69 Quoted in 'Africa's Outdated Colonial Boundaries Must Be Redrawn', University of Pennsylvania- A Hcan Studies Center, The Plain Dealer, Monday September 26,1994. 
7V, K Mathews, 'The Organisation of African Unity', in D Mazzeo (cd), African Regional. 
Organizations, (London; Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 79. 
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2.2 The OAU's 'Articles of Faith' and the Sovereignty Principle 
The OAU's 'articles of faith 971 were set out in article 3 of its Charter with the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs that lie within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states as one of the cardinal principles of the OAU Charter. 
72 This was in line with 
traditional practice whereby the state was considered as the anchor to sovereignty 
within the international legal system. 73 In particular, article 3 of the OAU Charter 
obligated member states to 'solemnly affirm and declare their adherence' 
74 to the 
dsovereign equality of all Member States, 75the '[n]on in-interference in the internal 
affairs of States' 76 and respect 'the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 
State. M 
Furthermore, African nations were required to hold in the highest regard the 
'inalienable right to independent existence' 78 of member states and refrain from 
engaging in subversive activities against other countries. 79 The veracity of these 
norms was later reaffirmed when African states institutionalised the colonial borders 
and reiterated these sovereignty-related provisions in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, as 
mentioned above. On this occasion, member states pledged to respect the borders 
existing on their achievement of national independence. 80 
In doing so, African rulers created a paradox. The resulting irony was clear from the 
fact that the apparent entrenchment of the artificial borders created by colonial 
powers 'stood in sharp contrast to the rhetorical statements by African leaders of a 
pan-African ideal of continental unity. '81 Furthermore, the actuality that the OAU was 
71 Described as such by the then Nigerian Attorney General. See T. O. Elias, 'The Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity', American Journal ofInternational Law, 59,2, (1965), p. 248. 72 See Paul D. Williams, 'From the Norm of Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference, ' supra note 27. 
See also T. O. Elias, 'The Charter of the Organization of African Unity', ibid, p. 248. 73 See chapter two. 
7" Article 3 of the OAU Charter. 
7' Article 3(l). 
76 Article 3 (2). 
77 Article 3 (3). 
78 ibid. 
79 Art 3 (5) of the OAU Charter. 
" Para 2 'Resolution on border disputes among African states' OAU Doc AHG/ Res 16(l). See S. 
Touval, ' The Organization of African Unity and African Boarders', (1967) 21 Int. Org p. 102 and A. 0. Cukwurah, I The Organization of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems 1963- 
1973', 13 IndJ. Int. L. p-176. 
81 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning'. 'Towards the new Millennium: ECOWAS' evolving Conflict Management 
System', African Security Review, Vol 9. No 516, (2000). 
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formed as a united reaction to western imperial and colonial domination which at the 
same time embraced the Westphalian system was not only contradictory in terms but 
82 brought to the continent further predicaments. In this context, a key problem with 
the principles contained in article 3 of OAU is articulated by Cillers and Sturman who 
observe that: 
The concept of sovereignty, on which the international system and the OAU 
were founded, presumes that each state has the power, authority and 
competence to govern its territory. For many African States, however, 
sovereignty is a legal 83 
fiction that is not matched by governance and 
administrative capacity. 
However, as stated earlier, although perceived as an obstacle to African unity, the 
emphasis on the sovereignty centred norms was primarily to protect the recently won 
independence from neo-colonial intervention and imperialism. 84 Indeed, these 
principles were justified by Haile Selassie as being necessary in order that African 
disputes are 'quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference. '85 The 
fear of drawing imperialism, particularly from the super powers and other strong 
states, was evident in the Africa's practice which showed immense reluctance to even 
submit disputes to the UN Security Council. 86 
Meanwhile, doubts were cast as to how possible it was for 'the collective of a group 
of non-cohesivc and unstable nation states [to] form a cohesive, stable and dynamic 
region. ' 87 This is particularly because the African state, as invented by the Europeans, 
had neither been deconstructed nor reconstituted. 88 Nevertheless, the OAU Charter 
and subsequent state practice by the member states were largely in conformity with 
the UN Charter, and in particular article 2(7) which provided for non-interference in 
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. 89 The rigid view of these 
82 Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden, supra note 56. 
93 j. Cillers, and K. Sturman, 'The Right of Intervention: Enforcement Challenges for the African 
Union', African Security Review, Vol 11, No. 3, (2002), p . 3. 84 Paul D. Williams, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference, ' supra note 27. 85 Haile L. Selassie, 'Towards African Unity', supra note 5 1, p. 287. 86 David B. Meyers, 'Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity, ' 
International organization, 28,3 (1974), p. 372.1 97 See Rotin-d Oyekanmi, 'Adedeji Cautions Against Hasty Emergence of African Union', the Guardian, March 6,2002.. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See chapter three and nine. 
157 
provisions ensured that African countries perceived international concern for human 
rights and democratic governance as pretexts for undermining their sovereignty. 90 As 
will be shown below, the strict interpretation of article 3 of OAU Charter barred the 
regional organisation from interfering in the internal affairs of a member state even 
during situations where it would have been logically necessary in order for the 
organisation to carry out its mandate. 
For example, even 'when a few African leaders tried to get the long, very highly 
intense Sudanese civil war [1955-1972] onto the OAU agenda, they found little 
support following a Sudanese announcement that it did not wish such discussion. '91 
As shown elsewhere in this study, this stood in sharp contrast to the practice of the 
UN whereby it is agreed that article 2(7) of the UN Charter in no way bars the 
Security Council from taking action in situations that would otherwise violate the 
domestic jurisdiction of member states. 92 As will be demonstrated in chapter nine, this 
point is of particular significance as it played a key part in the recent conflict in Sudan, 
which is reviewed at the end of the thesis. 
Meanwhile, while the OAU showed its willingness and preparedness to condemn the 
apartheid regimes perpetrated by the European minority, it chose to remain silent in 
the face of abuses committed by African governments. 93 The deafening silence and 
inaction of the OAU had tragic consequences for individuals and groups whose 
fundamental human rights were grossly violated. This behaviour not only partly led 
to the genocide in Rwanda but its deficiency made the case for the establishment of 
the AU and the right to intervene, which is considered further below. Meanwhile, as 
shown in the next section, the African regional norm of non-intervention ensured that 
impunity and gross violations of human rights raged across the continent despite the 
numerous treaties, resolutions and declarations affirmed by the OAU in support of 
fundamental rights. 
90 G. Naldi, The Organization ofAfirican Unity. An Analysis of its Role, 2nd edition. (London: Mansell, 1999). 
9' David B. Meyers, 'Intraregional conflict management by the Organization of African Unity,, supra 
note 86, p. 364. See generally, U. 0. Umozurike, 'The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter', African -4ffairs, Vol. 78, No. 311. (Apr., 1979), pp. 197-209. 92 See chapter three, seven and nine. 
93 A. Glenn Mower Jr., 'Human Rights in Black Africa: A Double Standard? ' Revue des droits de Phomme, (1976) Vol., IX-I, 39-70. 
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2.3 The OAU Charter and the Issue of Human Rights 
Although the formation of the OAU set the stage for further unification of African 
peoples, a key problem with its Charter was that no mention was made on the need to 
protect human rights. Instead, the concept of protecting sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence of member states was the overriding consideration in the 
treaty. 94 Therefore, for decades, articles 2 and 3 of the OAU Charter were held as a 
justification for permitting the perpetration of all forms of atrocities against the people 
of Africa. 95 In demonstrating this point, a former Chairman of the African 
Commission was to write that 'with regard to breaches of human rights, even of a 
grave nature such as genocide, the OAU ha[d] been bogged down by the jurisdictional 
clause. ' 96 'With the exception of only a few states, African states refrained from 
commenting on, let alone intervening, to stop grave violations of human rights in 
other countries. 97 
As it turned out, this policy ensured that the massacres of thousands, such as those of 
Hutus in Burundi in 1972 and 1973, 'were neither discussed nor condemned by the 
OAU. '98 In this context, a disturbing episode is given where Ethiopian Colonel 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, who on welcoming OAU delegates to its headquarters in 
Addis Ababa on 6 June 1983, was in turn thanked for his 'warrn and generous 
hospitality, despite having overthrown and murdered [amongst thousands) one of the 
OAU founding fathers and first Chairman, Emperor Haile Selassie, in 1974.99 
Meanwhile, key African figures such as Salim Ahmed Salim, who would later 
become the Secretary General of OAU, while expressing concern for human life, told 
the General Assembly that 'we have no desire to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
that brother state. "00 Indeed, the African policy of non-interference was so powerful 
94 Article 2 (1) (c) OAU Charter. , 95 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 'Towards the new Millennium, ' supra note 8 1. 96 See U. 0 Umozurike. 'The Domestic Jurisdictional Clause in the OAU Charter, supra note 9 1. 97 Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene, ' supra 
note 9, p. 42. 98 N. J. Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights', Vol. 17 American University International Law Review, (2002), p. I 177. See generally, U. 0. Umozurike, 'The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter, ' supra note 9 1. 99 Amani Daima, 'The Biggest Show' in Africa: the Launching of the African Union' The Perspective, 
Atlanta, Georgia, July 11,2002. Available at hj1p: vww. thel2ersPective, OTAippestshow, htmi. See 100 N. J. Udombana, ' Can the Leopard Change its Spots? supra note 98. See also U. N. Doc. A/PV. 230 1. See generally, U. 0. Urnozurike, 'The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter, ' 
supra note 9 1. 
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that the OAU organisation did nothing when its first and two-term Secretary General, 
Diallo Telli was murdered by Sekou Toure's regime in Guinea. 101 
Predictably, the OAU degenerated into what a Kenyan Statesman Oginga Odinga 
termed as a 'Trade Union of African Heads of States' 102 and effectively a 'dictators 
club. ' 103 The massive human rights violations in several African States, particularly in 
the 1970s by African dictators including, Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of 
Central African Republic and Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, highlighted the 
dangers of strict adherence to the sovereignty principle. 104 Nevertheless, it was hardly 
surprising that when Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania took'the decision to pursue 
invading Ugandan troops all the way back to Kampala and put a halt to Idi Amin's 
bloodbath in 1978, there was little support across the African continent. 105 However, 
the Tanzanian intervention'06 in Uganda, though of questionable legality, 107 led some 
member states to question the rigid interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. 
Indeed, the frustrations brought about by the OAU's inaction due to its strict 
adherence to the notion of sovereignty in the face of catastrophe resonated in 
President Museveni's maiden speech at an OAU Summit in 1986: 
Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandan's perished at 
the hands of governments that should have protected their lives ( ... )I must 
state that Ugandans felt a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept 
silent ( ... ) the reason for not condemning such massive crimes had 
supposedly been a desire not to interfere with the internal affairs of a 
Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United 
Nations. We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there 
are explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and the inviolability of human 
life. 10' 
101 See Edward Kannyo, 'The OAU and Human Rights, ' in Yassin EI-Ayouty & I. William Zartman ed, 
The OAUAfter Twenty Years, (Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 156. '0' Adams Oshiornhole, 'Popular Participation and the African Union' in Adagbo Onoja (ed), Plying 
the Foreign Pitch vol, 2 (2000-2000 1) ( Abuja: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 200 1), pp. 119-120. 101 Paul Reynolds, 'African Union replaces dictators' club, BBCWorld Version, Monday 8 July, 2002. 104 Evarist Bairnu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Unions Right to Intervene, ' supra 
note 9, p. 42. 105 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Interventions in International Affairs, 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 200 1), p. II 1- 13 8. 
'06 On the Tanzanian perspective of the intervention, see The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania and the War Against Amin's Uganda, (Official Publication, 1979). 107 See chapter three. On the legality of Tanzania's invasion, see Susan Breau, Humanitarian 
intervention: The United Nations and Collective Responsibility, Cameron May, 2005, pp. 54-62 "' President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, 22 Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and government. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia July 1986. 
160 
It must be said that even when the OAU decided to take interest in conflict situations, 
human rights concerns lay at the periphery as was evident in its involvement during 
the Congo Crisis (1964-65), the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70), the Angolan Civil War 
(1975-76) and the Chad Civil War (1965-78). 109 Indeed, Tanzania's invasion of 
Uganda in 1979 to halt Idi Amin's brutal regime remained a significant exception to 
the norm with its President, Julius Nyerere having similarly realised that the OAU 
was a 'trade union of the current Heads of State and Government, with solidarity 
reflected in silence if not in open support for each other. " 10 This tone however, stood 
in sharp contrast to Nyerere's earlier assertion that African leaders 'must avoid 
judging each other's internal policies, recognizing that each country has special 
problems. "" 
Indeed, according to the President Sekou Toure of Guinea, the OAU was not 'a 
tribunal which could sit in judgement on any member states' internal affairs. " 12 This 
position was clearly evident in 1975, when the organisation 'defied all logic and 
common sense and ordained Field Marshall Idi Amin as its Chairman at the Kampala 
Summit, despite his woeful human rights record and opposition by few African 
countries who cited Amin's disregard for the sanctity of life. ' 113 
However, as shown in chapter nine, the new AU seemed to partially shed the 
continent's past image when it declined to hand the AU Assembly Chair to Sudan in 
2006. On this occasion, there was the fear that, given the tragedy in the Darfur region, 
allowing Sudan to 'lead the AU would damage the AU's credibility, especially its 
commitment to respect human rights, democracy and good governance. ' 114 
Nevertheless, the remnants of old practice were evident in Africa's decision to 
109 N. J. Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots?,, supra note 98. "0 Nasila S. Rembe, 'The System of Protection of Human Rights under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: Problems and Prospec 
, 
ts, Lesotho: Inst. ofS. Afr. Stud 105 (199 1). See also Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, ' supra note 13. 11 Julius K Nyerere, 'A United States of Africa', Journal ofModern African Studies, 1,1 (1963), p. 5. 112 See U. 0. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INT'L L, 
902,903 (1983). 
"' Claude Welch Jr., The OAU and human rights: toward a new definition', Journal ofModern African Studies, 19,3 (198 1), p. 405. See also Nsongurua J. Udombana, 'When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan, Human Rights Quarterly 27.4 (2005) 1149-1199. 
114 Patrick Runkhurnise, 'Civilian (in) Security in the Darfur Region of Sudan, ISS paper 123, March 2006. 
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appoint Mugabe's Zimbabwe to chair the UN's commission on Sustainable 
Development, a major UN body, in May 2007 despite its poor human rights record! 15 
Meanwhile, gross human rights violations, particularly in the 1970s, soon prompted 
the OAU Head of States and Government to adopt the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights in June 1981.116 However, the problem was that the treaty did not 
come into force until 1986 and even though it made a significant contribution in 
eroding African states' strict adherence to sovereignty, it was inadequate to match the 
challenges brought by the end of the Cold War which brought with it a surge of 
increased internal and region conflicts in the late 1980s. 117 
As shown in the previous chapter, the new era witnessed the 'breakdown of the 
ideological mind set and structures of the Cold War global alliances', which in turn 
'exposed conflicts, which were formally overshadowed by strong nationalist 
governments and superpower rivalries. "18 Therefore, in order to meet this new 
challenge, the OAUs adopted what it envisaged as a permanent Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993.119 However, in spite of the 
initial optimism, it was during this period that the infamous collapse of the state of 
Somalia occurred 'while violence in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan led to the death of millions of Africans. ' 120 
Most significantly, the genocidal massacre in Rwanda (1994) took place when the 
Mechanism was in operation, and subsequently failed to bring any meaningful 
115 See BBC News, 'Zimbabwe to chair major UN body', International Version, Saturday, 12 May 
2007. 
116 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights, adopted June 27,198 1, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I. L. M. 58 (1982), 
117 On some of the criticism and general literature on the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, see Claude E. Welch, Jr., 'The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, ' supra note 61; Rose M. D'Sa, 'Human and Peoples'Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter', Journal 
oA* an Law, Vo . 29, No. 1. (Spring, 1985), pp. 72-8 1. ah : //un an I- lic/documents/CAFRADIUNPAN01 1836. pdt 119 See Declaration of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment, 
within the OAU, of a mechanism for Conflict Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted by the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly in Cairo, Egypt, on 30 June 1993: AHG/DECL. 3 (XXIX). 
120 Tim Murithi, 'Transforming African Union Values and Principles into Policy and Practice', ISS Paper 143, (June 2007). 
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hope. 121 Sam lbok who was then the Director of the OAU's Political Affairs 
Department conceded in 1999 that in spite of the Continental Mechanism for Conflict, 
Prevention, and Resolution, Africa had been unable to craft comprehensive security 
architecture to drive the peace and security agenda of the Continent. ' 22 This meant 
that reliance had to be made of sub-regional organisations, notably ECOWAS, to 
provide a 'framework for collective intervention by states' in order to halt massive 
violations of human rights. 123 Although the actions of ECOWAS were inspired by the 
OAU's failures, it was the world's inaction dunng the genocide in Rwanda that was to 
form a turning point in the history of post-colonial Africa and compel states to 
reassess their positions on non-intervention. 
2.4 The Lessons from Rwanda: A Rude Awakening for the OAU 
The Rwandan genocidal massacre marked a catastrophic period that not only 
unearthed the utter failure of humanity, 124 but also left a scar on the conscience of the 
international community. 125 Therefore, although the factors considered above led 
African states to question their own system and that of the UN as a whole, it was the 
unparalleled cataclysm brought about by the Rwandan genocide that is mainly 
credited with fundamental change of outlook with respect to Africa's position in 
121 For an assessment of the OAU's conflict response capacities, see Monde Muyangwa and Margaret 
A Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and 
Resolution, 1993-2000, (New York: International Peace Academy, 2002); A. Abass &M Baderin, 
'Towards Effective Collective Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union', 49 Netherlands International Law Review (2002), 1 12; Tim 
Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Afticanism, ' supra note 13. 
... Sam lbok, The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of Disputes, 
(Addis Abba, 1999), p. 4. 
" Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union's Right to intervene, ' 
su yra note 9. 
" See Romeo A. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, (Carroll 
& Graf, 2004). See also 'Rwanda Genocide 'Failure'Berated', BBC, April 5,2004. 
125 On the Rwandan genocide, see generally, Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story. 
Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch; Paris: International Federation of Human 
Rights, 1999); Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, 'Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali 
Battalion, ' in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., The Path ofa Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis 
from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda 
C? isis, 1959-1994: History ofa Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 1995); Scott Feil, Preventing 
Genocide: How the Early Use ofForce Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda: A Report to the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict, 1998); Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly 
Conflict - Final Report, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions ofthe United Nations 
during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Document S/1999/1257, December 15,1999, p. 1; and Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: 
Lessonsfrom the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). ý 
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conflict resolution, In this regard, a revelation of brief facts of the conflict that led to 
the deaths of between 500,000 and I million people within 100 days deserves 
mention. 126 As stated earlier, this approach is useful in ultimately understanding the 
rationale behind the formation of the AU mechanisms, in order to test the mantra of 
'Never Again, ' who's first key trial manifested itself in the Darfur conflict. 127 
Due to its operational failures in Yugoslavia 128 and Somalia 129 in the early 1990s, the 
UN approached the conflict in Rwanda with marked caution. 130 Its striking hesitance 
was as 49a consequence of America's shambolic intervention in Somalia the previous 
year. "" Nevertheless, in October 1993, at the joint request of the government of 
Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Council established the United Nations 
132 Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), with amongst others, the mandate of 
monitoring the cease-fire and overseeing the demilitalization and demobilization and 
126 Estimated deaths range from 500,000 to 1,000,000 persons. See Report ofEminent Personalities to 
Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, CM 12049 (LXVII), 29 May 2000. 
See also Question ofthe Violation ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, In Any Part of the 
World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories, U. N. 
ESCOR, Conudn on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12,124, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994n (1994). 
See generally Final Report ofthe Commission ofExperts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 935 (1994), U. N. SCOR, U. N. Doc. S/I 994/1405 (1994); Report on the Situation ofHuman 
Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rena Deqni-SJqui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 ofResolution S-311 of2S May 1994, U. N. ESCOR, Comnfn on 
HurrL Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda Item 10, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1996/68 (1996); Report on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rena Deqni-Siqui, Special Rapporteur, Under Paragraph 
20 ofResolution S-311 of25 May 1994, U. N. ESCOR, Conudn on Hurn. Rts.. 52d Sess., Agenda Item 
10, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995n(1995). 
127 See chapter nine. 
128 Mats Berdal, 'Lessons Not Leamt: The Use of Force in 'Peace Operations' in the 1990s, in Adekeye 
Adebajo & Chandra Lekha Srirarn, ManagingArmed Conflicts in 21st Century, (Frank Cass 
Publishers, 200 1); Ralph Zacklin, 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schriiver Security Council and the Use ofForce: Theory and Reality -A Needfor Change? 
(Martin Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 91-106. 
129 Jarat Chopra, A. Eknes, and T. Nordbo, 'Fighting for Hope in Somalia, ' Peacekeeping and 
Multinational Operations 6 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1995); Mohamed 
Sahnoun, Somalia: Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994); Ralph 
Zacklin, ' The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations', in Niels Blokker and Nico -Schriiver. Security Council and the Use ofForce, ibid, pp. 91-106. * 
"' See chapter eight. UN Publication, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace Keeping, 
(3rd Edition 1996); United Nations Department of Peace Keeping, Comprehensive Report on Lessons 
Learntfrom UNAMIR; United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol X, The United Nations and Rwanda 
1993-1996; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, (Oxford University Press; Second 
Edition, 2004) pp. 227-230; Ralph Zacklin, 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations', in Niels 
Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce, ibid. 91-106. 131 Lessons of genocide: Rwanda, Remembered, Economist, 27 March. 2004. 
132 See SC Res. 872 (1993) of 5 October, 1993. 
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assist with mine clearing. The force comprised of a mere 2,500 lightly armed military 
personnel. 133 
However, the country drifted to further conflict when the Presidents of Rwanda and 
Burundi were killed in a plane crash in April 1994. The mass slaughter and gross 
violations of human rights of Tutsis and moderate Hutus that ensued completely 
overwhelmed UNAMM which could no longer carry out its mandate to implement 
the peace agreement. Furthermore, Belgium announced its unilateral withdrawal from 
UNAMIR leaving the force level at 1500 troops. 134 These factors ensured that 
UNAMIR did not have the resources and logistics to prevent the looming genocide as 
the 'force level was too small for the military action to protect the victims of the 
slaughter and the force's capabilities had not been put together with a conflict 
situation in mind: With an extremely weak logistics base, UNAMIR was also rapidly 
running out of food and medical supplies[ ... ]It had no ambulances and mainly used 
soft-skin vehicles for the transportation of troops. ' 135 In spite of this, in May 1994, the 
Security Council, by way of resolution 918,136 imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda 
and expanded UNAMIR's mandate by authorising it to contribute to the security of 
refugees and civilians through the establishment of secure humanitarian areas and the 
provision of security for humanitarian operations. However, by this time UNAMIR 
had only 500 troops in Rwanda and states were reluctant to provide more forces. 
As it turned out, the UN's ambivalence towards conflicts in the continent reached its low 
point during the world's 'sin of omission' 137 in the genocide. In a mere 100 days, up one 
million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered. 138 And more so, this tragedy 
133 UN Publication, The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace Keeping, ibid; United 
Nations Department of Peace Keeping, Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learntfrom UNAMIR, ibid; 
United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol X, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, ibid. 134 See Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR, UN Doc. S/1994/470,20 April, 1994. 
135 UN Publication, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace Keeping, supra note 130; 
United Nations Department of Peace Keeping, Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learntfrom 
UNAMIR, supra note 130; United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol X, The United Nations and Rwanda 
1993-1996, supra note 130. 
136 See SC Res. 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994. 
137 Term used by the Secretary General to describe the world's failure to prevent and halt the Rwandan 
1 enocide. See 'UN Chief's Rwanda Genocide Regret'BBC News, World Edition, March 26,2004. 
38 See Report ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding 
Events, CM 12048 (LXVII), 29 May 2000. See Question of the Violation ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, In Any Part ofthe World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories, U. N. ESCOR, Comm! n on Hurn. Rts., 50th Sess., Agenda Item 
12,124, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1994n (1994). See generally, Final Report of the Commission ofExperts 
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occurred as 'the majority of the international community, impassive and apparently 
unperturbed, sat back and watched the unfolding apocalypse or simply changed 
(TV) 
channels. ' 139 The 'lack of political WiII9140 to intervene during those dark 
days leading to 
the catastrophic period not only unearthed the utter failure of humanity, 
141 but also 
clearly rode roughshod over a clear legal obligation under international law. 
142 
Most importantly, as mentioned in chapter three, the failure by the international 
community to intervene in this instance led to the commission of genocide, which 
in 
itself is violation of a peremptory norm of law. 
143 Meanwhile, the impact of the tragedy 
in Rwanda was to be felt across many of the countries within the African continent. 
144 
And as the remnants of the genocide spilled over to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the UN failed to intervene and instead sent a weakly mandated peace operation force 
which failed to stop the systematic slaughter of millions of innocent civilians. 
145 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U. N. SCOR, U. N. Doc. S/1994/1405 
(1994); Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rena Deqni-Saqui, 
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ESCOR, Cornrrfn on Hurn. Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda Item 10, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995n(1995). 
139 Romeo Dallaire, Shake hands with the Devil, supra note 124, p. xvii. 
"" Kofi Annan, speech, 'Secretary-General Observes International Day of Reflection on 1994 
Genocide, ' Geneva, April 7,2004. hM: //www. unog. cb/news2/documents/newsen/s&04003 e. htm. See 
also Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 'supra note 125; Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, 
'Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion, ' in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., 
The Path ofa Genocide: The Rwanda Crisisfrom Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1999); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: 
Hurst & Co., 1995); Scott Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use offorce Might Have 
Succeeded in Rwanda: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1998); Carnegie Commission 
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict - Final Report; Report of the Independent 
Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Document 
S/I 999/1257, December 15,1999, p. 1; and Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The 
International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessonsfrom the Rwanda Experience (Copenhagen: 
Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). 
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142 Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides 
that: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether conunitted in time of peace or in time of 
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. For discussion 
of the obligation to prevent and punish as as express duty imposed upon states in the Convention see 
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ 26 Feb. 2007 at paras. 161-7. 
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Nevertheless, the UN Security Council later authoriscd Operation Turquoise, a 
French peace operation that was mandated to put a halt to the genocidal massacre. 
146 
However, the same mission provided assistance to the genocidaires and helped them 
to escape into the east of the DR Congo thereby creating a 'rump genocidal state on 
the very border of Rwanda. ' 147 And the Council, adopted resolution 955 (1994), 
148 
providing for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), in order to prosecute persons 'responsible for genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. ' 
149 As shown in chapter nine, the 
Council's referral of the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court, as an 
alternative to the decisive enforcement action necessary to halt the devastating 
catastrophe in the region, led to accusations that it had 'all but plagiarized the 
resolutions on Rwanda. " 50 
Meanwhile, the world's failure in Rwanda 'had especially profound consequences in 
Africa. Throughout the continent, the perception of near indifference on the part of the 
international community [ ... ] left a poisonous 
legacy that continues to undermine 
confidence in the [UN] organisation. ' 151 Similarly, the OAU Panel of Eminent 
Personalities accused certain members of the Security Council members, specifically 
France and the United States that they 'consciously chose to abdicate their responsibility 
for Rwanda. ' 152 The Panel also blamed African states for their inaction and soon strongly 
Association, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - What is the Role for International 
Law? University of Sussex, April 20 & 21,2007. 
146 SC Res. 929,22 June 1994 See Helmut Freudenschuss, 'Between Unilateralism and Collective 
Security: Authorisations of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council, ' EJIL, 46, no. 1 (1994). 
147 Organization of African unity, International Panel ofEminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, supra note 145, para. 19.28; B. Jones 'Intervention 
Without Borders: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-1994' in Millenium, in N. Al-Naumi & 
R. Meese (eds) International Legal Issues Arising under the United Nations Decade ofInternational 
Law, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), vol. 24, No. 2, p. 225; BBC, 'France accused on Rwanda 
killings', BBC News, Tuesday, 24 October 2006. 
148 SC Res. 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994. 
149 ibid. 
150 Romio Dallaire, 'Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda', New York Times, 4 October, 2004. 
151 Report of the Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion ofDurable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Africa, S/1998/318,37 ILM (1998) 913 at para 11. See also Report of the 
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recommended that the OAU 'establish appropriate structures to enable it to respond 
effectively to enforce peace in conflict situations. ' 153 
It was at this point that the Pan African journey from the OAU to the new AU regained 
its momentum. However, before embarking on a discussion on the AU, despite its 
failures, it has to be said that the OAU is credited with the successful efforts for the total 
decolonisation of Africa and the struggle against apartheid. 154 Furthermore, by affirming 
the principle of inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism, it arguably limited the 
number of conflicts that could have potentially broken out, particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s, which formed the period subsequent to the achievement of independence by the 
majority of African states. 155 In addition, through its mediation role, the OAU made 
significant efforts in solving several disputes, including the ones involving Algeria and 
Morocco and also amongst Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. 156 Moreover, as stated above, the 
OAU also often engaged in cooperation with the United Nations that included 
agreements to deal with African disputes which had been referred to the UN Security 
Council and which were on occasion reverted back to the OAU, such as the Chad/Libya 
dispute. 157 
In this regard, as will be shown below, leaders at the launch of the AU, paid tribute to 
the organisation and praised it 'for the total decolonisation of Africa, the struggle 
against apartheid [and] the exaltation of the virtues of unity, solidarity and dignity on 
the continent. ' 158 Nevertheless, the failure to prevent and manage conflicts, 
particularly in Rwanda marked the demise of the organisation which 'in this context, 
[the OAU], like the prehistoric dinosaurs, was facing the threat of extinction for 
failing to adapt itself to changed global and regional political, social and economic 
settings and rising up to the new challenges faced by the continent in the post Cold 
153 ibid. 
154 See Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, ' supra note 13. 155 See Mr Amara Essy, Secretary-Gcneral of the OAU, 'Opening Statement', 38th Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government of the OAU, 8 July 2002. See also MacFarlane, S. N, 'Intervention and Security in Africa, International Affairs, Vol 60, Issue 1 (1983-84) p. 56. 156 Fredric S. Pearson and Robert A Baumann, 'International Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan 
African Subsysystem'Journal ofPolitical and Military Sociology, Vol 17 1989, p. 1 18. On peaceful dispute resolution in Africa, see B. D. Meyers, 'Interregional Conflict Management by the Organization 
of African Unity, '28 Int. Org., (1974) p. 345 at pp-359-60; M. Shaw, 'Dispute Settlement in Africa', 37 
Yearbook of WA (1983), p. 149 at pp. 156-7; and M. Wolfers, 'The Organization of African Unity as Mediator', in Touval and Zartman, International Mediation in Theory and Practice, (Westview, 1985) 
P; 
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War era. ' 159 Subsequently, in apparent continuation of the earlier Conferences on Pan 
Afficanism, an array of OAU summits culminated in the formal launch of a new 
African Union, as described in the following section. 
3.1 The Transition from the OAU to the New AU: From Sirte (1999) to Durban 
(2002) 
The call by the OAU Panel of Eminent Personalities to 'establish appropriate 
structures to enable it to respond effectively to enforce peace in conflict 
situations, ' 160was heeded by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 
1999 in Algiers, Algeria. 161 This occurred after African leaders assembled in Sirte, 
Libya following an invitation from Colonel Muhammar Ghadafi of Libya to the 4th 
Extraordinary Summit in 9 September, 1999. Incidentally, this date coincided with 
time during which Colonel Ghaddafi celebrated the 1969 coup that brought him to 
power. As will be shown further below, this point is of particular significance given 
that certain quarters have interpreted this misnomer as expressive of 'his desire for 
recognition as the continental leader. ' 162 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the Extraordinary Summit was to amend the OAU 
Charter to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the continental organisation. 
However, although the theme of the Summit was dubbed 'Strengthening OAU 
capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the new millennium, ' African leaders, 
instead, decided to issue the Sirte Declaration. 163 This Declaration, having taken note 
of the need to 'effectively address the new social, political and economic realities in 
Africa and in the world, ' 164 unanimously decided to 'establish an African Union, in 
conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organisation 
and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. ' 165 
"9 E Baimu, K Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene, ' supra note 9. "' Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding events', supra note 145, para. 13.1. "' See Decision AHG/ Dec. 140 (XXXV) adopted at the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the OAU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Algiers, Algeria, on 14 July 1999. 
See J. Cillers, 'From Durban to Maputo: A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union', ISS Paper 
76, (August 2003), p. 8. 
161 See the Sirte Declaration, Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 8-9 September 1999, Sirte, Libya, EAHG/DrafVDecl. (IV) Rev 1. 
"' Paragraph 6 of the preamble to the Sirte Declaration, ibid., 
165 See the Sirte Declaration, ibid. 
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Amongst others, the Declaration also decided to accelerate the process of 
implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 166 including 
shortening the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty., 67 Finally, the Declaration 
'[m]andate[d] the Council of Ministers to take the necessary measures to ensure the 
implementation of the above decisions and in particular, to prepare the constitutive 
legal text of the Union, taking into account the Charter of the OAU and the Treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community' and thereby submit its report at 
Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of [the] Assembly 168 in Lom6, Togo. Following the 
Sirte Declaration, the OAU legal department drew up a draft Constitutive Act of the 
Africa Union which was then debated in a meeting of legal experts and 
parliamentarians and later at a ministerial conference in Tripoli, Libya in June 
2000.169 
The next summit was held in Lom6, a mere month later, in July 2000, whereby the 
Assembly approved and adopted the Draft Constitutive Act on the establishment of 
the AU 170 in terms of the Sirte Declaration which became open for signature. 171 The 
Summit in Lome also saw the adoption by the OAU of the Solemn Declaration on the 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(CSSDCA). 172 This initiative, which is loosely based on the Organisation for Security 
166 The Treaty Establishing the African Econornic Community 199 1. See also the 'Final Communiqu6 
of the First extra Ordinary Summit', The First Extra-Ordinary Summit of the COMESA Authority of 
Heads of State and Government for the launching of the COMESA Free Trade Area, Lusaka, Republic 
of Zambia, 31 October, 2000; Asante, SKB, 'Towards an African economic community', Africa 
Institute ofSouth Africa, 200 1; Olufemi A. Babarinde, 'Analyzing the Proposed African Economic 
Community: Lessons from the Experience of the European Union', Paper, Third ECSA-World 
Conference on The European Union in a Changing World, Brussels, Belgium, 19-20 September, 1996. 
Available at http: //www. ecsanet. org/conferences/ccsaworld3lbabarinde. htm 
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16' Article iii. 
169 See chapter seven. See also Tiyarjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste 
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"' See Assembly of Heads of State and Government Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session/Fourth Ordinary 
Session of the AEC, 10 - 12 July, 2000, Lom6, Togo, AHG/Dec. 143-159 (XXXVI), AHG/Dec. 144 
(XXXVI). 
171 During the Summit, 27 African states signed the Constitutive Act of the AU during a formal signing 
ceremony in Lome on July 2000. These include: Algeria, Berlin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
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172 In its Declaration, the OAU Assembly 'acknowledged the CSSDCA process as creating a synergy between the various activities undertaken by the OAU/AEC, which therefore must help to consolidate the work of the OAU/AEC in the areas of peace, security, stability, development and cooperation'. See Assembly of Heads of State and Government Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session(Fourth Ordinary Session of the AEC, 10 - 12 July, 2000, Lom6, Togo, AHG/Dec. 143-159 (XXXVI), AHG/Dec. 144 (XXXVI). 
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and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was advocated by Nigeria's Olusegun 
Obasanjo. 173 
In March 2001, African leaders were back in Sirte, Libya where the Assembly, 
meeting in its Fifth Extraordinary Session noted that all member states had signed the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union and unanimously declared the establishment of 
the'AU. 174 This paved way for the Lusaka, Zambia summit (2001), which concerned 
itself with the implementation of the Union and mandated the OAU Secretary General 
to formulise modalities and guidelines for the launching of the organs of the Union. 175 
As will be shown in detail in chapter six, the Constitutive Act of the AU envisioned 
the creation of new institutions at the continental level. In this regard, the Assembly, 
the Executive Council, the Commission and the Permanent Representative Committee 
were considered to be of priority. 176 Furthermore, the Assembly called for the 
preparation of the Draft Rules of Procedure of the primary organs and requested 
member states to submit proposals regarding the structure, functions and powers of 
the Commission. 177 Finally, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) 
was adopted as a Programme of the AU at the Lusaka Summit (2001). 178 As shown in 
chapter seven, this organ is associated with the quest to promote the respect for 
democracy, good governance and human rights. 179 
The culmination of Summits symbolised an African a journey from North Africa 
(Sirte and Lome) making its way through Central Africa (Lusaka) and finally reached 
its high point in South Africa (Durban), which saw the formal inauguration of the new 
AU. Coincidentally, the AU's ceremonial launch marked the first ordinary session of 
the Assembly of the Union that adopted the Protocol on the establishment of the 
173 Bronwen Manby, 'The African Union, NEPAD and Human Rights, ' supra note 65; Lloyd and Rachel Murray, 'Institutions with Responsibility for Human Rights Protection under the African Union', Journal ofAfrican Law, 48,2 (2004), p. 165-186. 174 See the Decisions adopted by the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Goverm-nent of the OAU/AEC, 1-2 March 2001, Sirte, Great Jamahiriya 
EAHG/Dec. I (V). 
175 See Assembly of States Decision on the Implementation of the Sirte Summit Decision on the African Union, AHG/DEC-1 (XXXVH), Lusaka 9-11 July, 2001. 
176 ibid. 
177 ibid. 
178 ibid. - 179 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 7 1, African Union, A157/304 (8-10) July 2002. See also Bronwen Manby, 'The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights, ' supra note 65. 
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Peace and Security Council of the African Union, "80 the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly and the Statutes of the Commission. "81 Significantly, the AU Assembly 
encouraged all member states of the AU to support the NEPAD initiative and adopt 
the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and 
accede to the African Peer Review Mechanism. 182 
The formal launch also set the stage for the preparation to bid farewell to the OAU 
and the platform from which African states ushered in a new era of an AU embodied 
in the spirit of the Constitutive Act. The new era that was to 'dawn on Africa and for 
Africa' 183 bound the continent to democratic principles and further called for the 
adherence to 'principles of good governance, transparency and human rights [which] 
are essential elements for building representative and stable governments and can 
contribute to conflict prevention' 184 in Africa. As mentioned earlier, the adoption of 
the Sirte Declaration 'unleashed a new momentum in the quest for Continental 
integration and unity. ' 185 Indeed, the rapidity of signing and ratifying the Constitutive 
Act, expressed the remarkable enthusiasm and dedication towards the transition from 
the OAU to the new AU. 
It was during the moment of the formal launching of the AU in Durban that the 
Yaound6 Declaration, 186 issued by the OAU Summit meeting in July 1996 in 
Cameroon, resonated. 
180 Assembly of the African Union, First Ordinary Session: Decision on the Establishment of the Peace 
and Security Council of the African Union. ASS/AU/Dec. 3 (1). 9- 10 July, 2002, Durban, South 
Africa. 
'81 See Assembly of States Decision on the Draft Rules of Procedure, ASS/AU/Dec. I (I), I" Ord. Sess., 
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jakkie Cillers, 'Peace and Security Through Good Governance? A Guide to NEPAD Peer Review 
Mechanisms', ISS, Paper 70, April 2003. 
183 Opening Statement by Mr Amara Essy, Secretary-General of the OAU at the 38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, supra note 158. 
194 See Declaration prn the Framework for an OAU response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI) (2000). 
185 Statement by Mr Amara Essy, Secretary-General of the OAU, Special session of the AU Council of Ministers, Durban, I July 2002. 
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the total political liberation of the continent has just been achieved. This has 
been followed today by a transitional period characterised by the end of one- 
party rule, the inception of democratisation, the emergence of the state of 
law and the restructuring of our economies. 187 
As stated earlier, despite its shortcomings, African leaders paid tribute to the OAU 
during the formal launch of the AU where they issued the Durban Summit 
Declaration. 188 Here, the now defunct OAU was described as a 'pioneer, a liberator, a 
unifier, an organizer and the soul of the continent. 
"89 Further homage was also given 
to its founding leaders for 'their tenacity, resilience and commitment to African 
Unity' and for standing 'firm in the face of the decisive manipulation of the detractors 
of Africa and [fighting] for the integrity of Africa and the human dignity of all the 
peoples of the continent. "90 Finally, acknowledgment was also made of 'all the 
Secretaries General and all the women and men who served the OAU with dedication 
and commitment. 191 
3.2 The Aftermath of the New AU: The Prospects and Challenges of a New 
Regional Organisation 
As mentioned earlier, the African Union's Constitutive Act entered into force on the 
26th of May 2001 after Nigeria became the 36th member state to deposit its 
instrument of ratification. 192 However, as described below, the persistent debates that 
featured behind the scenes in the run up to the inauguration, and which were 
. reminiscent of those prior to the formation of the OAU, made it abundantly clear that 
the launch of the new Union was not an end but a road map for the further integration 
of Africa. As it turned out, the pace of signature and ratification of the Constitutive 
Act of the AU was a 'record-setting event considering the continent's history of a 
general lack of enthusiasm in ratifying multilateral treaties. ' 193 
"' Organisation of African Unity (OAU),, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Declarations, 
Resolutions and Decision. Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21 stt Century), AHG Decl. 
3, prnbl. para. 2, OAU AHG/Res. 247-257 (XXXII) (8-10 July 1996). 
"' The Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organization of African unity and the Launching of the 
African Union, AU Doc. ASS/AU/Decl. 2 (1), Assembly of the AU, I" Ord. Sess., Durban, South 
Africa, July 9-10,2002-- 
189 Ibid. para. 14. 
Ibid. para. 13 
191 Ibid. para. 14. 
192 Article 36 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
193 N. J. Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots?, ' supra note 98. 
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Indeed, by March 2001, all the 53 member states to the AU had signed'94 a 'freshly 
baked cake' 195 presented by African leaders to their citizens. Though 'teasing and 
tempting, [ ... I it was difficult to 
determine if it [was] nutritious. ' 196 Whatever the, case, 
for reasons discussed here and the next chapter, the rapid creation of the AU was 
described as 'one of the most puzzling events in inter-state cooperation in 
contemporary Africa. ' 197 Given the haste in the preparation, signature and adoption of 
the Constitutive Act of the AU, it was hardly surprisingly that the new African 
Charter was sent back to the draftsmen for a series of amendments. Predictably, Libya 
led the pressure for the immediate modification to the Constitutive Act., 98 However, 
although these proposals were not discussed at the AU launch in Durban due to 
procedural huddles, 199 concern was expressed by some states that embarking on the 
amendment of the Constitutive Act soon after its adoption would 'cast a shadow on 
the historic significance of the moment. 200 
In spite of the above, what was clear was that 'the speedy negotiation and elaboration 
of the Constitutive Act seems to have led to the adoption of a sketchy instrument 
which faile[d] to cover certain issues that merited inclusion. v201 Hence, subsequent to 
the adoption of the treaty, it was hardly seven months that African leaders passed the 
202 first amendments to the Constitutive Act of the AU. This was through the approval 
of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Council of the 
African Union that established the AU Peace and Security Council, which is standing 
decision-making body within the Union. 203 The other key amendments were 
194 See the OAU Assembly Decision, OAU Doc. EAHG/ Dec. I (V) (200 1) 
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199 Libya failed to abide by article 32 of the Constitutive Act which reads: Proposals for amendment or 
revision shall be submitted to the Chairman of the Commission who shall transmit same to Member 
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'0' See chapter six. 
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contained in the Protocol on the Amendments to Constitutive Act which was adopted 
204 in 2003. 
3.3 A United States of Africa versus a Confederation of Independent States 
Inevitably, it soon became clear that behind the pomp and vigour in the run up to the 
establishment of the Union, there ensued an intense debate amongst African leaders 
surrounding the very meaning of the 'union' that they sought. 205 Furthermore, these 
debates unearthed the influence of key African states, 206 such as Libya, in pushing the 
AU agenda. It will be recalled that disagreements which were grappled with by the 
earlier Pan Africanists of the earlier part of the 20th century revolved around the 
relentless dispute that centres on whether the pan African vision of continental unity 
should either be realised immediately or be a long term objective to be achieved first 
through the creation and consolidation of independent states and then built up using 
sub-regional building blocks. 207 
As it turned out, the contemporary intensity of this debate compelled African leaders, 
during a summit in January 2007, to dedicate the July AU Assembly Summit in Accra, 
to the theme of the 'Grand Debate on the Union Government. 208 Reminiscent of the 
deep divisions in the 1950s between the 'progressive' and 'gradualists' 
, 
blocks, 
discussed above, Africa was 'once again at the crossroads. ' 209 This is because the 
debate that had previously ensued between the Monrovia and Casablanca groups had 
come back to haunt African leaders in their quest for African unity. 
Having being recognised for his efforts as 'the son of Africa, 210 the vision contained 
in the proposal by Libya's Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi deserves mention. 
'" For a critical analysis of the amendments to the Constitutive act, see Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast. 
Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly? supra note 2 1. 
'0' Tiyaniana Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African union and Postcolonial institutional- 
building in Africa', 16 Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, (2003) p. 157 at 159. " Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'Explaining the Clash and 
, 
Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in 
the Creation of the African Union'supra note 198. 
'07 See Abdalla Bujra, ' Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Development From the OAU to 
the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for African Development 
ýp supra note 43. P=)bly/AU/Dec. 
156 (VIII) adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29-30 January, 2007. 
'0' Statement by Executive Council of the African Union (ECA) Executive Secretary, l4th Ordinary 
Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), 25-26 June, 2007. Accra, Ghana, 210 See Special Motion of Thanks to the Leader of the Great Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Brother 
Muammar Al Ghaddafi, preamble para 1-2,0AU, EAHG/ Decl. 4. (V) (2001). 
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Controversially, during the 2000 summit in Lom6, Togo 21 1 he proposed the formation 
of unity based upon Ghana! s president Kwame Nkrumah's dream of a 'United States 
of Africa' in the 1960s. 212 During this period, the Libyan leader also challenged the 
existing colonial borders that had been institutionalised by the OAU Charter and 
subsequent African instruments, including the Constitutive Act. Not only did 
Ghaddafi ask for the boarders to be dismantled, he further urged for a single African 
identity, army and common economy within the region. Furthermore, in a live 
broadcast, he declared that: 
[I]n the coming years, there will be changes towards further African 
integration. Boundaries between African states will be scrapped. Armies, 
with their heavy burden on the national state, will be made redundant and 
replaced by one African defence force. Even passports and national 
identities will inevitably disappear. From now on, national differences will 
give way to a single African identity, with a single currency, one central 
bank, a single passport and a joint defence force. 213 
Reminiscent of the aftermath of the creation of the 0AU in the 1960s, confusion as to 
the union that was achieved in 2002 was manifest in the speech by President 
Gnassimbe Eyadarna of Togo, who was then the OAU Chairman. Eyadma's statement 
was riddled with referrals to the birth of the 'United States of Africa' during the 
launch of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, on 9 July 2002.214 Other 
references, to a 'United States of Africa' were also recently made by the Chairperson 
of the African Commission215 on the occasion of the commemoration of the Africa 
216 Day, on May 25,2006. 
With this regard, the role of Libya! s Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi as a prime mover 
of the African agenda with regard to the unification of the continent created both 
doubt and interests as to his intentions within the organisation. 217 It will be recalled 
211 Barnaby Phillips 'A United States of Africa? ', BBC News, Tuesday, II July, 2000. 
212 See Kwarne Nkurumah, Africa Must Unite, supra note 40. 
213 The Libyan leader speaking at the General Peoples Congress on 18 March 2001 in an address also 
carried on Libyan television, quoted by Jakkie Ciffiers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union', 
2ýrican 
Security Review Vol 10 No 2, (200 1). A 
4 24 Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 2 1. 215 On the function and powers of the AU Chairperson, see chapter six. . 216 Statement of the Chairperson of the AU Comn-dssion On the Occasion of the Commemoration of Africa Day, 25 May 2006: Working Together for Integration and Development 25 May 2006. 
Available at http: //www. africa-union. org/root/au/Conferences/Past/2006/May/BC/CP_statement. htm 217 For more discussion on Ghaddafi's influence on the AU agenda, see Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 
'Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African 
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that the Sirte Declaration, which called for the establishment of the AU, had been at 
the request by Libya to 'discuss ways and means of making the OAU more effective' 
218 
in the context of globalisation. Further, amongst Libya's contributions to the Sirte 
process was includeda grant of one million dollars towards the AU '21 
9 and the North 
African state also paid $4.5 million to the Council of Ministers as imbursement of 
seven members of the OAU who were in arrears. 220 
These enormous efforts of the Libyan President were in return acknowledged by the 
AU Heads of State and Govenunent who paid 'tribute to Brother Leader Muarnmar 
Al-Qaddafi for his vision and commitment to a strong and a united continent within 
the framework of the African Union and for his continuing commitment to the 
consolidation of peace, security, development and integration in Africa. ' 
221 In 
addition to what it termed as 'deserving tribute to Brother Leader Muammar Al 
Ghaddafi [ ... ] for his role and efforts as the son of 
Africa, ' the AU further praised 
'the initiatives [ he has] taken [ to strengthen the unity, cohesion and solidarity of 
our peoples and the continent [ [b]earing in mind, the intense contributions made 
by the Libyan people and leadership, to the advancement of the objectives of the 
continent in the area of peace, security, stability and development. 222 
However, in spite of this development, there is evidence of Libya's strong influence 
among African states which is visibly clear from the much earlier position taken by 
the OAU in its support of Ghaddafi. Subsequent to its adoption of the Ouagadougou 
decision defying the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Libya in connection 
Union', African Affairs (2004), 103,249-267; T. Maluwa, 'Reimagining African Unity- Some 
Preliminary Reflections on the Constitutive Act of the African Union', (2001), 9 African Yearbook of 
international Law 3 and 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post 
Colonial Africa', Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, 16 (2003), pp. 157-170. 
"I The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 35 Ord Sess., AIIG/ Dec. 140 (XXXV). This 
coincided with Ghaddafi's 30 years of rule. See Donna Abu- Nasr, 'Ghaddafi Marks 30 Years in Power 
with a Massive Display of Force', Sun-Sentinel, 8 September, 1999. See also Libya- Quaddari 
Underlines His Conversion from Pan-Arabism. to Pan-Africanism by Hosting an Extraordinary AU 
Summit', 609 Middle East Int 77 (October 1999). 
219 Jakke Cillers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union, ' supra note 214. 
... See 'Libya Pays OAU Contributions for Seven States', Pan African News Agency, 7 September, 
1999. 
221 Assembly of the Union, '2nd Extraordinary Session, Ext/ Assembly/ AU/ Ded. 1-2 (11), 27-28 
February 2004. 
222 Special Motion of Thanks to the Leader of the Great Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Brother 
Muammar Al Ghaddafi, supra note 211. 
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to the Lockerbie bombings, 
223 
the OAU passed resolutions, from 1997 onwards, at 
every Heads of State and Government Summit demanding that sanctions against 
224 Libya be lifted and/or flouted by African states. Conveniently, during the AU's 
inauguration in Durban in July 2002, delegates took note of the settlement of the 
Lockerbie case and 'urgently request[ed] the Security Council to immediately and 
deflnitively lift these sanctions and embargo imposed on Libya which no longer have 
legal or moral justification. 9225 
The Libyan leader was later described as the 'accelerator of the cngine for the 
transformation and reconstruction of Africa unity' and anointed as the 'spiritual leader 
of the African Union. 226 However, although Ghadaffi remained the most prominent 
advocate for real continental unity at extraordinary summits, his vision on the AU 
initiative has somewhat been exaggerated. This is because his outspoken views were 
also shared by other African scholars, particularly those who were of the view that the 
transition from the OAU to AU 'should ensure that this semantic and institutional 
evolution creates new realities marked by the gradual eradication of all borders 
between Affican countries. 9227 
More significantly, as' Maluwa strongly argues, Ghaddafi was not alone in his 
pronouncements as they are riddled with Pan Africanist antecedents in regard to 
African unity, which are reiterations of previous calls by leaders such as Nkrumah. In 
this regard, the AU 'project is, therefore, not one individual country's sole initiative or 
one particular leader's obsession with personal aggrandizement. 228 Indeed, quite to 
223 T. Maluwa, 'Reimagining African Unity, ' supra note 218. 
224 Evarist Bairnu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Unioif s Right to Intervene, ' supra 
note 9; E. de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, (Hart Publishing 
2004), p. 382. 
22S AHG/Dec. 174 (XXXVIII); See also Assembly of the Heads of State and Governments, Thirty-Third 
Ordinary Session, AHG/Decl. 2 (X=11), Harare, Zimbabwe, 2 to 4 June 1997; the OAU Council of 
Ministers at its Sixty-Fourth Ordinary Session, Yaoundd, Cameroon, I-6 July, 1996 ; Sixty-Fifth 
Ordinary Session, Tripoli, Libya, 24 -28 February, 1997. 226 Quoted in Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of the African union and Postcolonial 
institutional-building in Africa', supra note 206, p. 160. 
227 See African Union, 'First Meeting of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora Organised by the 
African Union', supra note 24. See also Wole Soyinka, The Burden ofMemory, supra note 67, pp. 40- 
41. See also. O. Okafor, 'After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction 
of Legitimate Statehood in Africa', supra note 67. For a different view, see A. Mbembe, 'At the Edge 
of the World, ' supra note 67. 
... T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Africa', supra note 206. 
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the contrary, all the member states, through the adoption and ratification of AU 
agreements have endorsed the Union's programme of continental unity. Furthermore, 
states such as Nigeria and South Africa have also not shied from strongly influencing 
the AU's agenda. 229 
Moreover, the majority of African leaders, while appreciating the views of the Libyan 
leader, were not willing to go so far as agreeing to an absolute African integration. 
For example, some states, such as Kenya, argued that Africa was not ready for 
unification. 230 In its place the AU Assembly agreed that the Union be established in 
conformity with the OAU Charter and the Abuja treaty. 
231 In the end, the uncertainty 
in regard to the union that was sought and ultimately achieved, led Maluwa to observe 
that 'as it stands, the Constitutive Act is hardly the charter for the politically 
integrated Africa that some commentators may have made it out to be, or some Africa 
leaders may have wished for; and that it is not the programme of action in the sense 
that the Treaty Establishing the African Community (commonly) known as the Abuj a 
Treaty is, but simply an organizational framework for the future political integration 
of the Africa continent. 232 
As mentioned earlier, the ferocity of this debate was recently awoken leading to the 
AU Assembly's decision to dedicate the AU Summit in Accra, Ghana from 1-3 July 
2007, to the theme of the 'Grand Debate on the Union Government. Unsurprisingly, 
the leading voice for an immediate unification of Africa was the Libyan leader, 
Gaddafi. Although he found favour in leaders such as the Senegalese President, 
Abdoulaye, others, such as Robert Mugabe and Thabo Mbeki of Zimbabwe and South 
Africa respectively, preferred the gradualisý approach to integration. 233 Meanwhile, 
some leaders such as Yoweri Museveni, of Uganda, would rather have had more 
economic integration as opposed to political union, as he felt Africa was too diverse 
229 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in 
the Creation of the African Union', supra note 198. 
230 Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 21; Jakkie 
Cilliers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union, supra note 214. 
231 Kioko, Ben, 'The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act; Non- 
interference to Non-Intervention, ' International Review of the Red Cross, no. 85, (2003), pp. 807-825. 
23' Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 98. 
233 See BBC News, 'No timetable for uniting Africa', UK Version, Wednesday, 4 July 2007. Available 
at http: //news. bbc. co. uk/lWworld/africa/6268468. strrL 
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to be under one government. However, he remained a strong advocate of a politically 
united East Affican Federation. 234 
In the end, the Chairperson of the AU Assembly ruled that due to the lack of political 
will by states, the regional groupings had 'not performed to the degree of efficiency 
and purposefulness which would assure an objective observer of hastening the 
day of 
the attainment of the Continental Government. ' 
235 What is clear is that the outcome 
represented the willingness by African leaders to support continental 
integration to the 
extent that it did not considerably erode the jealously guarded concept of sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, the Abuja treaty remains the road map for the continental quest for a 
United States of Africa through a coordinated development approach modelled around 
236 Regional Economic Communities (RECs). As it stands, the on-going debate with 
regard to the most appropriate form of unity in similar fashion to earlier years rages 
on, and is in no where near conclusion. 
C: Conclusion 
The creation of the AU through the adoption of the Constitutive Act marked the 
'turning of a significant page in the modem history of Africa. 237 Leaders in modem 
Africa were inspired by the ideals which guided the Founding Fathers of [the 
continental] Organization and Generations of Pan-Africanists in their resolve to forge 
unity, solidarity and cohesion, as well as co-operation between African peoples and 
among African States. ' 239 In this sense, its establishment, 100 years after the first 
Conference in London was the embodiment of Pan-Africanism in its latest guise. 239 
234 On Musevenis's vision of a politically united East Africa, see Phillip Apuuli, Kasaija, 'Regional 
integration: A political Federation of the East African Countries, ' Africanjournal ofInternational 
4ffairs, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 &2, (2004), pp. 21-34. 
" Address by the Chairperson of the African Union, H. E. President J. A. Kofhor at the Opening of the 
Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Accra, Ghana, 28-29 June: II th 
Ordinary Session of the Executive Council. 
236 See chapter seven., 
237 T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Affica', supra note 206. 
239 See the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 8.9 
September 1999, Sirte, Libya. EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1 
239 See generally, Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Afticanism, Peacebuilding and 
Development, (Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 
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Indeed the tam of the 21" Century, saw the 'fully decolonised Africa, ' with apartheid 
having 'been consigned to the ignominy of history. 240 However, the 'the liberation of 
the yoke of colonialism did not automatically bring about peace and prosperity for 
Africa. 241 Instead, as shown in chapter seven, the post colonial system paved way the 
systematic coup d'&ats and gross violations of human rights which reached their 
watershed in the 1990S. 242 In the wider context, the increase in the marginalisation of 
the continent brought about the geopolitical changes resulting from the Cold War, and 
the frustrations of the post-1945 universal system compelled African leaders to 
replace the OAU. 243 This organisation 'effectively died of a cancer of inefficiency 
because it had not lived up to its ideals of promoting peace security and 
development. 244 In its place, the launch of the new AU formed a 'critical moment in 
the quest of African peoples for a politically united and economically integrated 
continent. 1,245 
As demonstrated in the coming chapters, the regional principles contained in the 
Constitutive Act of the AU represented the dramatic shift from the previous concept 
of non-interference to that of non-indifference. 246 Significantly, it also brought with it 
the right to intervene and deal with conflicts such as that in Darfur against the 
background of Rwanda which had formed 'a deplorable example of the international 
community's disinterest in the African continent. 247 Indeed, some have compared the 
emergence of the AU on the world stage as akin to that of the transformation of the 
248 League of Nations into the UN. However, as the rest of this thesis will show, some 
of the key features of the AU, such as the practice of some of its major organs, 
"' Assembly of the African Union, First Ordinary Session: Decisions and Declarations, 9- 10 July, 
2002, Durban, South Africa, ASSIAU/Dec. 1-8 (1), ASS/AU/Decl. 1-2 (1). 
24 1 Nsongurua J. Udombana, 'Critical Essay: Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?, ' supra note 98. 242 See chapter seven. 
243 See B Kioko, 'The Right ofIntervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act, 'supra note 
232. 
244 Tim MUrithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, ' supra note 13. 245 T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Postcolonial Institution-building in' 
Africa, ' supra note 206. 
246 Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), Addis Ababa June 28,2004 , 247 Daniela Kroslak, Book Review of Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, 'The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda (1998), 75 INTLAFF. 877 (1999). 
249 See 'U. S. Ambassador to the African Union, Cindy L. Courville, Presents Copy of Her Credentials to African Union Chairperson Alpha 0. Konare', US Embassy News, Addis Ababa, December 22, 2006, No. 50/06. Available at No. 50106. 
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continue to raise serious questions as to whether the AU treaty is indeed an old wine 
in new wineskin with the AU amounting to a reincarnation of the OAU. 249 
In the broader context, the quest to reduce the significance of imposed and artificial 
state borders have been welcomed as a prelude towards economic integration, which 
goes hand in hand with peace and stability. 250 On the other hand, concerns about 
regional hegemonies have been made with reference to Nigeria and South Africa in 
their quest to dominate key initiatives in order to pursue their own parochial foreign 
policy interests. 251 Most notably, the continued fear and mistrust by African states, of 
the intentions of Libya in pushing the AU agenda will be demonstrated in chapter 
seven. Furthermore, the issue of funding and availability of resources for the AU and 
its new organs remains a challenge. 252 
In conclusion, the establishment of the new AU was not an event but an ongoing 
project. Rather than amounting to fully established regime, its formation represents a 
gradual process whose 'organisational framework [is] aimed at providing the 
parameters for the future political integration the continent. ' 253 Driven by two 
contrasting paths in the form of immediate federalists and gradualists, 'the Union 
serves as guide map of where Africa wants to go. '254 It therefore 'forms part of a 
progression and is unlikely to be the final phase. '255 While the two opposing visions 
and interpretation of integration continue to be contested, the ongoing dialogue 
between the two remains part of the continent's historic steps towards achieving full 
political and economic unity. 256 
249 N. J. Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights', 
supra note 98. See also Adekeye Adebajo, 'The Curse of Berlin: Africa's Security Dilemmas, IPG 
4/2005. p 85; Adejo, Dr. Armstrong Matiu, 'From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottle?, ' supra note 
50; Cameron Duodu, 'Give Unity a Chance', News Africa Magazine, July 29,2002, pp. 20-2 I; Jakke 
Cilliers, 'Towards the African Union', supra note 214; Tim Murithi, Institutionalising Pan- 
Africanism, ' supra note 13. 
250 Timothy Murithi, 'The African'Union: Pan-Africanisrn, Peacebuilding and Development', (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2005), p. 45. 
251 Chris Landberg, 'SA Should Take Heed of the Harsh Criticisms against NEPAD' City Press, 12 
March 2006, p. 28. 
252 See chapter six, seven and nine. 
25' T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Africa', supra note 206. 
254 C. Packer and D. Rukare, 'The New Aftican Union and its Constitutive Act', 96, ARL, (2002) p. 379. 
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Chapter Six 
The African Union's Institutional Security 
Framework: A Critical Analysis 
A: Introduction 
The formal inauguration of the African Union (AU) in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 
2002, marked 'a new era in institution-building in postcolonial Africa. 
" Bearing in 
mind that violent conflicts had constituted a major impediment to African unity and 
economic prosperity, African leaders finally placed the concept of peace and security 
into. its proper perspective. In linking wars to economic development, the 
establishment of the AU institutional architecture of peace and security reflected a 
motivation to 'create propitious conditions for socio-economic development and 
2 integration of the Continent. This was evident from the fact that the AU's 
constitutional framework was based on the Treaty establishing the African Economic 
3 
Community (Abuja Treaty), which envisaged the formation of an African Economic 
Community by the year 2025.4 
In its set up, the constitutive Act (CA) of the AU amounted to an institutionalisation 
of the ideals of Pan-Africanism. 5 As it stands, it represents a radical departure from 
the political, legal and institutional set up of the former Organisation of African Unity 
6 (OAU). In sharp contrast to the OAU, which had only three organs, the AU possesses 
no less than 17 institutions. These include the Assembly of the Heads of State, the 
Peace and Security Council, the AU Commission, the Executive Council, the Pan 
1T Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Africa', Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, 16, (2003), pp. 157-170. 2 See preamble to the African Union Non- Aggression and Common Defence Pact Adopted by the 4 th 
Ordinary Session, Abuja, Nigeria, 31 January, 2005. 
3 4th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 8-9 September 1999, 
Sirte, Libya, EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. I. See chapter five. 
' The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 199 1. See also the 'Final Communiqud of 
the First extra Ordinary Summit, The First Extra-Ordinary Summit of the COMESA Authority of 
Heads of State and Government for the launching of the COMESA Free Trade Area, Lusaka, Republic 
of Zambia, 31 October, 2000; Asante, SKB, 'Towards an African economic community', Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001; Oluferni A. Babarinde, 'Analyzing the Proposed African Econon-dc 
Community: Lessons from the Experience of the European Union', Third ECSA-World Conference on The European Union in a Changing World, Brussels, Belgium, 19-20 September, 1996. Available at http: //www. ecsanet. org/conferences/ecsaworld3/babarinde. htnL 
5 Tim Murithi, Institutionalising Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Union Values and Principles into Policy and Practice', ISS Paper 143, (June 2007). 
T Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial Africa', supra note 1. 
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African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Permanent Representatives Committee, 
seven Specialised Technical Committees, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
and three financial institutions i. e. the African Central Bank, the Monetary Fund and 
the Investment Bank. 7 
Having elaborated the historical processes, as well as the political and legal discourses 
underpinning the new AU framework in chapter five, the present chapter analyses the 
powers and responsibilities of the institutions that were created through the 
Constitutive Act as amended by several Protocols. A close examination of the main 
component of the AU's evolving mechanism for peace and security demonstrates that 
the current system is grounded upon a robust security system comprised of the organs 
listed above and the continent's sub-regional organisations. As shall be shown below, 
the AU's institutional framework also constructs relationships with the UN and the 
wider international community. 
What will become clear is the extent to which the current system departs from the 
previous practice under the OAU regime. The chapter shall also highlight the increased 
roles of African regional and sub-regional organisations, as well as elaborate on the 
evolving relationship with the UN, and other international organisations. Finally, its 
also aims to assess the longer term prospects that the emerging AU's relationship will 
have with the UN, including the prospects of a formalised division of labour. 
B: Aims,, Purpose and Structure 
To some, 'the speedy negotiation and elaboration of the Constitutive Act seems to have 
led to the adoption of a sketchy instrument which faile[d] to cover certain issues that 
merited inclusion'. 8 In particular, the Act was severely criticised as wanting in respect 
to the functional attributes, institutional powers and interrelationships between the 
different organs of the Union? In order to reveal its true picture with regard to peace 
and security, the intended scope of I this chapter does not allow a detailed examination of 
all the bodies within the AU. Suffice to say here that while all the institutions remain 
7 Article 5(l) of the Constitutive Act of the , African Union. 8 Tiyanjana Maluwa 
, Tast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly? A Note on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union', Netherlands International Law Review, 
Volume 5 1, Issue 02, p. 195 at 198. 
9 See C. Parker and D. Rukare, 'The new African Union and its Constitutive Act', 96 American Journal 
ofInternational Law (2002) p. 3 65 at 374. 
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central to the running of the Union, priority is given to the key organs of the Union that 
form the basic apparatus of Africa's regional system for peace and security. After 
identifying the institutions that are most relevant to the area of regional peace and 
security, the chapter then engages in a comparative analysis of the similarities of roles 
and functions, as well as the differences in the AU's internal composition, working and 
organisation. In doing so, it also assesses the linkages between the AU's internal 
mechanisms and their relationship with the UN and other international and regional 
organisations. 
The chapter is organised in five main sections. The first part begins with a broad 
examination of the architectural design of the AU. What will emerge from this section 
will be the ongoing doctrinal debate on the appropriate model of the Union discussed 
in chapter five. Ultimately, some of the key similarities and differences between the 
AU and other regional organisations are also highlighted. The second section 
identifies and examines the key institutions of the AU. Precedence is given to the AU 
Assembly, the Peace and Security Council, the Commission, the African Standby 
Force, Early Warning System, Panel of the Wise and the Special Fund. The selection 
of these organs is based on their connection to the subject of African regional peace 
and security, particularly given their designated functions during grave 
circumstances. ' 0 
As stated above, the AU's institutional framework creates formal linkages with the 
traditionally recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This arrangement is 
discussed in the third section which elaborates on the role of RECs in the promotion and 
maintenance of regional peace and security. Given the background of weak linkages in 
the past between the OAU and sub-regional organisations, this section. not only assists 
in measuring the extent to which the AU has set right previous deficiencies but also 
highlights the direction that such cooperation must take in order to meet contemporary 
peace and security demands. The issue of funding of the Union deserves special 
mention as it touches on the working of the old and new institutions within the AU. 
This in turn impacts on the viability, accountability and credibility of the Union. Thus, 
the fourth section will assess the resource requirements for the AU and its institutions. 
Article 2 (2) of the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
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In particular, it addresses the serious questions that have emerged in regard to the AU's 
budget requirements particularly given the dramatic increase in the AU's institutions 
and mandate. This section also highlights how the current system differs from the 
practice of the OAU, whose over-reliance on membership dues meant that it was 
hampered by chronic funding problems. Fortunately, what becomes clear from this 
discussion is that the shortcoming brought about by Africa's resource requirements 
opens the way for a deeper relationship with the UN. 
Indeed, a central theme that runs through this study is that of an evolving relationship of 
cooperation and coordination between the AU and the UN. On this point, Abass notes 
that, at present, the developing relationship of cooperation between the AU and the UN 
'has been largely shaped by chances and opportunism rather than by a carefully 
considered modus operandi. "' Therefore, the fifth section dedicates itself to an analysis 
of the harmonisation between the two institutions and suggests the structural institution 
linkages that should be put in place between the two organisations in order to meet the 
demands of regional peace and security. Finally, the chapter concludes by arguing that, 
at present, despite notable improvement from past practice, the AU's security 
institutional framework of peace and security still has shortcomings because many of its 
programmes are not supported by clear and coherent operational strategies. 12 
1.1 The Debate on the Model and Ultimate Design of the African Union 
The adoption of the Constitutive Act immediately raised serious issues amongst states 
in regard to the basis of institutional set up of the AU. 13 Indeed, specific questions 
revolved around the very m eaning of the 'union' as well as its political, economic and 
legal implications for the continent. 14 Also, matters arose as to whether the AU 
11 Ademola Abass, 'The Security Council and the Challenges of Collective Security in the Twenty-First 
Century: What Role for African Regional Organizations'? In N. D. Lewis (ed) Global Governance and 
the Questfor Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 93. 12 Wafula Okumu, Tseppe Motumi, Funmi Olonisakin and Firmino Mucavele, 'Dynamics of The 
African Union (AU), the new Common African and Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and the New Partnership for the Development of Africa (NEPAD)', in Networking the Networks: Supporting 
Regional Peace and Security Agendas in Africa, Ann Fitz-Gerald and Anicia Lala (GFN-SSR, UK) 
2004. Available at http: //www. ssronline. org/ebooks_pages. cfm? b=3&id=l 5&p-I 5. " See chapter five. 
14 T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Africa', supra note I 
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amounted to a supranational organisation or whether it was better defined as an 
intergovernmental institution. 15 
These disagreements were reminiscent of the theoretical debates in regard to 
European integration. 16 Since the 1950s, these debates centred on 'neofunctionalism' 
and 'intergovemmentalism. ' 17 Similarly, in the African context, intense discussions 
ensued in regard to whether the AU structure should borrow from other models of 
integration such as the EU, the US and ASEAN. Other deliberations centred on 
whether the new continental unity should be something new and based on Africa's 
own experience and identity. While some favoured the EU structure due to its notable 
success as a model of regional integration, 18 some perceived it as being tantamount to 
4grecolonization. ' 19 
But the debate on the appropriate model for African integration had begun much 
earlier than the formation of notable regional integration such as that made possible 
by the EU and ASEAN. It will be recalled 20 that Nkrumali, in the early 1960s had 
called for an African high command, a common Market for Africa, an African 
Currency, an African Monetary Zone, an African Central Bank, a continental 
communication system, a common Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, a Common 
Defence and Common African Citizenship. 21 
At the turn of the twenty first century, these principles later found an advocate in 
Libya's Muamniar Ghaddafi. However, his proposals for a unified African 
Government were met with stiff opposition from other Heads of State. 22 Nevertheless, 
's Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For more on these debates, see Ben Rosamond, Theories ofEuropean Integration, (Basingstoke, 
2000) 
" See chapter two. 
19 See John Bart Agami 'Colonization and Recolonization Part III', interview held on 30/04/2006, Escaping old ideas ofDebt,. 4id andDevelopment. Available at http: //asp. african- 
institutc. org/articles. asp? indeks=I 84. 
'0 See chapter five. 
" Steven Maja, Distilling the vision of an African Union', Southern . 4frican Political & Economic Monthly (SAPEM), Vol. 14, No. 6, (2001), pp. 5-6; T. A. Imobighe, 'An African High Cornmand: The 
Search for Feasible Strategy of Continental Defence', 4fir, 4ff(Lond) (1980) 79: 241-254 ; See C. 0. C. Amate, Inside the 0,4U., Pan-. 4fricanism in practice (Macmillan, London, 1986), pp. 37-8; T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial Africa', supra note 1. 
22 Jakkie Cilliers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union', 4frican Security Review Vol 10 No 2, (2001); Sicgmar Schmidt/Keith Gottschalk, 'The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak StatesT, IPG12004. 
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as it continues to be shown throughout this study, the enduring influence of Libya 
during the discussions on the future of the AU led to a series of concessions. 
Subsequently, the visible struggles by legal experts in an attempt to keep divergent 
views on board resulted in compromise riddled with paradoxes. As it turned out, the 
final AU model resembled the EU model in that it aspired to establish a common 
market and a single currency. However, it was at the same time based on the ASEAN 
model of states whose immediate priority was to preserve their national sovereignty. 23 
The overall institutional structure of the AU embodied in the Constitutive Act of the 
AU was then left for the adoption and ratification by member states. Notably, there was 
no requirement of submission for democratic referenda to approve countries' accession 
to the Union. This was despite the latter's purported inclusion of civil participation in its 
framework and commitment to democratic principles. 24 With the framework of the new 
Union finally set up, the established organs in turn required institutional capacity and 
considerable skill in order to operate effectively. However, as will be shown in the next 
section some of the specific functions, powers and duties of the institutions have not 
been properly determined, specified and prioritised. What follows is a discussion of the 
specific powers and duties of some of the key institutions, their operations in practice, 
as well as their strengths and limitations. 
2.1 The AU Assembly 
The AU Assembly is designated as the chief decision making body of the Union. 
However, although it is listed by the Constitutive Act as the 'supreme organ'25 of the 
AU, the powers and practice of the AU Peace and Security, which is discussed below, 
suggests otherwise. 26 The Assembly organ is headed by the Chairperson 27 and consists 
of all the Heads of State and Government of member states or thei. r duly elected 
representatives. 28 In similar fashion to the former OAU, the Assembly meets once in a 
year with two-thirds of the total membership of the Union forming a quorum at any 
23 See, 'The Architecture and Capacity of the African Union,, Issues Paperfor African Union 
Symposium, 2007. Available at www. justjceafrica. or&L)ýT- 
contenVuploads/2006/07/AU IssusesPaper-ArchitectureandCapacily. pdf See also chapter two. 24 ibid. 
' Article 6(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 26 See chapter nine. 
27 See article 6 (5) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
28 See article 6 (1). 
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meeting. 29 However, the Assembly may meet at the request of a member state and on 
the approval of a two-thirds majority of the member states. The decisions of the 
Assembly are made by 'consensus, or failing which, by a two-thirds majority of 
member states. 30 
A key problem with the Constitutive Act is that it fails to articulate the legal status of 
AU decisions. Nevertheless, the Assembly's Rules of Procedure provide that 
, regulations and directives are legally binding while its declarations and 
recommendations remain merely persuasive. 31 However, the latter may acquire a 
status in international law and thereby become binding if their provisions amount to 
custom by way of st 
, 
ate practices and opiniojuris. 32 The AU Assembly decisions are 
particularly significant as they include the power to make a ruling in regard to the 
Union's right to intervene. On this point, Wafula Okumu observes that: 
If a decision [to intervene] is issued as a regulation or directive, then it will 
be binding to the Member States and all measures will be taken to ensure 
that it is implemented within 30 days. However, if a decision is taken as a 
'recommendation, resolution or opinion, ' then it will not be binding. 33 
In addition to possessing the authority to decide on intervention, the Assembly 
possesses a wide array of powers which are spelt out in article 9 of the AU's 
Constitutive Act. 34 Chief amongst them is the power to determine the common 
policies of the, Union; to receive, consider and take decisions on reports and 
recommendations from the other Union bodies, including the Peace and Security 
Council which, as will be shown below, may recommend the use of sanctions and 
military intervention by the Union against member states. 35 
29 Article 6(3) and 7(2). 
30 Article 7 (1). 
31 See Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the African Union, adopted during the 
First Ordinary Session,, 9-10 July 2002, Durban, South Africa. See also Viljoen, Frans and Louw, Lirette, 'The Status of the Findings of the African Commission: From Moral Persuasion to Legal 
Obligation', Journalof, 4frican Law, 2004,48 (1), p. 9. ' 32 See ICJ decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F. R. G. v. Den., F. R. G. v. Neth. ), 1969 I. C. J. 3 (Feb. 20), para. 77. See also Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods ofInternational Law, (Oceana Pubns, 1984). 
33 Quoted by Kristiana Powell in 'The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime 
Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to protect', Monograph series no. 119, Institutefor Security Studies, (2005). 
34 See article 9 (g)- (i). 
35 See article 4, protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African union, 3 February 
and 11 July 2003. See also the AU Assembly Rules of Procedure Rule 4 (e). 
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Significantly, the Assembly may delegate any of its powers and functions to any organ 
of the Union. 36 Magliveras and Naldi observe that this 'could potentially give rise to 
significant problems, since it was clearly not the intention of the Act's drafters to have 
lesser organs to decide on such fundamental issues as, for example, the admission of 
new Member States or the establishment of new organs. 
37 However, as stated earlier, 
the Assembly meets only once a year and takes decisions on the basis of consensus or, 
failing that, a two-thirds majority. Therefore to require the organ to deal with the vast 
array of matters concerning the Union would be time-consuming and ultimately 
impracticable. 
However, what would undoubtedly attract criticisms of the working of the Assembly is 
the role of regional politics particularly in the area of peace and security. This is 
particularly so given past practice reveals the traditional reluctance by African Heads of 
States and governments to endorse interventionism amidst fractious subregional 
alignments even in the face of grave circumstances. 38 As will be shown in chapter nine, 
the two AU peace operations, in Burundi39 and Darfur '40 were only conducted with 
host 
state consent despite the magnitude of the crimes committed in the respective territories. 
Clearly in this regard, the possibility of securing a two-thirds majority in the face of a 
hostile host must be thought unlikely at beSt. 41 
Indeed there remains the fear that the politicisation. of interpretation of the Assembly's 
power to determine the existence of the grounds for intervention may also be 'hijacked' 
by the more powerful states within the AU. 42 However, the absence of veto rights and 
the requirement of consensus, as well as the occasional requirement of the assent of a 
two-thirds majority of member states, ensures that the decision making process is not 
36 Article 9 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
37 Magliveras K. D and Naldi GJ, 'The African Union: A New Dawn for AfficaT, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 5 1, Number 2, (April 2002), pp. 415-425. 
38 See chapter five. 
39 See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and 
Contemporary Peace Operations, ' International Security 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 157-95. 40 See Paul D. WillianLs, 'Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan, ' 
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006). 
41 Alex J. Dellamy, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 
World Summit', Ethics& International Affairs 20 (2), 143-169. ý 42 K. Kindiki, 'The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African union Relating to the 
Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Critical 
Appraisal', 3 (1) African Human Rights Law Review Journal (2003). 
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controlled by a single state. 43 In addition, as stated in the next chapter, the establishment 
of the African Court of Justice, 44 which is the 'principal judicial organ of the 
Union, '45Will be instrumental in solving disputes by ensuring that the interpretation of 
situations amounting to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity accord with 
the definitions contained in texts such as the 1998 Rome Statute. 46 
2.2 The AU Peace and Security Council 
It will be recalled that the AU's Constitutive Act was hastily passed leading to calls 
for amendment. 47 During this time, it was discovered that the new institutional 
framework lacked 'the political mechanism to implement the Union's ambitious 
objectives. ' 48 Subsequently, the adoption of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the 
49 Establishment of the Peace and Security. Council of the AU, which established the 
AU Peace and Security Council, was a major amendment of the AU Act. This is 
because of the fact that not only did it replace the Central Organ of the OAU 
mechanism, it also confirmed the AU Peace and Security Council (now hereby AU 
PSC) as the 'standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts. 50 In apparent reference to the horrors of Rwanda, the AU PSC 
is also designated as a 'collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate 
timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Affica. 51 
52 In reality, though created by the AU Assembly pursuant to article 5(2) of the CA, 
recent practice and its allocated functions show the AU PSC possess more powers 
than the Assernbly. 53 Significantly, the Peace and Security Council is empowered 'to 
recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, 
intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave 
43 Article 7 (1) Constitutive Act of the AU. 
44 Article 19 of the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union adopted by the 2'd Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, II July 2003. 
45 Article 2 (2) the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union. 
46 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Article 6 (genocide), art 7 (crimes against humanity) and art 8 (war crimes). 
47 See chapter five. 
48 Jakkie Cilliers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union', supra note 22. 49 The PSC Protocol came into effect on 26 December 2003, after having been ratified by the requisite 27 Member States. 
50 Article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act. 
51 Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 5' Provides that in addition to existing institutions, the AU also consists of 'organs that the Assembly 
may decide to establish'. 
53 See chapter nine. 
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circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined 
in relevant international conventions and instruments. 54 In light of this provision, it is 
highly unlikely that the AU Assembly would overrule a recommendation from the AU 
PSC. 
The AU PSC is also mandated to ensure the effective implementation of decisions of 
the AU member states in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-support operations 
55 
and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict construction. In 
carrying out these tasks, the AU PSC 'is guided by the principles enshrined in the 
Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 56 However, this directive remains unclear given the vague nature of 
the relationship between the AU, the UN and general international law discussed 
throughout this study. Nonetheless, as suggested below, a formalised division of 
labour would go along way in clarifying the evolving relationship of cooperation 
between the AU and UN. 
In similar fashion to the UN Security Council, the AU PSC consists of 15 states. 57 
However, its membership is tied to the commitment to uphold the principles of the 
Union as well as the contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and 
security in Africa, to which experience in peace support operations is an added 
I advantage. " This arrangement automatically favours some stateS59 over others. 60 
Significantly, it also seems to go against the 'the principle of equitable regional 
representation and rotation, ' 61 which is meant to ensure that the AU PSC reflects 
regional balance within Africa. This point is picked up below in the section that 
54 Article 7 (e) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 55 Musifiky Mwanasali, 'Emerging Security in Architecture in Africa', Centrefor Policy Studies, 
Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 7, no. 4, February 2004, p. 13. " See 'Assembly of the African Union, First Ordinary Session: Protocol Relating to the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union', Durban, South Africa, 9 July, 2002. S7 Article 5(l) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 2002. " See article 5 (2)(a)-(i) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 
5' The most prominent African contributors to UN peacekeeping are Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, South 
Africa, Ethiopia, Zambia, Senegal Guinea-Bissau and Tunisia. ' States such as Somalia, Sudan and other states with civil strife are the most unlikely to meet the criteria for PSC membership as they have made little, if any, contribution to UN peace operations. " See article 5 (2) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 
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discusses similarities, differences and the envisaged relationship between the AU PSC 
and the UN Security Council. 
Meanwhile, member states to the AU PSC are also required to adhere to 'a 
commitment to honor financial obligations to the Union. ' 62 While this could 
significantly increase its funding, it may put off states that are already in arrears from 
seeking membership and potentially lead to the AU PSC being dubbed as the 'Rich 
Club'. Another key requirement relates to the respect for constitutional governance, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights. 63 However, the lack of clarity regarding 
any uniform standards expected under this condition may ultimately mean that key 
states, such as Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Zimbabwe, could possess seats within the 
AU PSC due to their influence on the AU agenda despite potentially failing the test on 
democratic principles and respect for human rights. 
Undoubtedly, such an episode would lead to the AU PSC losing international 
legitimacy and confidence which may in turn impact on the availability of external 
funding and result in decreased resources. 64Finally, in similar fashion to members of 
65 
the UN Security Council, the AU PSC member states are also required to provide 
effective and continuous diplomatic presence 66 at the AU Headquarters in Addis 
Ababa. 67 This makes sense because the AU PSC functions continuoUSIY. 68 The AU 
PSC meets at the level of Permanent Representatives at least twice a month and at the 
Ministers or Heads of State and Government level at least once a year. 69 The 
continuous diplomatic presence also enables the AU PSC to meet at any time and 
thereby respond quickly to emerging crisis. 
62 Article 5 (2) 0). 
63 Article 5(2) (g). 
64 J. Cilliers, K Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council', African Security Review, 2004. 
65 Article 28 of the UN Charter. " Article 8 (1) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 67 Article 5. 
Article 8 (1). 
Article 8(2). See Maluwa, T, 'Fast-tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, 'supra note B. 
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However, whilst the meetings of the AU PSC are designated to be held at the 
Headquarters of the Union, 70 such meetings may be held at the invitation of a state 
provided that two-thirds of its members agree . 
71 The chairpersonship of the AU PSC 
is held for one calendar month on a rotational basis by its member states in the 
alphabetical order of their names and the numbers of members required to constitute a 
quorum is set at two- thirds of the total membership of the AU pSC. 
72 
In practice, the AU PSC has been one of the most visibly active organs of the AU. It 
has acted on the advice of the Military Staff Committee, which comprises senior 
military officers of the members of the AU PSC and assists in 'all questions relating 
to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and 
security in Africa'. 73 For example, immediately after its inception, the AU PSC 
authorized the deployment of 3,500 military and civilian personnel for the AU's first 
peace operation, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in February 2003.74 
it later instituted the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in June 200475 and the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007,76 as its most recent 
deployment. As will be seen from chapter nine in regard to the Darfur conflict, despite 
the huge challenges, the AU PSC remains a 'potentially powerful tool for the 
prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict. 77 Meanwhile, due to their 
overlapping mandates and the envisaged relationship of cooperation, a brief 
comparison is warranted at this stage between the AU PSC and the UN Security 
Council. This discussion will also highlight the intended linkages between the two 
institutional organs. 
70 Article 8 (3) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
71 Article 8(4). 
72 Article 8 (6) and 8 (7). 
73 Article 13 (8) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
74 See 91" Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the ( Organisation of African Unity) Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, management and Resolution, meeting at ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa 
on 2 April 2003 doc Central Organ/MECIAMB/Comrn. (XCI). See also Peace and Security Council, 
Second Ordinary Session 25 March 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, PSCIPR/Communique (11). 
75 See the Communiqu6 on Conflict Situations in Africa, 26 May 2006, PSC/AHG/Comm. (X), AU 
PSC I Wh meeting. See also Status ofMission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and 
Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur Area of the Sudan, 4 June 2004. - 76 'See '69th meeting of the peace and Security Council', Agence de Presse Africaine, 22 January 2007 
77 See Secretary-General Kofi Annan's message to the official ceremony marking the inauguration of 
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in Addis Ababa on 25/05/2004. UN Press Release 
SG/SlvV9327 AFR/944. 
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2.2.1 The Similarities and Differences as well as the Relationship between the AU 
PSC and the UN Security Council 
The AU PSC was intended to be an African version of the UN Security Council. 78 
However, its powers are more clearly defined than those in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, 79 as shown below. It will be recalled from chapter three that the post 1945 
international legal system entrusted the UN Security Council with the 'primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 'so Similarly in 
the African context, the AU PSC has wide powers it being the 'standing decision- 
making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. '81 However, 
although the two bodies deal with peace and security and are patterned somewhat 
along the same lines, there are notable differences. 
The key distinctions between the two bodies lie in composition, organisation and 
working. For example, in regard to composition and powers, a serious debate had 
ensued in regard to regional hegemons, being allowed permanent seats and right of, 
veto in the IS member AU pSC. 82 However, these arguments were rejected. Hence, In 
contrast to the UN Security Council, the AU PSC was founded without any distinction 
between permanent and non-permanent members. Instead, member states are elected 
Gon the basis of equal rights' 
83 
with each member possessing one vote. In further 
84 
contrast to the UN Security Council, there exists no right of veto within the AU PSC 
and the principle of consensus acts as the main guide in seeking resolutions. This 
means that the AU PSC possesses a strong authority and is capable of making 
decisions without the presence of a threat or use of veto. 
78 T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Africa', supra note 1. For more on the Peace and Security Council powers, see Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case of 
Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijve , Security Council and the Use ofForce: Theory 
and Reality -A Needfor Change? (Martin Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 213-25 1; Levitt, J. I., 'The Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union: The Known Unknowns', 13 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2003), 109-37, e, I " See Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations 
Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver Security Council 
and the Use of Force, ibid. 
Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter. 
Article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act. 
82 Musifiky Mwanasali, 'Emerging Security in Architecture in Africa, ' supra note 55. 83 Article 5 (1) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 
Note the contrast with the UN Security Council. See sections on Security Council (chapters three and 
eight). 84 See chapter three. 
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In this regard, during voting, decisions on procedural matters are settled by simple 
majority and all other matters are determined by a two thirds majority. 85 However, it 
is worth noting that five of the AU PSC members are elected for a period of three 
years, while the remaining ten serve for two years. 86 This has been interpreted as 
necessary in order to 'guarantee a degree of continuity. ' 87 However, Adebajo observes 
that the creation of five renewable three-year seatS88 to work alongside 10 non 
renewable two-year seats is a recognition that some countries are still 'more equal 
than others. '89 This anomaly is despite the obligation to 'apply the principle of 
equitable regional representation and rotation, '90 ensuring that the AU PSC reflects 
regional balance within Africa. 
In parallel to the member states obligation under articles 24 (1)91 and 25 92 of the UN 
Charter in relation to the Security Council, member states of the AU are similarly 
obligated to 'agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Peace and Security 
Council, 03 which 'acts on their behalf. M In this regard, African states are required to 
textend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by the Peace and Security Council for 
the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, pursuant to the 
duties entrusted' 95 to the organ. 
One key similarity between the two bodies is that the UN Security Council and the 
AU PSC may hold closed meetings. 96 However, and in sharp contrast to UN Security 
Council practice, any member of the AU PSC that is party to a conflict or a situation 
under consideration by the AU PSC is barred from participation in either in the 
discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation. 97 
Notably, this provision is aimed at enhancing neutrality and impartiality in 
85 See article 8 (13) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 86 Article 5 (1)& (2). 
87 Omar A. Touray, 'The Common African Defence and Security Policy', African Affairs, volume 104 
number 417, pp. 63 5-656, (2005). 
" Currently occupied by Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Ethiopia, and Gabon. 19 Adekeye Adebajo, 'The Curse of Berlin: Africa's Security Dilemmas', IPG 4/2005. 
"0 See article 5 (2) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. " See chapter three. 
92 ibid. 
93 Article 7 (3) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 94 Article 7 (2). 
's Article 7 (4). 
9' See article 48 of the UN Security Council - Provisional Rules of Procedure, United Nations, New York, 1983, S/96/Rev. 7 & article 9 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. .1 " Article 7 (4) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 
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deliberations which would otherwise be at risk of being tainted by an influence of a 
AU PSC member state in pursuit of its national interests. However, the AU PSC may 
invite such a member 'to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as 
appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings. '98 
It is worth noting that the AU PSC may also hold open meetings and in this regard 
invite member states not members of the AU PSC, to present their case and 
participate in deliberations so long as they are 'party to a conflict or a situation under 
consideration by the Peace and Security Council'. 99 In addition, it may invite non- 
members of the Peace and Security Council in matters where the states' 'interests are 
especially affected. "Oo Finally, 'any Regional Mechanism, international organization 
or civil society organization involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation 
under consideration by the AU PSC may be invited to participate, without the right to 
vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation. "Ol The latter provision is 
significant for reasons explained below in regard to the Continental Early Warning 
System. 
The AU PSC will undoubtedly regulate much of Africa's relationship with the UN 
Security Council. 102 Certainly, the compatibility of the functioning of the AU PSC 
with the UN Charter and general international law is evident in the former's 
adherence to the principles such as that of 'peaceful settlement of disputes and 
conflicts', 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States' and 
the principle of 'non interference by any member state in the internal affairs of 
another. ' 103 However, a key principle which is absent in the AU PSC framework is the 
prohibition against the use of force. 104 This may appear surprising given the nature of 
this norm in international relations. 105 Nevertheless, as shown in the coming chapter, 
when read together, the AU and the UN framework on the use of force are in more 
harmony than previously thought. Furthermore, the Protocol Establishing the Peace 
Article 8 (9). 
99 Article 8 (10) (a). 
100 Article 8 (10) (b). 
101 Article 8 (10) (c). See also article 11. 
102 J Cilliers, K Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council', supra note 64. "' See article 4 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. '0' On the prohibition against the use of force, see chapter three. , 105 Maluwa, T, 'Fast-tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 8. 
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and Security Council is an amendment of the Constitutive Act whose article 4 (f) 
clearly outlines the application of the prohibition against the use of force. ' 06 
However, there is hardly any provision within the AU PSC framework that 
corresponds to article 53 of the UN Charter or obligates it to report to, or seek its 
authorisation or supervision from the UN Security Council for any operations it 
undertakes. Nevertheless, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC details 
how the Peace and Security Council will collaborate and compliment the UN Security 
Council. Under the protocol, the AU PSC is mandated to 'cooperate and work closely 
with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. ' 107 
In this regard, the AU PSC is required to develop a strong 'partnership of peace and 
security between the Union and the Security Council. ' 108 Moreover, 'in keeping with 
the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional 
Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, ' the Union is 
obligated to seek recourse, where appropriate to 'the United Nations [in order] to 
provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions' 
activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in 
Africa. "09 
It deserves to be mentioned that the AU PSC faces many hurdles some of which are 
similar to those facing the UN Security Council, although the majority portray the 
unique circumstances facing Africa. ' 10 Firstly, in spite of its immense powers, the AU 
PSC lacks a formal secretariat to support is work. "' This is compounded, as will be 
shown further below, by the limited availability of resources facing the AU as a whole. 
Furthermore, despite the envisaged relationship of cooperation between the AU PSC, 
sub-regional organisations and member states discussed further below, there exist 
106 See chapter sevcn. 107 Article 17 (1) of the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 108 Article 7 (k). 
109 Article 17 (2). 
110 see Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico SchrijveTP Security Council 
and the Use ofForce, supra note 78. 111 Alex Ramsbothain, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Useful Role for the UK and the G8? International Affairs, Volume 8 1, Number 2, March (2005), pp. 325-339(15). 
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fundamental coordination problems amongst these entities. These shortcomings have 
ensured that the AU PSC has sometimes revealed poor coordination and disparate 
working cultures, resulting in inconsistent policies and divergent expectations. 112 
These failings are highly significant given the envisaged system of coordination 
between the AU PSC and the organs that function in conjunction with the latter and 
which now fall for consideration. 
2.3 The Separate Organs working in Conjunction with the Peace and Security 
Council 
In carrying out its mandate, the AU PSC is supported by the Commission, a 
Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, a Panel of the Wise 
and a Special Fund. ' 13 In this regard, the PSC 'shall use its discretion to effect entry, 
[into a member state] whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself, 
or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the 
Wise, and/or in collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms. ' 114 While the Special 
Fund will be discussed further below under a more suitable heading, what follows 
here is an analysis of the Commission, the Early Warning System, the AU Standby 
Force, the Panel of the Wise and their relationship with Regional Mechanisms. 
2.3.1 The Commission of the AU 
The AU Commission, in similar fashion to the EU Commission, constitutes the 
Secretariat of the Union. The Commission, being the AU's bureaucratic wing that 
manages the day to day work of the Union, requires considerable skill for the 
effective management of continental affairs, particularly in the area of peace and 
security. 115 For this reason, the institution is headed by a Chairperson and number of 
Commissoners dealing with several different areas of policy. 116 The Chairperson and 
112 Katherine N. Andrews and Victoria K. Holt, 'United Nations-African Union Coordination on Peace 
and Security in Africa', Issue Brief, (2007). - 113 Article 2 (2) of the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. "" Article 9 (2). 
115 Jakke Cilliers, 'From Durban to Maputo: A Review of 2003 Summit of the African Union', ISS Paper 76, (2003). 1 116 The Commission has its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its departments include the Directorate of Peace and Security; Directorate of Political Affairs; Directorate of Womer4 Gender and Development; Directorate of Infrastructure and Energy; Directorate of Social Affairs; Directorate of Conferences and Events; Directorate of Trade and Industry; Directorate of Rural Economy and Agriculture; Directorate of Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting; Directorate of 
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vice-chair of the Commission are elected by the AU Heads of State while the 
remaining commissioners are appointed by the Executive Council. ' 17 
Currently headed by H. E. Jean Ping, the Chairperson of the Commission is mandated 
to act under the authority of the AU PSC. 118 However he may through his 'own 
initiative' 'use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, 
special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to prevent 
potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peace-building and post- 
conflict reconstruction. " 19 In doing so, the Chairperson is required to engage 'in 
consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, [to] deploy efforts and take all 
initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. "20 Thus, the 
Chairperson is able to play a key role in the pursuit of pacific settlement of disputes in 
similar fashion to that of the UN Secretary General under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter. 121 In this regard, the chairperson has appointed a Special Representative of 
the Chairperson of the Commission for both Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. ' 22 
The Chairperson is also designated to bring to the attention of the AU PSC or the 
Panel of the Wise any matter that may threaten peace, security and stability in the 
Continent. 123 Subsequently, the Commission is under the mandate to ensure the 
implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the AU PSC, including mounting 
and deploying duly authorized peace support missions. 124 Significantly, the 
Commission is obliged to 'ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions 
taken by the Assembly in conformity with Article 4 (h) and 6) of the Constitutive Act 
with respect to intervention by the Union . 
125 Furthermore, the Chairperson is also 
required to 'prepare comprehensive and periodic reports and documents, as required, 
Economic Affairs; Directorate of Administration and Human Resources Development and Office of the 
Legal Counsel. 
117 Rule 5 (e) of the Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council adopted by the Assembly of the 
African Union, First Ordinary Sesssion, 9- 10 July, Durban, South Africa, 2002. 
I's Article 10(l) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
119 Article 10 (2) (c). 
120 Article 10(l). 
"' See Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 
122 Peace and Security Council, Communiqu6 of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm. (V) 
of 13 April 2004, paras D (7) and E (4). 
123 Article 10 (2)(a) and (b) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 124 See article 10 (3) (a). 
125 See article 10 (3) (b). 
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to enable the Peace Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to perform their 
functions effectively. ' 126 
As will be shown further below, the Chairperson of the Commission is responsible for 
raising and accepting voluntary funds from sources within and outside Africa that 
goes to the Peace Fund. 127 Other key functions include the appointment of the Panel 
of the Wise 128 as well as acting as the head of the chain of command of the African 
Standby Force, 129 which is discussed fin-ther below. It is important to note that in the 
exercise of the designated functions and powers described above, the Chairperson of 
the Commission is assisted by the AU commissioner in charge of the Directorate of 
AU PSC within the Secretariat. 130 
Currently headed by Ambassador Djnnit, the AU commissioner in charge peace and 
security is responsible for the affairs of the AU PSC in its role of dealing with conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. 13 1 The fact that the Peace and Security 
Directorate is the largest of the eight substantive Directorates 'reflects the, inevitable 
focus of the AU on (more expensive) conflict management as opposed to (much 
cheaper) conflict prevention. ' 132 This is a matter of regret as more emphasis ought to 
be have been placed on conflict prevention with key roles assigned to the Panel of the 
Wise for reasons discussed further below. Finally, the Commission also receives 
information from the Continental Early System, 133 which now falls for discussion. 
2.3.2 The Continental Early Warning System 
In sharp contrast to the OAU's regional mechanism of peace and security, the AU 
framework consists an early warning system. The Continental Early Warning System 
is a mechanism which is aimed at locating potential threats to peace and security and 
recommending appropriate responses with the intention of forestalling crisis before 
their escalation. Instituted against the background of Rwanda, the Early Warning 
System is designed to anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies 
126 See article 10 (3) (c). 127 Article 21 (3). 
128 Article 11. 
129 Article 13 (6). 
130 Article 10 (4). 
13 1 Article 10 (4). 
132 j. Cilliers, K Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council,, supra note 64. 133 The African Union's Continental Early Warning System was established by article 12 (1) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
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that may trigger the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and threats to legitimate order. 134 This is primarily meant to be achieved by warning 
the AU PSC of impending threats to state and regional security. 135 Despite some 
obvious similarities, it deserves to be mentioned from the onset that the concepts of 
early warning and conflict prevention are different from the concept of traditional 
intelligence and state security. 136 
The Continental Early Warning System consists of an observation and monitoring 
centre, known as 'The Situation Room. ' This early warning System is located at the 
Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and is responsible for data collection 
and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module. 137 The 
Continental Early Warning System is linked to situation rooms in each of the five 
regions in order to disseminate and share information with the AU pSC. 138 Thus 
information will be relayed from monitoring units situated in sub-regional 
mechanisms under the guise of agencies such as such as the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which have 
established early warning units and are discussed below. 
The transmission of information is made possible by virtue of the fact that the 
Continental Situation Room consists of 'observation and monitoring units of the 
Regional Mechanisms' which are 'linked directly through (the] appropriate means of 
communications to the Situation Room' which in turn collect and process data at their 
level and transmit the same to the Situation Room. 139 It is under this mechanism that 
the Chairperson of the Commission is mandated, as shown above, to 'use the 
information gathered through the Early Warning System timeously to advise the 
134 These situations are designated as 'grave circumstances' under article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union. See chapter seven. 
135 Jakke Cilliers and Kathryn Sturinan 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council, ' 
su yra note 64. 
13 Jakkie Cilliers, 'Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa', Occasional Paper 102, 
ISS, (April 2005). 
137 See article 12(2) (a) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 138 Jakke Cillicrs and Kathryn Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council, ' 
sypra note 64. 
135P See article 12 (2) (b) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council 
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Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in 
Africa and recommend the best course of action'. 140 
Significantly, member states are under the obligation to 'commit themselves to 
facilitate early action by the AU PSC and or the Chairperson of the Commission 
based on early warning information. 141 It has been observed that the effective 
functioning of the Early Warning System depends on the political will of member 
states to alert the Union during looming crisis such as those in Darfur, Som4lia and 
Zimbabwe rather than the technical, financial or sociological obstacles. 
142 In 
maintaining the theme of cooperation between the AU and the UN, the Commission is 
required to 'collaborate with the United Nations [and] its agencies' to facilitate the 
effective functioning the Early. Warning System 143 In this regard, there lies the 
possibility of the African early warning information being included in the UN standby 
databases and also gain access to information such as the UN peace operations 
mechanisms as suggested below. 
Finally, the 'Chairperson of the Commission is required to consult with member states, 
the regional mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, ' 144 
including research centers, academic institutions and NGOs, in order to facilitate the 
effective functioning of the Early Warning System. 145 The inclusion of civil society 
organisations is significant because as discussed above, the AU PSC may invite 
persons or entities involved or interested in a conflict or a situation under its 
consideration to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that 
conflict or situation. 146 Finally, the reliance on information from the Early Warning 
System, as well as the collaboration of the AU PSC and the AU Commission may 
lead to the invocation of the African Standby Force System discussed below. 
140 Article 12 (5). 
141 Article 12 (6). 
142 jakke Cilliers and Kathryn . Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council, ' 
supra note 64. Jaklde Cilliers, 'Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa', Supra 136. "' See article 13 of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 144 Article 12 (7). 
145Article 13. 
146 Jakke Cilliers and Kathryn Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council, ' 
supra note 64; Jakkie Cilliers, 'Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa, ', Vuprq note 136. 
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2.3.3 The African Standby Force: Prospects and Challenges 
Interestingly, the AU, while awarding itself the right to intervene did not at that time 
'provide for the tools or mechanisms that [would] implement, monitor, or advance [its] 
ambitious but lofty ideas'. 147 Significantly, it neither possessed a standing force or 
rapid reaction force available to key regional organisations such as NATO. 
148 
However, African leaders had learnt from the weaknesses of the UN whose failure to 
establish an armed force 149 in support of its collective security system had 
catastrophic consequences on the continent, 
150 most notably Rwanda. 151 Hence, the 
AU subsequently established the African Standby Force, 152 in order 'to enable the 
Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment 
of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and 0) of the 
Constitutive Act. ' 153 
This was a highly significant development for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will be 
recalled from chapter five that Ghadaffi of Libya had proposed a single African Army 
with a single joint command, in order to '[secure] peace and stability, avert the 
outbreak of any internal armed dispute and [safeguard] the sovereignty, security, and 
safety of the Union. ' 154 These calls were reminiscent of the earlier calls by Nkurumah 
of a common military and defence strategy during the 1960s. Thus, the creation of the 
Affican Standby Force seemed to be a step in the direction advocated for by the 
federalists. However, as stated before, both Nkrumah's and Libya's proposals for a 
Union government were outrightly rejected. 
It should therefore be made clear from the onset that the concept of a 'force' is 
misleading. 155 In fact, the African Standby Force does not, as yet, constitute an army. 
147 N. J. Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Ile African Union Treaty and Human Rights', 
Vol. 17 American University International Law Review, (2002), p. 1177. 
1480n NATO's Rapid Reaction Force, see D Riggilo, 'EU-NATO Cooperation and Complementarily 
between the Rapid Reaction Forces', The International Spectator, 2003. 
"" See force envisaged under article 43 of the UN Charter. On the same, see chapter three. "0 See chapter three. 
"' see chapter five. 
152 For more on the African Standby Force, see Franke, Denedikt 'A Pan-African Army., The 
Evolution ofan Idea and Its Eventual Realisation in the African Standby Force, African Security 
Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2006), 2-16. 
153 Article 13 (1) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 154 Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 8. 155 De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept, ' Conflict Trends. 2 (2004): 22; De 
Coning, 'A Peacekeeping Stand-by System for SADC: Implementing the African Stand-by Force 
Concept in Southern Africa', Paper commissioned for the 2nd South African Institute ofInternational 
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Instead, as will be shown below, it is a standby system since the components remain 
in their countries of origin pending an authorised deployment. ' 56 Rather than 
intending to create an African standing army, it was indeed the lessons drawn from the 
horrors of Rwanda (1994) that compelled the African Peace and Security structure to 
envisage the creation of an African Standby Force. 157 The modalities for the proposed 
force were subsequently worked out at a meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff 
held in Addis Ababa in May 2003.158 
The establishment of the Standby Force is an ongoing project. It is 'based on brigades 
to be provided by the five African Regions' consisting of 'military, police and civilian 
components and will operate on the basis of the various scenarios under the African 
Union mandates' and will be available by 2010.159 In order to prevent imminent 
catastrophe, multidisciplinary contingents of 15,000-25,000,60 troops are designated 
to be ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. 161 For this reason, member 
states are required 'to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support 
missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by 
the Assembly. ' 162 
In this regard, several states from several sub-regional organisations have embarked 
on a collaborative implementation of the African Standby Force Framework. They 
include IGAD which established the East African Brigade Force (EASBRIG) 163 in 
2005 in line with the requirements of the AU PSC. 164 Similarly, the SADC Brigade of 
Affairs (SAIIA) workshop on'the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security', at Jan Smuts House, 
JaannesbuTg, 24 June 2004. 
156 De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept, ' ibid. 
157 
, T, 'Fast-tTacking African Unity or Making 
Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 8. 
158 See, African Union, ' First Meeting of the African Ministers of Defence and Security on the 
Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Common African Defence and Security policy', 
EXP/Def&Sec. (IV) Rev. I of 17-18 January 2004. 
"9 African Union, Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, Second 
Extra-Ordinary Assembly of the Union of 28 February 2004,19, Section A (1) (iii). See also an 
analysis of the common policy the Gambian A, mbassador to the African Union Omar A. Touray, 'The 
Common African Defence and Security Policy, ' supra note 87. 
160 Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Standby Force and the Military Staff 
Committee (Part 1), 12-14 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Exp, ASF-MSC/2(l. ). 
161 Article 13 (1) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
162 Article 31 (2). 
161 Contributing forces include Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. '64 Nelson Alusala, 'African Standby Force: East Africa Moves', African Security Review Vol 13 No 2, 
(2004). 
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the African Standby Force (SADCBRIG) was launched in August 2007 165 while the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has agreed to create a 
brigade-sized sub-regional standby force. 166 As will be seen below, while the 
ECOWAS Standby Brigade 167 remains the most developed amongst the five sub- 
regions, some such as Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which operates in northern 
Africa, has hardly established a peace and security mechanism and some states remain 
uncommitted to a particular brigade. 
The framework of the African Standby Force is designed around various operational 
scenarios with scenario six designed to prevent the recurrence of another Rwanda by 
providing for the invocation of article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. It will be shown in 
chapter seven that this provision allows the AU to embark on intervention in a 
member state without necessarily waiting for the consent of neither the country in 
question nor the UN Security Council's authorisation. 168 Furthermore, in addition to 
acting on intervention that is authorised by the AU with respect of grave 
circumstances, the African Standby Force is also empowered to intervene at the 
request of a AU member state, in order to restore peace and security in accordance 
with article 4 0) of the Constitutive Act. ' 69 
The African Standby Force may also be mandated, inter alia, to engage in observation 
and monitoring missions, 170 and other types of peace support missions. 171 The 
Standby Force can also embark on preventive deployment, in order to prevent '(i) a 
dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to 
neighbouring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a 
165 See Speech by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia and SADC Chairperson mr 
Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, SC, On the Occasion of the Official Launch of the Southern African 
Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG) in Lusaka, Zambia, August 17,2007. Available at 
http: //www. polity. org. za/article. php? a_id=l 15536. See also Innocent Gore, 'Southern Africa: SADC 
Peacekeeping Brigade Launched', The Herald (Harare), 20 August 2007. 
166 De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept, 'supra note 155; UN OCHA Integrated 
Regional Information Network (IRIN), Weekly Round-up for Central &Eastern Africa, 25-31 October 
2003. 
167 Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, 'Progress with the African Standby Force', Occasional Paper 98, 
ISS, (May 2005). 
168 Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, 'supra note Ill. 
` Article 13 (3) (c) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 17' Article 13 (3)(a). 
"' Article 13 (3) (b). 
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conflict have reached an agreement. ' 172 Furthermore, the mandate of the African 
Standby force is extended to peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and 
demobilization; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian 
population in conflict areas; and any other functions as may be mandated by the AU 
PSC or the Assembly. 173 
Once again, in maintaining the theme of complimentarily between the AU and the UN, 
the African Standby Force is required to take certain measures. Firstly, in undertaking 
the functions listed above, the African Standby Force 'shall, where appropriate, 
cooperate with the United Nations. ' 174 Preferably, the African Standby Force would 
act under a UN Security Council mandate. However, as made clear in the coming 
chapter, the AU PSC is authorised to deploy troops during grave circumstances, 
particularly when a Security Council mandate is subject to delay or not 
forthcoming. 175 What is important to note here is that the AU PSC is able to deploy 
the Standby Force both under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and under the AU's 
constitutional framework. It is thus hoped that the evolving relationship of 
cooperation which has been evident in recent practice will open opportunities for a 
clear division of labour between the two organisations. This is discussed further 
below and in chapter eight. 176 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that there are serious challenges that face the African 
Standby Force, particularly given the stringent time frames and in particular its goal 
of five regional brigades by 20 10.177 One of the hurdles the African Standby Force 
faces is the difficulty that might be encountered by large UN troop contributors such 
as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia. These states may find it hard to 
maintain their current deployment levels at the UN and at the same time participate in 
standby regional brigades under the ASF framework . 
178 However, De Coning argues 
172 Article 13 (3) . (d). 
173 Article 13 (3) (g). 
174 Article 13 (4). 
175 See chapter seven. 
176 On this point, see De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept, ' supra note 155. 177 Author conversation on 18'h October, 2007 with Major Tim Cross (Rtd) who is an adviser to the 
East African Regional Brigade. Major Cross also served second in conunand in the post-war planning 
of Iraq in 2003. 
17' De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept'supra note 155. 
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that this may be appeased by synchronising the AU sub-regional standby initiatives 
with the UN's operational deployments such as its Standby System. 
179 
However, in spite of the above, a key problem with the African Standby Forces is that 
they are not solely under the control and authority of the AU but are instead under the 
direction of the regional mechanisms. 180 This is particularly worrisome given the 
occasional competition between the AU and the regional mechanisms, which is 
discussed below. What is clear at this point is that this decentralized approach 
potentially creates or reinforces additional layers of bureaucracy which may in turn 
lead to major repercussions due to slow responses to conflicts. Other problems that 
may arise as a result of the current arrangement relate to the lack of standardised 
training of the Standby Force, regional politics and the issue of funding that is 
discussed further below. 
Nevertheless, despite the setbacks Murithi maintains that the African Standby Force 
possess the potential to prevent future Rwandas and promote and maintain the concept 
of shared responsibility for stability in Africa. 181 Having said so, it deserves to be 
mentioned that the envisaged completion of the process establishing the African 
Standby Force remains extremely ambitious with little hope that this will indeed be 
achieved. 182 And even when complete, the invocation of the African Standby Force 
requires clear command and control structures, a well trained personnel, 
communications, logistics and equipment ensuring that the AU's right to intervene 
can be matched by the necessary capability. Nevertheless, in line with the theme of 
cooperation between the AU and the UN, discussed below, the Security Council has 
recently underlined its support for the operationalisation of the AU Standby Force. ' 83 
179 This was envisaged in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14. 
16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, U. N. Doc A1601L. 1 (Sept. 20,2005). See also The Secretary 
General's report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All, para. 
13; De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept, ' supra note 15 1. 
180 Jakke Cilliers, & Mark Malon, 'Progress with the African Stand-by Force'supra note 166. I" Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development, (Aldershot, 
UK: Ashgate, 2005), p. 101. 
"' Jakke Cilliers, & Mark Malon, 'Progress with the African Stand-by Force, supra note 167. 183 See SC Res. 1809 (2008), 16 April, 2008. 
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2.3.4 The Panel of the Wise 
As stated above, both the AU PSC and the Commission are. authorised to utilise their 
discretion and convene the Panel of the Wise (the Panel). This is in order to take 
initiatives and action they deem appropriate regard during situations of potential 
conflict, as well as to those that have already developed into full-blown conflicts. 184 
The Panel consists of five highly respected African personalities' 85who must have 
contributed to the cause of peace, security and development of the continent. 186 The 
idea of a Panel was borrowed from the -ECOWAS peace and security structure which 
includes a Council of Elders. 187 The members of the Panel are selected by the 
Chairperson of the Commission, to serve for a period of three years, after consultation 
with the member states and in accordance with the principle of equitable regional 
representation. 188 
The Panel's mandate is primarily advisory, mainly in the areas of peace and 
security. 189 However, the Panel is authorised to take appropriate actions to support the 
AU PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission in their efforts to prevent conflict. 190 
in this regard, despite the fact that the Panel reports to the Assembly through the AU 
PSC, 191 it may on its own initiative, pronounce on issues relating to the promotion and 
maintenance of peace and security in Africa. 192 
However, a key problem with the Panel is that the requisite modalities for the 
operationalisation of its work have not been implemented. 193 Furthermore, the current 
"' Article 9 and 10 (b) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
185 Elected in January 2007, the Panel is currently composed of Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary- 
General of the Organisation of African Unity, representing the East African region; Brigalia Barn, 
Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Conunission of South Africa, representing the Southern 
Africa region; Ahmed Ben Bella former President of Algeria, representing the North Africa region; 
Elisabeth Pognon, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin, representing West Africa; and 
Miguel Trovoada, former President of Sao Tom6 and Princip6, representing Central Africa. See the 
African Union Decision on the Appointment of the Members of the Panel of the Wise - Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13 (VIII), adopted during the Eighth Ordinary Session, 29-30 January, 2007, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, Assembly/AU/Dec. 152 (VIH). 
11" Article I1 (1) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
117 Article 20 of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Peacc-Keeping and Security 1999. 
Article 11 (2) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
Article 11(3) of the AU Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security. 
Article I1 (1). 
Article 11(5). 
192 Article 11 (4). 
193 Tim Murithi, Tanel of the Wise: Operationalising the African Union's mediation framework', 
institutefor Security Studies, (2007); Tim Murithi, '23 August 2007: Panel of the Wise - Operationalising the African Union's Mediation Framework',, Institutefor Security Studies,, (2007). 
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set up lacks 'a robust mediation support unit within the African Union Commission' 
and lacks 'political officers who have experience in bilateral and multilateral 
negotiation settings. ' 194 These are vital in order for the Panel to be effective in its 
roles of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. 195 Furthermore, the absence of 
system-wide coordination means that there is a 'real danger that the activities of the 
Panel will be routinely undermined. ' 196 
Nevertheless, the role of the Panel remains vital, particularly in the prevention of 
conflicts and in the role of advising and supporting the AU PSC and the Commission 
once conflicts have escalated, as well as engaging in mediation and overseeing 
agreements. 197 Certainly, the working of the Panel is able to build on the noieworthy 
personal roles of eminent African personalities, such as Nelson Mandela and 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who were prominent in situations of armed conflicts where 
massive violations of fundamental human rights were taking place. Indeed, it was the 
mediation process led by the two aforementioned leaders that culminated in the 
Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi, which was signed on 28 
August 2000.198 The resulting agreement subsequently led to the deployment of the 
first African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003. 
More recently, the function of mediation as a strong African tradition was witnessed 
in Kenya where the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, himself an eminent 
African personality, was able to embark on reconciliation efforts between warring 
parties and opposition amidst violence over a disputed election in early 2008. It is 
primarily for this reason that, as suggested above, more attention should have'been 
given to the function of the Panel. Undoubtedly, given Africa's respect for elders, the 
Panel may succeed in reconciling warring parties and promote peace and sccurity. 199 
Nevertheless, the scarce attention and resources awarded to the Panel is somewhat 
194 Tim Murithi, 'Panel of the Wise, ' ibid. 
19' Laurie Nathan, 'Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise', Submission to the 
Conunission for Africa, 15 July 2004. See author chapter in Shannon Field (ed), 2004. Peace in Africa: 
Towards a Collaborative Security Regime, (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue) 
196 Tim Murithi, 'Panel of the Wise, ' ibid. , 197 Laurie Nathan, 'Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise', supra note 195. 198 See the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) signed on 7 October 2002 and the other between TGoB and the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza signed on 2 December 2002. 
19' Kithure Kindiki, 'Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur: Legal Dilemmas and Policy imperatives', Monograph 131, in Rethinking the Role ofthe United Nations and the African Union in Darfur, (Institute of Security Studies, May 2007). 
211 
appeased by the increased role that is envisaged for sub-regional organisations in the 
promotion of regional peace and security. 
3.1 The Relationship between the AU and its Regional Mechanisms 
The OAU had failed to determine the actual relationship between the continents' sub- 
regional groupings. In particular, its Charter did not contain any specific provision 
clarifying the continental hierarchy of institutions and organisations. This resulted in 
the lack of proper coordination which in turn led to increasing tensions between the 
OAU and the remaining web of sub-regional organisations. 200 Subsequently, the sub- 
regional organisations; took it upon themselves to modify their largely economic based 
constituent instruments to adapt to the prevailing peace and security challenges. 201 
Fortunately, the AU was keen on learning from the shortcomings of the OAU's 
relationship with regional mechanisms. Indeed, it was prepared to capitalise on their 
transfonnation to peace and security entities. 202 Therefore, the AU emphasises that 
'[t]he Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, 
which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in 
Africa. 203 Hence, the AU PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission are 'required 
to harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of 
peace, security and stability to ensure that these, activities are consistent with the 
objectives and principles of the Union. 204 
Moreover, the AU Commission is mandated to 'work closely with Regional 
Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership between them and the Peace and Security 
Council in' the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. ' 205 in 
addition, the AU PSC is under the obligation to promote initiatives aimed at 
anticipating and preventing conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have 
200 Benedikt F. Franke, 'Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security 
Architecture', African Studies Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3, (Spring 2007). 
2" See chapter four. For a general discussion on th 
, 
ese transformations, see Alex Ramsbotharn, Alhaji 
M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, ' supra note I 11. 202 See chapter seven. 203 Axticle 16 (1) of the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council 204 
205 
Article 16 1 (a). 
See article 16 (1) (b). 
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occurred, peace-making and peace-building functions in consultation with Regional 
Mechanisms. 206 
Indeed, a direct relationship between the AU PSC and Regional Mechanism is 
articulated in the requirement to ensure 'the full involvement of Regional 
Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning 
System and the African Standby Force' as they are 'linked directly through the 
appropriate means of communication' to the situation room. 207 Under this framework, 
emphasis is put on the need for the harmonisation and coordination of activities of the 
regional mechanisms and the AU PSC. To this end, the AU PSC and regional 
mechanisms are required to keep each other 'fully and continuously informed of their 
activities. 9 208 This would be by way of periodic meetings, 209 discussions of any 
question by the AU PSC relating to relevant regional mechanisms 210 and invitation to 
deliberations, 211 setting up of liaison offices, 212 as well as agreeing to Memorandum 
of Understanding on Cooperation between the bodies. 213 
The Common African Defence, and Security Policy (2004) lists a number of 
cessentially economic oriented 9 214 sub-regional organisations which arguable 
constitute regional mechanisms under the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and 
Security Council. These include the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), 215 the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States 
216 217 (CEMAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), 218 the East African Community 
206 Moreover, see article 16 (2). 
207 Article 12 (2) (b). 
208 Article 16(3). 
"' Article 16 (4). 
210 Article 16 (6). 
211 Article 16 (7). 
212 Article 16 (8). 
213 Article 16 (9). 
214 African Union, Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence Policy, Second Extra-Ordinary 
Assembly of the Union of 28 February 2004,26, para 25. 
215 The sixteen ECOWAS members are Benin; Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, C6te d'lvoire, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo. 
I I-, ýII 216 Member state include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the DR 
Congo, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. 
217 IGAD member states are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Eritrea. 218 SADC member states include: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
213 
220 
(EAC) '219 the 
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, (CEN-SAD), the Arab 
Maghreb_ Union (AMU) '221 and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA). 222 
However, as stated above, the interplay of continental organisations and the capacity 
to respond both politically and via military means has only been evident in the 
activities of sub-regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, which 
took a leading role in addressing the security related conflicts in their respective 
regions. Recently, ECOWAS troops in concert with French forces monitored the 
cease-fire that ended the civil war in Cote D'Voire and deployed peacekeepers in 
Liberia, pending the arrival of the UN forces in 2003. These actions were commended 
by the UN Security Council which welcomed the actions of ECOWAS troops in 
February 2003 by way of resolutions 1464 223 and 1497 224 for their responses to the 
violence in Cote D'Voire and Liberia respectively. 225 
Similarly, SADC intervened in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
in 1998 and engaged in attempts at mediation and deployment of troops. 226 
Meanwhile, despite some'set backs in funding, logistics and expedience available to 
ECOWAS and SADC, IGAD engaged in mediation in Sudan and Somalia and 
requested AU deployment of troops in the latter . 
227 However, other sub-regional 
blocks such as AMU have remained dormant due to poor relations amongst member 
219 EAC member states are Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. 
220 CEN-SAD member states include Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Central African 
Republic, Eritrea, Djibouti, Gambia, Senegal, Egypt Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Benin, Togo, 
COte d1voire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Comoros and Guinea. 
221 AMU Member states are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. 
222 COMESA member states include Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Libya, D. R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, 
U anda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. . 22f SC Res. 1464 (2003), 4 February 2003. 
224 SC Res. 1497 (2003), 1 August 2003. 
225 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use offorce, (Oxford University Press; Second Edition 
(2004) pp. 257-258. 
216 See chapter seven. See also, N Ngoma, 'Hawks, Doves or Penguins? A Critical Review of the 
SADC Military Intervention in the DRC', Institutefor Security Studies, Occasional Paper 88, Pretoria 
2004. 
227 See 'Building an African Union for the 21" Century: Relations with Regional Economic 
Communities (RECS), NEPAD and Civil Society', Policy Seminar Report, The Vineyard Hotel, Cape 
Town South Africa, 20-22 August 2005; Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaii M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 
'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, ' supra note I 11. 
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states meaning that they have hardly taken an active role in the mediation of conflicts 
and peacekeeping missions. 228 
However, recent practice demonstrates that there is evidence of the some level of 
commitment of the AU's relationship with its regional mechanisms across the 
designated regions. For example, as stated above, IGAD set up the East African 
Brigade Force (EASBRIG)229 in 2005 to operate as part of the envisaged Standby 
Force in line with the requirements of the AU pSC. 
230 Furthermore, the activation of 
IGAD's early warning system (CEWARN) could provide valuable lessons to the 
AU's own Continental Early Warning System. 
231 In West Africa, the decision to host 
the AU's regional office at the ECOWAS headquarters situated in Abuja, Nigeria 
increases the coordination of information and roles. However, the 'structural 
inequalities' and mutual mistrust amongst Southern African States has hampered 
SADC's ability to fully integrate within the AU's continental system. 
232 Nevertheless, 
the AU has concluded a memorandum of understanding with the various Regional 
Mechanisms, such as SADC and ECOWAS. 233 Moreover, there have been regular 
meetings and exchange of notes between the AU and the Regional Economic 
Communities. 
234 
Having said so, it deserves to be mentioned that the proliferation of sub-regional 
organisations has led to the 'confusion, dupI ication and a dissipation of energies and 
resources. 235 For example, countries such as Libya have membership of COMESA, 
CEN-SAD and AMU while Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland are all members of 
both the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC. Meanwhile the whole 
228 For more on AMU, see Ali F. Darrat and Anita Pennathur, 'Are the Arab Maghreb countries really 
integratable?: Some evidence from the theory of cointegratcd systems', Review of Financial Economics, 
Volume 11, issue 2, (2002), pp. 79-90. 
229 Contributing forces include Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. 
230 Nelson Alusala, 'African Standby Force: East Africa Moves', supra note 164. 
231 'Building an African Union for the 2 1" Century', supra note 22 7. 
232 'Building an African Union for the 21" Century, ' ibid; Ngubane, Senzo and Solomon, Hussein, 
Projects gone too far. Sub-regional Security Efforts in Aftica (Centre for International Political Studies, 
Pretoria, 2001), 5; Alex Ramsbotharn, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and 
Security Capacity, ' supra note III- 
233 Jakkie Cilliers, UN Reform and Funding Peacekeeping in Africa', African Security Review Vol 14 
No 2, (2005). 
234 Olonisakin, Funmi, 'African Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: An Assessment of the Continent's 
Evolving Peace and Security Architecture ', (United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices, New York, 
2004), p. 8. 
235 'Building an African Union for the 21" Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities 
(RECS), NEPAD and Civil Society', supra note 227; Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny 
Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, ' supra note I 11. 
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of Arab North Africa simultaneously holds membership of the Arab League and the 
AMU. In fact, of the 53 states within the AU, only six states hold membership in just 
one regional community. 236 
The confusion created by the duplication of membership is further compounded by 
the fact that, despite some similarities, there exist distinct differences in institutional 
structures, financial patrons as well as ideologies and strategies amongst these 
organisations and the AU. 237 However, it is worth mentioning that this ambiguous 
arrangement is not unique to Africa. Indeed, Europe also possesses a highly complex 
regional security architecture that includes the multiplication of state membership to 
various institutions such as the 55-member Organisation for Security and Co- 
operation in Europe (OSCE), the 26-member NATO and the 28-member West 
European Union (WEU), as well as the EU. 
In the African context, it wo 
' 
uld appear that the states possess a degree of discretion in 
choosing between the AU and the relevant sub-regional organisations in key matters, 
such as the resolution of disputes and the allocation of resources. Despite the 
occasional references in regard to cooperation, it is still not clear in which instances 
there will be a stand-alone AU action, a set out AU cooperation with the regional 
communities, or a designated collaboration with the UN and other international actors. 
In addition, there is also the danger that those wishing to play a continental role might 
neglect institutional development at the sub-regional level. 238 On the other hand, there 
remains the concern that since regional major powers, such as Nigeria and South 
Africa, may not be able to project their relative strength in the AU PSC, they may 
redirect their strength to the sub-regional organisations where member states may be 
easily influenced. 
236 United Nations Econon-dc Commission'for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in 
Aftica(UNECA, Addis Ababa, 2004), 3940; African Union Corrunission/Economic Commission for 
Africa, Report on Meeting ofExperts on the Rationalisation of the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), EX. CC/220(VIII), 2005. 
237 Benedikt F. Franke, 'Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security 
Architecture', supra note 199; Adejo, Dr. Armstrong Matiu 'From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old 
Bottle?, ' Paper prepared for presentation at the I Oth CODESRIA General Assembly, Nile International 
Conference Centre, Kampala, December 8-12,2002; Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaj i M. S. Dah & Fanny 
Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, supra note I 11. " Maxi Schoeman, 'The African Union after the Durban Summit', Occasional Paper, Centre for 
African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2003. Available at 
http: //www. teol. ku. dklcaslnyhomepagelmapperlOccasional%2OPapersISchoernan_intemetvcrsion. doc 
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For the moment, there remains competing interests amongst the AU, RECs and 
member states, 239 which in turn has resulted in obstacles to coherent integration and 
has slowed down the goals of a unified African government. 240 What is abundantly 
clear is that the arrangement under the current AU organisation calls for the 
consolidation of shared o bjcctivcs as well as properly defined collaboration in the 
areas of overlap between its various regional mechanisms. 
4.1 The Overall Capacity of the AU, Financial Issues and the Special Fund 
Subsequent to the creation of the AU's institutional security framework, African 
leaders pledged 'to take all necessary measures' to strengthen the common institutions 
discussed above and to 'provide them with the necessary powers and resources to 
enable them [to) discharge their respective mandates effectively. ' 241 However, in 
similar fashion to the 0AU, the AU largely depends on statutory contributions as well 
as voluntary contributions by member states to finance its activities. 242 Indeed, a key 
problem with this affangement. is that some states are always behind with their 
membership contributions. And although the defaulting states face the possibility of 
sanctionS243 for non-payment, few of these countries hardly ever abide by their debt 
repayment plan. 
244 
It thus became clear from the onset that this was an area where the AU, just like the 
OAU, would struggle to secure the necessary finances, including attaining annual 
subscription fees that would in turn impact on its effectiveness and overall running. 
Inevitably, the 'increased operational requirements made it imperative to identify 
239 Chris Landsberg and Shaun Mackay, 'Engaging the New Pan-Africanism: Strategies for Civil 
Society', ActionA id International and Open Society Initiativefor Southern Africa, 2004, p. 12. " Address by the Chairperson of the African Union, H. E. President J. A. Kofuor at the Opening of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the As 
, 
sembly of the African Union, Accra, Ghana, 28-29 June :I Ith Ordinary Session of the Executive Council. Available at http: //www. africa- 
union. org/root/au/Conferences/2007/J*une/summit/9MUSummit. htm 
241 Preamble to the Constitutive Act of the AU, para. 10. 242 See African Union, 'Experts' Preparatory Meeting for The Conference of African Ministers of Economy and Finance CAMEF, 4-5 May, 2005, AU/EXP1Rpt (1), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 24' E. g. during the Maputo Summit in 2003, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Slo Tom6 and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia and the Union of Comoros were eventually placed under sanctions for the Maputo meeting 244 See the Report ofthe Second Ordinary Session ofthe Sub-Committee on Contributions, Executive Council, Third Ordinary Session, 4-8 July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique, EX/CL/27(111), Par 20. See 
also Report of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives' Committee, Perrmnent 
Representatives' Committee, Sixth Ordinary Session, 4-5 July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique, 
PRCIRPT(VI), para. 38. 
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other financing sources. 245 This led to the re-invention of the Special Fund, which 
includes a Trust Fund that is governed by the relevant Financial Rules and 
Regulations of the Union. 246 Also known as the Peace Fund, the Special Fund 
operates under the AU Commission and is made up of financial appropriations from 
the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary 
contributions from member states and from other sources both within and outside the 
continent. 247 
This arrangement is highly significant. As shown below, the AU's lack of funds 
attracts the attention of the UN and the wider international community and paves the 
way for a collaborative effort between the two organisations. Indeed, in April 2008, 
the Security Council recognised that one major constraint facing the AU 'in 
effectively carrying out the mandates of maintaining regional peace and security is 
securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources. t248 In this regard, the Council 
welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal to set up an AU-UN panel consisting of 
distinguished persons to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support AU 
operations under a UN mandate, in particular start-up funding, equipment and 
logistics and to consider lessons from past and current AU peace efforts. 249 
However, such a possibility had been put forward by the Secretary General much 
earlier. Indeed, the report, In Larger Freedom of 2005, proposed that the rules of the 
UN peace operations budget should be amended to give the UN the option of using 
assessed contributions to finance authorized regional operations or the participation of 
regional organisations in multi-pillar missions 'under the overall United Nations 
umbrella. ' 250 This proposal was subsequently heeded at a meeting in May 2007 
between the representatives of the AU, UN, G-8 countries and delegates from the EU 
and Africa's regional economic communities. These organisations endorsed the 
possibility of providing financial assistance to the AU through UN funding 
245 See African Union, 'Experts, Preparatory Meeting for The Conference of African Ministers of Economy and Finance CAMEF', supra note 241. 246 Article 21 (1) and (4) of the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 247 Article 21 (2) and (3). 248 See SC Res. 1809 (2005), 16 April, 2008. 249 ibid 
"0 Secretary General's report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc A159/2005, para. 215. 
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mechanisms. 251 This was soon followed by issuance of a joint communiqu6 by the AU 
PSC and UN Security Council in which they agreed to examine the possibility of UN 
financing for AU or AU-authorized mission ? 52 
Yet, in the meantime, it was the assistance and cooperation given to the AU from the 
developed countries and the other regional groupings that 'to continue[d] to give 
logistic and financial support to the speeding up of the establishment of an African 
Standby Force. ' 253 In this regard, during the Maputo Summit in 2003, the AU 
Assembly asked the EU to establish a Peace Facility 'to fund peace support and 
peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU. s254 This request 
was approved during the ACP-EC Council of Ministers in December 2003 '215 which 
was followed by a formal announcement of a total of C250 million to be made 
available to the AU Peace Facility at an EU-African meeting in April 2004.256 
Designed to support African-led peace operations, as well as capacity building for the 
institutional security structure of the AU, part of this finance saw the AU Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) designated as the first recipient of the fund. 257 However, as it turned 
out, the AMIS operation was cash strapped from the very beginning of its existence 
despite the financial support. 258 Furthermore, the EU funding of the Peace Facility is 
curtailed due to the fact that the financing comes from the European Development 
Fund (EDF). The EDF forms the financial instrument of the Cotonou Agreement and 
is itself renegotiated every five years meaning that there has to be a new agreement at 
subsequent meetings by the EU Council of Ministers. 259 And with the current fund 
251 Aftican Union 'Annual Consultation between the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the 
G8 Member Countries, and Other Partners: Communiqu6, ' Addis Ababa, 14 May 2007, 
para. 2. 
252 The United Nations & African Union 'Joint CommuniquV Agreed by the UN Security Council and 
AU Peace and Security Council, " 16 June 2007, para. 10 
253 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, 'the Ezutwini 
Consensus, adopted by the Executive Council of the African Union at the 7 T" Extraordinary Session, 
7- 8 March 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ext/EXCU2 (VII). 
"' See Assembly/AU/Dec. 24 (11) adopted in Maputo, in July 2003. 
255 Decision 2003/3 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of II December 2003. 256 See EU Council, 'EU-Africa Ministerial meeting -Dublin, Ireland I April 2004', 5/4/2004 - Press: 104 Nr: 8230/04. 
JaIdde Cilliers, UN Reform and Funding Peacekeeping in Africa', supra note 233. 25g See chapter nine. 
259 For a general discussion on the Cotonou Agreement, see Stephen Kingah, 'The Revised Cotonou 
Agreement between the European Community and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States: Innovations on Security Political Dialogue, Transparency, Money and Social Responsibility', Journal 
ofAfrican Law, 50,1 (2006), 59-71. 
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nearly depleted, a major concern arises in regards to the impact that this situation 
promises to have on Darfur and other emerging crises. 260 
From this discussion, it can be safely be concluded that in similar fashion to the OAU, 
which had to rely on donor financial support and could only fund a very limited 
peacekeeping observer mission for a limited period, the AU can still only undertake 
symbolic post-conflict reconstruction activities. 261 What is even more -concerning is 
the impact that the AU's financial weakness may have on the AU PSC, the 
Commission, the African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise, the Military 
Committee and the Early Warning System, particularly given their crucial roles within 
the continental institutional security set up. 
However, as suggested earlier, the lack of sufficient funds creates an interesting 
dynamic. This is because the consensus amongst the UN member states on the need to 
promote the evolving African regional peace and security framework increases 
opportunities for proper coordination between the AU and the UN. In this regard, the 
UN Security Council has welcomed the developments regarding cooperation between 
the UN, the AU as well as hailed the contribution of the EU to the enhancement of 
AU capacities. 262 As shown below, the potential of transforming the AU's 
shortcomings into strengths seems to have been foreseen by the drafters of the 
Constitutive Act. 
5.1 The envisaged Relationship'of Cooperation with the UN under the AU's 
Constitutional Framework 
The AU's overall relationship with the UN, in regards to peace and security, has often 
been perceived as one of contest rather than complimentary. 263 Indeed, the AU's 
constitutional framework has been described as 'the first true blow to the 
s264 constitutional framework of the international system established in 1945 . Part of 
"' The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination', 4frica Report N*99 - 25 October 2005. 
" Jakkie Cilliers, 'UN Reform and Funding Peacekeeping in Africa'supra note 233. See also Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, ' 
sýpra note 111. . 262 See SC Res. 1809 (2008), 16 April, 2008. 
263 See chapter seven. 
264 Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use ofForce: The Failures of Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the, 4frican Union, 8 MAX PLANCK Y. B. INVL L. 237,238 
(2004). 
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this reason is that the AU framework ambiguously provides that '[t]he Regional 
Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the 
primary responsibility 265 for promoting peace, security and stability in 
Africa. 266 Therefore, by seeming to entrust itself with the primary responsibility for 
promoting peace and security within the continent, the AU raised fundamental 
questions with respect to the role left for the UN Security Council which, traditionally, 
is designated the same function. 267 
The assertion that the AU's Constitutive Act signifies an exit from the UN system is 
supported by the Act's and the Protocol's silence when it comes to placing the 
Union's activities under the subordination of the UN Security Council as dictated by 
268 the UN Charter. Instead, the Protocol establishing the AU PSC merely lists the UN 
as only one of the many organisations that will assist the AU Peace and Security 
Council . 
269 However, on closer reading, it soon becomes clear that article 16 of the 
Protocol merely affirms the AU's superiority over regional mechanisms, which form 
part of its architecture of peace and security. Furthermore, article 16 of the Protocol 
refcrs to the promotion and not maintenance of peace and security, and thus is 
arguably complimentary to the UN system. Clearly the mandate of the UN Security 
Council to 'maintain' international peace and security is wider than that of the AU's 
responsibility for the 'promotion' of peace within Africa. 270 Moreover, taken together, 
the major provisions of the AU framework, including the right to intervene discussed 
in the next chapter, reaffirm, rather than deny, the UN's primacy in the discharge of 
its primary responsibility for peace and security. 
Indeed, the pre-eminence of the AU in the promotion of peace and security in the 
continent, compliments, rather than contradicts the collective security system under 
the Charter, which vests the Security Council with overall powers in the area of peace 
and security. This interpretation is further evidenced within the AU PSC's mandate to 
dcooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the 
265 Emphasis added. 
166 Article 16 (1) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council 
267 Article 24 UN Charter. See also Section on the Security Council (Chapter Three).. 
268 See Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 
263. 
269 on one interpretation of article 17 (1) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council, 
see ibid. 270 ibid. 
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primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
'271 In 
addition, the AU PSC is required to cooperate and work closely with other relevant 
UN agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. 
272 Thus, 
rather than a contest, the true dynamic relationship is articulated by Kofi 
Annan: 
Within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters 
of international peace and security, providing support for regional and sub- 
regional initiatives is both necessary and desirable. Such support is 
necessary, because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and 
expertise to address all the problems that may arise in Africa. It 
is desirable 
because wherever possible the international community should strive to 
compliment rather than supplant Africa's efforts to resolve Africa's 
problems. 2739 
Indeed, in April 2008, in its resolution 1809,274 the Security Council expressed 'its 
determination to take effective steps to further enhance the relationship with the AU 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and 'make more effective its cooperation' with 
the AU PSC. However, this view had also been affirmed in March 2007 during a 
thematic debate focusing on Africa where, through a presidential statement, the UN 
Security Council stressed that the collaboration between the UN and regional 
organisations 'should be based on their complimentary capacities and comparative 
advantages. 275 The Council further expressed encouragement for increased exchange 
of information and shared experience, best practices and lessons learnt between the 
276 Security Council and the AU . 
in this regard, the establishment of a Peace and Support Team (PST) in 2006, in order 
to build and enhance the AU long-term capacity, particularly with regard to the 
African Standby Force and AU headquarters is most promising. 277 Other notable 
instances of cooperation between the UN and the AU have also been witnessed in the 
recent past. For example, in regard to the Darfur crisis, the UN Secretariat assisted the 
AU with planning and assessment for the expansion of its monitoring mission in 
271 Article 17 (1) of the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
272 Article 17 (1). 
273 Annan, Kofi, 1998, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion ofDurable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa, Report ofthe Secretary General. UN Doc S/1998/318/37/ILM (1998) 913. 
274 SC Res. 1809 (2008) of 16 April 2008. 
275 S/PRST/2007n, 28 March, 2007. 
276 ibid. 
277 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working 
Group at the 2006 substantive session, New York, 27 February-17 March 2006, A/60/19,22 March 
2006, 
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Darfur in accordance with Security Council resolution 1556.2780ther examples of 
cooperation include the deployment of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 2003, 
which was a holding operation pending the deployment of a UN Security Council 
mandated peacekeeping mission. 279 Not only does the evolving practice demonstrate 
how the UN and the AU may cooperate with each other effectively, it also shed light 
on the form that a division of labor is likely to take. 
5.2 The AU's Relationship with the UN: The Case for Division of Labour in 
Peace Operations 
The UN's acceptance and support of the regional mechanisms such as the AU, 
ECOWAS and SADC in their quest to promote peace and security in their respective 
regions was largely accepted but also raised several concerns. In particular, by 
entrusting these organisations; with responsibility for regional conflict, the 
international community alongside the UN risked abrogating its duty to maintain 
peace and security in Africa. This is partly because it was hardly envisaged by the 
drafters of the UN Charter that the institution vested with primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security would play a mere supporting role 
in operations led by other regional organisations. 280 
However, on this point, the UN Secretary General took note of the fact that the active 
role played by regional mechanisms did not absolve the UN from its 
responsibilities. 281 The problem remains that he did not set forth any formal pattern of 
relations between the UN, nor called for any specific division of labour. This was in 
spite of the compelling arguments which emphasised the potential of regional 
agencies that needed to be utilised. 282 In this regard, some commentators have called 
for a formalised division of labour between the UN and the AU. For example, Cilliers 
argues that although 'a clear hierarchy and division of responsibility [... ] is probably 
278 SC Res. 1556 (2004), 30 July 2004. 
2.79 Festus Agoagye, 'The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learntfrom the First African Union 
Peacekeeping Operation'ISS (2004). Available at www. issafrica. org/pubs/Other/CT2_2004*/`20PG9- 
15. pdf. See also Security Brief - African Security Review Vol 12 No 2, (2003). 280 See chapter four. 
29' Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Frýedom, supra note 250. 282 Christine GrayInternational Law and the Use ofForce, supra note 225, p. 283. See also chapter four. 
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neither desirable nor achievable in all instances, this is clearly a requirement for 
Affica. 283 
Indeed, the current institutional system creates an interesting dynamic which' 
strengthens the case for a division labour between the UN and the AU. As will be 
shown in the next chapter, even though the UN possess the legal authority and 
institutional capacity to address conflicts, it is often slow in responding to crisis 
particularly in Africa. On the other hand, while the AU and its sub-regional 
organisations, are often quicker to respond to crisis, they hardly posses the resources 
and mandate to conduct complex peace operations. 284 Hence, a division of labour 
between the AU and the UN would 'play into the strengths and compensate for the 
weaknesses of both types of organisations. 285 
Furthermore, such an arrangement would lead to the replacement of the current ad 
hoc systems which lacked coherent practice, with 'the establishment of an 
interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to 
work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships. 286 
A formalised division of labour between the UN and AU would also alleviate the 
overlap, duplication and disagreements with regard to mandates most recently 
manifest in the Darfur conflict in connection to whether to establish a UN, a hybrid 
operation or strengthen an AU-led mission. 287 
It is important at this point to consider how such a division of responsibilities may be 
established. A formalised division of labour between the two organisations would 
require the UN to build on its achievements with the AU in Africa. 288 For a start, the 
AU has observer status and a Permanent Mission to the UN. As shown in * chapter four, 
the UN Security Council and the General Assembly have also made declarations 
promoting cooperation between the UN and regional organisations which include 
283 Jakke Cilliers, 'UN Reform and Funding Peacekeeping in Africa, ' supra note 233. 284 See SC REs. 1809 (2005), 16 April, 2008. 
285 De Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concept, ' Supra note 15 5; A. Adebayo & C. Landsberg, 'Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa, in A. Adebayo & C. L. Sriram (eds. ), 
ManagingAmed Conflicts in the 21"Centu? y, (Frank Cass, London, 2001; Benedikt F. Franke, 'In 
Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa', The Journal ofHumanitarian Assistance, (2006); 
Theo Neethling, 'Realising the African Standby Force as a Pan-African Deal: Progress, Prospects and Challenges, ' Journal ofMilitary and Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, Issue 1, (2005), pp. 1-25. 2'6 Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 250, para. 112. 287 See chapter nine. 
218 See SC Res. 1631 (2005), 17 October 2005.. 
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African regional and sub-regional organisations. 289 Similarly, recent key UN reports 
have emphasised the role of regional organisations in conflict prevention and peace 
operations, which should be expanded and strengthened. 290 
Most recently, the AU and UN, through the UN Secretary-General and the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission, signed a Declaration on 'Enhancing UN-AU 
Cooperation' in November 2006.291 The Declaration 'provided a framework for the 
evolving UN Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union and an 
expression of the common commitment of both institutions to work together on issues 
of peace and human security, human rights, post-conflict reconstruction and regional 
integration. ' 292 Similarly, the Security Council has also recently held a special 
meeting to discuss UN collaboration with African regional organizations, particularly 
the AU. 293 In an apparent reference to previous lack of coordination in the past, the 
AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council in their joint 
communiqu6 expressed their commitment to develop 'a stronger and more structured 
relationship' in regard to the management of peace and security. 294 
Most recently, in April 2008, the Security Council expressed 'its determination to 
strengthen and make more effective its cooperation with relevant organs of regional 
organisations, in particular the African Union Peace and Security Council . 9295 It is 
therefore hoped that as evidenced by recent practice, including the plans of a stronger 
inter-organizational relationship, the two bodies 'are moving towards a more coherent 
289 A/Res/49/57,9 December 1994. See also A/Res/46/58 (1991), A/Res/47/38 (1992) and A/Res/48/36 
(1993); S/Res/1631 (2005). 
290 See Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
(United Nations, 2004) and the Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 250, 
ýara. 213. 
9"Declaration, Enhancing U`N-AU Cooperation Framework: for the Ten-Year Capacity Building 
Programme for the African Union', 16 November 2006. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, GA, 62nd Session, Supplement No. I (A/62/1), New York, 31 August, 
2007. See also the AU Assembly of the AU Assembly Decision on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: 
Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Prograrnme for the African Union, 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 140 (VIII), adopted at the Eighth Ordinary Session, 29-30, January 2007, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. 
292 Statement by Mr. Abdoulie Janneh, UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ECA, Tenth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 25 
January 2007. 
293 See S/PV. 5649, Wednesday, 28 MarcI4 2007, New York. 
294 The United Nations & African Union 'Joint CommuniquP Agreed by the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council, 16 June 2007, para. 7. 29' See SC Res. 1809 (2005), 16 April, 2008. 
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institutional division of labor, in line with political realities and their respective 
capacities, and thus, more predictable responses in the future. 296 
Indeed, it is clear that the emergence of a division of labour between the UN and the 
AU is slowly but surely occurring 'as the disinterest of the most powerful members of 
the UN Security Council in politically risky interventions in Africa is forcing a 
rethink of how best to guarantee- a Pax Africana on the world's most volatile 
continent. 297 As suggested by the Secretary General's March 2005 report In Larger 
Freedom, a memorandum of understanding may govern such a relationship. 298 It is 
therefore submitted that the approach could lead to the formalisation of clear lines of 
responsibility and more efficient relationship of collaboration between the AU and 
UN. It is therefore primarily for this reason that the issue is picked up later in chapter 
eight on the discussion of Africa's agenda in the reform of the UN. What will become 
clear is that such an arrangement would not only support the evolving relationship of 
cooperation between the two organisations, but would also improve the coherence and 
coordination of the work of other international partners supporting peace and security 
initiatives under the AU's leadership but under the UN's umbrella. 
C: Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the AU's institutional framework represents a significant 
departure from the political, legal and institutional framework of the OAU. 299 Indeed, 
the AU set up is founded on new approaches to peace and security that are based on 
calculated linkages between the member states, regional mechanisms and the UN, as 
well as the wider international community. It is therefore expected that the organs 
and systems put in place will anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as 
policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
situations amounting to threats to legitimate order. However, measured against the 
high, and often, unrealistic expectations within and beyond Africa, not only does the 
296 Katherine N. Andrews and Victoria K. Holt, 'United Nations-African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa', supra note 112. 297 Adekeye Adebajo & Chandra Lekha Sriram, Managing Ar7ned Conflicts in 21st Centuq, (Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. xv. 2'8 The Secretary General's report, 'In Larger Freedom, ' supra note 25 0, para. 13. See chapter four. 299 T Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union' and Institution-Building in Post Colonial Africa', supra note 1. 
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AU's institutional framework possess many shortcomings, it also, faces serious 
challenges. 300 
It deserves to be mentioned at this stage that that the institutional structure of the 
Union as envisaged by the Constitutive Act of the AU 'was not a program of action 
but [merely] a legal constitutional framework. 9 301 Thus the current institutional 
structure of the AU is incomplete and hence constitutes an ongoing project. It will 
also be recalled that the formation of the AU was not an event but rather, it represents 
a gradual process of for the future political integration the continent. 302 Therefore, a 
key problem with the majority of the criticisms levelled against the current AU set up 
is they ignore the fact that it is a recent initiative. Having been formally inaugurated in 
2002, its peace and security institutional structures have only been in place since mid- 
2004. Furthen-nore, it will be recalled that it took many years for other comparable 
regional organisations in Latin America, Asia, and Europe to acquire institutional 
capacity in their respective regions. 303 Moreover, it is visibly notable that, though still 
in its early stages, the AU's institutional framework is better organised and equipped 
than its predecessor, which failed to deal with conflict resolution and management. 304 
However, the concerns that the AU represents a reincarnation of the OAU remain. 305 
It will be recalled that OAU's failures were attributed to African leaders' own failure 
to live up to the norms and principles that they themselves had established. 306 To 
confront its challenges, the AU will particularly need to address the lack of political 
consensus among African leaders on situations amounting to grave circumstances. At 
this point, it is worth noting that there has been hardly any call by any African leader 
to recommend the intervention of the AU in circumstances such as those occurring in 
Sudan, Northern Uganda and Zimbabwe despite the situations in those regions 
... See chapter nine. 
301 Ns6ngurua J. Udornbana, 'Critical Essay: Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?, ' supra note 147. 302 See chapter five. 
303 Alex Ramsbotharn, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity, ' supra note I 11. 
3' T. Maluwa, 'The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Post Colonial 
Africa', supra note 1. 
305 N. J. Udornbana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots?, ' supra note 147. See also Adekeye Adebajo, 'The Curse of Berlin, 'supra note 89, p 85; Adejo, Dr. Armstrong Matiu 'From OAU to AU, ' supra 
note supra 237; Cameron Duodu, 'Give Unity a Chance', News, 4frica Magazine, July 29,2002, pp. 20- 2 I; Jakke Cilliers, 'Towards the African Union', supra note 22. "6 See chapter five. 
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arguably meeting the grounds contained in article 4 of the Constitutive Act . 
307 These 
situations beg the question as to whether African leaders are serious about the 
principles to which they committed themselves to being the signatories of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU . 
308 It thus remains imperative that the AU transfonns its 
norms and principles into practical policies. 
Another major criticism facing the AU is that it contains remarkable internal 
organizational barriers. Despite the notable improvement from the practice of the 
OAU, the systems of relationship between the AU, member states and the Regional 
Mechanisms (RECs) still need to be worked out. 309 This is particularly important 
given their vast responsibilities for peace and security within their respective regions. 
For the moment, the lack of proper coordination means that the AU's reliance on 
regional economic communities will not evolve in a uniform manner, particularly 
given that they are not evenly developed nor are they organised in a synchronised 
manner. 
These disparities are partly due to the fact that 'the AU exists but African unity does 
not. ' 310 In agreeing to the new constitutional framework, the majority of African 
States have discovered that the Union can be a useful tool for the pursuit of their 
national interests. 311 While this may in the long run be useful to the'AU, the influence 
of hegemonic states such as Libya, Nigeria and South Africa remains of major 
concern given their previous use of sheer strength to push the Union's agenda, in 
order to finiher their national interests. 312 However, the rules on voting and decision 
making within the AU organs curtail this possibility. Moreover, the member states are 
likely to reject the domination of the Union's affairs by one state due to the 
continent's history of slavery, colonialism, and globalisation which entrenched a 
strong African tradition of equality. 313 Ultimately the success of the AU depends on 
the ability of African leaders to strike the right balance between pursuing their 
307 j. Cilliers, K Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council', supra note 64. 308 Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, ' supra note 4. 309 Franke, Benedikt, Enabling a Continent to Help Itself- US Military Capacity Building and Africa's Emerging Security Architecture, Strategic Insights, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2007). 
3 10 Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, ' supra note 5. 31 1 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union', African Affairs (2004), 103,249-267. 312 Ibid. 
313 j. Cilliers, K Sturman, 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council'. supra note 64. 
228 
national interests and possessing the political will to forgo certain aspects of their 
national sovereignty for the common interests of the continent. 314 
Having said that, a fundamental challenge facing the architecture of the AU's regime 
for security remains that of availability of resources, particularly given the increase in 
its budgetary requirements. The Union currently lacks sufficient funds from its 
member states-which inevitably means that it has to tum to funding from external 
sources. Given that the emergence of crises exacerbates already weak capacity for 
strategic, long-term planning, the AU's ability to clearly determine its budgetary 
requirements are further curtailed making it difficult to secure coherent donor 
assistance. 3 15 Furthermore, concern has also emerged that the AU's reference to 
principles of democracy and human rights could be a 'mere cosmetic exercise' to 
impress western donor states and international financial institutions. 316 
In any case, reliance on external funds means that the success of crucial operations 
may ultimately depend on the donor's readiness to support the deployment of the 
Union's activities in conflict regions. Such an arrangement not only compromises 
continental autonomy but also waters down the rhetoric of 'African solutions to 
African problems'. However, it is hoped that the lack of resources and other short- 
comings of the AU will attract the UN and other international partners to cooperate 
and act decisively in support of the AU's efforts to lead. In this regard, a formalised 
division of labour between the AU and the UN in the promotion of peace and security 
possesses the potential at ensuring the Secretary General's vision of a 'unity of 
purpose as the foundation of Africa's partnership with the United Nations. 0 17 Such an 
arrangement would then create the appropriate conditions for an environment where 
, international law would now find itself in a phase of mature constitutionalization, 
envisaging new forms of cooperation on a regional scale to carry the common 
values. ' 318 
314 Adejo, Dr. Armstrong Matiu "From OAU to AU, ' supra note 237. 
`5 Alex Ramsbotharn, Alhaji M. S. Bah & Fanny Calder, 'Enhancing African Peace and Security 
Capacity, ' supra note I 11. 
3"N. J. Udombana, 'Can the Leopard Change its Spots?, ' supra note 147. 
317 See Secretary General, 'Through the Unity of Purpose, 'There is No Limit to What We Can 
Achieve', SG/SNV1 0861, AFR//1493,29 January 2007. 
3" Andrea Gattini 'Sense and Quasisense of Schmitts Groj3raum Theory in International Law -A Rejoinder to Carty's 'Carl Schmitts Critique of Liberal International Legal Order, ' Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), 15.53-68. 
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Chapter Seven 
The AU's Constitutional Framework: The African 
Right to Intervene and its Relationship with the UN 
and International Law 
A: Introduction 
In spite of the uncertainties that would later emerge, the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
revived new hopes for a new age of cooperation in pursuit of a more just and peaceful 
world. ' Indeed the optimism of the post Cold War era led the period 1990-1999 being 
designated as the 'United Nations Decade of International Law. 2 During this era, states 
undertook to uphold the respect for the principles of international law, including 
promoting the means and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes. But it is also 
within this time that conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide (1994), the ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia (1991) and Sierra Leone (1997), the East Timor crisis (1999), as 
well as the NATO bombings of Kosovo in 1999, took place. 
In the African context, internal wars such as those raging in Sudan, Somalia, D. R. 
Congo, Ethiopia and Mozambique not only led to the deaths of millions of citizens but 
also threatened to cripple Africa's management of continental affairs. The despair, 
destitution, poverty, disease and number of displaced persons led to serious moral, legal 
and political questions as to whether African states could afford to continue to uphold 
their strict adherence to the OAU's policy of non-interference in the affairs of member 
states. Equally compelling questions were with respect to whether African leaders 
could sole rely on the rules of the UN Charter as their justification for failing to prevent 
heinous crimes, such genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
It was shown in chapter four that the post-Cold War era compelled prganisations such 
as NATO, the AU and ECOWAS to transform themselves from purely defence and 
economic blocks to peace and security regimes in preparedness to confront the new and 
potential threats. However, it was their subsequent actions that raised fundamental 
questions relevant to international law, particularly with regard to whether it would be 
See chapters three and four 2 See GA/ Res/44/23 of 17 November 1989. 
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'legitimate for a regional organisation to use force without a UN mandate' or if it was 
'permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave 
humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked. 93 
It was in this context that African states seemed 'willing to push the frontiers of 
collective stability and security to the limit without any regard for legal niceties such as 
the authorisation of the Security Council. 94 Although these organisations seemed to 
challenge the UN rules on intervention, theirs was a response to the dilemma brought 
about by the predicament that arose due to an impotent Council in times of grave peril. 
5 
This quandary had been eloquently articulated by the UN Secretary General who posed 
a question to 'those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is 
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate. ' '[I]n the context of 
Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of 
States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive 
prompt Council authorisation, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the 
horror to unfold? s6 
Africa's reply to -this challenge was groundbreaking. Indeed, the AU's Constitutive Act, 
being the first and only international treaty to contain the right to intervene in grave 
circumstances, raised fundamental questions relevant to international law, particularly 
with respect to the Act's compatibility with traditional concepts such as the key 
provisions in article 2(4) and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, discussed in chapters 
three and four. While the UN's adoption of the responsibility to protect as its own 
response to its past failures is acknowledged in chapter eight, the present chapter 
examines the AU's right to intervene and the move away from the principle of non- 
interference in the affairs of member states to that of non-indifference. Furthermore it 
also demonstrates the manner through which the AU, while paying lip service to the 
UN Charter, sought to broaden the two permitted exceptions to the ban on the use of 
force and awarded itself a new role as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter. 
3 Koffi. Annan, 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist, Sept. 18,1999. 
4 B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act; Non-Interference 
to Non-Intervention, ' International Review of the Red Cross, no. 85,2003. ' See chapters three and eight. 
6 Kofi Annan's speech on 20 September 1999 before the UN General Assembly: Balance State 
Sovereignty with Individual Sovereignty! http: //users. Imi. ncttwfanca/pp. 
_4nnan_on_sov. 
html. 
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B: Aims, Purpose and Structure 
The leitmotiv of the present chapter is to consider African perspectives of international 
law, including how African states have understood, interpreted and applied key 
provisions of the UN Charter, international custom and other general principles of 
international law. Taking in to account the political context in which the major 
provisions were inserted in the Constitutive Act of the AU, the chapter aims to 
ultimately determine whether African agreements were reached at the expense of sound 
legal rules. 
Amongst its major conclusions, it is argued that the AU's right to intervene is not only 
compatible with international law, it also seeks to strengthen the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter. In doing so, the chapter picks up on the AU's envisaged 
system of cooperation between itself and the UN, described in the previous chapter. 
Thereafter, the discussion herein reiterates a key theme of the thesis which perceives 
the envisaged cooperation between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security 
as evidence of great potential that should be tapped from regional organisations. 7 
In order to meet its objectives, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
part begins with the definition and analysis of the concept of intervention and how it 
fits in within the AU's constitutional framework. This will be followed by an article- 
by-article analysis of the key principles of the AU's Constitutive Act and their 
compatibility with established legal rules, in the second section. Finally, having 
demonstrated the relationship with articles 2(4), 53 and 103 of the UN Charter, the last 
section ends with a discussion of the role of sanctions in the overall AU framework and 
its connection with the emerging right to democratic governance. 
1.1 The Background to Article 4 of the Constitutive Act and the intense debate 
It will be recalled from -chapter five that the International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities investigating the causes and atrocities committed during the Rwandan 
genocide blamed African states for their inaction and strongly recommended that the 
OAU 'establish appropriate structures to enable it to respond effectively to enforce 
7 See chapters four, sever4 eight and nine. 
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peace in conflict situations. 8 The call, for the establishment of a new AU was 
subsequently enacted upon in the Sirte Declaration, 9 which was closely followed by 
the drafting of the legal text of the AU contained in the Constitutive Act. Having 
being adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting, in 
Lom6, Togo in July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the AU entered into force on 26 
May 2001, after the 36th depository of instrument of ratification by its member 
states. 10 
As stated above, the establishment of the AU was not only a recognition of the UN's 
ambivalent attitude towards African conflicts but also due to Africa's own internal 
shortcomings. " Hence, in establishing the AU, member states agreed to abide by a 
constitutional framework that obligated all member states to observe certain 
fundamental values, including respect for human rights and democratic governance. 
In addition, it condemned unconstitutional change of governments. 12 As will be 
shown further below, failure to abide by these principles leads to sanctions being 
imposed on defaulting member states. 13 
Most significantly, the breach of fundamental values of African regional law gave the 
AU the right to intervene in 4 member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. 14 Member states would also be able to request intervention from the AU to 
restore peace and security. 15 Although controversial, Maluwa, who was the Legal 
Adviser to the AU at the relevant time, explained the justification for the new thinking 
by Africa leaders, which contradicted the OAU's principled of non-interference and 
challenged universal customary laws of non-intervention: 16 
' Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding events', 2000. 
9 See the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 8-9 
September 1999, Sirte, Libya. EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1 
10 In line with article 36 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
See introduction and chapter five. 
See chapter five. 
13 Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
14 See article 4(h). 
See article 4 6). 
See chapters two, three, five eight and nine. See also article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, article 3 of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. 
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[i]n an era in which post-independence Africa has witnessed the horrors of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing perpetrated on its own soil and against her own 
kind, it would have absolutely amiss for the Constitutive Act to remain silent 
on the question of the right to intervene in respect of such grave circumstances 
as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
17 
In doing so, although the majority of African states agreed to award the AU with the 
right to intervene in grave circumstances, including war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity, Libya led the onslaught in advocating for a wider right to intervene 
that provoked an intense debate. 
18 While Libya's suggestion was far-reaching, as it 
had also sought the inclusion of the right to intervene to deal with situations of a 
'serious threat to legitimate order, ' its proposal was initially rejected by some states as 
'being both premature and potentially dangerous, in the absence of an agreed 
mechanism within the context of the African Union for assessing whether and to what 
extent such a threat existed, and what constituted legitimate order. '19 Furthermore, in 
apparent reference to general international law, delegates notably from the Arab 
Republic of Egypt at the session of the OAU Council advocated for an article 4(h) 
limited to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, which constituted clear 
international crimes. 20 However, in spite of the earlier opposition, Libya's proposal 
was later approved by the Assembly without much deliberation when it adopted the 
draft Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 21 
Thus, the AU's right in article 4 (h) was phrased as follows: 
The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to 
legitimate order to restore peace and stability in the Member State of the 
Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council. 
17 T Maluwa 'Reimagining African unity: Some preliminary reflections on the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union' (2002) 8 African Yearbook ofInternational Law 28. 
'a Tiyanjana Maluwa , 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly? A Note on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union', Netherlands International Law Review, 
Volume 5 1, Issue 02. 
19 Ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 See Doc. Ext Assembly/4/(1): Assembly of the African union, First Extraordinary session, 34 
February, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. See also T. Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste 
Slowly? A Note on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union', Netherlands 
International Law Review, Volume 5 1, Issue 02, (2004). 
234 
The problem with the Constitutive Act of the AU is that, in a similar fashion to the 
UN Charter. ' it does not define what it means by 'intervention' and whether the 
concept includes military measures or whether it is restricted to non-forcible measures. 
Nevertheless, generally speaking, the concept of intervention has been described as 
having a distinct character. 22 Although several definitions exist with regard to 
intervention, these contain minor differences. 23 According to Oppenheim's classical 
description, '[i]ntervention is dictatorial interference by a [s]tate in the affairs of 
another [s]state for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of 
things. 24 Similarly, Hedley Bull terms it as a 'dictatorial or coercive measure, by an 
outside party or parties, in the spheres of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more 
broadly of an independent political community. 
25 
it is clear that military intervention under article 4 of the Constitutive Act would apply 
to 'grave circumstances' which are listed by the Act to include; war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity. This is because these transgressions are normally 
committed in the context of armed conflicts and whose proportionate response would 
arguably require armed force. 
26 However, in addition to outright military intervention 
permissible under the AU framework, the definition of intervention may be broadened 
to include 'political, economic or any other form of coercion. '27 This description is 
clear from the practice of the AU, which has made use of sanctions during situations 
that arguably amount to 'a threat to legitimate order' under the Constitutive Act of the 
AU, as will be shown further below. In using this approach, a uniting thread running 
through the different forms of intervention is the concept of interference in the affairs 
22 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law (London: Longmans, 1996), 
pp. 428-434; and Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use ofForce by States (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), pp. 44-45. 
2' See definitions in R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), p. 3; Lous Jacquet, (ed. ), Intervention in Inter-national Politics, (The 
Hague: Nijhof Press, 197 1), p. 40; Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Boarders: On the Limits and 
Ethical International Politics, (Syracus, University Press, 1981), p. 11. 
24 Oppenheirn, L.: 1905, International Law: A Treatise, (I st edn. Longmans, Green, London), p. 18 1. 
25 Hedley Bull, 1984, Intervention in World Politics, (Oxford University Press, USA), p. 1. 
26 K. Kindiki, 'The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African union Relating to the 
Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Critical 
Appraisal', 3 (1) African Human Rights Law Review Journal (2003). 
21 See The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 
1970. See also the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, 
GA Res. 213 1 (XX) 1965; the 1974 Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) and the 
Resolution on the Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of the Use of Force, GA Res. 42/22, 
1987. 
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of other member states by the AU, regardless of whether it is a forcible or a non- 
forcible measure. 
With this background, a major object of this thesis has been to address the 
fundamental questions raised by the AU's right to intervene, particularly with regard 
to its compatibility with traditional concepts such as the key provisions in article 2(4) 
and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 28 However, before doing so, it is of crucial 
importance to understand the African context before moving on to the broader 
questions of international law, in order to fully understand the origins, 
institutionalisation and dynamics of the right to intervene. Firstly, immediately after 
the AU's establishment, its right to intervene provoked deeply divisive debates 
amongst African scholars and states over the nature, extent and discretion awarded to 
the AU. 
For some, the right to intervene went too far and ought to be rephrased as 
cassistance. 29 One the other hand, some writers argued that it did not go far enough 
and that the decision making process under of article 4(h) should have been expressed 
as an obligation, as opposed to being phrased as a discretion. On this point, Kindiki 
opined that expressing it as a 'right' was unfortunate as it purports to give the Union 
'discretion' to decide whether or not to intervene. 30 However, such a view fails to take 
into account of the fact that it would be due to lack of political will, rather than 
absence of the law 31 that would determined the effectiveness of the AU, as shown in 
chapter nine with regard to the Darfur conflict. In any case, it remains 'doubtful 
" See Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The failures 
of Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union' Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law, Vol. 8, (2004), pp. 237-289. 
29 Tim Murithi, 'Institutionalising Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Values and Principles into 
Policy and Practice', ISS Paper 143, (2007). 
" See also Kithure Kindiki, 'Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur: Legal Dilemmas and Policy 
Imperatives', Monograph 13 1, in Rethinking the Role of the United Nations and the African Union in 
Darfur, Institute of Security Studies, May 2007; K. Kindiki, 'The Normative and Institutional 
Framework of the African union Relating to the Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security, supra note 26; Evarist Bairnu and Kathzyn Sturman, 'Amendment to 
the African Union's Right to Intervene: A Shift From Human Security to Regime Security, ' African 
Security Review 12, no. 2 (2003). 
31 On this point, see Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Generally, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Michael Walzer, 'The Argument about 
Humanitarian Intervention, ' Dissent 49, no. I (Winter 2002), pp. 29-37. 
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whether African states pay attention to such details as to whether they have a right or 
a duty to act in a certain way. 32 
What is relevant here is that, despite the consensus that the AU could intervene where 
the UN had failed, it nevertheless gave the Union a broad margin of discretion in its 
decision making. 33 In this context, in similar fashion to the UN Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the AU's right to intervene was not designed to 
issue the regional organisation with any specific obligation but rather a wide 
discretion to intervene, which in turn is likely to be dictated by regional politics as 
opposed to the law. Meanwhile, as shown below, disagreements emerged with regard 
the compatibility of the AUs right to intervene with African regional norms, 
particularly with respect to the norm of non-intervention. Although the Constitutive 
Act of the AU contains no less that sixteen principles, what follows here is a review 
of some of the key provisions, including articles 4(f), (g), (h) and 0), which touch 
upon and concern the right to intervention within the AUs framework. 
2.1 Article 4(g): Non-interference in the internal affairs of another State 
This article provides for the non-interference by any AU member state in the internal 
affairs of another. Interestingly, the provision in article 4 (g) arguably resembles 
article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which forbids the UN from intervening 'in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. ' Regrettably, the 
Constitutive Act fails to make mention on what constitutes 'internal affairs of 
another, ' which potentially leaves member states 'to give whatever interpretation that 
suits them best. 34 Furthermore, its silence on the matter also begs the question as to 
whether matters that are a threat to peace and security or amount to gross violations of 
human rights should be denied the character of 'internal affairs, ' particularly where 
35 they form the grounds for intervention under the AU framework. 
32 Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene,, supra 
note 30. 
33 See chapter six. 
34 Nsongurua J. Udombana, 'Critical Essay: Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union 
Treaty and Human Rights', Vol. 17, No. 6, American University Law Review, (2002). " On this point, see O. U. Umozurike, Introduction to International Law, (Ibadan Nigeria: Specter 
Books, 1993), p. 235. 
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In addition, on simple reading, article 4(g) seems to be in contradiction with the AU's 
right to intervene as it does not expressly refer to article 4 (h) as an exception. Thus it 
seems to effectively disempower article 4(h) by affirming the 'non interference by any 
member state. 36 However, on a closer analysis, it becomes clear that the stipulation in 
(g) prohibits interference from an AU 'Member State' and not intervention by the AU 
itself. Hence, this provision stands in contrast to article 2 (7) of the UN Charter which 
is expressly addressed to the UN. 37 Therefore, it specifically deals with the relations 
between member states and does not in any way refrain the AU from interfering in the 
38 affairs of member states. From this interpretation, these provisions reject 
unilateralism and favor the regional collective action which is considered to be more 
legitimate. 39 Finally, it clearly reflects the veracity of the international nonn of non- 
intervention which prohibits one state ftom interfering in another. 40 
2.2 Article 4 (f): The Prohibition of the Use of Force or Threat to Use Force 
among Member States of the Union 
Article 4 (f) prohibits the use of force or threat to use force amongst AU member 
states and therefore is a restatement of the ban on the threat or use of force contained 
in article 2 (4) LJN Charter. It will be recalled from chapter three that the prohibition 
on the recourse to use of force lies at the heart of international law and instils a 
fundamental obligation amounting to jus cogens whereby derogation by states is not 
allowed . 
41 Recently, the principles of non-intervention and the ban on the prohibition 
of force have also been reiterated in the recent two African cases concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda 
& Democratic Republic ofthe Congo v Rwanda) in 2005.42 
Furthermore, in support of the prohibition against the use of force, states undertake to 
abide by the objectives of the AU, including to (encourage international cooperation, 
36 Adejo, Dr. Armstrong Matiu 'From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottle? 'Paper prepared for 
presentation at the 10th CODESRIA General Assembly, Nile International Conference Centre, 
Kampala, December 8-12,2002. 
37 See also Kithure Kindiki, 'Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur, ' supra note 30. 38 Jean Allen, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 28. 39 Alex J Bellamy, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Sununit', Ethics & International Affairs 20 (2), (2006), 143-169. 
40 See chapters two, three, five eight and nine. See also article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, article 3 of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. 
41 Gennady M. Danilenko, 'International Jus Cogens: Issues ofLaw-Making, 'EJIL Vol 1 (2) (199 1). " Posted on the ICJ website. 
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taking due account of the [UN] Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 943 The Act also seeks to promote peace, security and stability in Affice 4 and 
to '[p]romote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments. 45 In particular, states undertake to pay respect to the sanctity of human 
life '46 condemn and reject 
impunity47 and shun political assassination, acts of 
terroriSM, 48 and subversive activitieS. 49 
Interestingly however, the Constitutive Act is silent on the exceptions contained in the 
UN Charter, namely self-defence and Chapter VII measures under article 51 and 42 of 
the UN Charter respectively. This lack of reference to the exceptions could be 
interpreted as an emphasis on the AU's mandate to act collectively in self-defence of 
a victim state and individuals during grave circumstances, as suggested in chapter 
four. However, the AU recently acknowledged the role the right to self-defence in its 
Common Policy on Reform of 2005 where it explained that 'any recourse to force 
outside the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 (h) of the AU 
Constitutive Act should be prohibited. 50 
However, the Constitutive Act of the AU, despite paying lip service to the UN Charter 
and its vague references to the Security Council, as shown below, failed to pronounce 
on any obligations it may have under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. With this 
stance standing in sharp contrast to the Constitutive instruments of other major 
51 52 53 
regional organisations, such as the OAS and NATO , the AU's own preparedness 
to exercise its right to intervene under article 4 (h), raised questions regarding to its 
compatibility with the UN Charter. While this specific issue is addressed further 
43 Article 3 (e) Constitutive Act of the AU. 
44 Article 3 (f). 
45 Artcle 3 (h). 
46 ibid. 
47 Article 4 (o). 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
50 See the Common Aftican Position on the Proposed Refor? n of the United Nations, 'the Ezulwini 
Consensus' adopted by the Executive Council of the African Union at the 7 TH Extraordinary Session, 
7- 8 March 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. ExtIEXCL/2 (VII) 
See chapter four. 
See article I of the Charter of the Organisation of American States. 53 See Article I and 7 of the NATO Treaty. 
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below, what follows here is an analysis of the actual right to intervene as envisaged 
under the AU framework. 
2.3 Article 4 (h): Intervention in Respect to Grave Circumstances 
Predictably, article 4(h) is the most controversial as it specifically offers the 
unprecedented right of intervention. Precisely, article 4(h) provides for intervention in 
situations of grave circumstances and in particular, territories where serious crimes 
and human right violations are taking place. Although this seems to be contradicted 
by the principle of non-interference, 54 the latter provision applies between AU states 
and in no way bars the Union acting collectively to halt systematic violations of 
human ri ghtS. 55 
With respect to the grounds of intervention in article 4(h), a common thread originally 
united war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. As shown in chapter one, 
in addition to these crimes having attained the status ofjus cogens, they also form the 
ratione materiae of the Yugoslav 56 and Rwandan 57 International Criminal Tribunals" 
and fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court where they have 
been termed as crimes of 'greatest concern to the international community. '59 What 
aroused considerable debate was the amendment6o to article 4 (h), which added a 
further ground of intervention namely, 'serious threats to legitimate order. ' However 
this ground is discussed under the more appropriate section relating to the emerging 
African regional right to democratic governance. What follows is a discussion of 
other instances that permits intervention under the AU framework. 
2.4 Article 4 0): Intervention in Order to Restore Peace and Security 
This article provides for the 'right of member states to request intervention from the 
Union in order to restore peace and security. ' Questions have arisen as to how this 
54 See article 4 (g) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 55 Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 28. 56 See article 3,4 and 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. 57 See article 2,3 and 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 58 See SC Res. 827 (1993) of 25, May, 1993 and SC Res. 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 on the 
creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. 59 See art 2 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. 60 See article 4, Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union on 03 February and II July 2003. 
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61 
right is to be construed. In particular, could a member state ask the AU to intervene 
in another member state or is intervention limited to states that request the 
intervention themselves? On this question, the AU Assembly, 62 in its Rules of 
Procedure, 63 opted for a narrow interpretation in Rule 4, which reads that the 
Assembly shall '(f) decide on intervention in a Member State at the request of that 
Member State in order to restore peace and security. '64 This is consistent with 
international law's recognition of a government's sovereign right to request for 
external assistance, particularly during armed conflict. 65 
In light of the foregoing, article 4 0) has been 'interpreted in a manner that restricts 
the application of the clause to when an affected member state requests intervention 
, 66 itself, rather than other members states requesting intervention in a third country. 
However, this narrow interpretation seems to be contradicted by the Protocol 
establishing the Peace and Security Council, which maintains the 'right of Member 
States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security in 
accordance with article 40) of the Constitutive Act. s67 
While the former speaks of a 'member state', the latter mentions 'Member States. ' In 
spite of the uncertainty, it is worth noting that with respect to interpretation, while the 
Rules of Assembly are mere internal and thus secondary legislation, the Protocol 
establishing the Peace and Security Council is an international agreement. Therefore 
the latter, being a treaty based on state consent will carry more weight. 68 In any case, 
the question that needs to be asked goes to the legality of such a premise within and 
beyond Africa and whether it is supported by state practice and opiniojuris. Part of 
61 On this question, see Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of 
Force, ' supra note 28. 
6' For illustration on the AU Assembly, see chapter six. 63 See Rule 4 (1) (f) Assembly of the African Union, 'Rules ofProcedure of The Assembly of The Union', First Ordinary Session 9-10 July 2002, Durban South Africa. /2(l) ASS/AU - a. " Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 28. 65 On this point, see McCoubrey & %ite, International Law and Armed Conflict, (Dartmouth, 1992), 
pp. 318-9. See also Louise Doswald-Beck 'The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, ' 1985 British Yearbook ofInternational Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); 
O. Schachter, 'The Rights of States to use Armed Force', 82 Michigan Law Review, (1984), pp. 1620- 1646. 
66 J. Cilliers/ K. Sturman, 'The Right Intervention: Enforcement Challenges for the African Union, 
A, Jýcan Security Review 11 (2002) 29. 
6 See article 4(k) of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. 
6" Article 38 (1) Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945. 
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the answer lay in yet another development arising, unsurprisingly, from the Security 
Council's unwillingness or inability to act in conflicts that threatened regional 
stability. 69 In particular, the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both without 
Council authorisation, under the auspices of ECOWAS were witnessed by AU 
member states that would later be eager to take on board the lessons learnt. 
2.5 The Genesis of the African Regional Right to Intervene: The Impact of 
ECOWAS interventions on State Practice 
The 1990s Africa saw two interventions, in Liberia (1991)70 and Sierra Leone 
(1997)71 that had not been authorised by the United Nations and which remain 
72 controversial. What is more, ECOWAS interventions in West Africa 'gravely 
undermined the sacrosanct tenets guiding international relations among Africa's post- 
independence political leaders. 73 Indeed, this action set in motion what was to later 
play a crucial role in influencing the reformulation of the OAU's cardinal principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. 
74 As Chairman of the OAU, 
President Museveni, who had earlier liberated Ugandans from Idi Amin's regime, 
75 
joined the then OAU Secretary General Salim A. Salim in supporting ECOWAS' 
intervention in Liberia (1991). 76 
"' H. Howe, Ambiguous Order. Military Forces in African States, (Boulder, Cob.: Lynne Rienner, 
2001), p. 136. 
70 On this intervention see Ikechi Mgbeoji, Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, 
and Global Order, (University of British Columbia Press, 2004); Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W, Regional 
Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, ' 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 1994; A., Historical Background to the Liberian 
Crisis in Vogt, M., (ed), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional 
Peacekeeping, (Lagos: Gamburno Publishing, 1992). 
` Berger, Lee F. 'State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine: The ECOWAS 
Intervention in Sierra Leone, ' 11(3) Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 605 (200 1); 
Nowrot, Karsten, et al, 'The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of 
the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, ' 14(2) American University International Law Review 321 
ý1998). 
' On literature looking at both interventions, see Jeremy Levitt, 'Humanitarian Intervention by 
Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ' Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 12, no. '2 (1998); Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, The 
Evolution and Conduct ofECOMOG Operations in West Africa, in Monograph NoA4, Institute for 
Security Studies, (2000). 
73 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 'Towards the new Millennium: ECOWAS' evolving Conflict Management 
System', Aftican Security Review, Vol 9. No 5/6, (2000). 
74 Article 3 of the OAU Charter. 
75 See chapter five. 
76 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 'Towards the new Millennium, ' supra note 73. See generally, M. Weller 
(ed. ), Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (Grotius 
Publications, Cambridge, 1994). 
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During this time, a new interpretation of the territorial principle contained in the 
African Charter took into account of the dignity and worth of the African and rejected 
the formulation of the term 'non-interference as meaning indifference. " 77 This 
reasoning was first utilised following the collapse of President Doe's regime that led 
to the ensuing civil war in Liberia in 1990. Subsequently, the Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established by the 
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Commission to keep the peace, restore order and 
monitor the cease-fire between the government and the rebels. 
78 To some, this 
intervention formed 'the first real attempt by African countries to [re]solve an African 
conflict. 09 It deserves to be mentioned that the UN Security Council, despite not 
having authorised ECOMOG, endorsed the intervention two years later. By way of 
resolution 788 (1992), 80 the Council having determined that the 'deterioration of the 
situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly 
in West Africa as a whole', enforced a complete arms embargo on Liberia. The 
resolution, which has been cited as retrospective authorisation by the Council, 81 
further commended ECOWAS, 'for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability 
in Liberia. 982 
In 1997, ECOMOG was again mandated by ECOWAS to enforce sanctions and 
restore law and order in Sierra Leone following the ousting of the democratically 
elected government that again led to a civil war. As shown further below, on this 
occasion, at the OAU Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe in May 1997, the Council of 
Ministers strayed far away from the very much revered African principle of non- 
interference, and publicly, strongly and unequivocally condemned the coup d'jtdt and 
appealed to the leaders of ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore 
77 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 'Towards the new Millennium,, supra note 73. 79 See ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC. 1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and 
Establishment of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Groups for Liberia, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, August 7,1990; See also D. Wippman, 'Enforcing the Peace; ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War', 
in L. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, (1993), p. 167. 79 The OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, quoted in The Guardian, Nigeria, 08 May 1991. 
See also the African Concord, Nigeria, of 22 April 1991 and Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 'Towards the 
new Millennium, ' supra note 73. 
" See SC Res. 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992 
81 Aoife O'Donoghue, (2005), 'Humanitarian Intervention Revisited', I HanseLR 165-175. 82 SC Res. 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992. 
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constitutional order to the country. " Meanwhile, in addition to the condemnation of 
the coup by the President of the Security Council '84 
its members adopted resolution 
85 1132 (1997), which determined that the situation constituted a threat to regional 
peace and security. Furthermore the Council demanded that 'the military junta take 
immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone. ' Having imposed an embargo on 
the junta, the Council authorised ECOWAS 'to ensure strict implementation of the 
provisions' in regards to the blockade. 
86 As showed further below, ECOMOG 
intervened in 1998 again without Council authorisation reinstalling the democratically 
elected president, which in turn led to questions relating to the emerging right of 
democratic governance in Africa. 87 Meanwhile, the Council welcomed the actions by 
ECOWAS in a presidential statemen t88 and later in resolution 1162 (199 8). 
89 
Although lacking the Security Council's prior authorisation, these interventions found 
legitimacy from the fact that not only was there hardly any criticisms from the 
Council, they had considerable international support especially by member states of 
the OAU. 90 Meanwhile, by 1999, ECOWAS had institutionalised its right to intervene 
by deciding that its newly established Mediation and Security Council could, 
lauthorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on deployment of political 
and military missions. '91 On this point, Abass argues that the ECOWAS Mechanisms 
could be perceived as the 'first attempt by a regional arrangement to pursue a course 
of a completely decentralised collective security. '92 In regard to the reaction of states 
to questions on the apparent usurpation of the Security Council, Ben Kioko, the Legal 
Advisor to the AU, explains that '[i]t would appear that the UN Security Council has 
" Organisation of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session, 28-30 May 1997, 
Harare, Zimbabwe, Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. 1, p. Is 
84 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR, 52nd Session, UN Document 
S/PRST/1997/29 (1997). 
See SC Res. 1132 (1997) of 8 October, 1997., 
SC Res. 1132 (1997) of 8 OctoberI997. 
87 Nowrot, Karsten, et al, 'The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of 
the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone', 14(2) American University International Law Review 321 
(1998). 
" UN Document S/PRST/1998/5. 
"See SC Res. 1162 (1998) of 17 April 1998. 
90 J. Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Intemal Conflicts', supra note 72. 
91 Article 10 (c) ECOWAS, Protocol concerning the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management 
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security 10 December (1999). The Protocol mandates ECOWAS to 
engage in, inter alia preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. 
12 A. Abass, 'The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems', 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 5 No. 2, (2000), pp. 211-229. 
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never complained about its powers being usurped because the interventions were in 
support of popular causes and were carried out partly because the UN Security 
Council had not taken action or was unlikely to do so at the time. 93 
Indeed, the intervention by the ECOWAS in the shape of ECOMOG in Liberia (1991) 
and Sierra Leone (1997) would develop into a customary regional law 94 that would 
later be codified in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Moreover, although contested by 
certain quarters, 95 an emerging African practice led to the position whereby an 
otherwise illegal intervention becomes lawful after an ex-postfacto authorisation. 96 it 
is particularly important to note that with regard to the ECOWAS intervention in 
Liberia (1991) and Sierra Leone (1997), there was hardly any justification as to the 
legality of both operations. These interventions neither put up the traditional argument 
of self-defence nor sought Security Council authorisation. 97 Significantly however, 
there was hardly any condemnation of the intervention. 98 
As mentioned earlier, ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both 
without Security Council authorisation, were witnessed by the draftsmen of the AU's 
right to intervene who would codify the new norm in the Constitutive Act of the AU. 
Therefore, in picking up on the lessons learnt, the AU, while agreeing that the 
'intervention of Regional Organisations should be with the approval of the Security 
Council, ' affirmed that 'in certain situations, such approval could be granted 'after the 
fact' in circumstances requiring urgent action. '99 Therefore, in such situations, the AU 
may intervene, particularly after the Security Council has determined that a situation 
is a threat to international peace and security and thereby remains seized of the matter 
but fails to act due to a deadlock in the Council. 100 Meanwhile, the move away from 
93 B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act, ' supra note 4. 94 On local or regional customary law, see The Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru, 1950 L C. J. 266. 95 E. g. See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use ofForce in International Law, 
(Manchester University Press, 2006). 
96 Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations 
Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council 
and the Use ofForce: Theory and Reality -A Needfor Change? (Martin Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 213-25 1. See also Jeremy L. Levitt., 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Ile Known 
Unknowns', 13 Transnational Law and Contemporaq Problems (2003), 109-37. 
97 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, (Oxford University Press; Second Edition. 
2004). 
9' Ibid. 
99 See the Common African Position on the proposed Reforms of the United Nations, supra note 50. See chapter eight. 
11 A. Abass, 'The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS, supra note 92. 
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the principle of indifference to non-interference exhibited by the ECOWAS 
interventions formed a significant page in Africa's history and would later be 
incorporated in the Constitutive Act of the AU, as shown below'01 
2.6 The AU1 Codification of the African Norm of Intervention: It's Relation to 
Sovereignty and the Question of Consent 
In signing up to the Constitutive Act of the AU, member states abandoned their 
jealously guarded sovereignty and unanimously agreed to attach the condition of 
respect for human rights on their territorial authority. However, despite their 
conscious acceptance allowing the AU to intervene in their territories, it will be 
recalled that the norm of non-intervention is still a cornerstone of international law, 102 
whose breach may entail state responsibility. 103 On the other hand, regardless of the 
sacrosanct nature of this doctrine, it is important to note that the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility contain several circumstances, including that of consent which when 
invoked, would justify an otherwise illegal act. 104 
In this regard, Abass and Baderin explain that what the AU member states contracted 
out of by giving their consent to intervention was the principle of non-intervention. 
Therefore, in ratifying the AU Act, African countries must be understood to have 
$conceded a quantum of their legal and political sovereignty' to the AU. 105 Similarly, 
Naldi and Magliveras, on their part, perceive the right to intervene as 'an obvious 
trend in the Act towards limiting the sacred sovereignty and moving towards 
limiting the direction permitting the involvement of the Union in the domestic affairs 
of participating countries. ' 106 
What is important to note here is that this consent was not to be abused or frivolously 
utilised. Indeed, had the provision allowed such infringement, 'the member states 
101 On this point, see also Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 28. 
102 See chapters two, three and nine. 103 On state responsibility, see chapters one and nine. 104 Article 20, I. L. C. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the 53"d Session, LL. C. (2001), GA. R. 56 Session, Supplement 10. 
105 A. Abass and M. Baderin, 'Towards Effective Collective Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African Union', 49 Netherlands 
international Law Review (2002), 119. 
" Magliveras K. D and Naldi G. J, 'The Affican Union: A New Dawn for Africa', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 5 1, Number 2, (April 2002), pp. 415-425(l 1). 
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would not have agreed to allow the provision in the Act. ' 
107 In this regard, African 
countries, by being state parties to the Constitutive Act, a multilateral treaty, consent 
to the institutional invocation of this right by the appropriate body within the 
Union. 108 Hence, the fact that AU member states consent to intervention by AU in 
clearly defined circumstances would remove responsibility entirely. 
However, article 26 of the ILC Articles invalidates any invocation of consent 
in 
situations involving a peremptory norm of international law. 
109 Hence, the problem 
with the above argument is that the prohibition of the use of force 
in member states, 
being a rule ofjus cogens renders void any consent that African states have given the 
AU to intervene. ' 10 This point is reinforced by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which provides that '[a) treaty is void, if at the time of its conclusion, 
it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. 
"" Furthermore, it 
shall be recalled' 12 that the UN Charter provides that obligations of member states 
113 
under the UN Charter supersede their obligations under any other treaty. 
Therefore, the principles of the AU, from the start, raise fundamental questions 
relevant to international law, particularly in regard to article 2(4) and Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter. For the most part, the question that arises is whether the provisions in 
article 4 of the Constitutive Act, interpreted narrowly or permissively, are in harmony 
with established normative rules of the UN Charter However, it is argued below that 
as shown in chapter four, rather than relying on the internal mechanisms of regional 
arrangements in order to determine an organisation's legality, its is more preferable to 
assess their overall compatibility with the purposes of the UN by examining the 
practice between the UN and the said organisations. 
1 14 
107 K. Kindiki, 'The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African union Relating to the 
Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Critical 
Appraisal', 3 (1) African Human Rights Law Review Journal (2003. 
10 On the means of expressing consent, see article II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969. 
"9 On this point see, Ademola Abass, 'Consent Precluding State, Responsibility: A Critical Analysis', 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2004) 53(l): 211-225. 
"o See also Kithure Kindiki, 'Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur, supra note 26. 
... Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
1" See chapters two and three. 
113 Article 103 of the UN Charter. See chapters three and four. 
114 Cliristine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, supra note 97, p. 287. 
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3.1 The AU's Right to Intervene as Measured against the Prohibition in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter 
The first issue to be considered in this section is with respect to the relationship 
between the AUs right to intervene and the key peremptory norm of international law 
contained in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Although the Constitutive Act of the AU 
does not expressly challenge this norm, its clear lack of reference to its obligations 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which stands in sharp contrast to the OAS and 
NATO, ' 15 raises serious questions as to whether political negotiations within member 
states had been reached at the expense of sound legal rules. 
Hence, unsurprisingly, several commentators conclude that the right to intervene 
under the AU's constitutional framework is at crossroads with the prohibition on the 
use of force found in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 116 Such a conclusion is 
particularly significant given that it will be recalled, 17 that the legality of this ban is 
not only of 'universal validity"18 but has acquired the status of jus cogens'19 and 
thereby constitutes an integral part of a' higher law, ' which is of overriding 
importance and in which no derogation is permitted. 120 
However, chapter four raised the question concerning the extent to which regional 
organisations, including the AU, are bound by certain key provisions of the UN 
Charter. This point is significant because the ban on recourse to force is addressed to 
member states of the UN and not regional organisations, which possess an 
international legal personality that is independent of their member states. 121 
Borrowing from this argument, it will be recalled from the discussion above that it is 
115 See chapter four. 
116 Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. See also chapter three and four. 117 See chapter three. 
118 Peter Malanczuk, A kehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, (7th rev. ed. Routledge, 1997), p. 309. 
119 See Nicaragua v United States ICJ Reports (1986) 14, para 190. See also the Palestinian Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep (2004) para 87. For an appraisal of the Nicaragua Case, see Christenson, 'The World Court and Jus Cogens', 81 American Journal ofInternational Law (1987) 93. See also Ronzitti, 'Use of Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent', in Cassese (ed. ), Developments in 
International Law, the Current Regulation of the Use ofForce, (Brill Academic Publishers, 1986) 
147; Weisburd, 'The Emptiness of the Concept ofJus Cogens, as Illustrated by the law Bosnia- 
Herzegovina', Michigan Journal ofInternational Law (1995-6) 591. See also Gennady M. Danilenko, 'International Jus Cogens: Issues ofLaw-Making, 'supra note 41. "' Article 53 of the Vienna Convection on the Law of Treaties 1969. 121 Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949) 174. See 
also chapter four. 
248 
the AU, and not member states that are assigned the right to intervene. Hence, the AU 
arguable escapes from the dictates of article 2(4) of the UN Charter. But the problem 
with this argument is that the international law rules relating to the use of force are 
not dependent upon any distinction between a state and a regional organisation. 122 
Indeed, 'it can hardly be maintained that States can avoid compliance with 
peremptory norms by creating an organization. ' 123 Therefore, the general 
understanding is that there is currently is no legal right of states or regional 
organisations to forcefully intervene in violation of article 2(4) for humanitarian 
reasons or due to defects of the UN system, notwithstanding there may be a moral 
right to intervene in such circumstances. And although the AU's right is grounded on 
member states' prior consent to intervention, the Vienna Convention 124 and the ILC 
Articles 125 invalidate any notion of consent in situations involving a peremptory norm 
of international law, including the one found in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Nonetheless, it has been suggested that only parts of article 2(4) of the UN Charter are 
jus cogens. 126 In this regard, a distinction has been made between coercive use of 
force and a consensual use of force. In this context, it has strongly been argued that 
while the prohibition in article 2 (4) of the UN Charter prohibits the former, it does 
not restrict the latter. 127 Following this reasoning, in signing up to the Constitutive Act, 
AU member exercised permissible sovereign rights which allows them to 
consensually authorisc the AU to use force on their territories. This argument is based 
on the rccognised rights of states, in the absence of a civil war, to request for 
intervention. 128 
122 On this point, see chapter three. 
123 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, A/37/10, II 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1982), Part Two, at 56. 124 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 1969. 
125 Article 26 ILC Draft Articles supra note 104. 126 Rein Milllerson, 'Jus Ad Bellum: Plus Qa Change (Le Mo'nde) Plus C'Est La Meme Chose (Le Droit) T, Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2002) 7(2): 149-190 ; Adernola Abass, 'Consent Precluding State Responsibility, ' supra 109. 
127 Adernola Abass, 'Consent Precluding State Responsibility, I ibid. See also David Wippman, 'Treaty. Based Intervention: Who Can Say NoT, University of Chicago Law Review, (1995). 128 On this point, see O. Schachter, 'The Rights of States to use Armed Force, ' supra note 65; if. McCoubrey & N. D White, International Law and Armed Corflict, supra note 65, pp. 318-9. See also Louise Doswald-Beclc, 'The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, ' 
supra note 65. 
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Regardless of the above, it needs to be emphasised that even if the whole ban on the 
use of force amounts tojus cogens, the AU's right of intervention does not discount 
the status of article 2(4) of the UN Charter as a peremptory norm but is framed with 
the intention of broadening the rule in order to halt human rights situations that give 
rise tojus cogens violations and erga ormnes obligations. 129 Here, it is argued that the 
lack of hierarchy of these nonns, as shown in chapter one, means that the AU has 
some discretion in event of a conflict between fundamental rules of international law. 
In this regard the AU, while seemingly acting in apparent violation of article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter, would actually be complying with other international criminal law 
obligations that mandate the Union to halt the international crimes of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, in order to restore peace and security in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. In this context, given the 
criticisms 130 that the UN provisions on the protection of human rights are 'relatively 
few and far between, ' 131 it could be argued the AU's right of intervention is Africa's 
attempt to rectify this defect. 
Furthermore, such an interpretation would set right the shortcoming in article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter, which merely prohibits the use of force by states in 'international 
relations' and therefore does not specifically address conflicts within states, such as the 
Darfur conflict, where gross human rights violations take place as rebel factions 
challenge the authority of the government. 132 In this context, it will be recalled that 
article 2 (4) is limited to inter-state conflict and thus does not extend to internal wars 
which are arguably out of reach of the Charter's provision. 133 Therefore, it could thus be 
argued the AU right of intervention is Africa's attempt to remedy this flaw by 
interpreting the ban on the use of force to cover internal wars involving grave 
circumstances. 
"' For example Genocide. See Advisory Opinion of the International Court ofJustice on Reservations 
to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I. C. J. 1,15 
(May 28); Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,1948, 
78 U. N. T. S. 277. M Cherif Bassiouni, 'International crimes: Jus cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes' 
(1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 63,66. See also Raphael Lemkin, 'Genocide as a crime 
under international law' (1947) 41(l) American Journal ofInternational Law 145,197. 130 E. g. A. Abass and M BadcrinTowards Effective Collective Security and Human Rights Protection 
in Africa, ' supra note 105. 
131 N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Rights to the UN Security Council', in 
Mashood A. Baderin, Robert Mccorquodale, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 89. 
132 See chapter three, four and nine. 
133 Yorum Dinstein, War, Aggression and Sey-*Defence, (Cambridge University Press), 1992, p. 80. 
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Moreover, the AU, in its actions, would not infringe the territorial integrity or 
political independence of states, given that the right to intervene is consciously 
awarded to the AU by its member states. 134 However, in spite of the foregoing, it 
deserves to be recalled that the rationale and reasoning behind such intervention was 
not only rejected by the ICJ in the Corfu Channe1135 and Nicaragua 136 cases, it has 
also been repudiated by notable academics 137 who favour an all encompassing 
interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
However, the emphasis on the circumstances allowing for the AU's intervention 
merits further discussion as the viewpoints held above may have been overtaken by 
events, particularly where states issue their consent to intervention in pursuit of more 
fundamental values. In this regard, in order to prevent and halt the commission of war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, the AU's right to take action 
&presumes prior consent by every member state of the AU to the effect that the Union 
is allowed to intervene in their respective territories. ' 138 At this point it is interesting 
to note that in the 2005 World Summit Document, 139 which led to the adoption of the 
responsibility to protect, 140 the world leaders did not include the words 'against 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state' when reiterating the norm 
in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Instead, it was agreed that the AU's grounds of 
134 K. Kindiki, 'The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African union Relating to the 
Protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, ' supra note 26; 
Kithure Kindiki, 'Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur, ' supra note 30. For wider literature in 
regard to this reasoning see eg. William M. Reisman, 'Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in 
International Law', 10 Yale Journal ofInternational Law and Policy 279 (1985); William M. Reisman, 
'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 American Journal of 
International Law, 866, (1990). 
135 Corfu Channel Case, Pleadings, Vol III, p 296. See Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 
(Manchester University Press, 1958), p. 152; Simma B., (ed. ), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, ( Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 106; Waldock, 'The Regulation 
of the Use of Force by Individual Stated in International Law', 81 Recueil des Cours (1952)415. 
136 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Mcar. v. US. ), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ Rep. 392 June 27,1986. 
137 See e. g., Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use ofForce Between States, supra note 22; Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 133; Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard 
Haffibro & Anne P. Simons, 'Charter of the United Nations', in Luis Henkin, International Law: 
politics Values and Functions, 216, Recueil Des Cours De La Academie De Droit International 9 
(1989-IV); Oscar Schachter, International Law in 77ieory and Practice, Springer, (I edition, 199 1). 138 K. Kindiki, 'The Normative and Institutional Framework of the African union Relating to the protection of Human Rights and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, ' supra note 26. 139 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, U. N. Doe A/60/L. I 
(Sept. 20,2005). 
I" See chapter eight. 
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intervention warrant action by the 2005 World Summit Document, which is discussed 
in chapter eight. 
According to the Legal Adviser of the AU at the relevant time, the original proposal 
to incorporate the right to intervene was heavily debated and its limitation to 'grave 
circumstances' was agreed upon in order for the Constitutive act of the AU to be in 
line with the rapidly developing international criminal law. 141 In this context, as 
shown in the opening chapter, the peremptory nature of war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity means that their violation entail aggravated state 
responsibility. 142 Their special status in turn imposes a positive duty on states to take 
positive measures to bring the violation to an end. 143 While bearing in mind that the 
Articles on State Responsibility do not expressly refer to intervention in this regard, 
neither do they expressly forbid the latter. 144 Therefore, while making note of 
Brownlie's perception of the relative inedibility of peremptory rules, such as that 
found in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it is submitted that the wide acceptance of the 
AU's right to intervene, so long as it is backed by state practice and proof of opinio 
juris, amounts to the formation of a subsequent customary rule. 145 Indeed, the Asylum 
Case 146 acknowledged international law's recognition of regional customary law such 
as that emerging from the developing practice on intervention invoked on the African 
continent in support of collective peace and security. 
141 See Maluwa Tinanjana, 'The OAU/African Union and International Law: Mapping New Boundaries 
of Revising Old Terrain, 'ASIL Proceedings, 98, (2004)232 at 236. On the development of international 
criminal law, see generally, Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, (Oxford University Press; 
2Rev Ed edition, 2008); William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 
(Cambridge University Press; 3 edition, 2007); Gerhard Werle, Florian Jessberger & Wulf Burchards, 
Principles ofInternational Criminal Law, (Asser Press, 2005); Alexander Zahar and Goran Sluiter, 
International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Cherif 
M. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 
2003); Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System ofInternational Criminal Law: Developments in 
Codification and Implementation, (Kluwer, 1997). 
142 Article 40, I. L. C. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 104. See chapter eight. 
143 Article 41, I. L. C. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 
104. 
'44 See chapter eight. 
145 L Brownlie, Principles ofInternational Law, (Oxford University Press, USA; 6 edition 2003), p. 488. 
146 See the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I-C. J. 266. 
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3.2 The AU's Right to Intervene and its Compatibility with Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter: In Conflict or Cooperation? 
The provisions in article 4 of the Constitutive Act also raised fundamental questions 
with respect to article 53 of the UN Charter as well as its relationship with the 
universal role played by the Security Council in its 'primary responsibility to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. ' 147 Muluwa observes that although 
'some delegations implicitly raised the problem of reconciling' the right to intervene 
'with the requirement of prior authorization by the United Nations Council of 
enforcement action by regional organizations or arrangements under article 53 of the 
UN Charter, the issue was not as such addressed in these debates. ' 148 Ben Kioko, 
Legal Adviser to the Union confirms the reason being that: 
When questions were raised as to whether the Union could possibly have 
the inherent right other than through the Security Council, they were 
dismissed out of hand. This decision [to provide for right to intervene] 
reflected a sense of frustration with the slow pace of reform of the 
international order, and with instances in which the international 
community tended to focus attention on other9parts of the world at the 
expense of more pressing problems in Africa. 14 
However, in spite of the above, the AU's right to intervene without clearly 
subordinating itself under the Security Council nor outlining its obligations under 
Chapter VIII was hotly contested by legal commentators who perceived it as 'the first 
true blow to the constitutional framework of the international system established in 
1945 predicated on the ultimate control of the use of force' by the Security 
CoUnCil. 150 At this point, it is interesting to note that African leaders had themselves 
previously denounced regional intervention involving the use of force and stressed 
the primacy of the Security Council. 151 
This position was clearly manifest in Africa's reaction to NATO's intervention of 
Kosovo in 1999, where Namibia voted with Russia and China in condemning the 
147 See article 24 (1) of the UN Charter. 
148 Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, 'supra note 21, 149 See B Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act, ' supra note 4. '50 Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force', supra note 28. '51 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect?, ' supra note 39. 
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action, which was publicly shared by both South Africa and Nigeria. 
152 Here, Africa 
noted 'with grave concern, the growing marginalisation' of the UN and its role of the 
maintenance of international peace and security' and declared that the unilateral use 
of force, outside the duly conferred mandate of the Council, 'opens the way to 
practices inimical to world peace and security. ' 153 Similarly, although post-Cold War 
practice shows that regional organisations have increased their tendencies to adopt 
enforcement measures without Council authorisation, the increasing propensity by 
regional agencies to take up enforcement roles has been met with protests and 
objections from commentators. 154 
These arguments have led scholars such as Gazzini to conclude that the right to 
intervene embodied in the evolving African regional security, under organisations 
such as the AU and ECOWAS is scarcely compatible with the UN Charter and any 
enforcement by the AU, without authorisation by the Council, would be illegal 
despite its legitimacy under article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. "5 The scepticism 
behind the legality of the AU's right to intervene also seems to be line with the UN 
reforms contained in the 2005 World Summit Document, 156 as well as the earlier UN 
High-Level Report, 157 which seek to centralise the military interventions in the 
Security Council as envisaged during the UN's inception back in 1945.158 
However, an alternative reading of the AU framework would resist such strict 
interpretations of the UN Charter. Bearing in mind that the UN Charter is 'not static, 
152 Philip Nel, 'South Africa: The Demand for Legitimate Multilateralism, ' in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur, eds., Kosovo and the Challenge ofHumanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, 
Collective Action and International Citizenship (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2000), pp. 245-59. 
"' Algiers Declaration, 12-14 Jul. 1999, O. A. U. Doc. AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXV) (1999). 
154 E. g see Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, supra note 
95, p. 114.; A Gioia, 'The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and 
Security, ' in M. Bothe/N. Ronzittie/A. Rosas, The maintenance ofpeace and security: conflict 
prevention, crisis management andpeaceful settlement ofdisputes, (The Hague, London, Boston, 
Kluwer Law international, 1997), p. 197; C. Walter, 'Security Council Control over Regional Action', 
Max Planck UNYB 1, (1997), p. 129. 
... See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use offorce in International Law, supra note 95, 
P; 6114. 2005 World Summit, supra note 139. 
157 See the Report of the United Nations, A More Secure World., Our Shared Responsibility, Report of 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004. See also ICISS, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, (Ottawa, International Development Research Council, 2001). 
"' See chapter eight. 
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and is open to adapt to emerging norms of international law,, ' 59 a rejection of a 'static 
vision of the Charter (in]favour of a more flexible and mainly inductive approach 
based on the analysis of the practice of states' 160 would resist a strict textual 
interpretation of the Charter. In its place, a preferable approach would be based on the 
understanding that the UN Charter is to be interpreted bearing in mind 'any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation. ' 161 
In this regard, it will be recalled that a regional customary right had emerged in Africa 
primarily due to the deficiency of the UN system. In spite of the lack of UN 
authorisation, the African interventions in West Africa, referred to above, received the 
support of the Security Council and the wider international community. And in 
demonstration of the special customary nature of the right of intervention, its 
acceptance by Africa and the international community stood in sharp contrast to 
NATO's military attack on Kosovo (1999). 162 In the African context, UN Security 
Council has hardly complained with regard to the usurpation of its powers by the AU 
and has instead, routinely retrospectively ratified African state practice that would 
otherwise be unlawful. And as with ECOWAS interventions in West Africa, 
described above, a tacit authorization is possible and may be manifest in the Council's 
inaction, silence and quiet support of an AU action, in urgent situations. 163 Combined 
with the arguments outlined earlier with regard to the emergence of the AU's right to 
intervene as a regional customary law, it is submitted that the African constitutional 
framework arguably amended and developed the collective security system, as shown 
throughout this study. Indeed, the AU has sought to vary the peremptory norms that 
lie at the heart of the international system through the prioritisation of the 
fundamental freedoms against war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
159 Case Concerning the GabcEDkovo-Nagymaros Project (HungarylSlovakia), 37 ILM 162 (1998). 
See also the Namibia (Legal Consequences) Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 3 1. 
See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use ofForce in International Law, supra note 95, I and 123.1 
See article 31 (3) (b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
162 See chapter three. 
163 See the Common Aftican Position on the Proposed Refom of the United Nations, supra note 50. See A Chayes, 'Law and the Quarantine of Cuba', Foreign Affairs, 41 (196-63), 550; L. C. Meeker, 
'Defensive Quarantine and the Law', AJIL 57,1963,515; M. Dettati, 'Les prernieres lecons du Kosovo',. Le Courrier de. I'IJNESCO,. juillet-aout (1999), 60. 
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Meanwhile, it needs to be emphasised here that in possessing the right to intervene, 
the AU hardly seeks to challenge the authority of the UN but on the contrary, is more 
readily prepared to act upon future Security Council mandates through its possession 
of the right to intervene. Therefore, as ECOWAS practice demonstrates, the AU can 
act during situations involving 'grave circumstances' and address gross violations of 
human rights should the Council be unable or unwilling to act decisively. In other 
words, although the Council's authorisation of AU action should preferably be 
express, such approval would also include the Council's tactical acceptance 'after the 
fact. ' 164 Although there is clearly no guarantee of getting ex post facto approval, this 
interpretation is based in the Council's practice in regard to regional action in Africa, 
particularly its acquiescence in ECOWAS operations in West Africa. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the foregoing arguments, there are more issues with regard to the overall 
relationship between the AU and the UN that need further examination and 
clarification, as shown below. 
3.2 The Relationship between the AU's Right to Intervene and Article 103 of the 
UN Charter 
Although this thesis takes the premise that the AU framework is compatible with 
international law and that it indeed seeks to strengthen the principles and purposes of 
the UN Charter, it deserves to be mentioned that reservations have also been made 
with regard to its potential conflict with the UN Charter. On this point, Rudolf 
Bernhardt comments that the special status of the territorial integrity of all states and 
the prohibition of the use of force would render any agreement amongst regional 
arrangements permitting forceful intervention incompatible with the Charter and 
165 would fall under article 103. 
However, the problem with this position is that it ignores the fact that article 103 is 
addressed to states and not regional arrangements, which have a legal personality that 
is independent of their members, as shown in chapter four. Secondly, and in any case, 
the position by Bernhardt is'subject to dispute because it is one thing to doubt the 
compatibility of the AU's framework with the UN and another to rule on its 
I" See the Common. 4frican Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 50. 165 R. Bernhardt, 'Article 103', in Simirm et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1297. 
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lawfulness or validity. 166 In this context, it needs to be pointed out that article 103 
does render void any incompatible international agreement but merely sets it aside to 
the extent of the conflict. 167 
Furthermore, even supposing that it purported to do so, it is argued that the UN 
Charter would not prevail with regard to AU's right to intervene because article 103 
does not apply to conflicts between the Charter and customary international law. 
168 
As mentioned above, the Constitutive Act of the AU is not merely a treaty but also 
amounts to a codification of African regional principles founded on sufficient practice 
to acquire the status of special regional customary law. Moreover, as argued in 
chapter four, article 103 cannot be interpreted as being able to override the 
peremptory norms against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, which 
the AU seeks to protect. 169 Finally, as argued earlier and in the last chapter, the AU 
does not deny but, on the contrary, acknowledges and reinforces the primacy of the 
UN in maintaining international peace and security. In any event, it also argued that 
the cooperation between the AU and the UN, when operative, has the potential to 
render the invocation of article 103 to be of little practical significance. 170 
"' Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations 
Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council 
and the Use offorce, supra note 96, pp. 213-25 1; Levitt, J. I., 'The Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, ' supra note 96. 
167 Karl Zemanek, 'General Course on Public International Law, ' Recueil des Cours, vol. 266 (1977), p. 
230; Michael Wood, 'The Security Council and the 'Constitutionalization' of International Law', 
Paper, University of Leeds, 14 March 2007. Available at 
http: //www. law. leeds. ac. uk/leedslaw/webdocs/leedslaw/uploadeddocuments/cfig-wood. doc; Jeremy L. 
Levitt, I The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council: 
The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use of 
Force, ' supra note 96. 
"" Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations 
Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council 
and the Use of Force, ' ibid; N. D. White, 'The Applicability of Economic and Social Rights to the UN 
Security Council, ' in Mashood A. Baderin& Robert Mccorquodale, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Action, supra note 13 1. See also See El Erian, 'The Legal Organization of the International 
Society', in M. Sorensen, ed., Manual ofPublic International Law. (London, Macmillan 1968), pp. 79. 
80; Gardarr4 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action', 17 Michigan JIL 
(1996) 302; Zemanek, 'The Legal Foundations of the International System. General Course on Public 
international Law'266 RCADI (1997), 230; R Bernhardt, 'Article 103', in Sinuna (ed), The Charter of 
The United Nations. A Commentary', supra note 165. 
169 On article 103 and peremptory norms, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, 'The Impact of Peremptory 
Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions', 
European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 16 (2005) No. I. See also Alexander Orakhelashvili, 
Peremptory Norms in International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
"o See chapters four. 
257 
However, a theoretical example would be where there is disagreement between the 
AU and the UN Security Council. Such a possibility is hardly far fetched given 
Africa's position contained in the Ouagadougou Decision, which saw the OAU's 
concerted defiance of the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Libya in 
connection to the Lockerbie bombings. 17 'However, during this instance, it can be 
argued that Africa was expressing its disapproval of the controversial sanctions 
imposed on Libya as opposed to questioning the authority of the UN. Indeed, as 
shown below, in awarding sanctions a key role within its framework, the AU seeks to 
fill some of the well acknowledged gaps that exist within the UN system. 
In this context, it is the emerging relationship of cooperation between the two 
organisations that should lie at the heart of the debate, rather than treating the two as 
possibly in contest. As shown in the previous chapter, the AU does not challenge the 
UN Charter but instead seeks to 'forge closer cooperation and partnership between 
the United Nations, other international organizations in the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. ' 172 Having analysed the 
framework of intervention in the grave circumstances discussed above the latter point 
is important in discussing the further ground of intervention under the AU framework. 
The distinction between the AU's right to intervene in cases of war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity is particularly important given the difficulty that has 
emerged with regard to the extent to which the latter can be reconciled with 
intervention in 'situations that amount to a serious threat to legitimate orden', 
3.4 The AU's Right to Intervene In Respect of 'Serious Threat to Legitimate 
Order' and its Relationship with the African Right to Democratic Governance 
As shown above, while the grave circumstances outlined in the right to intervene were 
agreeable to the majority of states and scholars, the inclusion of a further ground 
stirred immediate concerns with regard to what amounts to serious threat to legitimate 
order. 173 Given that it had not been defined in the Constitutive Act or in subsequent 
protocols, the main question that emerged was: a) does it refer to internal order of 
member states or international order and; b) what does 'legitimate order' itself entail? 
171 T. Maluwa, 'Reimagining African Unity, I supra note 18, See chapter five. 172 The preamble to the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. See also article 17. 173 Evarist Baimu & Katlu)m Sturman, Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene, ' supra note 30. 
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Furthermore, it is also not clear whether there has to be a nexus between 'serious 
threat to legitimate order' and the wider threat to regional peace and security for any 
resort to intervention. Indeed, the phrase 'threats to legitimate order' remains radically 
different from the three crimes underlined above and has not been defined as an 
international crime in treaties. 174 This lack of definition further means that it cannot be 
measured against those crimes that are of the highest concern to the international 
community. 
In the broader context, Baimu and Sturman make special note of the threat to legitimate 
order as a ground for intervention. They argue that allowing the AU to intervene in 
situations amounting to 'serious threat to legitimate order' broadens the grounds of 
intervention much wider than is envisaged by the UN Charter and is remote from the 
objective of promoting regional peace and security. "' According to this reasoning, the 
legitimacy of AU intervention under this ground thus rests on 'shaky grounds' and is 
hardly consistent with the purpose of the UN. Furthermore, the insertion of this 
provision has been interpreted as 'signifying [an] expensive attempt to avoid conceding 
to controversial or regressive amendments to the Constitutive Act while keeping an 
influential and potentially troublesome [Libyan] Member State 'inside the OAU 
tent. " 176 
However, on this point, two interrelated justifications are put forward by the AUs first 
and second Legal Advisers. Firstly, Ben Kioko justifles the amendment to be a residual 
clause that allowed the AU to 'decide on intervention in situations where the provision 
relating to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is not applicable, but 
where the situation nevertheless waiTants the intervention. ' 177 This raises the question 
as to what criteria would be utilised in the relevant circumstances. On this point, 
Maluwa argues that the policy organs would 'necessarily be guided by other relevant 
norms and instruments, ' 178 of which he gives the examples of the Lome Declaration on 
174 ibid. 
175 ibid. 
176 ibid. 
177 B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act' supra note 4. 178 Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'Fast-Tracking African Unity or Making Haste Slowly?, ' supra note 2 1. 
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the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government 179 
and the Declaration Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. 180 
According to Maluwa, both of the aforementioned Declarations may provide guidance 
and shed light on the meaning of a 'serious threat to legitimate order. ' Furthermore, he 
observes that the absence of a definition of what constitutes a threat to legitimate order 
'is not, as such, the most critical issue' as an analogy could be found in the UN Charter 
which does not define what constitutes the terms 'threat to peace, ' 'breach to peace, ' or 
'act of aggression. ' Therefore, the lack of a definition notwithstanding, what constitute 
these terms may be inferred from the practice of the AU itself, the General Assembly 
and the Security Council. 181 
Moreover, the coming to effect of the African Court of Justice, which is the 'principle 
judicial organ of the Union, ' 182 may assist in the interpretation and application of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU and all subsidiary legal instruments, including what would 
amount to a serious threat to legitimate order. 183 Alternatively, the AU Assembly 
which is chief decision-making body could rule on what would qualify as a threat to 
legitimate order. 184 However, there exists the worry that the perceived threat could be 
utilised as a pretext for intervention for other political reasons hence violating the 
very principles the Union seeks to uphold. Furthermore, serious doubts have also been 
expressed over whether progressive interpretation of such provision can be expected 
from the Assembly given the tendency of African leadership to stick together. ' 85 
On their part, Packer and Rukare warn that this provision could be subject to abuse by 
governments who may request an AU intervention in order to keep them in power in 
the face of popular rebellion. 186 It is in this context that the provision was described as 
1'9 Lom6 Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes 
of government (AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI). 
180 See African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, 
AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVIII), 2002. 
'81 Ibid. 
182 Article 2 (2) the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union. 183 Article 19 of the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union. 184 Article 7 of the Constitutive Act and Rule 18 of Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. '83 Evarist Baimu & Kathryn Sturman, Amendment to the African Unioifs Right to Intervene, ' supra note 30. 
I" C Packer and Rukare, 'The New African union and its Constitutive Act, 96 American Journal of International Law (2002), 372. 
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backward step and has been criticized as amounting to a shift from'human security tq 
regime security. 187 This is because the provision 'could actually provide cover for 
Africa's celebrated dictators to continue to perpetrate human rights abuses, '188 such as 
those reported in countries such as Sudan 189 and Zimbabwe. 190 However, in response 
to this argument, Ben Kioko disagrees and expresses the view that in deciding on 
intervention, African leaders would be bound to adhere to the Constitutive Act, the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Solemn Declaration and 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability and 
Development in Africa. 191 As mentioned in chapter six, these instruments mandate the 
AU to provide for human security based on due process and democratic principles in 
line with the aspiration of African peoples. 
Having said so, for now, until a criteria is agreed upon, what ultimately amounts to a 
serious threat to legitimate order will be determined by the discretion arrived at by 
consensus or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority of members eligible to vote in the 
Assembly. 192 Nevertheless, as shown further below, there is sufficient practice to 
suggest that the AU is likely to intervene in practice by way of sanctions in situations 
that appear to amount to threats to legitimate order due to the breach of democratic 
principles. Given this background, what follows is a brief discussion on the role of 
sanctions under the AU framework of peace and security. 
3.5 The Function of Sanctions in the Promotion of Peace and Security In Africa 
A key feature within the AU's constitutional framework is the function of sanctions as 
a mechanism of enforcing the goals of the Union. It will be recalled that in 
establishing the AU, member states agreed to abide by a constitutional framework that 
obligated all member states to observe certain fundamental values including respect 
for human rights, democratic governance and condemned unconstitutional change of 
187 Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union! s Right to Intervene, ' supra 
note 30. ... Nsongurua J. Udombanas 'Critical Essay, ' supra note 34. 
See chapter nine. 
See Masipula Sithole, 'Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, ' Journal ofDemocracy 12 (2001), 
162-163. 
191 B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act, ' supra note 4. " Article 7 of the Constitutive Act and Rule 18 of Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. On this point, 
see Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, 'Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene's 
supra note 30. 
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governments. Failure to abide by these principles would lead to sanctions'93 being 
imposed on the defaulting member states. In particular, article 23 (2) of the 
Constitutive Act provides that the failure to comply with decisions and policies of the 
AU may be subjected to 'sanctions, such as the denial of transport and 
communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political 
and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly. ' 
In contrast to countermeasures which are taken by states, sanctions are non-forcible 
measures taken by international organisations. 194 It is undisputed that universal 
organisations such as the UN 195 can legally impose sanctions. ' 96 However, questions 
arise as to whether a regional organisation may legally impose sanctions as an 
enforcement measure without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. On this 
point, it is argued that 'Article 53 UN Charter seemed to provide that any non-forcible 
measure taken by regiohal organizations that amounted to 'enforcement action' would 
require the authorization of the Security Council. ' 197 
However, in practice, as with military interventions, the determining factor of legality 
of sanctions as enforcement action by a regional organisation has traditionally been 
decided by the position taken by the Security Council and the wider international 
community. 198 This is clear from the OAS recommendation that its member states 
impose sanctions on Haiti in 1991, which was agreed upon without seeking Security 
Council authorisation. 199 In this instance, there was hardly any criticism by the 
international community on the usurpation of the Council's powers by the regional 
organisation. Also, this view is supported by the evidence provided by the East 
African Community's trade and economic sanctions on Burundi in 1996 which, 
despite lacking Security Council authorisation, were endorsed and supported by the 
193 For a discussion on the meaning of sanctions, see Nigel D. White & Ademola Abass, 
'Countermeasures and Sanctions' in Malcolm D. Evans (ed. ), International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 524. 
194 ibid, P. sog. 
'95 See chapter three and nine. See also article 41 UN Charter. 
196 See chapter three. 
'9'N. D. White & Ademola Abass, 'Countermeasures and Sanctions' in Malcolm D. Evans (ed. ), 
International Law, supra note 193 p5 11. 
19' See above and chapter four. 
199 OAS doc. MRE/RES. 1/91, OAS Ser. FN. 1,3 October 1991. 
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OAU . 
200 As shown below, in the recent past, the AU has taken a strong stance and 
imposed sanctions on member states, without seeking Council authorisation in regard 
to the violation of respect for democratic governance. 
3.6 The Emergence of an African Regional Right to Democratic Governance 
In the July 2000 Summit in Togo, the AU Assembly adopted the Lome Declaration 
on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
governments. 201 This Declaration was highly significant because the post-colonial era 
had seen the 48 states of sub-Saharan Africa experience 80 successful and 108 failed 
coups d6tats between 1956 and 2001.202 Despite the fact that Article 111 (5) of the 
OAU Charter prohibited 'subversive activities, ' military coups were predominant. 
The prevalence of coups was largely due to OAU's principles of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of its members as evidenced in the statement by the Ugandan 
representative in 197 1: 
The question of a change in government in one country is purely an internal 
matter which is not the concern of the OAU. Twenty member states of the 
OAU which are now taking their seats in the OAU conference have had 
changes of government through coups and counter-coups. We strongly feel 
that if the OAU tries to involve itself in the internal affairs of member states, 
it is going to destroy itself. 203 
However the series of coups ditats in Sierra Leone during the 1990s brought a 
drwnatic change in the OAU's response to military take-overs. 204 This transformation 
reached its watershed when the democratically elected President Ahmed Kabbah was 
ousted in a coup orchestrated by Anned Forces Revolutionary Council in May 1997. 
As mentioned above, this coup was widely condemned internationally and the OAU 
argued that other states had a duty not to cooperate with the junta. 205 Subsequently, 
Kabbah's government was restored nine months later after the intervention of 
200 B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the Affican Union's Constitutive Actý' supra note 4. 201 Lom6 Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes 
of government (AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI). 202 Patrick J. McGowan, 'African military coups dl&ats, 1956-2001', Journal ofModern African 
Studies, 41,3 (2003), pp. 339-70. 
"' Claude Welch Jr., 'The OAU and human rights: toward a new definition', Journal ofModern 
African Studies, 19,3 (198 1), p. 404. 
204 Paul D. Williams, 'The African Union's Emerging Security Culture: Options for U. S. 
Policyrnakers', Centrefor Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Forum, (July 2007). 
205 Decisions Adopted by the 66th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, CM/Dec. 330- 
363 (LXVI), Dec. 356 (1997). 
263 
ECOMOG, which had been mandated by ECOWAS to enforce sanctions and restore 
law and order in Sierra Leone. 206 
The OAU later took a common position on military takeovers at its Harare Summit 
meeting in 1997.207 This was followed by the Algiers decision on Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government (1999). 208 Subsequent to the Lome Declaration mentioned 
above, African leaders passed the 'Declaration on the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa' 209 in 2002. All these declarations reiterated that 
governments which came to power through unconstitutional means would not be 
allowed to take part in the activities of the AU. 210 Significantly, the Constitutive Act, 
in contrast to the OAU Charter, introduced and affirmed the respect for democratic 
principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. 21 'However, a key 
problem with the Constitutive Act is that it failed to define what constitutes an 
unconstitutional change of governments. This meant that reliance would have to be 
placed on other formulae, such as that found in the Declaration on the Framework for 
an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Governments of 2000.212 
The AU's commitment to ensure the strict adherence to democratic principles is 
evident in the sanctions imposed against governments that come to power through 
unconstitutional means. 213 In practice, this principle has since been applied in respect 
to the African states of Togo and Mauritania which were suspended from the Union 
subsequent to a series of coups in 2005 as will be shown below. Meanwhile, it 
deserves to be reitcratea that the AU's recent practice on the matter stands in sharp 
"6 See above. 
207 Organisation of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session, 28-30 May 1997, 
Harare, Zimbabwe, Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. 1, p. 18. On this position, see Jakkie 
Cilliers, 'Commentary: Towards the African Union', African Security Review Vol 10 No 2,200 1. 
208 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government adopted by the Assembly of Heads 
of State, AHG/Dec. 141,142 XXXV, Algiers, Algeria 12 to 14 July, 1999. 209 See OAU/ AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, OAU Doc. 
AHG/ Decl. 1 (XXXVIII), para. 1,4 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 380'Ord. 
Scss., Durban, South Africa, July 8,2002. 
`0 See article 30 Constitutive Act of African Union. 
211 Article 4(m). 
212 See Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Governments, OAU Doc. AHG/ Decl. 5 (XXXVI) (2000). 
2" Article 30 of the Constitutive Act. 
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contrast to that of the OAU, which had affirmed the 'right of any member state to 
change its government in any way it sees it., 214 
However, despite the recent change in image, the remnants of previous practice are 
still somewhat manifest in practice, as illustrated in the position of AU Assembly with 
regard to the Darfur conflict, as shown in chapter nine. On this occasion, subsequent 
to their rejection of Sudan's assumption of the Chairmanship of the AU Assembl Y215 
in January 2006, due to its human rights record, African leaders, after much 
bargaining, handed the Chair to Congo's President Sassou-Nguesso, who himself 
came to power in a coup dWat in 1997. Meanwhile, leaders, such as Namibia's Sam 
NuJorna, 216 Uganda's Yoweri Museveni '217 and Chad's Idris Deb Y, 
2 18 amended their 
domestic constitutions in order to extend their terms. Most disturbingly, whilst the 
majority of the attention was focused on Robert Mugabe's attempt to stay in power in 
Zimbabwe in 2008, the Cameroonian president, Paul Biya, who has been in power for 
26 years, scrapped the country's presidential term limits to enable him to run for the 
presidency until 2018.219 
Nevertheless, the AUs emerging practice of condemning coups seems to give 
recognition to Thomas Frank's assertion of an emerging right to democratic 
governance whereby 'only democracy validates governance. v220 The new thinking 
was in line with the practice of the 'Organization of American States (OAS). 
Subsequent to the overthrow of the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide, by military coup in September 1991, the OAS unanimously 
recommended its member states to take 'action and to bring about the democratic 
isolation of those who hold power illegally in Haiti. ' 
214 See the Council of Ministers of the OAU in regard to Samuel Does's military regime in Liberia, 
Liberia: Coup Topples Tolbert, 17 Afir. Res. Bull. 5639,5649 (1980). 
215 On presidency of the AU Chairmanship, see chapter six. 216 See 'President For Life? Take Note', Afrobarometer Press Briefing, 24 May 2006 
217 See Marc Lacey, 'Museveni extends his rule in Uganda', International Herald Tribune, 26 February, 
2006. Anne Mugisha, 'Change in Uganda: Museveni's Machinations', Journal ofDemocracy 15.2 (2004) 140-144.1 
2111 See BBC Profile on Chad, International Version, available at 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2Wafrica/countyý_profiles/1068700. stm. 219 See 'Deputies extend Biya's Term, Afrol News, II April, 2008; 'Cameroon: Parliament Extends 
President Paul Biya's Rule for Life, ' Catholic Information Servicefor Africa, II April 2008. 220 Thomas M. Franck 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', A merican Journal of International Law, (1992), pp. 46-9 1. 
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The organization fin-ther called on states to 'suspend their economic, financial and 
221 
commercial ties' until constitutional order was restored. Significantly, the UN 
Security Council resolution 841 (1993)222 authorised enforcement action against the 
military junta that took power in Haiti. Subsequently, the OAS moved beyond the ad 
hoc approach and institutionalized democratic principles which are now incorporated 
in its Charter. 223 Other organizations that have amended their charters to incorporate 
democratic principles include the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the 
European Union. 224 
In the African context, the AU's Constitutive Act adopted several progran-unes such 
225 
as the New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD), which seeks to 
promote democracy, good governance and economic development. In addition, the 
African Peer Review (AFPR)226 aims to monitor the adherence of political, economic 
and corporate governance values, codes and standards among African states within 
NEPAD. The renewed commitment to the adherence of democratic principles has 
given weight to the right of the AU to impose sanctions in situations that have been 
interpreted as amounting to threats to legitimate order, as illustrated below. What 
becomes clear here is that in addition to reiterating that sanctions should not be left to 
the Security Council alone, and that they ought to be exercised in accordance with the 
UN Charter and international law, 227 the AU's practice demonstrates wide discretion 
in an area where it has rarely sought the approval of the UN but at the same time, has 
not been contested. 
221 Cited in Thomas M. Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', ibid. See also Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OEA/ser. F/ V. I/ MRE/ RES. 1/9 1, corr. 1, paras. 5,6 T91). 
22 UNSC/ Res/841 (1993), June 16,1993. 
223 The Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001. 
224 See Amendment effected by the Treaty of Amsterdam to article 309 of the Treaty of Rome. 225 The NEPAD was adopted at the 37th session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in july 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia. 
226 On the AFPR, see Ayesha Kajee, 'NEPAD's APRM- A Progress Report, Practical Limitations and Challenges', South African Institute ofInternational, 4ffairs SA Yearbook ofInternational Affairs, 20o3/04. See also Ross Herbert 'Becoming my brother's keeper' eAfrica (October 2003). 227 See the Common African ýosftion on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 50. 
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3.7 The AU's Use of Sanctions in Support of Democratic Principles: The Togo 
and Mauritania Case Studies 
It was five years after its adoption in Togo that the provisions of the Lome 
Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government were put to effect, ironically against the host country. In particular, the 
AU publicly denounced the naming of Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma's son as president of 
Togo and described it as a military coup following the latter's death in February 
2005 . 
228 The AU further demanded that the Togolese Armed Forces comply with the 
constitution and threatened to impose sanctions under article 7(g) of the Protocol 
relating to the establishment of the AU PSC and the OAU's July 2000 Declaration. 
229 
Furthermore, the AU PSC mandated ECOWAS 'to take all such measures as it deems 
necessary to restore constitutional legality in Togo within the shortest time. ' 
230 
Heeding this call, ECOWAS, imposed sanctions against Togo that were soon 
followed by the AU's own suspension of Togo's membership and a further travel ban 
on Togolese leaders, as well as economic sanctions. Following the announcement by 
Faure Gnassingbe that he was stepping down after increasing international pressure, 
the' sanctions against Togo were lifted by ECOWAS231 and the AU pSC232 in 
February and May 2005 respectively. However, the decision to lift the sanctions was 
controversial on two fronts. 
Firstly, the subsequent support by both the AU and ECOWAS of an election process 
which, according to the European Parliament, 'did not comply with the principles of 
transparency, pluralism and the freedom of the people to determine their own 
future, 233 'demonstrated the willingness of Africa's regional organizations to support 
228 See BBC News, 'AU denounces Togo 'military coup,, Sunday, 6 February, 2005. 
229 AU Peace and Security Council, 24th Meeting, Addis Ababa, PSCIPR/Cornm. (XXIV), 7 February 
2005, p. 2. 
" AU Peace and Security Council, 25th Meeting, Addis Ababa, PSCIPRJComrrL (XXV), 25 February 
2005. 
23 'BBC News, 'West Africans lift Togo sanctions', Saturday, 26 February, 2005 See also BBC News, 
'African Union lifts Togo embargo', Friday, 27 May, 2005. 
11 AU Peace and Security Council, 30th Meeting, Addis Ababa, PSC/PR/ComnL (XXX), 27 May 
2005. 
233 See European Parliament resolution P6-TA (2005)0184, Strasbourg, France, 12 May 2005. 
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a fagade of constitutionality. ' 234 Secondly, the attempts by the Nigerian President, 
who was then the Chairman of the AU, Olusegun Obasanjo, 'to broker a government 
of national unity irrespective of the presidential election results, 9235 cast doubts on 
African leader's commitments on their own stated democratic principles. 
Meanwhile, it was hardly three months after Togo's reinstatement and participation in 
the organization's activities when the AU was compelled to act on the coup d'itat that 
occurred in Mauritania on 3 August 2005. Once again, the AU was to be tested on its 
commitment on the principles of democracy. However, it was on the following day 
that, in conformity with the Lome Declaration and article 30 of the AU Constitutive 
Act, the AU PSC condemned the unconstitutional change of government and 
suspended Mauritania's participation in AU activities. 236 This time, 'the AU's 
dilemma was that although its support for this new norm [of democratic principles] 
meant it had to condemn the coup ditat in principle, the junta's ousting of the 
unpopular President Taya generated some international sympathy as well as 
significant domestic support. 237 
Indeed, the Mauritania case raised the question of whether bloodless coups ditats that 
topple authoritarian regimes in exchange for a democratic process, may advance the 
AU's stated goal of democratisation. One interpretation is articulated by South 
Africa% ambassador to Mauritania who gave the view that '[t]he principle of the AU 
is not to agree with coups but we believe we shall not have one policy to fit every 
situation. 238As it turned out, Mauritania was readmitted to the AU in April 2007 with 
full rights after the country's Constitutional Council officially confirmed Sidi Ould 
Cheikh Abdallahi as the country's first, democratically elected president since 
independence. 239 
234 Paul D. Williams, 'From the Norm of Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture', African Affairs, (March 2007). See also Paul Simon Handy, 'The dynastic succession in Togo', African Security Review, 14,3 (2005), pp. 47-5 1. 131 Ibid. see also Andreas Mehler, 'The hidden costs ofpower-sharing: reproducing insurgent violence in Africa', African Affairs, 104,416 (2005), pp. 393-4. 236 See Peace and Security Council, 'Statement', 3 64' Meeting, 4 August 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
PSC/PR/Stat:. (XXXVI)-(ii). 
237 Paul D. Williams, 'From the Norm of Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference, ' Supra note 234. Is 1AU Seeks Mauritania junta talks', BBC International Version, 9 August 2005. 239 See, AU Peace and Security, 'Communique on the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Muritania' 76'h Meeting, PSC/PR/Comm(LXXVI), 10 April 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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While the adherence to democratic principle remain one of the most visible changes 
manifest in the transformation from the OAU to the new AU, it is worth mentioning 
that 'unconstitutional changes of government do not only come about through coups 
d'itats. 240 As suggested above, fraudulent elections and alteration of constitutions by 
regimes which seek to hold on to power may also make a mockery of democracy, as 
was clearly the case in Zimbabwe's elections of 2000,2005 241 and 2008. Furthermore, 
the attempts by African leaders, notably those in Chad, Nigeria and Uganda to amend 
the constitution in order to hold on to power serve as obstacles to the emerging norm 
of right to democratic governance in modem Africa. Nevertheless, the clear shift from 
Africa's strict interpretation of sovereignty to that of non-indifference has the 
potential to redraw the landscape of international law and further community values. 
C: Conclusion 
The AU's constitutional framework brought with it the potential to redraw the way in 
which the world understands, interprets and applies mechanisms for peace and security 
with serious ramifications for the UN, member states and other regional arrangements. 
However, it is the interventionist approach of the AU that brought the relationship 
between universalism and regionalism with respect to peace and security into sharper 
focus. In the process, it exhibited its considerable force in norin making in several key 
areas. Firstly, article 4(h) introduces new grounds for intervention that are 'wider' but 
at the same time more specific than those in the UN Charter (i. e. threats to peace, 
breach of peace and'aggression). 242 In doing so, the AU also institutionalises other 
grounds for intervention wider than those established under the UN Charter namely 
self-defence and measures under Chapter VIL Although absent in the Charter, the new 
grounds of intervention including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
are relatively clear in international law, as a common thread that unites these heinous 
crimes is that they have attained the status of international crimes forming the ratione 
materiae of the current international tribunals. 
Moreover, against the background of Rwanda, the AU framework also brought to the 
fore the notion that the 'once sacrosanct legal principle of the sovereignty of, and non- 
240 Paul D. Williams, 'From the Norm of Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference, ' supra note 234. 241 See James Sturcke and agencies, 'Mugabe's party wins Zimbabwe election', Guardian Unlimited., 
A ril 1,2005. 
24F Jean Allain, 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force, ' supra note 28. 
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interference in, the domestic affairs of states has been weakened if not yet 
abandoned. -P243 Indeed, in its adoption of the Constitutive Act, not only did Africa reject 
its own previous reliance on the policy on non-interference, it effectively endowed a 
regional customary law, which at the same time filled the institutional void left by the 
UN's inaction in the face of African conflicts. Therefore, the legality of AU's 
constitutional framework is based on unfolding interpretation of the UN Charter and 
African regional law. Taking a more humane approach to the two treaties, despite the 
occasional inconsistencies, the Constitutive Act of the AU, read together with the UN 
Charter, affirm the prohibition of the use of force and place a distinct emphasis on the 
protection of fundamental human rights. Together, these Charters also reject unilateral 
intervention and instead, favour collective action. This is made clear from the fact that 
any recourse to force outside the framework of articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter 
and article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act is prohibited under the AU fraMeWork. 244 
However, AU's right to intervene must not be interpreted as an opening of the flood 
gates for other regional organisations such as NATO and OAS. This is particularly 
significant given that some have utilised the practice of ECOWAS as justifications for 
controversial interventions, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 245 As made 
clear in the chapter, the legality of the AU's right to intervene is grounded upon a 
regional customary law that was subsequently codified in the Constitutive Act of the 
AU. Its unique characteristics also includes the fact that African countries, by being 
state parties to the Constitutive Act, a multilateral treaty, consent to institutional 
invocation of this right by the AU. 246 Finally, it is considered a legitimate right bearing 
in mind that the right to intervene is not assigned to a single or particular group of states 
but to the AU acting collectively. 
243 Adekeye Adebajo, 'Collective Security and Humanitarian Intervention', United Nations H United 
Nations Foundation // United Nations and Global Security (2004) available at www. un- 
globalsecurity. org/ pdVAdebajoý_paper - 
hurn_intervention. pdf. 
244 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 50. 245 See Belgium's argument in the Case Concerning LegalitY of Use ofForce, (Serbia and Montenegro 
v Belgium and others) ICJ 1999. See also B. Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal 
aspects ", European Journal ofInternational Laývp Vol. 10, (1999); A Cassese, "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community ", European Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 10, (1999). 
246 On the permissible means of consent to treaties, see Article II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
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In the broader context, the two Charters, as well as recent practice, portray the current 
shift of international law to a new position where, in grave circumstances, the concept 
of the sovereignty of states is at variance with the emerging responsibility to protect 
human life. 247 However, a key problem with the AU framework, in similar fashion to 
that of the UN, is that the current authorisation to intervene leaves the AU free to act at 
its discretion or even not to act at all. Indeed, in similar fashion to the Security 
Council's authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the AU's powers under the 
Constitutive Act were not designed to issue the regional organisation with any specific 
obligation but rather a broad discretion to intervene. This means that, as Darfur shows, 
the AU's failure to intervene is more likely to be influenced by regional politics as 
opposed to the legal rights and duties with regard to intervention under the African 
Constitutive Act and the UN Charter. 248 
On a more positive note, the emergence of an African regional right to democratic 
governance, which itself is a developing principle of the UN '249 deserves special 
mention, particularly given the potential that the ongoing collaborative efforts between 
the AU and UN hold in entrenching democratic governance at the universal level. 
indeed, the use of sanctions in support of the latter visibly shows the clear shift in 
paradigm and the move away from the OAUs principle of non-interference in the 
affairs of member states to that of non-indifference on the part of the AU. In light of the 
foregoing, it 'is hoped that the new standards of democracy, accountability and good 
governance enforced by the Constitutive Act's provision for the possible imposition of 
sanctions will obliviate the need for costly interventions. 250 
Having said so, as shown in the coming chapters, although the AU framework is 
designed to further the principles of the UN, permitting regional action in Africa may 
be potentially dangerous as it could further marginalise Africa and lead to further 
abrogation of the Security Council's duty to take primary responsibility for 
international peace and security. It is in this context that this thesis calls for a 
247 See chapter eight. See also ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 157. 248 See chapter nine. 
249 See G. A Res. 511101,12 December 1996. On this poin% see also Richard Burchill, Regional 
organizations and the Promotion and Protection of Democracy as a Contribution to International Peace 
and Security, in Richard Burchill, N. D. White& Justin Morris, International Conflict and Security Law: Essays in Memory ofHilaire McCoubrey, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 209-234. 250 B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act, ' supra note 4. 
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strengthened relationship between the UN and the AU, and in particular one that 
consists of a formalised division of responsibilities between the two organisations, 251 as 
argued in the next chapter. 
251 See chapters four and six. 
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Chapter Eight 
African Perspectives on UN Reform, Regional Action 
and Future Prospects 
A: Introduction 
In September 2005, representatives of the 192 member states converged in New York 
City to celebrate 60 years of the UN. However, there was a tone of caution contained 
in the words of the Secretary General. The international community 'must recognize 
that the world today is very different from that of our founders. The United Nations 
must reflect this new age, and respond to its challenges. " This message was made in a 
broad context. The threats brought about by the post 9/11 terrorism phenomenon and 
its relation to rogue states and non-state actors, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and environmental degradation were said to be the major challenges 
facing the world at the turn of the 2lt century. 
Yet this assumption did not necessarily represent the reality for the African region. 
Rather, the reincarnation of horrors'from the Rwandan genocide (1994), which were 
visibly manifest in the Darfur conflict (2004), confirmed that it was the prevalence of 
regional conflicts created by internal wars that posed the greatest challenge to the 
continent's peace and security. Indeed, the African perception of the matter was 
hardly surprising given that the state of affairs had resulted in tens of millions of 
deaths and brought with it despair, destitution, poverty, disease, and displaced persons 
in Africa more than in any other continent. 2 
Nevertheless, irrespective of differing perceptions arnongst states of what constituted 
threats to peace, the combination of catastrophic events proved that the existing 
collective security institutions had failed 'to keep pace with the nature of threats 
facing the international community. 0 This conclusion was based on the dreadfulness 
of Rwanda (1994), the'attacks of ll'h September 2001, as well as the invasion of 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), which pointed towards the rcalisation that the 
'The Secretary General, 'Message on United Nations Day', 24, October, 2005. 
2 The Organisation 'Of African Unity (OAU), Assembly of Heads of State and Governrnent, 
Declarations, Resolutions and Decision. Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21 st Century), 
AHG Decl. 3, pmbl. para. 2, OAU AHG/Res. 247-257 (XXXII) (8-10 July 1996). 
3 See the Report of the United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN doc. A/59/2005,2 December 2004, p. 13. 
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UN Charter, a 1945 document, could not realistically be expected to meet the 
challenges of the 2l't century and beyond. 
The dramatic response of the international community highlighted an overwhelming 
consensus over the key challenges facing the world at the entry of the new millennium, 
which in turn led a wide array of key publications, all stressing the need for UN 
refonn. These reports include one written by the UN High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, titled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility 
4 (2004), and the other, titled Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals, inscribed by 250 experts under the direction of 
Jeffrey D. Sachs in 2005.5 Finally, the Secretary-Gencral published his own report, In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development, and Human Rightsfor All (2005). 6 
These blueprints later set the agenda for the 2005 World Summit, which the UN 
described as 'a once-in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions, 97 in crucial 
areas, such as that of peace and security as well as UN reforin. 8 In turn, the high 
stakes for Africa ensured that the AU was the first and only continental organisation 
to adopt a Common Policy on UN Reform, in March 2005.9 
B: Aims Purpose and Structure 
This chapter explores the current UN reform debate and assesses African perspectives 
in the area of regional peace and security. In particular, it seeks to offer valuable 
insights as to how the current proposals on UN reform measure against Africa's own 
understanding, interpretation and application of key provisions of the UN Charter, 
international custom and other general principles of international law. In order to do 
so, the chapter relies heavily on the proposals set forth in the documents mentioned 
above, particularly the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Reliance on this 
4 Ibid. 
5 See the UN Millennium Project 2005. Investing in Development. A Practical Plan to Achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. New York. See also Jeffery Sachs, 'The Millennium Project: From 
Words to Action, ' in Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (eds. ), Irrelevant of indispensable? The United 
Nations in the 21" Century, (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2005), pp. 19-23. 6 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom. Towards Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All, UN doc. 
A/59/2005,21 March 2005. 
7 See the 2005 World Summit 'An overview', www. un. org. 
8 Ibid 
9 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, 'the Ezulwini 
Consensus' adopted by the Executive Council of the African Union at the 7TH Extraordinary Session, 
7- 8 March 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ext/EXCL/2 (VII). See also Chris Landsberg, 'The UN 
High-Level Reports and Implications for Africa', Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 3,388-391 (2005). 
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Document is based on the premise that although hardly a treaty, it makes 'an 
important contribution to international law' in that 'it builds on recent trends in 
international law and practice and codifies them in an agreement. "O 
Further reference is made to the African Common Policy on UN Reform. What will 
become clear is that Africa's contribution to the debate, including its role as an 
obstacle to certain aspects of change in the UN structure, proved that the continent 
had finally come of age and was 'now in a position to influence the proposed UN 
reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose. 
"' In order to reach its conclusions, the 
chapter restricts itself to the matters that immediately touch and concern Africa's 
regional peace and security. It thereby precedes in three main parts which primarily 
explore the vital questions of; 1) the prospects of Security Council reform; 2) the 
doctrine of responsibility to protect and; 3) the regionalisation of peace operations. 
The first part begins by looking at the institutional reform of the LN Security Council 
and demonstrates the manner in which Africa may, itself, be an obstacle to UN reform. 
Highlight shall also be made of the practice of the permanent members of the Council, 
which set forth a stringent standard that made reform, without their consent, beyond 
the bounds of possibility. 12 This section will also demonstrate how the veto power 
possessed by these states has further reinforced their seemingly unfettered discretion 
in pursuit of their national interests, occasionally to the detriment of international 
peace and security, including during grave circumstances. 13 
10 See Alicia L. Bannon 'The responsibility to Protect: The U. N. World summit and the Question of 
Unilateralism' Yale Lawjournal, 1157 (2006). See also Blaine Sloan, United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions in Our Changing World, (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc. 199 1), pp. 
71-75. On soft law, see generally, C. Chinkin 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law' (1989) 38 ICLQ 850; H Hillberg, 'A Fresh Look at Soft Law' 10 European Journal 
ofInternational Law (1999), 499; KW Abbott& D Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance' 54 International Organization (2000), 42 1. 
" See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform ofthe United Nations, supra note 9. 12 See article 108 of the UN Charter. For general discussion of difficulty of achieving UN reform, see 
Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Illusion of Security Council Reform The Washington Quarterly 26.4 (2003) 
147-16 1; See also Ruth B. Russell, A Histo? y of the United Nations Charter. - The Role of the United 
States, 1940-1945 (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 742-749. See also Rosemary 
Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, (eds. ), The United States and Multilateral 
Organizations (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); B. Fassbender, 'All Illusions 
Shattered? Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform of the UN Security Council', 7 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2003, pp. 283-98; M-J. Glennon, 'Why the Security 
Council Failed', Foreign Affairs, (May/ June 2003), p. 16. 
" See chapter three. 
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This discussion paves way for the second section that introduces the controversial 
doctrine of responsibility to protect, of which Africa had considerable interest. 
Although the legality of this concept is more conclusively analysed in relation to the 
Darfiir conflict, which served as the first test of the doctrine's application, 14 this part 
analyses its impact on the reform debate. It then examines the concept's compatibility 
with the AU's right to intervene, including the major differences, similarities as well 
as relationship between the two principles. 
Given that the AU will primarily be involved in consensual peace operations, as 
opposed to forceful interventions, the final section assesses Africa's viability and 
potential in exercising its regional responsibility to protect in this area. Having done 
so, the section argues that the lessons from recent practice call for a formal division of 
labour between the AU and the UN, and further suggests how this may be achieved. 
Finally, this part ends with a brief analysis of the newly created Peacebuilding 
Commission and explains how this organ fits within developing cooperation between 
the AU and UN, in the promotion and maintenance of regional and international peace 
and security. 
1.1 The Prospects of Institutional Reform and African's Position on the 
Modification of the Security Council 
The issue of Security Council reform was the most discussed subject in the run up to 
the World Summit. 15 It will be recalled that the Council possesses the 'primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,, ' 16 and is the 
most powerful organ of the UN. 17 Founded in the aftermath of World War II, its 
constitution and powers remain archaic and properly fits Krauthammer's description 
of being 'nothing more than the victory coalition of 1945. '18 It therefore follows that 
its current membership and powers portray the balance of power of the aftermath of 
the Second World War, as opposed to reflecting the realities facing the international 
14 See chapter nine. 
15 Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform% in Adekeye 
Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue ofthe Deaf. Essays on Africa and the United Nations (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2006), p. 3. 
16 Article 25 of the UN Charter. 
17 See chapter three. 
" Charles Krauthammer, 'Don! t Go Back to the UN, I Washington Post, 21 March 2003, p. A-37. 
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community of the 21" century. 
19 What is equally disturbing are the deep 
disagreements over its reform, whose frustration has led some to say that it 'seems 
that the debate itself is still locked up in the realities of 1945 or earlier. 
20 
For an era that emphasises democracy and accountability, 
21 the absence of African 
regional representation within the Council, despite the 
fact that the 54 states in the 
continent account for over twenty five percent of UN membership, 
is of major 
concern. What is more, Africa's situation as the only continent without a permanent 
seat is tied to a historical injustice, as the majority of 
African states were under 
colonial rule in 1945.22 Indeed, it was not until 1963, when the OAU was set up, that 
African leaders made their demands for equitable representation for the continent 
within the main institutions of the UN, including the Security Council. 
23 In this context, 
after decades of Cold War re , alignments, 
Africa finally united in voicing its frustration 
in 1997 during the Harare Declaration on UN reform. 24 
Significantly, the Declaration reiterated the dire 'need to democratize the Council and 
make it more efficient and transparent', 'enlarge the composition of the Council and 
reform its decision-making process' and stressed 'the imperative need of ensuring 
equitable geographical representation. 25 Finally, the OAU officially stated that any 
democratised, effective and transparent Security Council must include African 
representation. 26 In carrying on with this theme, the 2005 African Common Policy on 
UN Reform went further. It demanded for no less than two permanent seats within the 
Security Council that would comprise. of states selected by the AU itself. 27 However, 
what was more controversial was its stipulation that the new seats were also to 
19 Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye 
Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue of the Deaf, supra note 15, p. I. 
20 Karel van Kesteren, 'Reform of the UN Security Council: A No-Win Situation? ' in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use offorce: Theory and Reality-A Needfor 
Change?, (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), p. 268. 
2'See generally Gregory H. Fox& Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance and International Law, 
ýCambridge University Press, 2000). On the application of democracy in Africa, see chapter seven. 
2 See chapter five on impact of colonialism on Africa. 
23 See Lucien Manokou, "L'Afrique et le Conseil de s6curit6 de PONU (1946-1990)", Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, Paris, n" 196, December 1999. 24 Assembly of the Heads of State and Govermnents, Thirty-Third Ordinary Session, AHGIDecl. 3 
(XXXIII), Harare, Zimbabwe, 2 to 4 June 1997. 
's Ibid. 
26Harare Declaration of the Assembly Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Reform of 
the UN Security Council, OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 24 June 1997, Harare, 
Zimbabwe AHG/Decl. 14 (XXXIII) AHG/Dec. 120-123 (XXXIII) AHG/AECIDec. 1 (1). 
27 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform ofthe United Nations, supra note 9. 
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possess all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including, as 
shown below, the right of veto. 28 
Meanwhile, the desire to enlarge the Council went beyond Africa's borders and 
incorporated the majority of states within the UN General Assembly. 29 However, the 
debate on the Security Council brought deep divisions as states aligned themselves in 
groupings based on strategic national and regional interests. 30 During this time, the 
disagreements centred on the proposals put forward by the so-called G-4 states 31 
(Japan, Germany, Brazil and India), the Uniting for Consensus group 32 (pakiStan, 
Italy, Canada and Mexico) and the AU block. As shown. below, the failure to reform 
the Council was later attributed to the AU's refusal to compromise on its 'intransigent 
demand 933 Of two veto-wielding permanent Security Council seats, which stood in 
sharp contrast to the position adopted by other states. 
Meanwhile, despite the show of African solidarity that manifest itself in the adoption 
of the A Us Common Policy on UN Reform, internal divisions ensued as to not only 
which states would secure permanent seats but also on how Africa should be 
represented in the Council. 34 And while commentators mainly focussed their debate on 
the 'Byzantine contest' between the candidacy of Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt, 
the states of Kenya, Libya and Senegal similarly expressed their interests. 35 Despite 
the obvious strengths that made them favourites, cynics dismissed Nigeria as too 
'anarchic'; Egypt as too 'Arab'; and South Africa as too 'albinoic. 36 
28 ibid. 
29 
, E. g. GA Res. 47/62, UN Doc. A/ Res/ 47/62 (1992); GA Res 48/26, UN Doc. A/Res/ 48/26 ( 1993). 30 Jean Pierre Cot, 'Reforming the Security Council: Is There a Hidden Agenda?, ' in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Yhe Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 20, p. 276. 31 A/59/L. 64,6 July 2005, re-tabled as A/60/L. 46,9 January 2006. See also 'Reform '05. Joint position 
paper by Brazil, India, Japan and Germany on Security Council reform', New York, 31 March 2005; 
'Draft Resolution on Security Council reform, 13 May 2005, and 'Draft Resolution on Security Council reform', 8 June 2005, available at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/. 32 A/59/L. 68,21 July 2005. 
33 Shaun Benton, 'No UN Reform Likely, Say Directors of Africa Policy Think-Tanks', BuaNews, 
August 27,2005. 
34 Felix Onuah, 'Africa Fails to Break Deadlock Over UN Reform', Reuters , June 9,2005; Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue ofthe Deaf, supra note 14, pA 35 Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall c)f UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue of the Deaf, ibid. See also Jibrin Abubakar, 'Egypt Slams Nigeria Over UN Seats, ' 28 July 2005, Daily Trust, 28 Dec. 2005. 36 Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: Ile Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue ofthe Deaf, ibid. 
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As it turned out, although the Africa's Common Policy on UN Reform signified real 
consensus within the continent, its refusal to compromise on the veto and reach an 
agreement with the G4 states, impacted negatively on the enlargement of the 
Council. 37 Meanwhile, the veto remained a stumbling block to any real reform of the 
Council particularly because not only were major disagreements tied to its power, any 
prospects of reform would itself be subject to the threat or use of veto, as discussed 
below. 
1.2 Criticisms of the Veto Power and State Practice within the Security Council 
It was mentioned in chapter three that in exercising its powers under the UN Charter, 
the Security Council is bound by the requirement of consensus amongst its permanent 
members. 38 Although hardly mentioned in the Charter, the political supremacy of the 
veto, which was awarded to the Allied Powers in the aftermath of World War 11, 
imposed a 'form of victor's justice' 39 within the UN organisation. Consequently, not 
only does it contradict a major UN theory, which affirms the 'principle of the 
sovereign equality of all UN member states, 40 it enables each permanent member to 
invoke a single blocking vote with the capability of outweighing any majority within 
the Council. 41 
37 Amber Henshaw, 'African Leaders Reject Compromise on UN Security Council', Associated press, 
August 5,2005; Shaun Benton, 'No UN Reform Likely, ' supra note 33. 
38 Article 27 (3) UN Charter. Note that the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ ruled that an abstention 
by permanent members would not bar the lawful adoption of a decision under article 27 (3) of the UN 
Charter. See Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Namibia 
(south west Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 197 1, 
ICJ Rep. 16,22,21 June, 197 1, para. 22. For a historical account on the creation and scope of the veto 
power, see Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys, 'Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century? ', 
Egmont Papers 9, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, (August 2005). See also Inis 
Claude, 'The Security Council', in E. Luard (ed), The Evolution ofInternational Organizations, (New 
York: Frederick A Praeger, 1966). 
39 Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys, 'Security Council Reform, ' ibid. See also Tad Daley and David Lionel, 
'Reinventing the United Nations, ' in: Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 83, No. 9, (2006), pp. 33-39; p. 36. 
40 Article 2(l) of the UN Charter. 
41 See Statement of the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, 21 April 1998, 
available at http: //www. un. int/mexico/discur97/veto-eng. htm. See also Wouters, Jan & Ruys, Tom, 
'Security Council Reform, ' ibid; Hans K6chler, 'Security Council Reform: A Requirement of 
International Democracy', Lecture delivered at the International Seminar on Reforming the United 
Nations: Democracy, Justice and Security in the Age of Globalization, Center for the Study of 
Federalism, Turin, Italy, 8 June 2007, available at www. hanskoechler. com/Koechler- 
Security_Council-Reform-CSF-TurinV3-25AugO7. pdf -See also Hans K6chler, 'The Voting Procedure 
in the United Nations Security Council Examining a Normative Contradiction and its Consequences on International Relations. Studies in International Relations, XVII., Vienna: International Progress 
Organization, 1991. 
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Although vastly unpopular, the veto power was the 'price' which the world 
community had to pay in order for permanent members, such as the US and Soviet 
Union, to create the UN in 1945.42 Thereafter, the apparent breach of their 
undertaking 'not to use their 'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the 
Council, A3 has served as a powerful hindrance to the proper functioning of the UN 
organisation. 44 For this reason, there exists an array of fierce criticism of this power 
since Brierly first pointed out that the veto was a significant flaw in the organisation's 
collective security system, barely a year after the establishment of the UN. 45 
Chief amongst the criticisms associated with the 'very special power 46 provided by 
the veto is that it has often been used as a sovereign right of powerful states to protect 
or further their individual interests, rather than for the purpose of reflecting the 
collective will of the Security Council. 47 Indeed, there exists a pattern of practice 
which illustrates instances where permanent members of the Council used the veto's 
'extraordinary decision blocking competence 9 48 to merely pursue their national 
interests, during before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 49 
For example during the Cold War era, the UK's decision to unilaterally exercise its 
veto power in regards to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), on no less than seven occasions, 
42 Sir Michael Wood', The UN Security Council and International Law', Paper, Hersch Lauterpacht 
Memorial Lectures, Lauterpacht Centre for international Law, University of Cambridge, 7-9 November, 
2006; Niels Blokker, 'The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels 
Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce, ' supra note 20, p. 8. 43 See Statement by the Delegation of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the 
Security Council', June 7 1945, UNCIO vol. XI, p. 754. 
44 'Dwight Lee, 'The Genesis of the Veto, ' International Organisation 33(1947); J. L. Briery, 'The 
Covenant and the Charter', 23 British Yearbook ofInternational 83, (1946) pp 89-90; Adernola Abass, 
Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter V111 of the UN 
Charter, (Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 88. 
45 J. L. Briery, 'The Covenant and the Charter', ibid, p. 92. For additional criticisms of the veto power, See B. Fassbender, UNSecurity Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1998); 1. Razali, 'The United Nations in the 
2V Century: Prospects for Reform', 14 Medicine, Conflict and Survival 97, (1998); Niels Blokker, 
'The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use offorce, supra note 20, p. 8. See also the legal adviser to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, Gregory Khalil 'Just Say No to Vetoes', New York Times, July 19,2004; 
Ciline Nahory, 'The Hidden Veto', Global Policyforum, May 2004. 
46 B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations, (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002, p. 508. 47 On the corporate will of the Council, see N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, 17 (2004), pp. 645-672. 48 Inis Claude, 'The Security Council', in E. Luard (ed), The Evolution ofinternational Organizations, 
supra note 3 8, p. 7 1. 
49 On the misuse of the veto power, see Jan Wouters, & Tom Ruys, 'Security Council Reform,, supra note 38. 
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is more readily, justiflable on grounds of national interests, as opposed to furthering 
the maintenance peace and security. 
50 Similarly, France hardly refused to exercise its 
power of veto to protect its national interests, including during its confrontation with 
51 Comoros over the disputed Island of Mayotte, in 1976. Interestingly, this action 
stood in sharp contrast to its earlier position at the San Francisco Conference in May 
1945, where it had forcefully argued for certain restrictions on the use of veto 
power, 52 a position it seemed to abandon as soon as it acquired permanent 
membership. 
However, the optimism that came along with the entry of the post-Cold War eraý 3 saw 
the dramatic decline of the use of veto. 54 Nevertheless, recent examples of the 
continued use of veto to protect and promote national interests include China's 
rejection of the deployment of military observers to Guatemala (1997) 
55 and 
Macedonia (1999), 56 on the account of the latter's perceived support of Taiwan, 
which it considers part of its territory. 57 Furthermore, in order to guard is immediate 
interests, the United States vetoed resolutions that had sought to condemn its attacks 
on Libya (1986), 58 as well as its military activities in Panama (1989). 59 
Similarly, Russia controversially blocked a resolution outlining new UN security 
arrangements in Cyprus that would have taken effect if Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
5OS/PV. 1069para64, S/5425/Rev. 1,13 September, 1963; S/PV. 1534para207, S/9696+Coff. 1,2,17 
March, 1970; S/PV. 1556 para 212, S/9976, November 10,1970; S/PV. 1639 para 48, S/10606,4 
February, 1974; S/PV. 1666 para 119, S/10805/Rev. 1 op. para 1,29 September, 1972; S/PV. 1666 
para 120, S/10805/Rev. 1 op. para 5,29 September, 1972; S/PV. 1666 para 121, S/10805/Rev. 1 as 
Amended, 29 September 1972; S/PV. 1716 para 48, S/I 0928,22 May, 1973. 
51 S/PV. 1888 para 247, S/I 1967,6 February, 1976 in U. N. Y. B, 1976, pp. 179-181. 
52 See Statement of the Permanent Representative of Mexico referring to the early French position to 
the United Nations, April 21,1998, available at http: //www. un. int/mexico/discur97/veto-eng. htriL 
53 On the post Cold War optimisms, see chapter three, four and five. 
54 David M. Malone,. 'Introduction', in David M. Malone, ed., The UNSecurity Council: From the 
Cold War to the 21st Centu? y (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 1-16); Thomas G. Weiss, 'The 
Illusion of Security Council Reform, ' supra note 12; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of 
Force: Foundations ofPublic International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition), 2004, p. 204. 
55 See Security Council 3730th Meeting, Press Release SC1631 1,10 January, 1997. See also F. HAQ, 
'The veto: a case study. The China veto and the Guatemalan Peace Process', 20 January 1997, 
available at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/membship/chinavet. htm. 
56 See S/PV. 3982, p. 5, S/1999/201,25 February 1999. 
57 For an international law perspective on the China-Taiwan issue, see Leopoldo Lovelace, Jr, 'Is There 
A Question of Taiwan in International Law? '4 Harvard Asia Quarterly 3, (2000). For a political 
perspective, see John F. Copper, Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan, 
Praeger Security International General Interest-Cloth, 2006) 
8 U. N. Y. B (1986), pp. 247-257. 
s9 U. N. Y. 11 (1989), pp. 173-174. 
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voted in favour of reunification, in April 2004 . 
60 The exercise of the veto on a 
technicality in the latter case, as well as its misuse referred to above, not only raised 
reservations as to the veto's relation to peace and security but also cast doubts on the 
compatibility with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 61 
Before embarking on a critique of the current reform proposals on the veto power, 
mention ought also to be made of a further, but equally problematic hindrance to the 
proper functioning of the United Nations. Although less visible than its actual practice 
suggests, the significance of the quiet threat of veto cannot be understated. 62 Also 
known as the 'hidden veto, ' 'the mere presence of the threat of the veto [ ... ] 
determines the way the Council conducts its business. ' 63 Some illustration of the 
impact of the threat of veto is important at this point, particularly that which 
highlights some of the instances where the proper functioning of the UN was 
compromised by the will of powerful states often leading to disastrous consequences. 
A clear example of the impact of a threat of veto is manifest in the warning by the US 
to block an extension of the UN mission in Bosnia, unless its nationals were protected 
from prosecution by the ICC in July 2002.64 Similarly, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, Security Council resolution 1593 of March 2005 65 with regard to the Darfur 
conflict was only approved upon by the US condition that it gave blanket immunity 
from prosecution to designated peacekeepers. 66 What is disturbing about this practice 
is that in addition to shaping the Council's affairs, the threat of veto may, initself, 
engender a threat to peace and security. 67 
60 Security Council 4947 Meeting, 21 April 2004, UN Doc. S/2004/313,21 April 2004. 
61 N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq, ' supra note 47. 62 See C61ine Nahory, 'The Hidden Veto', supra note 45. 
63 Ambassador Curtis Ward of Jamaica, Statement at the Wrap-Up Session of August 2001, S/PV. 
4363, p. 7. See also Tono Eitel, 'The UN Security Council and its Future Contribution to the Field of 
International Law: What we May Expect', Max Planck Y. B. 4 (2000). 
64 Security Council 4568h Meeting, UN. Doc. SC/7445/Rev. 1,10 July 2002. See Security Council 
Resolution 1422 (2002), 12 July 2002. 
65 See Security Council 5158h Meeting, Press release SC/8351,31 March, 2005. 66 For discussion on the question of immunity and the relationship between the Security Council and 
the ICC, see Neha Jain, 'A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council 
and the International Criminal Court', (2005), 16 EJIL, 239. See also Robert Crier and N. D. White, 
'The Security Council and the International Crirninal Court: Who is feeling Threatened? ' 8 Yearbook 
ofInternational Peacekeeping (2002), 141 and Carsten Stahn, 'The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)', '(2003) 14 EJIL 85. 
67 N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 47. 
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The most catastrophic illustration of this point remains the tragic failure of the 
68 
Council to intervene during the Rwandan genocidal massacre (1994). Most notably, 
it will be recalled that the Council failed to act during this episode due to the threats 
of vetoes of France and the US who 'consciously chose to abdicate their responsibility 
for Rwanda. ' 69 Criticisms of the states' pursuit of national interests were made. In 
particular, an US influential human rights organisation concluded that 'the Americans 
were interested in saving money, the Belgians were interested in saving face, and the 
French were interested in saving their ally, the genocidal government. 
70 In the end, 
their inaction ensured that the Council, as a whole, bore responsibility for failing to 
'stop the killing. 71 
Despite the lessons from Rwanda, the disturbing remnants of this practice were 
visible at the turn of the 21" century. In particular, it was hardly 10 years after the 
1994 genocide when the threats of veto by China severely restricted UN action in 
Darfur. 72 The Chinese position during this episode was attributed to its commercial 
ties with Sudar, 73 despite the Khartoum government's involvement in 'violations of 
human rights. 74 Meanwhile, evidence of the impact of the threat to use the veto was 
also evident in the negotiations which determined the legality of the Iraq war (2003) 
and the controversy surrounding the extension of UN mission in Bosnia (2002). 
75 
Read together, the alanning episodes described above are attributable to the lack of 
accountability of the Council for its actions. And although commentators have been 
keen to argue that the Council's resolutions can be ultra vires, there remains a 
" See chapter three and five. 
69 Organisation of African Unity, 'The International Panel ofEminent Personalities to Investigate the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding events', 2000 para. 13.1. See also Independent UN 
Inquiry into the Actions of the UNduring the 1994 Genocide, UN Doc. S/1999/1257, December 15, 
1999. 
70 Alison Des Forges, 'Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda' Human Rights Watch, 
March 1999. 
71 Independent UNInquiry into the Actions of the UNduring the 1994 Genocide, supra note 60, at 30. 
72 See chapter nine. 
73 Ibid. See also Scott Peterson, 'Sudan's Key Ties at the UN, Christian Science Monitor, August 
31,2004, p 5; Human Rights Watch, 'The United Nations and Darfur', available at 
http: //www. hrw. org/wr2k5/darfur/3. ht; Jeremy L. Levitt, 'The Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case of Darfur, Sudan', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use offorce, 'supra note 20, pp. 213-25 1. 74 Report of the High- Level Mission on the situation ofhuman rights in Darfur in pursuant to Human 
Rights Council decision S4/101, A/ HRC14/80, Human Rights Council Fourth Session, March 2007. 75 Nigel D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 47. 
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practical difficulty of any tribunal carrying out judicial review of the Council's 
decisions. 76 Therefore, this means that resort to informal methods, such as intense 
lobbying by the civil society and world opinion serve as the only method of review of 
Council decisions. These handicaps have in turn raised major questions in relation to 
the extent to which: 1) the threat and use of veto may be restricted or abolished 
altogether, and; 2) whether the power should be awarded to future Council members, 
including African regional representation, as discussed below. 
1.3 A Critique of Reform Proposals on the Veto Power 
With the notable exception of the permanent members and a few others, 77 the vast 
majority of states and organisations, including the AU, the Arab League, and the 
Group of Non-Aligned Nations, in principle support the abolition of the veto power. 78 
Interestingly however, the basis of the continuing debate has centred on the 
continuing existence of the veto power, as opposed to its elimination. This consensus 
is borne out of the realisation that the chances for the abolition of the veto remain 
"' On judicial review of Security Council, see Martenczuk, Bernd, 'The Security Council, the 
International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie? '(1999). EJIL, Vol. 10, pp. 
517-547, (1999); Wemer W. G., 'Securitization and Judicial Review: A Semiotic Perspective on the 
Relation Between the Security Council and International Judicial Bodies', International Journalfor the 
Semiotics ofLaw, Volume 14, Number 4, (200 1) , pp. 345-3 66(22); Mohammed BedJaoui, The New 
World Order and the Security Council. Testing the Legality ofIts Acts, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995); 
Bardo Fassbender, 'Quisjudicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control', EJIL, Vol. 
11 (2000) No. 1; Ioana Petculescu, 'The Review of the United Nations Security Council Decisions by 
the International Court of Justice', NILR , (2005), 52 (2), p. 167; Erika De Wet, The Chapter V71 
Powers of the United Nations Security Council, (Hart Publishing, 2005); David Schweigman, 'The 
Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Legal Limits and the Role of the 
International Court of Justice', Nordic Journal ofInternational Law, Volume 7 1, Number 3 (January, 
2002); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between Political and Judicial Organs of 
International Organisations: The Role of the Security Council in the New International Criminal Court", 
in Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence, Romano, Cesare, and Mackenzie, Ruth (eds. ), International 
Organizations and International Dispute Settlement. Trends and Prospects, (Transnational Publishers, 
2002), pp. 195-219; John Dugard, 'Judicial Review' of Sanctions', in Gowlland-Debbas, Vera (ed. ), 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law, (Kluwer Law International, 200 1), pp. 83-92; Franck, 
M. Thomas, 'The 'Powers of Appreciation: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN LegalityT, AJIL , 
vol. 86/3, (1992), pp. 519-523. Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, 'Ile Relationship between the International 
Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie case,. AJIL, vol. 88/4, (1994), 
V 643-677. rior 
example, see Polish position paper, UN Doc. A/AC. 247/1997/CRP. 9,12 June, 1997. Ernesto 
Zedillo, 'An Overview', in Ernesto Zedillo ed., Reforming the United Nationsfor Peace and Security, 
Proceedings ofa Workshop to Anal)Te the Report ofthe High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2005), p. 6. 78 See I. Winkelmann, 'Bringing the Security Council into a New Era', I Max Planck YB., 75-83.; see 
Russell, History of the United Nations Charter, supra note 12, pp. 713-719; Bruce Russett, ed., The Once and Future Security Council (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 2-5; Townsend Hoopes 
and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U. N. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 
pp. 198-203. 
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'hopeless, 09 or are 'hardly realistic, '80 particularly given that the issue would itself be 
subject to the threat and use of the veto power. 
81 Therefore, to confront this reality, 
the majority of states and commentators have directed their energy at ensuring that the 
veto power reflects the evolving character of international legal system, particularly in 
its quest to protect and promote fundamental human rights. 
82 
With this regard, it has been perceived as more useful to 'constrain the use of veto by 
law, while at the same time leaving it intact as a core power. 193 Such proposals are 
intended not only to prevent the use of 'unreasonable vetoes, ' 
84 but also promote a 
'veto free'85 culture. In this regard, the UN General Assembly, 
86 the Non-Aligned 
Movement, 87 the AU, 88 the 'Group of Ten'89 and several individual UN States9o have 
previously urged for restrictions on the use of the veto. 
91 However, these proposals 
have often met fierce resistance from permanent members such as the US and Russia 
who have persistently resisted the imposition of any limitations on their veto power. 
92 
79 ND White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 47. 
80 Sir Michael Wood', The UN Security Council and International Law', supra note 42. 
8'See article 108 of the UN Charter. See also B. Fassbender, 'Pressure for Security Council Reform', in 
David. M. Malone (ed. ), The UN Security Council, 'supra note 54. 
82 See chapter one. See also Robert McCorquodale, 'The Individual and the International Legal 
System', in Malcom D. Evans, International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 307-332. 
83 N. D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 47. 
84 For a discussion of the unreasonable veto, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Moral 
Britannia: Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Britain's Foreign Policy, ' Foreign Policy Centre, April 
26,2004, pp. 28-32; available at fpc. org. uk/fsblob/233. pdf. 
85 Statement by H. E. Mr. Anders Lid6n, 'Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations', 
At the General Assembly on "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership 
of the Security Council and related matter: draft resolution (A/59/L. 64), June 2005. 
86 See Fifty-Sixth General Assembly Plenary 36h Meeting, UN Press Release, GA/9945,01 January, 
2001. 
87 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Egypt, 28 July 1999, UN Doc. A/53/47, Annex X. 
' See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 9. 
9 Proposals on decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto', 25 June 1998, Annex 
XVI to UN Doc. A/52/47. The Group of Ten consists of Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. 
90 For example see the Statement of the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, 
April 21,1998, available at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/docs/mexrefmp. htni; for the German 
position, see UN Doc. A/AC. 247/2000/CRP. 4; Annexes XIV and XXII to UN Doc. A/52/47, available 
at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/reform/scref98. htm; See also S. R. Weisman 'U. S. firm in 
rebuff of German bid at UN, International Herald Tribune, 9 June 2005. 
91 On proposals restricting the power of veto, see Ian Wouters, & Tom Ruys, 'Security Council 
Reform, ' supra note 38. 
92 For example, see Statement by a Representative of the Russian Federation, 24 March 1999, available 
athttp: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/docs/russia99. htm; Statement by Cameron R. Hume, US 
Minister Counsellor for Political Affairs, 23 May 1996, available at 
http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/docs/hume. htm; Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Illusion of Security 
Council Reform, ' supra note 12. 
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In spite of the above, the practice of the permanent five portrays a dramatic decline in 
veto usage in the post-Cold War era 93 and much significance has been attached to the 
fact that the Council is in theory restricted by the law. 94 However, the lack of a 
mechanism to curb the misuse of the veto power remains of major concern as the 
recent restraint on the use of veto fails to offer sufficient guarantees that the Council 
will be more readily willing at act in order to avert future catastrophe. 
Meanwhile, as the debate rages on, reliance is placed upon the hope that in times of 
deep disagreements, permanent members should resort to principles, such as that of 
good faith, which arguably apply to the working of the Council. 95 This viewpoint was 
favoured by the ICISS and UN High Level Panel, which recommended that in grave 
circumstances, the permanent members should limit the use and threat of veto to cases 
where 'vital interests' are genuinely at stake. 96 In Africa for example, this could mean 
that the veto ought not to be used in well defined circumstances, such as those 
recognised by Constitutive Act of the AU namely; war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity. 97 Unfortunately however, not only did these reports fall short of 
elaborating what 'vital interests' would entail, they failed to identify who would 
determine when they are at stake. 98 This aspect is picked up for consideration under 
the more appropriate heading dealing with the responsibility to protect, discussed 
further below. 
1.4 The Question of Extending the Veto Power to Future Security Council 
Members 
Mention was made earlier of the disagreements that emerged in relation to the 
proposed increment of Security Council membership from the current 15 tq 24.99 
93 Malone, David M., 2004. 'Introduction', in David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council, supra 
note 54; Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Illusion of Security Council Reforni, ibid; Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use offorce, supra note 54, pp. 204. 94 See chapter three. 
95 T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 5 I 3& 219-220. See also P- Cryer, 'The Security Council and Article 39-- A Tbreat to Cohcrence? ', l 
Journal ofA rmed Conflict Law (1996), 161 at 165. 96 See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility 
to Protect (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001), p. xiii and UN High Level Panel, A more secure world, supra note 3, aL2 5 6. 
F ii 7 icle 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 98 Sir Michael Wood', The UN Security Council and International Law, ' supra note 42. 99 UN High Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 3; Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, supra note 4. For a discussion on the models that seek to increase the membership of the Council, see Ernesto 
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While some have cast doubts on the whether an enlarged Council would improve its 
efficiency, 100 others contend that wider representation would lead 'to a more 
democratic decision-making process. "01 Meanwhile, a further, but equally serious, 
question that also arose was in regard to whether the power of veto should be 
extended to states who acquire Council permanent membership in the future. On this 
issues, deep divisions gained prominence amongst UN member states following the 
G-4 states' initial proposal that new 'permanent members should have the same 
responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members. ' 102 While this 
position had the support of France and Russia, 103 it was vehemently opposed by the 
US which argued that the veto power ought to rest with the current permanent five 
members alone. 104 
In the meantime, the AU was opposed, in principle, to the veto. 105 However it 
explained the 'view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it 
should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council. ' 106 
Although this position was expressly shared by the Arab League, 107 the permanent 
member states of China and the UK did not express their position on the matter. 108 As 
it turned out, the lack of sufficient support from the General Assembly later forced the 
Zedillo, 'An Overview', in Ernesto Zedillo ed., Reforming the United Nationsfor Peace and Security, 
Proceedings ofa Workshop to Analy7e the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change, (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for the Study oflGlobalization, 2005), pp. 1-1 8. 
100 K. van Kesteren, 'Reforming the Security Council: Views from Practice', in N. M. Blokker and N. J. 
Schrijver (eds. ), The Security Council and the Use offorce, supra note 20, pp. 261-268 ; S. Neil 
Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Responsibility to Protect. - Is Anyone 
Interested in Humanitarian Intervention? ' Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004); Thomas G. Weiss, 
'The Illusion of Security Council Reform' supra note 12; James Paul and C61ine Nahory, 'Theses 
Toward a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council', 13 July 2005, Global Policy Forum, 27 
Dec. 2005; P. van Walsurn, 'A hitch could still stall the momentum in favour of a P- II UN Security 
Council', Financial Times, 18 April 2005; Ernesto Zedillo, 'An Overview', and Muchkund Dubey, 
' Comments on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', in Ernesto 
Zedillo ed., Reforming the United Nationsfor Peace and Security, Proceedings ofa Workshop to 
A naly7e the Report ofthe High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2005), p. 5. 
101 Philippine Ambassador Felipe Mabilangan, quoted in James A. Paul, 'Security Council Reform; 
Arguments about the Future of the United Nations System, " Feb. 1995, Global Policy Forum, 27 Dec. 
2005, available at <http: //www. globalpolicy-org/Security/Pubs/secref. hhn> 
102 See 'Draft Resolution on Security Council reform', 13 May 2005, and 'Draft Resolution on Security 
Council reform', 8 June 2005, available at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/. 
103 For example, see Statement by a Representative of the Russian Federation, 24 March 1999, 
available at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/docs/ýussia99. htnL 
104 R. N. Bums 'On-the-record briefing on UN reforrn, 16 June 2005, available at http: //www. state. gov/ 105 See the Coýmon African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 9. 106 ibid. 
'0' Letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, 23 May 1997, Annex 
VIII to UN Doc. A/AC. 247/1997/CRP. 7. 
108 Wouters, Jan & Ruys, Torr4 'Security Council Refom-4' supra note 38 
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G4 states to subsequently drop their demands for the veto power and ultimately settle 
on their quest for permanent membership. 109 What is more, not only did the AU's 
stand on the matter and the deep divisions between states act as a stumbling block to 
the reforni of the Council and its veto power, they further entrenched the status quo. 
In the end, as with previous quests for reform, the failure to agree ensured that little 
progress was made in regard to the veto power, which further prevented the 
institutional reform of the UN Security Council. ' 10 However, although the failure to 
amend the Council's membership and its decision making process was a major 
setback for the UN reform process, an international commitment by member states to 
protect citizens from avoidable catastrophe was a most important achievement of the 
2005 World Summit. However, a word of caution is vital from the onset. This is 
because of the fact that, in addition to the discretionary power of the Security Council 
in determining the existence of threat to peace, "' the ultimate success of the doctrine 
of responsibility to protect remained tied to the presence of the veto and other 
deficient workings of the Council, as shown below. 
2.1 Introducing the Responsibility to Protect: The Background and Africa's 
Contribution to the Emerging Norm 
It will be recalled from chapter three that the so called right of humanitarian 
intervention remained ambiguous and fell short of acquiring the status of international 
law. This was primarily because it largely remained an academic debate centring on 
the uneasy relationship between law, politics and morals. However, the doctrine's 
failure posed a fundamental question that led to the Secrctary-General's challenge to 
the international community; should the legal quandaries posed by intervention and 
sovereignty allow coalitions of states to stand aside and watch as horror unfolds on a 
future Rwanda or Srebrenica? l 12 
109 Shaun Benton, 'No UN Reform Likely, ' supra note 33; Amber Henshaw, 'African Leaders Reject 
Compromise on UN Security Council', supra note 37. 
110 On past attempts at UN reform, see Thomas G. Weiss, The Illusion of Security Council Reform, 
supra note 12; See B. Fassbender, 'All Illusions Shattered?, ' supra note 12; M. J. Glennon, 'Why the 
Security Council Failed', supra note 12; Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise 
and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue of the Deaf, ' supra 
note 14, p. 3. 
111 See chapter three. 
112 Kofi Annan's speech on 20 September 1999 before the UN General Assembly: Balance State 
Sovereignty with Individual Sovereignty! http: //users. Imi. net/wfanca/pp_annan on sov. htnA; Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, A/54/1,1999, p. 48. see also Kofi Annan, 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ' Economist, September 18,1999. 
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In confronting this dilemma, the Canadian government responded by establishing the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 
September 2000, which consisted of high level Commissioners led by Gareth Evans 
and Mohamed Sahnoun. 113 Basically the Commission sought to address the political, 
operational, legal and ethical dilemmas posed by the issue of sovereignty and 
intervention. ' 14 As it turned out, central to the ICISS's conclusion was the positing of 
a new norm which reinterpreted the doctrine of sovereignty to include a responsibility 
to protect, and not a mere authority to govern. 
115 Although the concept of 
responsibility to protect had prominently featured in the earlier manuscripts of Francis 
Deng, 116 its publication by the ICISS immediately aroused immense interdisciplinary 
attention and academic review. 117 The concept was subsequently taken up and 
113 For details of commissioners, see http: //www. iciss. ca/members-en. asp. 
114 See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, ' supra note 96. Available at 
http: //www. iciss. ca/05-Background-erLasp. 
113 lbid p. xi. 
116 Francis M. Deng, 'Frontiers of sovereignty, Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, 8,2 (1995), pp. 
249-86'Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, 
(Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996. ); Francis Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993). 
117 They include Jeremy I Levin, 'The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a DamT, Michigan 
Journal ofInternational Law, 25 (1), (2003), pp 153-177; Ian Williams, 'Righting the Wrongs of Past 
interventions: A Review of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty', 
International Journal ofHuman Rights, 6 (3), (2002), pp 103-113; David Ryan, 'Report of the 
international Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect', 
international Affairs, 78 (4), (2002), pp 890-89 1; JL Holzgrefe &Robert 0 Keohane 
(eds), Humanitarian Intervention : Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Jennifer Welsh (ed), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, New 
York: Commission on Human Security, 2003, pp 10,57; Peter Singer, One World- The Ethics of 
Globalization, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); Kathleen Newland, No Refuge: The 
Challenge ofInternal Displacement, (New York: OCHA, 2003); John Harker, 'Intervention is Served. 
the US Federal Alien Torts Claims Act and the irony of ironies', Cambridge Review ofInternational 
Affairs, 16 (1), (2003), pp 155-164; Joelle Tanguy, 'Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention, Ethics 
and International Affairs, 17 (1), (2003), pp 141-148; Adam Roberts, 'The Price of Protection', 
Survival, 44 (4), (2002), pp 157-161; Peter J Burgess, 'The Foundation for a New Consensus on 
Humanitarian Intervention', Security Dialogue, 33 (3), (2002), pp. 383-384; Jane Boulden, 'Book 
review: The Responsibility to Protect', Journal ofRefugee Studies, 15 (4), 2002, pp 428-429; Edward 
Newman, 'Humanitarian Intervention, legality and legitimacy', International Journal ofHuman Rights, 
6 (4), (2002), pp 102-120; Thomas G Weiss, 'To intervene or not to intervene? A contemporary snap. 
shot', Canadian Foreign Policy, 9 (2), (2002), pp 141-157; Jennifer M Welsh, 'Review Essay: From 
Right to Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society', Global Governance, 8 
(4), (2002), pp 503-521; Jennifer Welsh et al, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty', International Journal, 57 
(4), (2002), pp 489-512 and; Daniel Warner, 'The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical 
Frigagement', Millennium, 32 (1), (2003), pp 109-12 1. 
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developed by the UN High Level Panell's and later, incorporated into the Secretary 
General's report In Larger Freedom. 
Meanwhile, the AU was the first regional organisation to approve the doctrine of 
responsibility to protect, in preparedness for the 2005 UN summit on reform of the 
organisation. 1 19As shown below, the African Union's Common Policy on UN Reform 
was to later contribute to the adoption of the doctrine at the World SUMMit. 
120 What 
should be mentioned at this stage is that despite Africa's well documented strict 
adherence to the sovereignty principle, 
121 the AU's support of the emerging norm was 
hardly astonishing. This is because although African states 'historically are among the 
staunchest subscribers to the international law principles of nonintervention and state 
sovereignty, ' 122 their Constitutive Act 
123 had earlier endorsed an interventionist 
approach towards 'cases of egregious human rights abuses, coups and regional 
instability. ' 124 
It was thus unsurprising when the African states of Benin, Rwanda and Tanzania, all 
gave strong explicit support for the concept at a UN Security Council debate on the 
responsibility to protect. Benin tried to build congruence by suggesting that 'collective 
responsibility to protect is the basis of the creation of the African Union and its 
structures concerned with the maintenance of peace and security. ' 
125 Similarly, 
Rwanda drew on its harrowing history to argue forcefully that international 'business 
as usual is inadequate and can no longer prevail. ' 
126 The East African country went 
on to support the use of Chapter VII action where states fail to live up to their 
sovereign responsibilities. 
127 However, while emphasising Africa's regional 
UN High Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 3, p. 66. 
See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 9. 
120 Alex J Bellamy 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 
World Summit', Ethics & International Affairs 20 (2) (2006), 143-169. 
121 See chapter five. 
122 Jeremy I Levitt, 'The Responsibility to Protectý supra note 117; See also Jeremy I Levitt Africa: 
Selected Documents on Constitutive, Conj7ict and Securi% Humanitarian, and Judicial Issues, 
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2003). 
123 See chapter seven. 
124 Adekeye Adebajo, 'UN Reform Needs an African Perspective', Mail & Guardian, May 23,2005. 
Available at http: //www. globalpolicy. org/refornVinitiatives/annaiV2005/0523african. htm. 125 UN doc. S/PV. 5319,9 December 2005, p. 11. 126 UN doc. S/PV. 5319 (Resumption 1), 9 December 2005, pp. 18-9. 
127 Ibid. 
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responsibility to protect, the AU warned that its position on the matter 'should not 
undermine the responsibility of the international community to protect. '128 
Ultimately, world leaders at the Summit heeded Africa's call and reaffirmed their 
readiness and willingness to take 'collective action' through the Security Council to 
protect populations where governments fail to do so. This responsibility to protect 
was phrased in two parts; first, each 'individual State has the responsibility to protect 
its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. ' 129 The second component of responsibility to protect was directed at the 
rest of the world and automatically comes to play when the individual state is unable 
or unwilling to protect its citizens. Specifically, the international community could 
embark on 'collective action' through the Security Council to protect populations 
where governments failed to do so. 130 
Subsequently, on 28 April 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted a 
historical resolution 1674, which made reference to the responsibility to protect. 131 
This resolution was unprecedented in that it was the first to 'reaffirm the World 
Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. ' 132 Furthermore, 
as shown in the next chapter, the new doctrine was also acknowledged by the Security 
Council in resolutions 1679 133 and 1706 134 regarding the Darfur conflict, which 
135 formed the first test of the doctrine's application. 
It should be mentioned that the legal significance of the resolutions listed above 
cannot be over emphasised. Indeed, mention was made that article 25 of the UN 
Charter obligates UN member states 'to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter'. Although not all Council 
resolutions are binding, it will recalleý from chapter three that decisions passed under 
128 See the Common. 4frican Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 9. 129 2005 World Sumrnitý Sept. 14-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, para I* 38, U. N. Doc A/60/L I 
(Sept. 20,2005). See also See also Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, 'The responsibility to protect, Foreign Affairs 81,6 (2002), pp. 99-110. 130 ibid. 
131 SC Res 1674 (2006), 28 April 2006. 
132 ibid. 
133 SC Res 1679 (2006), 16 May 2006. 
134 SC Res 1706 (2006); 31 August 2006. 
135 See chapter nine. -, 
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter are legally binding. 136 Nonetheless, despite its 
adoption the following section makes clear that the responsibility to protect remains a 
controversial subject both within the UN Security Council, the General Assembly and 
the wider international community. 137 
2.2 The Divergent Views on the Responsibility to Protect 
From the onset, the permanent members of the Security Council were divided on the 
doctrine due to different reasons. The US initially rejected the criteria for intervention 
as they infringed on its discretion to intervene on grounds that suited 
its national 
interests, particularly in the aftermath of September 11,2001.1 
38 Although China 
rejected the responsibility to protect, it nevertheless asserted that human rights 
violations were a 'legitimate concern of the international community. ' 
139 Russia on its 
part, despite its support of the concept, argued that the Security Council already had 
the mechanisms to deal with humanitarian crisis and opined that any action taken 
without the Security Council authorisation risked undermining the Charter. 
140 
Meanwhile, although the UK and France remained in strong support of the doctrine, 
they too expressed the concern that the agreement on criteria for action would not 
necessarily produce the required political will to avert a tragedy. 
141 
136 See also Sir Michael Wood', The UN Security Council and International Law, ' supra note 42. See 
also the same author, 'The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions", 2 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law (1998). 
137 See Carsten Stahn, "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, " 10 1 
AXL 99 (2007); Susan Breau, 'Is the Responsibility to Protect Evolving into a Doctrine of International 
Law? ', Paper presented at the University of Sheffield, School of Law, 29th November 2006. See also 
Susan Breau, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations and Collective Responsibility, (Cameron 
May, 2005). 
131 Jennifer M. Welsh, 'Conclusion: Humanitarian Intervention after II September, ' in Jennifer M. 
Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 180; Roberts, 'The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention', in Welsh, Humanitarian 
Intervention and Internation 
, 
al Relations, pp 71-97; S. Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, and 
Thomas G. -Weiss, 'The Responsibility to Protect, ' supra note 100, Alex J. Bellamy, 'Whither the 
Responsibility to Protect?, ' supra note 120. 
139 Government of China, 'Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations 
Reforms, ' June 7,2005, pp. 10-12; available at www. china-un. org/eng/smhmj/2005/tl99 10 l. htm 140 See Yevgeny Primakov, 'UN Process, Not Humanitarian Intervention, Is World! s Best Hope, ' New 
Perspectives Quarterly (September 2,2004). 
141 Jennifer M. Welsh, 'Conclusion: Humanitarian Intervention after II September, ' in Jennifer M. 
Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, supra note 138, p. 204. 
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Yet, the deep disagreements regarding the emerging concept extended beyond the 
premises of the Security Council, with divergence amongst states and 
commentators. 142 For a start, the responsibility to protect was strongly opposed 
by 
some leaders, such as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, who feared that such 
interventions 
might be used by powerful states, particularly the US, against developing countries. 
143 
And borrowing from Africa's past experience with colonialism, this argument had 
some support from the AU which, while advocating for the doctrine, warned that 
it 
should not be used 'as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, 
independence, and 
144 
tenitonal integity of states. ' 
However, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) broke ranks with the AU and rejected 
the concept which, to them, represented a reincarnation of humanitarian 
intervention, 
which they had long concluded lacked any basis in international law. 
145 Meanwhile, 
the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003 seemed to trigger the G 77 group 
146 to 
reiterate the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
147 On the other hand, states such as 
142 Alex J Bellamy (2006), 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect?, 'supra note 120. On the major 
divisions, see also S Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielkirig & Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Responsibility to 
Protect, ' supra note 100; Mohammed Ayoob, 'Humanitarian Intervention and international society', 
International Journal ofHuman Rights, 6 (1), (2002), pp 81-102; David Chandler, From Kosovo to 
Kabuk Human Rights and International Intervention, (Pluto Press: London, 2002); Lance Selfa, 'A 
new colonial 'Age of Ernpire'T, International Socialist Review, 23,2002; David 
Rieff, A Bedfor the 
Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, (London: Vintage, 2002). 
143 See Statement by Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, at the General Debate of the 60th Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, September 15,2005; available at www. embavenez- 
us. org/news. php? nid=1745. See also Rosemary Foot, S Neil MacFarlane & Michael Mastanduno (eds), 
The United States and MultilateralOrganizations, supra note 12; Michael Byers & Georg Nolte (eds), 
United States Hegemony and the Foundations ofInternational Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Chris Landsberg, 'The UN High-Level Reports and Implications for Africa, ' 
, 
yra note 9. s 
1 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 9. For 
an illustration of this point, see Mohammed Ayoob, 'Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Administration, ' 10 Global Governance 99,115 (2004); 
145 See chapter 3 and the Statement by Radzi Rahman, Charg6 dAffaires ai, Permanent Mission of 
Malaysia to the United Nations, Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
at the Informal Meeting of the Plenary of the General Assembly Concerning the Draft Outcome 
Document, June 21,2005; available at www. un. int/malaysia/NAM/mm2l06O5. html. 
146 On G-77, see Sauvant, Karl P. The Group of 77: Evolution, structure, organization, (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 198 1). 
147 Statement by Stafford Neil, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations and 
Chairman of the Group of 77, on the Report of the Secretary-General entitled In Larger Freedom, April 
6,2005; available at www. g77. org/Speeches/040605. htnLSee also the earlier Declaration of the Group 
of 77 South Summit, 10-14 April, 2000 where the 133 member states rejected an interventionist 
approach to humanitarian crisis, including humanitarian intervention. Available at 
www. g77. org/sununit/Declaration_G77Sununit. htm -6 lk. See also M. Byers, 'The Shifting 
Foundations of International Law: A Decade of Forcible Measures Against Iraq', 13 European Journal 
of International Law 21, ( 2002), p. 28. ,. 
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Argentina, 149 Australia, 
149 Armenia, Colombia, 150 Greece, 151 Ireland, 
152 New 
Zealand, 153 Norway 154 and Peru, 
155 
and many others advocated the concept. 
156 Some, 
such as Korea, ironically then represented by the current UN Secretary General, 
wanted some conditions attached to the concept, including those that limited the 
situations during which the doctrine would override state sovereignty. 157 
Meanwhile, although conunentators, such as Todd Lindberg, described the concept as 
a crevolution in the consciousness of world affairs, ' 
158 others fiercely disagreed. 159 For 
Michael Byers, the World Summit diluted the concept to the extent that it would lead 
to the failure of the Security Council to uphold the very principles embodied in the 
responsibility to protect. 160 For others, the doctrine risked undermining the UN 
Charter and general international law. 161 At the same time, some dismissed the 
doctrine on the basis that it added little to the dilemma facing the world community, 
149 Statement by Ambassador Jorge Arguello, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United 
Nations at the Open Debate on Agenda Item, 'Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict', New York, 
22 June, 2007. 
149 See Hon Robert Hill, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations, 
Statement to the 62 nd United Nations General Assembly, New York, 2 October, 2007. 
150 See S. E. Sra. Claudia Blum Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Colombia, Statement at 
the 2 nd Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians, New York 4 December, 2006. 
'51 See Statement by Maria Telelian, Minister Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of Greece 
to the United Nations, Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians, 28 June, 2006. 
152 See the Republic of Ireland Statement by Mr. Dermot Ahern, T. D, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 
the 6 1" Session of the General Assembly, United Nations New York, 26, September, 2006. 
153 See Letter dated 27 January, 2005, to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council by the representatives of New Zealand, Canada and Australia. 
" Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Norwegian Perspectives on International Peace and Security', China 
Institute ofInternational Studies Forum, Beijing, 29, March, 2005. 
155 See Statement by Ambassodor Oswaldo de Reviro, Permanent Representative of Peru at the Open 
Debate on Agenda Itern, 'Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict', 26 June, 2006, New York 
156 See government statements in Responsibility to Protect; Engaging Civil Society', available at 
http: //www. responsibilitytoprotect. org/index. php/govermncnt - statements%22. 
See also Sixtieth 
General Assembly Plenary, GA/I 03 85,16 September, 2005. 
157 Statement by Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, at the 
General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 18,2005. 
158 Todd Lindberg, 'Protect the People, ' Washington Times, September 27,2005 * 159 David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul. - Human Rights and International Intervention (London: 
Pluto, 2002), p. 135. 
160 Michael Byers, 'High Ground Lost on UN's Responsibility to Protect' Winnipeg Free Press, 18 
September 2005, p. 133; Bellamy, Alex J, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect?, ' supra note 120. 161 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Taking Opinio Juris Seriously, in Customary International Law on the Use 
of Force 28-29 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paulo Palchetti eds., 2005); David Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: 
Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 1,18-19 (2003); Yevgeny 
Primakov, 'UN Process, Not Humanitarian Intervention, Is Worlds Best Hope, ' New Perspectives 
Quarterly (September 2,2004). 
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and merely reinforced the status quo by continuing to vest the Council with the sole 
authority to decide when to act on the responsibility to protect. 162 
Indeed, although the decision to retain the power to act within the Council may be in 
conformity with the principles of the UN Charter, it failed to provide the solution 
where disagreement, featuring the use or threat of veto, may lead to a paralysis within 
the Council. And given that it remains unlikely that the UN would act in defiance of a 
vetoed Council resolution, 163 the failure to identify any body which may exercise 
subsidiary responsibility in lieu of the Council turns regional organisations into viable 
candidates. 
2.3 Enforcing the Emerging Doctrine and Africa's Regional Responsibility to 
Protect 
A serious problem with the current concept of responsibility to protect is that in no 
way does it provide an impetus for the permanent Council members to refrain from 
use of the veto. This position is surprising given that the importance of guaranteeing 
the political will of the Security Council members during times of grave peril had 
been made clear during the drafting of the responsibility to protect. 164 However, 
during this time, rejection was made of a proposal compelling permanent members of 
the Council 'to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. ' 165 As it turned out, the failure to obtain the 
necessary undertaking from the permanent five was a clear set back to the 
development of the concept as an emerging norm, at least as intended by its 
drafters. 166 Nevertheless, it follows that this anomaly and the potential failure of the 
162 See, e. g., Jeremy I. Levitt, 'The Responsibility to Protect, ' supra note 117; G. Weiss & Don Hubert, 
The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, (Ottawa: IDRC Books, 2001). See 
also Chris Landsberg, 'The UN High-Level Reports and Implications for Africa, supra note 9. 163 Nigel D White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council After Iraq', supra note 47. 164See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 96, paras. 6.19-6.21. ICISS, para. 6.21 See also 
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Salmoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect, ' supra note 129; Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, 'Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures, ' Melbourne Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2001), p. 566; Michael Byers, 'High Ground Lost on UN's Responsibility 
to Protect, ' supra note 160. 165 See Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High Level Panel Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly, 120, U. N. Doc 
A/59/HLPNVCRP. I/Rev. 2 (August 10,2005). 
1" Alex J. Bellamy, -'Whither the Responsibility to Protect?, ' supra note 120. 
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Council to enforce the new doctrine strengthens the case for regional action on the 
basis of the responsibility to protect. 167 
Indeed this argument seems to have been foreseen by the ICSS who stressed that it 
would be 'difficult to argue that alternative means of discharging the duty to protect 
can be entirely discounted, ' 'if the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for 
the intervention where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, 
or the Council fails to deal with such a proposal within reasonable time'. 168 However, 
while a similar position found favour with the UN High Level Panel, 169 both reports 
not only failed to elaborate what would entail 'reasonable time', they fell short of 
identifying which entity would make the determination of such a finding. 
Irrespective of its shortcomings, the view mentioned above was shared by some 
regional organisations. Specifically, although the AU agreed that 'intervention of 
Regional Organisations should be with the approval of the Security Council, ' it 
explained that in certain situations, 'such approval could be granted 'after the fact' in 
circumstances requiring urgent action. ' 170 Thus the AU expressed its preparedness to 
exercise its regional right to protect upon the UN's failure during circumstances 
requiring urgent action, and subsequently request for ex post facto authorisation, 
whose legality was addressed earlier. 171 
In such instances, rather 'than acting illegally, [the AU] states would be acting in a 
legal void opened by UN inaction and with the purpose of addressing an institutional 
failure. ' 172 In this regard, although the principle of responsibility to protect speaks of 
collective action through the UN, it ironically strengthens the legal justification for 
limited forms of regional action when the UN fails to act upon the doctrine. 173 
Therefore, the failure by the 2005 World Summit to adequately address the 
167 See Alicia L. Bannon 'The responsibility to Protect' supra note 10. 'See ICISS, The responsibility to protect, supra note 96, at 53. 169 UN High Level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 3, p. 71 para 272. 170 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Refonn of the United Nations, supra note 9. 171 Ibid. See also chapter seven. 172 See Alicia L. Bannon 'The responsibility to Protect, ' supra note 10. 173 Ibid. See also S Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Tbielking & Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Responsibility to Protect' supra note 100. 
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institutional hurdles that constrain UN action, including the threat and use of veto 
referred to above, ensured the possibility of regional action. 174 
However, such a possibility is limited. This is because the doctrine of responsibility to 
protect only applies to a prescribed set of international crimes. 
175 And even though 
the latter feature in both the AU and UN framework of intervention and responsibility 
to protect, the legal-political and operational hurdles persist within both 
organisations. 176 Furthermore, serious questions have also ensued with regard to the 
UN's new doctrine and its compatibility with the AU's own right to intervene, 
including the major differences, similarities as well as relationship between the two 
concepts. 
2.4 Reconciling the AU's Right to Intervene and the UN's Responsibility to 
Protect 
It is clear from the onset that both the AU's right to intervene and the UN's 
responsibility to protect are designed to restrict the doctrine of sovereignty which has 
been at the cornerstone of the international legal SyStem. 177 The gradual erosion of the 
once sacrosanct doctrine was largely inspired by the increased consensus on the need 
to adhere to key peremptory norms, 178 particularly those protecting the individual, 
which take 'precedence over concerns of State sovereignty. ' 179 Nevertheless, the first 
key distinction between the two doctrines is the phrasal difference between the AU's 
'right to intervene i 180 and the UN's 'responsibility to protect. ' The latter is described 
as enot one of a right to intervene, but rather of a responsibility of the whole human 
race to protect our fellow human beings from extreme abuse wherever and whenever 
174 See Alicia L. Bannon 'The responsibility to Protect, ' supra note 10. 
1752005 World Sunuri: itSept. 14-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, para 138, U. N. Doc A/60/L. 1 
(Sept. 20,2005). See also See also Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, 'The responsibility to protect', 
Foreign Affairs 81,6 (2002), pp. 99-110. 
176 See chapters three, seven and nine on the UN and AU constraints on their effective functioning. 177 Chapter two. See also article 2(l) & (7) of the UN Charter. See ICJ decision in the Corfu Channel 
case, UK v. Albania) lCJ Reports, 1949, p. 4. On a summary of the scope and significance of state 
sovereignty, see Nico Shrijiver, 'The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty', The British Year Book of International Law 1999 ( Oxford; Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 69-70. 178 See chapter one. 179 The Secretary-General in an address to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Geneva, 7 April (1999) http: //www. freeserbia. net/Documcnts/Kosovo/Annan3. html. See also chapter one. "0 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of African Union. 
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it occurs. ' 181 Hence, the responsibility to protect 'is not a license for intervention [but] 
an international guarantor of international accountability. ' 
182 However, what is clear is 
that the two doctrines apply to cases of 'grave circumstances" 
83 and where there is 
'serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings or imminently 
likely to 
occur. 9184 
Yet, and as the next chapter shows, there remains the distinct possibility that the AU 
and UN may have different ideas about the gravity of a particular situation. 
185 
However, the two concepts agree that situations amounting to genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity would warrant action. A common thread that unites these 
crimes is that they have attained the status of international crimes forming the ratione 
186 187 188 
materiae of the Yugoslav and Rwandan International Criminal Tribunals. 
Significantly, they fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
where they have been termed as the 'most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community. ' 189 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the responsibility to protect adds the crime of 
'ethnic cleansing' to its list. 190 On the other hand, the AU framework contains a 
further ground of a situation that constitutes a 'serious threat to legitimate order 191 
While the former consists of a lesser crime than those prescribed above, the latter's 
status in international law is fiercely contested. 
192 Ultimately, the relevant discussion 
on the gravity of the Darfur conflict in the next chapter will demonstrate that despite 
the seriousness of these situations, disagreements with regard to their factual elements 
181 Kofi Annan, Address to the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, January 2004 - 
available at http: //www. preventinggenocide-conL See also Dr. Susan Breau, 'Is the Responsibility to 
Protect Evolving into a Doctrine of International LawT, supra note 137. 
182 Statement by Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, at the General Debate of the 59th General 
Assembly, September 22,2004, available at www. un. org/webcast/ga/59/statement, s/canengO4O922. pdf. 
"' Article 4 Constitutive Act of African Union. 
184 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 96. 
185 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect, 'supra note 120; Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
'Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures, ' Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 2, no. 2 (200 1), p. 566. 
186 See article 3,4 and 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. 
187 Article 2,3 and 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. "' Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals created by Security Council resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 
1994 and resolution 827 (1993) of May 25,1993 respectively. 
"9 See Art 5 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. 
190 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16,2005,2005 World Summit Outcome, para 139, U. N. Doc A/60/L. 1 
(Sept. 20,2005). 
191 Article 4 Constitutive Act of African Union., 
192 See chapter seven. 
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may be unduly influenced by politics 'giving the powerful an opportunity to sway 
others by bringing financial, military, and political pressure to bear. ' 193 
Meanwhile, another key distinction between the AU's right to intervene and the UN's 
responsibility to protect lies with the designated authority to act in situations entailing 
breach. It will be recalled that African states bestowed prior consent on the AU, in 
order to intervene in their territories during grave circumstances. 194 This position 
stands in contrast to the confusion that has arisen with regard to which legal entity 
would invoke the responsibility to protect, particularly in light of the Security 
Council's inaction. 195 Again, illustration of this point is made in the coming chapter in 
relation to the Darfur conflict, where it became relatively unclear as to whom, 
between the AU and the Security Council bore, the duty when Sudan appeared to fail 
on its responsibility to protect. 
Nevertheless, the envisaged system of cooperation between the AU and the UN, when 
operative, has the potential to render this lack of clarity of little practical 
significance. 196 This is because the AU mandates the PSC, which is the standing 
decision-making organ of the Union 197 to 'work closely and cooperate' with the 
Security Council. 198 Furthermore, it will be recalled from chapter s, even that the AU 
does not deny, but actually formally recognizes the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. 199 Therefore, 
as argued below, a formal division of labour would develop a strong 'partnership of 
peace and security between the Union and the Security Council. s200 
Meanwhile, from the analysis above, it can be concluded that in acting on its right to 
intervene, the AU would be carrying out its regional responsibility to protect, 
sanctioned by the UN. Indeed, although considered more appropriately in the next 
chapter on Darfur, it deserves'mention here the doctrine of responsibility to protect 
has had an impact on peace operations, including those by the AU, where deployed 
1 93 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect?, ' supra note 120. "'Chapter seven. 
195 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Whither the Responsibility to Protect?, supra note 120. 196 See chapter seven., -- 197 Article 9 of the 2002 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act. 198 Article 17 (1) of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council. 199 Ibid. - 200 Article 7 (k). 
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troops arguably have a duty to use force, in order to protect endangered civilians 
within their vicinity, as suggested by Breau. 201 This is clear from the recent joint 
AU/TJN peace operations where the troops were issued with a mandate that was 
backed by an enforcement element. However, although the AU allows for an 
interventionist approach, its current practice, including in Burundi and Darfur, 
suggests that rather than engaging in forceful intervention, the organisation is more 
likely to embark in consensual regional peace operations. 
3.1 Regionalisation of Peace Operations and a Further Case for a Division of 
Labour between the UN and AU 
Peace operations involve the deployment of civilian, police and military personnel in 
post-conflict situations to carry out two coordinated functions. 
202 Firstly, they are 
mandated to assist in the implementation of an agreement between warring states or 
factions by providing post-conflict security. Secondly, the deployed personnel assist 
in pcacebuilding by leading efforts designed to enhance post-conflict recovery, 
reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries 
emerging from conflict. 203 As described below, although the two functions have been 
treated separately in the past, recent opinion, including that of the Secretary-General, 
advocates for the inclusion of peace-building functions within Peacekeeping 
operations. 204 
It is important to mention from the onset that amidst their similar identities, 205 which 
often lead to the occasional blur, it is of crucial important to make a distinction. 
between peace operations and enforcement measures taken by the Security Council 
201 Breau, Susan C., 'The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping' Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law, Vol. 11, Issue 3, pp. 429-464,2006. 
202 N. D. White, 'Key Concept: Peace Operations', in V. Chetail (ed. ) PeaceBuilding and 
Reconstruction (2008). (Forthcoming, copy on file with author). 
203 SC Res. 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005. ' 204 Report ofthe Secretar)-General, Prevention ofArmed Conflicts, UN doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574,7 
June 2001, paras. 81-85. See also Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programmefor 
Refonn, UN Doc. A/51/950,14 July 1997. See also Brahimi Report of 21 August 2000, UN Doc. 
A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 36-43. 205 On some of the similarities and differences between peace operations and Chapter VII measures - see See N. D White, 'Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The 
Brahimi Report)', Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 6, Number 1,2001; Niels Blokker, 
' The Security Council and the Use of Force: On Recent Practice', in Niels Blokker and Nico SchfiLyer, Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 20, ppA-29. 
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under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 206 It will be recalled from chapter three that the 
non-applicability of article 43 of the UN Charter made it the practice of the Council to 
sanction a coalition of the willing states to take authorised action against the 
sovereignty of a state, in order to restore peace and security. 
207 In sharp contrast, 
peace operations are not only voluntary and grounded on consent and cooperation of 
the host state, they are also normally limited by the concept of impartiality as well as 
by certain restrictions in regard to the use of force. 208 
It has already been mentioned that the paralysis of the Council during the Cold War 
era severely restricted the proper functioning of the collective security system, 
particularly the Security Council's enforcement mechanism. 
209 As a result of the 
occasional deadlock within the Council, lack of resources and other UN shortcomings, 
led to the development of peace operations, which emerged as a pragmatic solution to 
the deficiency of the UN system. 210 Consequently, as the practice below demonstrates, 
the deployment of peace support forces not only filled key gaps created by a defective 
206 Christine Gray, 'The Use of Force and the International Legal Order', in Malcolm N. Shaw, 
International Law, (OUP Oxford; 2 edition, 2006), p. 610; Ralph Zacklin, 'The Use of Force in 
Peacekeeping Operations', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, ne Security Council and the Use of 
Force, ibid, p. 91. 
207 ND White, Keeping the Peace. The United Nations and the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and 
Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) p. 30. See also L. Sohn, 'The authority of the 
United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Per 
, 
manent Force', 52 AXL (1958) 229, p. 230; G. 
Schwarzenberger, 'Problems of a United Nations Force', 12 CLP (1959) 247, p. 254; D. Sarooshi, The 
United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation of the UN Security 
Council of its Chapter VII Powers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); N. D. White, 'Key 
Concept: Peace Operations', in V. Chetail (ed) PeaceBuilding and Reconstruction, supra note 202. 
" See UNEF. Summary Study of the Experience Derivedfrom the Establishment and Operation of the 
Force: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, Thirteenth Session, Annex 1, Agenda Item 65, 
UN doc. A/3943 (195 8); The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping-Operations (3rd 
edn., 1996) 7; An Agendafor Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, 
A/47/277 - S/24111 (1992), paras. 11-12; Supplement to an Agendafor Peace, A150/60 - 
S/1995/1(1995), para. 33; Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of2l August 2000, 
UN doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809, (Brahitni Report), para 48; Report of the Special Corrunittee of 
Peacekeeping, UN Doc. A/56/767,28 March, 2003, para 46. See also N. D. White, Keeping the Peace: 
The United Nations and the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and Security (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997, pp. 232-244; Nicholas Tsagourias, 'Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the 
Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension', Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 
Volume 11, Number 3, (2006), pp. 465-482 and; M. Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations 
Peacekeeping', 69 Int Aff (1993), 451 at 455; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, 
supra note 54, p. 201-25 1; Ralph Zacklin, 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations', in Niels 
Blokker and Nico Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 20, pp. 91-106. 209 See introduction and chapter three. See also N. D. White, Keeping the Peace, supra note 207, p 224; 
A. James, 'United Nations Peacekeeping and Non Alignment, in M. S. Rajan et al., The Non Aligned 
and the United Nations, (Oceana Publications, 1987), p. 93-9. 
210 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, ibid, p. 22; Christine Gray, 'The Use of 
Force and the International Legal Order', in Malcolm N. Shaw, Intemational Law, supra note 206, p. 610. 
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UN arrangement, they remain an indispensable tool for strengthening peace and 
security. 211 
3.2 State Practice and the Development of Peace Operations 
Peace operations have had undergone a remarkable development 
212 since the well 
known UN's deployment of UNEF I in 1956, following the Suez crisis within 
Egyptian territory. 213 Although the term peace operations hardly exists in the UN 
214 Charter, the ICJ ruling in the Certain Expenses Case , recognised the 
UN's power to 
constitute peace operations. Since then, it has been the nature, rather than the 
constitutional basis of subsequent practice, that has led to much controversy. 
21 5 This 
was particularly evident during the deployment of troops in Yugoslavia (1992) and 
Somalia (1993), whose vague mandates not only resulted in a blur of peace operations 
and enforcement action, but also undermined the concept of neutrality, consent and 
limitation on the use of force, which form the bedrock of peace operations. 216 
The latter's challenge to the traditional rules governing the deployment of troops not 
only ended in failure, they also ensured that traditional peace operations, and not 
enforcement action, was carried out in the later UN missions. 217 Tragically, the 
21 1 Antonio Cassese, International Law, (OUP Oxford; 2 edition, 2004), p. 345-346. 
212 M. P. Kams & K. A. Mingst, 'Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four 
Dilernmas', in R. Thakur & Al. Schnabel (eds. ), United Nations Peacekeeping Operation: Ad Hoc 
Missions, Permanent Engagement (2001) 215; Ralph Zacklin', 'Ile Use of Force in Peacekeeping 
Operations', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra 
note 20, pp. 91-106; Antonio Cassese, International Law, (OUP Oxford; 2 edition, 2004), p. 34-346. 
213 See GA Res. 1000, UN Doc. A/Res/1000 (ES-1) (1956), see also R. Higgins, UnitedNations 
Peacekeeping 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary, (vol. 1, The Middle East, 1. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969) 221-529; Ralph Zacklin', 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations', in 
Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use offorce, supra note 20, p. 94. 
214 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Rep. 1962,151,163-168. See also F. Seycrsted, United Nations Force in the Law ofPeace and 
War (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966), pp. 144-151,211; Antonio Cassese, International Law, ibid, p. 
344. 
215 Christine Gray, 'The Use of Force and the International Legal Order', in Malcolm N. Shaw, 
International Law, supra note 206, p. 610. 
216 Secretary General, Supplement to An Agendafor Peace, UN Doc. S/1995/1, para. 35,1995; N. D 
White, Keeping the Peace, supra note 208, p. 222; Ralph Zacklin, 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping 
Operations', in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, 7he Security Council and the Use offorce, supra 
note 20, p. 95; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, supra note 52, p. 217-224; 
Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security, supra note 207, p. 187-194. 
217 See N. D White, 'Conunentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The 
Brahirni Report)', Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Volume 6, Number 1, (200 1); Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use ofForce: Foundations ofPublic International Law, (Oxford University 
Press, 2 nd edition, 2004), pp. 217-25 1. 
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horrifying lessons from this period were to later guide the developed states' reluctance 
to issue, the UN with the necessary troops to intervene in Rwanda (1994) . 
218 This in 
turn led the catastrophic massacre of up to one million citizens of Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus. 21 9 The UN's disastrous failure during this period raised serious questions as to 
whether the organisation could solely be relied on to restore peace and security, 
particularly given its record in Africa. The answer lay in yet another development 
arising, unsurprisingly, from the Council's unwillingness or inability to act, that saw 
the genesis of the emerging practice from the ECOWAS operations in West Africa in 
the 1990s. As shown earlier in the thesis the evolving custom was later picked up by 
220 the drafters of the Constitutive Act of the AU . 
Meanwhile, although the UN has traditionally had the most experience in authorising 
and carrying out peace operations, recent practice by regional organisations and 
certain states across the globe confirm that the UN organisation has never possessed a 
monopoly over them. 221 Indeed some, but not all, of the operations were authorised by 
the Security Council. For example in Europe, Italy led the NATO peace operation in 
Albania in 1997 while Russian troops, under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) deployed troops to Moldova (1992), Georgia (1993), and 
Tajikistan (1993). Also, NATO engaged in peace operation in Kosovo from 1999, as 
well as its control of Bosnia from 1995 before handing over to the EU in December 
2004. 
Furthermore, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003. In the same year, the EU conducted Operation 
Concordia in Macedonia following NATO's departure and followed it on with a 
police mission, Proxima. Meanwhile in the Americas, the United States led a 
218 See chapter five. See also UN Publication, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace 
Keeping, 3rd Edition 1996; United Nations Department of Peace Keeping, Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learntfrom UNAMIR; United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol X, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996; Christine Gray, 'International Law and the Use of Force', supra note 54, pp. 227- 230. 
219 See chapter five. 
220 See chapter seven. See also Jean Allain 'The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The failures of Kosovo and Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union', Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 8, (2004), pp 237-289. 221 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, 'Who is Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations', International Security 29.4 (2005) 157-195; Christine Gray, international Law and the Use ofForce, supra note 54, pp. 227-230. 
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multinational force into Haiti after the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
in the spring of 2004. Moreover, in Asia, Australia also led peace operations in East 
Timor (1999) and the Solomon Islands (2003). Similarly, there were British 
operations in Sierra Leone, the French in Central African Republic and Me d'Ivoire, 
and a French-led EU force in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
222 (2003). 
In Africa alone, regional and sub-organizations have conducted no less than ten peace 
operations since 1990.223 In particular, ECOWAS conducted operations in Liberia 
(1991 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998) and C6te d1voire (2002). 
Similarly, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) carried out 
operations in Lesotho (1998) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998). 
Meanwhile, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States 
(CEMAC) led peace operations in the Central African Republic (2002). Most recently, 
the AU deployed operations in Burundi (2003), and Sudan (2004). 
It deserves to be pointed out that the dramatic increase in African regional activity 
stands in sharp contrast to the practice of the OAU which authorised a total of 11 
peace operations during its 38 years of existence. 
224 As put forward throughout this 
study, the dramatic regionalisation of African peace and security has largely been a 
spirited response to the 'failure of the Security Council to act decisively in the face of 
serious threats to peace, security and human lives, particularly in Africa. 225 However, 
the decentralisation and subsequent reliance on regional organisations in 
222 Authorised by Security Council resolution 1484, S/ Res/1484 (2003), 30 May, 2003. 
223 On some of these operations, see Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, supra 
note 54; Ralph Zacklin, 'The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations', in Niels Blokker and N ico 
Schrijver, Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 20, pp. 91-106. 
224 The OAU authorised missions in Chad (2), Rwanda (3), Burundi (1), Comoros (3), DRC (1) and 
Eritrea/Ethiopia (1). See Erick G. Berman, 'African Regional Organisations' Peace Operations; 
Developments and Challenges', African Security Review Vol. II No 4, (2002). See also Terry M. Mays, 
'Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982, (Greenwood Press, 2002); 
Festus Aboagye, 'Towards New Peacekeeping Partnerships in Africa?; The OAU Liaison Mission in 
Ethiopia - Eritrea', 4frican Security Review Vol 10 No 2,200 1. " See Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 168h and 169'h Meetings, UN Press Release 
GA/PK/175,12 February, 2002. See also Declaration of African Heads of State and Governments, 
Lome, Togo, July 12,2002; available at www. africaýreview. org/docs/anns/lome. pdt; Den Kioko, 'The 
Right of Interference Under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interfercnce to Non- 
Intervention, ' International Review, ofthe Red Cross 85, no. 6 (2003), p. 852. 
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enforcements and peace operations also aroused intense debates on both the legality 
and viability of these entities in carrying out their mandates. 226 
3.3 UN verses Regional Peace Operations: The Academic and Political Debate 
The diverse views on these questions taken by commentators divide the 'regionalists' 
227 and 'regiosceptics' schools of thought . On one 
hand, some believe that regional 
peacekeeping operations offer a number of advantages not available to the UN, such 
as their proximity to conflicts, common culture, and greater legitimacy. 
228 
Furthermore, mention was made that these organisations also provide an alternative to 
the well documented deficient practices of the UN . 
229 However, some commentators 
remain highly sceptical of regional organisation's viability and ability to carry out 
peace operations. 230 
226 See, for example, Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold 
War Era (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); Renata Dawn, International Policing in Peace 
Operations: The Role ofRegional Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul Diehl 
and Joseph Lepgold, eds., Regional Conflict Management (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2003); Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations (Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Jane Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conj7ict in Africa: Vie United 
Nations and Regional Organizations (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal 
Singh Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienncr, 2003); 
and Paul Diehl, 'Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21 st Century Peacekeeping, ' 
Global Society, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 337-360; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use 
otForce, supra note 54, p. 282. 
27 Terms used by Benedikt in Benedikt F. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in 
Africa', The Journal ofIfumanitarian Assistance, (2006). 
228 See Report of the Secretary General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and 
Security, S/2008/186,24 March, 2008. See also Benedikt F. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace 
Operations in Africa', ibid; Oldrich Bures, 'Regional peacekeeping operations: Complementing or 
underniining the united nations security council? ' Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 18, Issue 
2 June 2006, pp 83 - 99; Powell, Kristiana The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect, ISS Monograph Series, 
No. 119, (2005). 
229 Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., Peacekeeping Fiascoes ofthe 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US. Interests 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, ý 2002). 230 For a surarnary of the main arguments against regional peace operations, see Walter Dom, Regional 
Peacekeeping is not the Way; Peacekeeping and International Relations, vol. 27, no. 2,1998. See also 
Ghebremeskel, Adanc 'Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali 
Experience, ' The Online Journal ofPeace and Conj7ict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 2. (2002), pp. 9.29; 
Jackson, Richard, 'The dangers of regionalising international conflict management: The African 
experience, ' Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1(2000), pp. 41-60; Junia, M. and A Mengistu, A., The 
Infrastructure of Peace in. 4fHca: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity ofAfrican Institutions, ( International Peace Academy, New York, 2002, ). 
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For example, in apparent contradiction to his earlier emphasis on the role of regional 
organisations in the area of peace and security, 231 a former UN Secretary-General 
opined that regionalisation threatened to weaken the internationalist basis of the 
UN. 232 Meanwhile, others argue that, in addition to being susceptible to local 
hegemonies, regional organisations confront 'exactly the same problems the UN 
faces' and hence are 'quite limited in their capacity. ' 233 Finally, regional organisations 
were observed as lacking in experience, bureaucratic structures, and resources to 
conduct peace operations effectively. 234 
These heated disagreements also emanate, in part, from the lack of clarity deriving 
from the provisions in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
235 Although the provisions 
therein envisage a relationship between the Security Council and regional 
organisations, they remain silent with regard to their constitutional relationship. 
236 Yet, 
key UN reports such as the Agenda for Peace (1992) and the Brahimi Report 
(2000)237 hardly fair any better, in the elaboration of the relationship between 
universalism and regionalism under the current UN system. In further irony, although 
their formulation of policy emphasises the role of regional organisations, these reports 
fail to call for specific division of labour and hardly offer details on how to formally 
improve the relationship and cooperation, particularly between the UN and Africa's 
regional and sub-regional organisations. 238 However, as shown in the next chapter, 
there are key lessons learned from the practical cooperation between the UN and the 
AU, in particular in Burundi and Sudan, on the form that a division of responsibility is 
likely to take. 
231 See chapter four. See also Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1992, Agendafor Peace. - Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peace Making and Peacekeeping, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111,17 June 1992, paragraph 64; UN 
Document A/50/71 I and S/1995/91 1, Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace. 
keeping in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General, I November 1995, paragraph 4. 232 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished. - A US. -U. N. Saga (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), p. 306. 233 Former UN Undersecretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart, email exchange with students from Marin 
Academy High School, UC Berkeley's Model UN Program, at Boalt Law School, March 
1999, available at http: //globetrotter. Berkeley. edu/UN/Urquhart/urqchat99. peace. hftnl. 234 Marrack Goulding, 'Peacemonger, '(London: John Murray, 2002), p. 217. 235 See chapter four. 
236 ibid. 
237 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace 
0 erations, UN Doc. A/55/505-S/2000/809,21 August 2000. Led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi. 23F Christine Gray, International Law and the Use ofForce, supra note 54, p. 283; Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue of the Deaf, supra note 15. 
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3.4 Devising a Division of Labour based on a Relationship of Cooperation 
Meanwhile, in spite the disagreements above, a clear development of increased 
cooperation between regionalism and universalism in the area of peace operations has 
emerged . 
239 Recent practice confirms that it is their coordination, as opposed to their 
antagonism, that should lie at the heart of the debate. 240 This viewpoint found support 
with the UN's Special Committee, which not only stressed the need for enhanced 
African regional peace operations, but also recommended the development of a close 
relationship with the AU. 241 SigniflCantly, important proposals relating to the 
complimentary partnership between the UN and regional organisations, particularly 
with African organisations were also put forward by key UN documents, such as the 
UN High Level Panel Report, 242 the Secretary General's Report In Larger 
Fd M243 244 ree 0 and the 2005 Summit Outcome Document. 
African perspectives on the relationship with the UN were first discussed at a meeting 
of the UN High Level Panel with AU officials and civil society in 2004.24' Although 
ilie UN Panel devoted only five paragraphs out of 302 to Africa's peace operations 
challenge, it favoured a much more integrated approach to peace operations between 
the UN and regional organisations. 246 However, the Secretary General's Report In 
Larger Freedom went further. It specifically called for the 'establishment of an 
interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to 
work with relevant regional. organisations in predictable and reliable partnershi PS., 247 
It is argued that a forrnalis6d division of labour would enable the AU and the UN to 
respond more quickly in a more 'comprehensive manner by building strengths and 
2'9 See chapter four. UN Department of Peacekeeping, LI essons Learnt, Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional OrganizationslArrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested 
Principles andMechanisms, March 1999; UN Press Release GA/10104,21 November, 2002: UN Press Release SC/7724, SC 4739h meeting, II April, 2003; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use 
of Force, supra note, p. 284: 240 See chapter one. 241 Special Committee Report, 2003, paras. 165-9. 242 UN High-level Panel, A More Secure World, supra note 3. 243 Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 4. 244 2005 World Summit Outcome, U. N. Doc A/60/L. I (Sept. 20,2005). 245 Adekeye Adcbabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue ofthe Deaf, supra note 15. 246 ibid. 
247 Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, para 112. 
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compensating for the weaknesses of both types of organisation. 
248 Such a 
formalisation of a division of labour may be achieved by acting on the Secretary 
General's pledge to 'introduce memoranda of understanding between the United 
Nations and individual organisations. 249 Given that the AU and its regional 
mechanism 'possesses a conflict prevention or peacekeeping capacity, these 
memoranda of understanding could place those capacities within the framework of the 
United Nations Standby Arrangement SySteMS., 250 
Furthermore, the formalisation of a relationship that incorporates a division of labour 
may be drawn from the lessons learnt from the UN and ECOWAS collaboration in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. 251 And as the more recent practice in 
Burundi (2003) and Darfur conflicts suggests, 252 due to its proximity to local conflicts, 
the AU may provide the initial pacification of the conflict, and if needed, the 
deployment of a regional peace operation, while the UN flexes its muscle for 
peacebuilding and post-construction functions. 253 Although the formalisation of such 
a system is yet to be devised, it is worth mentioning that the 200S World Summit 
Document urged 'further development of proposals for enhanced rapidly deployable 
capacities, ' including 'an initial operating capability'for a standing police capacity. 254 
With regard to coordination, reliance could be made on the Secretary General's 
pledge to 'invite regional organisations to participate in meetings of the United 
Nations system coordinating bodies, when issues in which they have a particular 
interest are Oiscussed. t 255 Such arrangements would ease the work of the UN Security 
Council, which as shown in chapter seven, has borrowed from the reports referred to 
above, and stressed the benefits of closer cooperation, particularly with African 
248 Benedikt F. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa', supra note 227; lbeo 
Neethling, 'Realising the African Standby Force as a Pan-African Deal: Progress, Prospects and 
Challenges, 'Journal ofMilitary and Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, Issue 1, (2005), pp. 1-25, pg. 15; De 
Coning, 'Refining the African Standby Force Concep4' Conflict Trends. 2 (2004): 22; A. Adebayo & C. 
Landsberg, 'Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa, in A. Adebayo & C. L. Sriram (eds. ), 
ManagingArmed Conflicts in the 21' Centupy, (Frank Cass, London, 2001). 249 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome (2005), paras. 92-93. 250 Ibid at para. 213. 
251 Christine Gray, 'The Use of Force and the International Legal Order', in Malcolm N. Shaw, 
International Law, supra note 206, p. 614. 
" See chapter nine. I 
253 Benedikt F. Franke, 'In Defense of Regional Peace Operations in Africa', supra note 227. ... 2005 World Summit Outcome (2005), pars. 92-93. 
2" Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 4, para. 215 
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regional mechanisms in the maintenance of peace and security. 
256 In this context, it 
deserves to be mentioned that in recent practice, the Council welcomed African peace 
operations led by ECOWAS and the AU in Cote D'Ivoire (2003), 
257 Liberia (2003), 258 
and Burundi (2004) respectively. 259 
Significantly, its July 2007 resolution on Darfur, the Council affirmed that "co- 
operation between the UN and the regional arrangements in matters relating to the 
- maintenance of peace and security is an 
integral part of collective security as provided 
for in the Charter of the United Nations. , 260 More recently, in April 2008, the Council 
also unanimously passed resolution 1809261 which expressed 'its determination to take 
effective steps to further enhance' the relationship with the AU under Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter and 'make more effective its cooperation' with the AU PSC. 
Finally, the newly established Peacebulding Commission deserves consideration, 
particularly given its relationship with the AU, whose regional mechanisms continue 
to adapt themselves to meet the challenges of post-conflict situations. It was 
mentioned earlier that the notion of peace building is an integral component of 
African regional peace and security. 262 It was also shown in chapter seven that the 
AU pSC, 263 which is designated as the 'standing decision-making organ' 264 of the 
Union, consists of the Peace and Security Directoýate that is in turn divided into 
three main divisions. 
This partitioning includes the Peace Support Division that consists of the Operations 
and Support Unit, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee Unit. 
Meanwhile, the Conflict Management Division includes an Early Warning and 
Conflict Management, Resolution and Post-Conflict Unit. It will also be recalled that 
256 E. g SC Res. 1809 (2008) of 16 April 2008. SC Res. 1625 (2005) of 14 September 2005, and SC Res. 
1631 (2005) of 17 October 2005, S/PRST/2004/27 of 20 July 2004, S/PRST/2004/44 of 19 November 
2004, S/PRST/2007nof 28 March 2007, S/PRST/2007/31 of 28 August 2007 and S/PRST/2007/42 of 
6 November 2007; SC Res. 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, SC Res. 1612 (2005) of 26 July 2005 and 
SC Res. 1674 (2006) of 28 April 2006. 
257 SC Res. 1464 (2003), 4 February 2003. 
258 SC Res. 1497 (2003), 1 August, 2003. 
259 SC Res. 1545 (2004), 21 May 2004. 
260 SC Res. 1556 (2004), 30 July, 2004. 
261 SC Res. 1809 (2008) of 16 April 2008. 
262 See chapter seven. See also Musifiky Mwanasali, 'Emerging Security in Architecture in Africa'. 
Policy Studies, Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 7, no. 4, (February 2004), p. 13. 263 Ce=01er6(e), 7 (b) & 14 of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council 264 Article 9 of the 2003 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act. 
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the AU Chairperson, 265 the Panel of the Wise, 266 Regional MechaniSMS, 267 and the 
Affican Standby Force, 268 all possess a wide mandate to promote peace-building and 
post-conflict reconstruction. 269 
3.5 The New Peacebulding Commission: The Need for Further Cooperation 
Given the UN's failure to embark on far reaching institutional reform, the 
establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission at the 2005 World Summit was a 
notable achievement. Although a recent creation, the genesis of the new Commission 
can be traced from as early as 1991 when the Secretary-General's An Agenda for 
Peace considered not only peacekeeping, but also what he termed as 'post-conflict 
peace-building. 2'0 As mentioned earlier, this two tiered policy, embodied in the term 
peace operations, was later picked up by the later UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. 271 Having been carried forward by the Brahimi Report, 272 the idea of a 
Peacebulding Commission was subsequently agreed upon at the 2005 World 
Summit, 273 following a proposal by the UN High Level Panel. 274 
Formed as an intergovernmental body, the Commission is designated to address a gap 
in the UN system by assisting states with the difficult transition from conflict to 
stability and development . 
275 Its mandate is therefore to 'marshal resources at the 
disposal of the international community, to advise and propose integrated strategies 
for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building, 
and sustainable development in countries emerging from conflict. 9 276 It is in this 
context that the Commission's relationship with the AU is crucial, particularly given 
265 Article 10 (2) (c) & 10 (3) (a) of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. 
266 Article 11 (3) &(4). 
267 Article 16 (2). 
268 Article 13 of the 2002. 
269 See MUSifiky Mwanasali, 'Emerging Security in Architecture in Africa', supra note 262. 270Boutros-GhalL An Agendafor Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111,17 June 1992, para. 2 1; Klaus 
Hdfiier, 'Reforming the UN: The Case of the Peacebuilding Commission', Global Policy Forum, 
ýJanuary 2007). 
71 Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programmefor Reform, UN Doc. A/5 1/950,14 July 
1997. See also Prevention of Armed Conflicts, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/55/985- 
S/2001/574,7 June 200 1, paras. 8 1-85. 
272 Brahimi Report of 21 August. 2000, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 3643. 273 General Assembly, Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005, UN Doc. A/60/L. 1,15 
September 2005. 
274 UN High-level, A More Secure World, supra note 3, para. 264. 27S 
276 
Ibidpara. 261. 
SC Res. 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005. 
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the prevalence of African conflicts and the challenges facing regional mechanisms as 
they struggle to adapt themselves to meet the challenges of post-conflict situations. 
Amidst certain reservations, the new institution was created as a subsidiary organ of 
the General Assembl Y277 and the Security Council, 278 under the legal provisions of 
article 22 and 29 of the UN Charter. On its creation, it is worth noting that the AU's 
Common Policy on UN Reform had argued that the Peacebulding Commission should 
not be placed under the authority of the Security Council, due to the fact that the body 
needed to benefit from the contributions of all the major UN organs. 279 Nevertheless, 
it was the issue of cooperation with the UN body that formed the AU's most 
immediate concern. Indeed, the Union's position on the matter went beyond the High 
Level Panel's call for 'predictable and reliable s280 partnership with the UN. Drawing 
from its past experience with regard to legal-political, logistical and financial hurdles, 
the AU specifically called for; 
a promotion of closer cooperation and coordination between General 
Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC, the major Funds and 
Programmes, the UN Specialised Agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the Member States and the Regional Organisations throughout the cycle of 
the conflict. 281 
According to the AU, such a relationship would guarantee a 'harmonious transition 
from conflict management to long-term reconstruction until the danger of instability 
or the threat of resumption of the conflict has diminished. 282 In the end, the Afýican 
proposals were subsequently incorporated in the structure of the new Commission 
whose system of cooperation 'draws together all the relevant U. N. agencies, bilateral 
donors, international financial institutions and relevant government officials., 283 
So far, Sierra Leone and Burundi have been assigned as the first 'clients' to be 
referred to the Commission, in July 2007.284 While it may still be too early to 
277 See GA Res. 60/180 December 30,2005. 
278 See SC Res 1645, (2005), December 20,2005. 
279 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform ofthe United Nations, supra note 9. 280 UN High-level, A More Secure World, supra note 3, para. 112. 281 See the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations, supra note 9. 282 ibid. 
I 283 Gareth Evans, 'Building Peace from Ashes of War', Baltimore Sun, 20 January 2006 284 See United Nations Security Council Document 458, Report of the Peacebuilding Comn-dssion on its first session, A/ 62/ 137- S/2007145 8,25 July 2007. 
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examine with exact clarity as to the direction in which the current system will take, it 
is clear that the issue of funding remains of worrying concern, since the Standing 
285 Peacebuilding Fund will be achieved through voluntary contributions. This in turn 
becomes particularly alarming for the AU given the short time span in which it has 
authorised peace operations. 
It will be recalled from chapter six that immediately after its inception, the AU PSC 
authorized the deployment the AU's first peace operation, the African Union Mission 
in Burundi (AMIB) in February 2003.286 This was closely followed by the 
deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in June 2004 
287 and the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007 . 
288 Finally, in addition 
to the haste, what is clear from this practice is the absence of a single forceful AU 
intervention makes clear the fact that the organisation will primarily be utilised in 
consensual peace operations, as opposed to military intervention. It is with this 
background that the AU's function in the Darfur region consequently falls for close 
examination in the next chapter. 
C: Conclusion 
The turn of the 21" century witnessed the international community's arrival at a 
'historic junction' where a 'significant confluence of interests emerged between the 
center and periphery of the world system. ' 289 The deep differences amongst states 
were visibly manifest during the 2005 World Summit, which provided a rare 
opportunity for world leaders to arrive at a consensus that would fundamentally 
modify the international legal system, to adjust to the demands of the new millennium. 
285 See UN 'Peacebuilding Fund: Terms of Reference', A/60/984,22 August, 2006. 286 See 91 "' Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the ( Organisation of African Unity) Mechanism 
for Conflicf Prevention, management and Resolution, meeting at ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa 
on 2 April 2003 doc Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Conum (XCI). See also Peace and Security Council, 
Second Ordinary Session 25 March 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, PSCtPR/Conununique (11). Further 
see Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Who's Keeping the Peace? Rcgionalization and 
Contemporary Peace Operations, '. International Security 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 157-95. 287 See the Communiqu6 on Conflict Situations in Africa, 26 May 2006, PSCtA1lG1Comm. (X), AU 
PSC I& meeting. See also Status ofMission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and, Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur Area of the Sudan, 4 June 2004. Available 
http: //www. iss. co. za/AF/Profiles/Sudan/darfur/soma. pdf. See also Paul D. Williams, 'Military 
Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan, ' International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2(2006)., ) 2138 'See '69th meeting of the peace and Security Council', Agence de Presse Africaine, 22 January 
2007. 
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In sharp contrast to 1945, when the UN was created, the impact of the 4frican 
Common Policy on UN Reform at the Summit demonstrated that the continent 
undoubtedly possessed a central role to play, if any kind of progressive UN reform is 
to be made. In putting forward its perspectives on the modification of the UN system, 
the AU's recurring theme remained that it was the regional instability and 
underdevelopment, caused by episodes such as Rwanda and Darfur that was most 
pressing for Africa, and not the terrorism phenomenon and other major threats facing 
the developed world. 290 
However, its controversial role in the reform process also enlisted it as an active 
participant of past endeavours aimed at UN's institutional reform, the vast majority of 
which resulted in failure . 
291 As it turned out, although some viewed the achievement 
of the Summit to be a success, 292 others were not so optimistic and argued that 'the 
lifeless corpse of UN reform was dead on arrival by the time world leaders flew into 
the 'big apple. ' s293 Meanwhile, others remained sceptical as to whether the current 
blueprint on reform would have a different fate from that of its predecessors, whose 
majority were 'politely ignored and gather dust on shelves. s294 
The correct picture remains that there were key failures, but I also notable 
achievements during the Summit, some of which deserve mention. Specifically, the 
inability to agree on the reform the Security Council, primarily due to the fact that 
powerful states chose to pursue their national interests, as opposed to strengthening 
peace and security, is a matter of serious regret. This failure is alarming given that 
'today's threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be 
addressed at the global and regional as well as the national 'levels. ' 295 An equally 
290 South African president Thabo Mbeki quoted in Angela Quintal, 'Mbeki sees the Awful Truth: Ile 
UN is but a Charade', The Sunday Independent, 26 September, 2004; Chris Landsberg, 'The UN I ligh. 
Level Reports and Implicationi for Africa', supra note 9. - 291 See B. Fassbender, 'All Illusions Shattered?, ' supra note 12; M. J. Glennon, lWhy the Security Council Failed' supra note 12; Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue of the Deaf, supra note IS, F; 23. Ian Williams, 'Reform or Counterrevolution at the UN?, Foreign Policy in Focus, August 7,2006 293 Adekeye Adebabo, 'Chronicle of A Death Foretold: The Rise and Fall of UN Reform', in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds. ) A Dialogue of the Deaf, supra note 15, p. 1. 294 Jeane-Pierre Co4 Reforming the Security Council: Is There a Hidden Agenda? ', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 20, p. 270. 295 UN High Level Panel Report, A More Secure World, supra note 3. 
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disappointing, but hardly surprising Outcome was the retention of the anachronistic 
power of the veto which stamped the system as the 'new form of global apartheid. )296 
Irrespective of the shortcomings, the international community's recognition of an 
international collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity was of noteworthy 
accomplishment. Furthermore, the Security Council's subsequently endorsement of 
the concept, and the AU's move away from the strict interpretation of sovereignty and 
towards the emphasis on the rights and protection of the individual, 
297 confirms its 
emergence as a nascent international norm. However, the lack of legal standards and 
mechanisms of accountability pose a major problem, as there are currently no 
guarantees that the norm would prevent the veto from being utilised to prevent clear 
and legitimate cases of intervention. 
The overall difficulty with the current debate is that, although there is wide agreement in 
principle with regard to UN reform, there remains deep divisions as to how this is to be 
achieved. For some, rather than 'tinkering at the margins' there ought to be a 'deep- 
seated overhaul of the Charter to bring about a truly rules-based global order suited to 
respond to current global challenges. 298 Meanwhile, others argue that the quýestion of 
institutional reform of the UN focuses too much attention on Council and not enough on 
other issues. 299 From this perspective, less effort should be made on institutional reform 
and more attention ought to be given to substantive issues of concern, so as to avoid 
'300 
modest proposals from being 'drowned in the uproar of a fruitless institutional debate. 
Finally, some forcefully argue that reform of the UN requires innovation, such as that 
296 Chris Landsberg, 'The UN High-Level Reports and Implications for Africa', supra note 9. 
297 Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, 'Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying 
Humanitarian Intervention, ' Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992), p. 95; Ramesh Thakur, 'Global 
Norms and International Humanitarian Law: An Asian Perspective, ' International Review of the Red 
Cross 83, no. 841 (March 2001), p. 35; Adekeye Adebajo, 'Collective Security and Humanitarian 
Intervention', United Nations H United Nations Foundation H United Nations and Global Security 
(2004) available at www. un-globalsecurity. org/ pdVAdebajo_paper hum intervention. pdE 298 Chris Landsberg, 'The UN High-Level Reports and Impýication; fbr iffical, supra note 9. 299 Jean- Pierre Cot, 'Reforming the Security Council: Is There a Hidden Agenda? ', in Niels Dlokker 
and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the VsiqfForce, supra note 20, p. 279; Adekeye 
Adebajo, 'UN Reform Needs an African Perspective, Mail & Guardian, 23 May 2005. Available at http-//www. globalpolicy. org/reform/initiatives/annan/2005/0523african. htrm 300 Jean- Pierre Cot, 'Reforming the Security Council: Is There a Hidden Agenda? ', in Niels Blokker 
and Nico Schrijver, The Security Council and the Use ofForce, supra note 20, p. 277. 
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provided by 'outside competition,, through multilateral treaties. 301 Nevertheless, in spite 
of the lack of consensus on how best to achieve the objectives, the issue of UN reform. is 
ta glass at least half-full, 302 and remains 'a process andnot an event. ' 303 
Meanwhile, the inveterate theme with regard to how the AU and UN can better their 
relationship in order to promote and maintain peace and stability remains ongoing. 
Important questions remain in regard to their decision making as well as the course of 
action to be taken, and by whom, during circumstances that call for action. Despite 
their complimentary nature, the huge gap between AU's and LTN's formal recognition 
and implementation of their adopted principles remains the greatest , 
challenge. 304 in 
this context, there is a pressing need to formalise a division of labour that sets out the 
legal, operational and financial details in , 
order to create a synergy between their 
respective institutions, particularly in the area of peace' operatioýs. 305 
Moreover, a well defined and structured relationship between the AU and UN would 
also go a long way in guaranteeing what the 2005 Summit termed as a 'culture of 
organizational accountability, transparency, and integnty. ' 306 Although the foregoing 
chapters have showed the numerous problems in regard to the AU's internal structure 
and its relationship with the UN, the emerging practice between the two organisations 
portray important developments, in the promotion and maintenance of regional and 
international peace and security. It is within this context that the Darfur conflict, 
discussed in the next chapter, provides useful insights in regard t6the direction that 
the cooperation between the UN and the AU may take in developing regional and 
universal norms that are essential for peace and security. 
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